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Abstract
This dissertation examines the influence of vernacular suburban architectural and
neighborhood design on new inner-city housing developments in Detroit,
Michigan, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The central research hypothesis of
the dissertation is that the widespread pastoral ideal of American culture is acting
in concert with the weak land market of inner cities to produce a reshaping of
these places in the image of the American vernacular suburb. I call this shift
inner-city suburbanization.
This dissertation offers a needed new perspective on the study of American
urban revitalization. Most current debate concentrates on the alleviation of
economic and social problems in inner cities, a focus which leaves the physical
dimensions of the situation underexamined, while urban design theory advocates
a different physical vision from that which many distressed urban neighborhoods
are actually experiencing. The result has been a lacuna of academic research on
the form of inner cities while significant decisions are being made in the world of
practice. This dissertation attempts to bring these two worlds closer together.
The dissertation begins with an introduction that frames the central research
questions of the study. It continues with a review of the role of the suburb, the
inner city, and of low-income housing in the history of American urbanism in
Chapter Two. Chapter Three provides operational definitions of vernacular
suburbia and of the process of inner-city suburbanization to produce a
suburbanization index. In Chapter Four case cities are selected and case
neighborhoods are selected within these cities. The index is then applied to new
developments in the case cities to produce a portrait of the inner-city
suburbanization process there. Chapter Five investigates the causality of inner-
city suburbanization by examining the histories of three developments in each
city in more detail. Chapter Six concludes by discussing the significance of the
phenomenon, the dilemmas that it raises for design and planning professionals,
and the prospects for future research. The study includes two appendices with
additional data.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence J. Vale
Title: Department Head and Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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... I drive and then I take... say, all Third Avenue, and then you see
all these buildings are burned, and you see the people on the
streets, and sometimes just seeing some neighborhoods, you feel
depressing... and then when I come to my house, it's so different.
It's just like living in Long Island.
- Resident of Charlotte Gardens, Bronx, NY, quoted in Plunz
(1990)

Chapter One
Introduction
Charlotte Gardens: an inner-city suburb
In October of 1986, the first homes in a new single-family subdivision called
Charlotte Gardens went on sale. Neither pretentiously oversized nor unworkably
miniscule, the new houses were perfect for the aspiring working-class families
moving into the neighborhood. With their sizeable front and back yards, the new
houses offered both privacy and room for expansion with features like swimming
pools and rear decks. And while the new homes did not have their own garages,
there was plenty of room in the side yard for one or two cars to be safely parked
off the street. At a cost of only $55,000 per unit, the houses of Charlotte Gardens
were a bargain, especially in the overheated housing market of the 1980's. All 89
houses were quickly snapped up, and the new neighborhood was on its way.
Fifteen years later, Charlotte Gardens had fulfilled the promise of its optimistic
early days. Planning professionals surveying the neighborhood saw " ... a prim
neighborhood of shady trees and manicured lawns, lace curtains, sprinklers, and
gardens, neighbors walking their dogs and baby strollers coursing along smooth
sidewalks..." (Grogan and Proscio 2000). In short, the planners saw a successful
suburban neighborhood. From their description, one may infer that they
associated many positive values with this type of environment. The planners
appreciated that Charlotte Gardens was a peaceful, quiet neighborhood. It also
appeared to be a safe, supportive neighborhood in which to raise a family, and it
was a place that was valued, and consequently well-maintained, by its
homeowners. In its manifestation of these values Charlotte Gardens was
seemingly little different from thousands of other suburban neighborhoods across
the United States.
Although a visitor dropped in the middle of Charlotte Gardens might be expected
to think initially that he or she was in a typical suburban community, a short walk
in any direction would quickly divest our visitor of this notion. To the west, the
visitor would find a large park whose shoddy maintenance and litter are telltale
signs of big-city problems, not suburban idyll. To the east, a walk of a few blocks
would lead our visitor not to a suburban highway, but to the rumbling
superstructure of an elevated subway line. And on all sides, the visitor would find
the peaceful houses of Charlotte Gardens surrounded by bulky apartment
buildings which one would never expect to find in the suburbs. The seemingly
suburban community of Charlotte Gardens is located in the inner city, not the
suburbs. Charlotte Gardens is a paradoxical development, an inner-city suburb.
A writer describing suburban decline asked readers to "picture the South Bronx,
circa the late 1970's, transplanted to the leafy suburbs". (Lindgren 1995). What
the writer failed to note is that precisely the opposite transplant has already
occurred: the South Bronx is now in part composed of leafy suburbs.
Although it is similar to a typical suburb in appearance, Charlotte Gardens also
differs in many ways. Most importantly, it is located in the heart of the South
Bronx, an inner-city neighborhood which was once one of New York City's most
troubled and one which became a national symbol of urban blight. This rather
ordinary neighborhood of single-family houses, which would be so typical in the
suburbs that it would be beneath notice, is a bizarre anomaly in the dense, if
somewhat decayed, urban fabric of the South Bronx. Charlotte Gardens's design
is unique not for any inherent distinctiveness but because of its spatial location in
an environment where suburban housing and neighborhood design would not be
generally expected.
Charlotte Gardens also differs demographically from typical suburbs. The
majority of American suburbs are inhabited by whites, many of whom relocated
there from neighborhoods in older cities in a vast population shift that began in
large numbers after World War Il and continued into the 1970s. The South Bronx,
once an immigrant European neighborhood, became almost entirely Puerto
Rican and African-American during this period. In keeping with the ethnic
makeup of its surroundings, Charlotte Gardens is a Hispanic development,
whose working-class homeowners appear to enjoy their ranch homes and leafy
yards as much as their white counterparts might in Long Island.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Charlotte Gardens is a bucolic suburban environment (left)... which is
surrounded by dilapidated tenement neighborhoods (right). It is a new type of development... an
inner-city suburb.
As one might expect, Charlotte Gardens is also far from typical in the way in
which it was developed. Most suburban subdivisions are built on 'greenfield' sites
that were undeveloped before they were built up with housing. Charlotte Gardens
had been densely built up with rowhouses and apartments by the end of the 19th
century, but its land became available once again by the end of the 1970's
through the process of neighborhood decline. The abandonment and arson of
many buildings in the South Bronx became a matter of almost national shame
during the 1970s, and the redevelopment of hard-hit areas like Charlotte
Gardens became a public relations priority for New York City's government. As
one of the first redevelopments, Charlotte Gardens was constructed as a
municpal vote of confidence in the future of the South Bronx. Ironically, its
creation was directed by Edward Logue, a leader of previous 'urban renewal'
movements designed to eradicte urban blight in the 1950s and 1960s. The form
of Charlotte Gardens was useful for both functional and symbolic reasons.
Functionally, it was extremely cheap- its houses were prefabricated, could be
trucked to the site almost intact, and could be quickly assembled (Plunz 1990).
Charlotte Gardens could never have been constructed independently of local real
estate conditions. Land values in the neighborhood had dropped substantially, so
assembly and rebuilding by the city was relatively inexpensive, although it took
the action of a special authority headed by Logue to accomplish development.
Symbolically, a neighborhood of new single-family houses was the strongest
possible visual countermeasure to the bleak landscape of decaying tenements
that it replaced. Such a landscape, was proposed half-seriously by Robert A.M.
Stern in a project prepared for the 1976 Venice Biennale (Stern and Massengale
1981: 92). Stern called this project the "subway suburb", and described it as
(an) uncharacteristic way to develop the land in blighted, marginal
areas of the city... accommodating the automobile in the new
development (and) provid(ing) housing at the densities of new
moderate-priced suburban development in the outlying area...
The decline of the South Bronx did not last forever. Although its population has
not recovered, the Bronx is no longer losing population- it has stabilized at a new,
lower level. It has seemingly permanently dedensified, and this dedensification
has been physically encoded in the new housing developments which have been
built there. Land values have to some degree recovered, and the extremely low-
density experiment of Charlotte Gardens has not been repeated elsewhere in the
Bronx. Multistory apartments, however, are also a thing of the past. In the 1870s,
the South Bronx was first built up with row houses, and a hundred and thirty
years later, the rowhouse has returned as the housing typology of choice in
nearby neighborhoods like Mott Haven, Melrose, and East Tremont. Each
rowhouse provides a small back yard and front yard, the latter of which is often
used for parking the family car.
The puzzle of inner-city suburbanization
I first heard the Charlotte Gardens story in the early 1990s when I was an
architecture student and urban planning intern in New York City. The
development was not only surprising to me, it was also somewhat horrifying. Why
would a city encourage such low-density housing in such an urban area, three
blocks from a major subway line? Was the suburban design paradigm so
dominant that it was the only conceivable future for blighted urban
neighborhoods? How many other Charlotte Gardens were being constructed? At
the same time, I recognized that Charlotte Gardens, despite its, to me,
problematic form, represented an advance over the rubble-strewn lots and
burned-out tenements of the 1970s. It was certainly better than nothing. The
question was, how much better?
As I gained experience of other cities the example of Charlotte Gardens began to
seem less and less anomalous. Stern's polemical prediction seemed to be
coming true in cities across the United States. In Buffalo, I saw new tracts of
single-family homes being built along the major avenues leading into the city's
downtown. In Philadelphia, I saw freestanding twin houses built on cul-de-sacs
replacing dense row house neighborhoods a short walk from a major subway
line. In Camden, the hard-hit industrial city across the river from Philadelphia, I
saw an urban waterfront revitalization project consisting of condominiums
surrounded by parking and fenced off from the rest of the city. In Cleveland, I
saw suburban-style 'tract mansions' selling for hundreds of thousands of dollars
abutting the empty lots of that city's Hough neighborhood. In Detroit, perhaps the
city in America hardest-hit by urban decline, I saw almost unbelievable
subdivisions of single-family homes occupying self-contained suburban
superblocks amidst the mostly vacant blocks of former city neighborhoods.
Across the Northeast and Midwest of the United States, in the hardest-hit
neighborhoods of declining industrial cities, I saw a new urban housing paradigm
emerging: something which I called the inner city suburb. I decided to make the
exploration of this phenomenon, which I called inner-city suburbanization, the
subject of my dissertation.
At first the phenomenon appeared to be quite simple. I saw the application of
suburban design standards, both architectural and urbanistic, being applied to
new housing developments in declining cities. But the more I looked at this
phenomenon, the more complicated it began to appear. Not all declining cities
were experiencing suburbanization; Boston, for example, had experienced much
neighborhood decline but had rebuilt these neighborhoods in a relatively dense
manner that did not appear to be very suburban. Nor were all the housing
developments in declining cities being rebuilt in a suburban manner. Philadelphia
had a downtown so dense and prosperous that it was difficult to imagine inner-
city suburbanization occurring only a few blocks away. Even in Detroit, a
development of urban row houses was being constructed adjacent to the
downtown. Finally, many cities, especially smaller ones, had residential
neighborhoods near their downtowns that were rather suburban in appearance to
begin with. Even New York City had never replicated the Levittown-like
appearance of Charlotte Gardens. It was clear that inner-city suburbanization
was not a universal phenomenon; otherwise, it could hardly have escaped notice
to the degree that I saw that it had. But nevertheless, its occurrence in many
cities indicated that it was a significant force in these places and one that was
therefore worthy of future investigation.
Inner-city suburbanization was puzzling to me for another reason. How was I to
interpret this phenomenon? My reaction to Charlotte Gardens had been, overall,
quite negative. In other cities, however, my opinions were altered. The incredibly
bleak landscapes of Camden and Detroit far outmatched the South Bronx in their
poverty, desperation, and physical decay; could one justifiably criticize any new
housing development in these tormented places? And yet my urbanistic instincts
were still troubled, even in the most desperate places. How could a gated
development, forever isolated from its surroundings and blocking off access to
the water, possibly be viewed as a contributory gesture to revitalization? Even if
these developments were considered to be good examples of revitalization on
paper, they were, at the least, poor urban design. I found that inner-city
suburbanization troubled me not only because of its design but because of the
conflicting instincts that it aroused in me as someone who considered himself to
be an architect, urban planner, and perhaps above all an urban designer. I
recognized that many of these developments were conceived in a spirit of
optimism toward the city; that they were probably inhabited by people who valued
their homes and perhaps their neighborhood; that they replaced areas that had
been, in all likelihood, derelict wastelands. Yet I had difficulty reconciling the built
product of these processes with my ideals of what an urban neighborhood should
look like. The ambiguity of inner-city suburbanization, more than anything else,
argued for further study of this phenomenon, not only as an examination of the
possible future form of blighted American inner-city neighborhoods, but as an
examination of the professional values being applied to urban revitalization by
the professions most involved in its design and implementation.
Finally, I found that where I would expect to find a substantial literature on inner-
city suburbanization, I found very little. Although urban decline and revitalization
were widely covered, much of this literature dealt with areas that were either
temporally or spatially- distinct from the developments that I was seeing. Much of
the literature on revitalization dealt with the urban renewal movement which had
ended in the 1970s, and with the Modernist projects that had been constructed
during that period. The housing that I was observing had all been constructed
during the 1990's and was therefore not treated by this literature. There was also
a substantial literature on public housing revitalization because of the major
Federal HOPE VI program in this area during the 1990's (see HUD 2000a for an
overview of this program), but the projects that I was observing were not public
housing, nor were they built according to the design principles advocated by that
literature. There was also a substantial literature in existence about the
community development corporation movement, a decentralized housing
production mechanism that had grown up in the wake of urban renewal, but this
literature studied the organizational and policy aspects of the movement rather
than analyzing the physical output of the organizations.
Why was there so little discussion of inner city suburbanization? I concluded that
part of the reason lay in the nature of the housing being constructed. The
housing that I saw was not being built by any one major government program like
urban renewal or HOPE VI. While much of the new housing that I saw was
subsidized, the funding sources were diverse and the projects were often
initiated at the city level. In addition, some of the housing that I was seeing
involved private financing. The housing was thus the result of a diverse set of
programs and was therefore not being studied by those interested in specific
urban revitalization policies. The design of these projects was generally
mundane. None of the projects that I saw were of particular architectural interest.
While they excited my notice because of their anomalous location and because
of their particular spatial configurations, I recognized that, much like the majority
of vernacular suburban development, they were uninteresting to design theorists.
Thus, a gap in interests had led a lack of research in the literature. Most scholars
interested in the inner city were not particularly interested in design, and most
scholars interested in design were not particularly interested in the inner city. The
major intersection of those two areas was perceived as being in the area of
public housing revitalization, an area which was both the result of a single
Federal policy (HOPE VI) and which conformed to a popular design ideology
among urban designers (New Urbanism). Despite the lack of coverage of the
phenomenon that I perceived in the literature, my personal experience led me to
believe inner-city suburbanization was more prevalent than the literature would
lead one to expect, and that it was worthy of further exploration.
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is therefore that the neighborhood
transformation of Charlotte Gardens is far from unique. Rather, this dissertation
hypothesizes that the inner-city suburbanization manifested by that development
heralds other similar transformations that are currently occurring in troubled
urban neighborhoods of declining cities across the United States. Many older
American cities have been losing population for decades, and most of these
cities have experienced net losses of housing in tandem with their population
losses. The results, seen in hollowed-out cities across the northeastern and
midwestern United States, are neighborhoods with thousands of vacant houses
and lots. Cities like Philadelphia and St. Louis have neither the economic
resilience nor the population influxes of New York, and their decline has been
correspondingly harsher and more persistent. What will be the physical fates of
these cities' hard-hit neighborhoods? This dissertation explores those physical
shifts occurring in redeveloping inner-city neighborhoods in declining cities
toward neighborhood and housing forms that emulate a suburban model.
Background
At its heart, the suburbanization process is a product of urban decline. Urban
decline is perhaps the most troublesome face of the deindustrialization process
which has relocated or closed thousands of firms and jobs in America's older
cities. This process has been most severe since the end of the Second World
War. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this process has almost
ceased. In many cities, the great majority of industrial establishments have
already closed or relocated. With the closure of the factories, the retail and
housing that once supported and housed factory workers have become
superfluous. In the majority of older cities, despite the transformation to a
service-based economy, there are no longer sufficient jobs for the inhabitants of
the poorest neighborhoods. Many cities are receiving new immigrants, but this
influx is highly variable, and so many older cities' poorest neighborhoods are
slowly but inexorably depopulating.
In some cases urban depopulation has been advantageous. Many inner-city
houses were densely and cheaply built with housing that at best was exploitative
and that at worst was miserable. Few other American cities had the incredible
crowding of New York City's tenements, but they each had their own versions of
squalor. In Boston, three-apartment 'triple-deckers' crowded families of six or
more in each apartment. In Chicago, cheap wooden single-family houses were
packed as tightly as they could be built, with minimal outdoor space. Uncrowding
these neighborhoods was a major concern of early housing reformers, and in
many cases, population decline is the sign that these goals are being
accomplished.
Other poor neighborhoods have experienced a different sort of depopulation. As
inner city residents in poor neighborhoods have left, their houses have been
abandoned, often by landlords unable to rerent the apartment at a high enough
rent to provide a financial return. In a seemingly unstoppable sequence of
degradation, these houses, once empty, have fallen easy prey to vandals and
arsonists. Their depredations have quickly transformed once-habitable houses
into stripped, burned-out shells. Entire inner-city neighborhoods have been
degraded by this process, leaving only those residents too old, too poor, or too
attached to relocate.
Inner cities are perceived as frightening places. The stereotype of an inner-city
neighborhood is one of shabby or abandoned houses, with shattered windows
gaping, graffiti covering the walls, and potentially hostile youth gathered at street
corners. A sense of menace is palpable, and the average American does not
linger long in such a place. While some inner city environments are indeed like
this, the reality in many American cities is exactly the opposite. Many American
inner cities are peaceful places. Most of their houses are gone, collapsed or
burned and then demolished by the city. Their foundations have been filled and
planted with grass, which is neatly mowed. Trees once confined to back yards
flourish in the new open spaces. Remaining city streets, often crumbling, cut
across wide expanses of green. Signs of human habitation are few, except for
the occasional resident cutting across the fields to a remaining house. In their
emptiness, America's inner cities are increasingly coming to resemble the open
spaces that we usually associate with the urban fringe.
The openness of these neighborhoods makes them fertile ground for new
development. Close to the central business district, the locations of these
neighborhoods are considered advantageous by potential residents who are not
deterred by the often disturbing surroundings. There is little demand for space,
and property prices are consequently lower than other parts of the city- or the
suburbs. Having watched so many of these neighborhoods decline, city
governments are often eager to facilitate redevelopment, to the extent that heavy
subsidies for development are often possible. And despite the loss of large-scale
federal funding for redevelopment, a host of new nonprofit development agencies
focused on housing have proved extremely competent at producing tens of new
housing units per organization per year. In short, despite the long-term economic
change, abandonment and decay that has laid them low, many of America's
inner city neighborhoods seem poised at the edge of a new era of
redevelopment. As in the South Bronx, the old is making way for the new.
Figure 1.3. Amidst the blighted urban landscapes of cities like Detroit, empty blocks that once
held houses are making way for new, suburban-style developments. The photograph above
shows empty blocks in the upper left adjoining new developments in the right and lower center.
As we saw in the South Bronx, however, these redeveloping inner city
neighborhoods are not necessarily reassuming their old form. Instead, the design
not only of many new houses but of many entire new neighborhoods is reflecting
a changed vision of the inner city. Tracts of single-family homes reflect both a
resident interest in homeownership and the influence of funding mechanisms that
encourage the production of such housing. More generous house lots reflect
residents' concern for privacy, security, and parking space in an era when urban
public transportation has declined and automobile ownership is often essential
for getting to work. Where multifamily housing is built, it often reflects the same
generous space standards, with large yards and parking lots. New open spaces,
be they playgrounds, community gardens, or traditional parks, reflect amenities,
sometimes originally created through decline, that are appreciated by residents
and that also reflect an effort to improve upon the mediocre open space
standards of the original neighborhoods. Redesigned streets reflect a desire for
increased privacy or for separation from the dilapidated context of surrounding
neighborhoods.
Although the historic neighborhood form of America's declining inner cities are
diverse, ranging from freestanding wooden houses in Cleveland to, brick
iowhousos in Baltimore to multistory apartments in New York, these
neighborhoods are experiencing a common transformation. Through all of those
urban design shifts previously described, America's redeveloping inner city
neighborhoods are emulating a lower-.density, even suburban neighborhood
model. Familiar to all Americans, residential suburban neighborhoods are the
Often homogenous tracts of single-family housing, or increasingly of attached
condominiums or garden apartments, that occupy the perimeter areas of
American cities. These houses share several inportant characteristics. Suburban
houses, even if built relatively densely, are always designed to provide private
outdoor space, almost always including a front and back yard, as well as off-
street parking for one or more cars. This parking is mandatory because
automobile transportation is dominant in the suburbs, often to the exclusion of all
other forms. The neighborhood design of suburbia reflects this orientation toward
the car with residential subdivisions that difficult to navigate on foot, both
because they are large in scale and because wide, curving suburban streets
facilitate automobile passage. The resulting suburban neighborhoods are
segregated from each other as well as from other land uses. Shops, offices, and
industries are located across pedestrian-hostile roads or are widely separated
from residential areas. Interchange between the different components of the
suburbs is only by automobile.
Although suburbs have been constructed around American cities since at least
the middle of the nineteenth century, those that are most familiar, and that have
established the popular vision of the suburb, are the suburban tracts that were
built in large numbers beginning after World War II. The construction of these
tracts coincided with large-scale automobile ownership, the availability of
financing mechanisms which made suburbia affordable to most middle-class
Americans, and the development of a massive homebuilding industry dedicated
to providing every American household with a single-family home. Although there
have been some modifications to both the suburban neighborhood and the
suburban house since 1950, the basic principle of a dwelling surrounded by
green and accessible by car has persisted both in the public mind and in the
reality of the suburban landscape. It is this suburban image that the new inner
city is seeking to emulate through the inner city suburbanization process, and it is
the postwar suburb that this study will therefore refer to as 'the suburb'.
The housing and neighborhood features of suburbia are extremely common, in
large part because they are popular with millions of Americans, especially those
with young children to raise. Other features of suburbia not visible in its physical
design offer advantages equally as valuable as the peace and quiet of its
residential neighborhoods. Suburbs are often politically independent of their core
city, and as such they regulate their own land uses as well as provide their own
local services like police, libraries, and most importantly, schools. The political
structure of suburbia offers a relatively fail-safe guarantee of safe, stable,
functional school districts, as well as the likelihood of growing property values.
These protections are essential commodities in a society where most cities are
no longer able to offer adequate school systems and where rising housing values
are an essential means of gaining equity for homeowners.
Inner-city suburbanization: good or bad?
One can see that the values of suburbs fall into at least two categories. The first
comprises the inherent physical qualities of suburbs as places which offer,
among other features, peace and quiet, green space, and adequate parking. The
second comprises the superior public, or social, services that suburbs offer,
schools and land use control being perhaps the most important. Whether the tail
is wagging the dog or vice versa, these two sets of values, physical and social,
are closely associated and doubtless both contribute to the popular public image
of the suburban environment in the United States.
These values indicate the advantages that could be perceived in the
suburbanization of the inner city. If substantially transformed, urban
neighborhoods can offer most of the physical advantages of the suburbs plus a
few of their own. Streets can be closed and changed into cul-de-sacs, housing
can be rebuilt at lower densities, new open spaces can be created- and these
neighborhoods, unlike suburban ones, are convenient to the central city. If
sufficiently isolated from their problematic context, the disadvantageous location
of inner city neighborhoods is thereby transformed into an advantageous one-
dependent, of course, upon the continued vitality of the central city. Automobile
access is essential in buffering inhabitants of new developments from the often
dysfunctional inner city neighborhoods surrounding the development.
The social values of suburban environments are more difficult for inner cities to
emulate through environmental transformation. Though altered in form,
suburbanized inner city neighborhoods remain part of their central city, and
consequently are unable to develop local services on a level to compete with
suburban municipalities. The same demographic trends, however, that are
benefiting gentrifying urban neighborhoods might also benefit a suburbanizing
inner city neighborhood. Many urban families either do not have children or pay
for private school education, and they can therefore forego participating in the
generally problematic public school systems. In addition, increasing numbers of
middle-class residents are members of racial minority groups. Middle-class
African-Americans and Hispanics, like their white counterparts, value the
amenities of suburban housing and can also afford them, but may feel more
comfortable than a typical white household in purchasing property in an inner-city
location whose neighborhoods are inhabited mainly by racial minorities.
Inner city suburbanization appears to offer both benefits and disadvantages. As
previously indicated, inner-city suburban neighborhoods are quite pleasant
places. Many new inner city neighborhoods, like Charlotte Gardens, are stable
and well-maintained environments that bear no resemblance to the desolate,
abandoned neighborhoods that they replaced. Filled with new residents who are
proud of their homes, America's new revitalized inner-city neighborhoods can be
seen as bright spots amidst the troubled landscape of urban decline and
disinvestment.
At the same time, an observer can find much to critique in the suburbanization of
the inner city. The new architecture of these neighborhoods is often dissimilar to
its context, and even to the most casual observer, does not seem to 'fit' with
surrounding neighborhoods. Altered street systems prevent easy pedestrian
passage through the new neighborhoods, isolating them from their surroundings.
While this isolation may be desired by residents, street reconfigurations inhibit
future connections to restored surrounding neighborhoods. Although mass transit
networks in inner cities are often poor, encouraging automobile ownership might
be perceived as a destructive policy for the survival or restoration of mass transit
in inner city neighborhoods.
These competing qualities make inner city suburbanization a compelling subject
for study. Suburbs are clearly popular environments, yet they are often criticized
as monotonous, designed for a single type of user and inhospitable to the needs
of older or younger inhabitants. The required automobile access of suburbia is
convenient for most, but not all users, and widespread automobile use causes
heavy traffic, leading both to quality-of-life and environmental problems. Placed
as they are within the physical context of a declining urban neighborhood, inner
city suburban developments avoid some of the problems of suburban
developments while replicating others. They also raise serious questions as a
function of their location within cities. While suburbs often have no alternative to
mass transit except the private car, cities usually have existing transit networks
whose usage is hardly encouraged by the development of automobile-dependent
housing. Urban neighborhoods are often varied, pedestrian-friendly places, with
small blocks, local retail uses, and streets that are pleasant and interesting to
walk on. These urban environmental qualities are absent in the self-contained,
automobile-oriented housing developments of inner city suburbia. Isolated from
nearby neighborhoods, inner-city suburbs may therefore fail to contribute to the
revitalization of their surrounding blocks.
At the same time, the development of suburban housing in inner cities offers new
opportunities for residents of inner-city neighborhoods. New housing in inner
cities is often subsidized, therefore making it affordable to residents who would
be unable to relocated to the suburbs. Amenities like lawns and off-street parking
are often almost unknown, especially in the dense rowhouse neighborhoods of
many older cities, and their provision in new housing is therefore likely to be
welcomed. Nor should the economic and symbolic value of an owned single-
family house be underestimated. The financial benefits accruing to homeowners
through mortgage income tax deductions, and the pride of owning property,
thereby participating in the ideal of the 'American dream', are doubtless
substantial for residents who have not been able to consider ownership before.
Cities, too, benefit from the physical and symbolic reoccupation of derelict land
with stable communities. If these communities are inhabited by middle-class
homeowners, so much the better, for it is precisely these types of residents which
cities have lost in large numbers and whose return is often cited as necessary for
the eventual revitalization of declining cities. One might therefore expect cities to
welcome the development of new housing communities in derelict inner cities
irrespective of their form.
Planners, architects, and inner-city suburbanization
At another level, the ambiguity of inner city suburban development can be seen
as a function of the value systems used to evaluate the phenomenon. Assessing
whether inner city suburbanization is 'good' or 'bad' necessitates an evaluator's
application of certain normative values to the phenomenon in order to reach a
judgment. While investigating the extent and future prospects for inner city
suburbanization is one major motivation for this dissertation, a second is the
recognition that any evaluation of this phenomenon is complicated by the
contrasting value systems of the two professions of urban planning and
architecture that play major roles in the design and creation of urban space. The
differing value systems of these two professions are united in the field of urban
design, which this study views as a profession that incorporates values from both
urban planning and architecture. Although the combined value system of urban
design is perhaps the one best equipped for evaluating the suburbanization of
the inner city, it is also responsible for reconciling the differing value systems of
the professions from which it is derived.
Urban planning is not a particularly judgmental profession. A central tenet of
current urban planning theory and practice is the valuation and even prioritization
of resident wishes in the planning process over those of the planner. As a
planner coordinating the production of a Chicago regional plan recently said, "We
will have an open and democratic planning process... the citizens themselves will
shape the plan." (Mamoser 2002) Some planning theorists go so far as to
downplay any normative role at all for the planner in favor of a mediator role. If
we allow for the above values to define the planner's value system, how might a
planning professional following these values evaluate inner city suburbanization?
Assuming that inner city suburbanization is both a product of neighborhood
resident desires and is appreciated by development residents post-construction,
a planner would be expected to evaluate it positively. If, however, resident
interpretations of inner city suburbanization were to be more ambiguous, for
example if some residents were to resent a development while others favored it,
the planner would then be placed in a mediator role between these factions, and
his or her evaluation might therefore be neutral. This ambiguity is often required
of planners involved in typical greenfield suburban development, where one
group of residents might advocate change while another resents the loss of
existing open space and the increased traffic that new development would bring.
Inner city neighborhoods are environments with substantial negative indicators
and one might therefore expect both a greater public sentiment for change and
an advocacy for this type of development on the part of many planners.
Though urban planning theory supports the advocacy and mediation of
neighborhood resident desires, in practice the profession has not entirely
sacrificed a normative stance on development form. Another regional planning
organization in Chicago, which presents development alternatives "to enable
people to see what can occur if we make particular choices", already believes
that continued suburban growth will lead to future problems like suburban decline
and traffic congestion (Mamoser 2002). This indicates that the planners are likely
to be providing development alternatives in a less than perfectly impartial
manner. One general sentiment popular among many planners, manifested most
recently as the smart growth movement, advocates among other things the
concentration of new greenfield development in order to preserve existing open
spaces. In cities, smart growth favors the reuse of existing urban or 'brownfield'
sites for new development. While planning values like the preservation of open
space dovetail neatly with the popular desires like environmental preservation,
other values, such as concentration of development, are not necessarily as
popular with the public. The planning profession therefore confronts the
possibility of internal value conflicts in its responsibility to the public versus its
own normative values. The possibility therefore exists that the phenomenon of
inner city suburbanization, even if it conforms with resident desires, may not be
evaluated positively by some urban planners.
The profession of architecture differs from the planning profession in that its
normative values are much stronger. As designers, most architects have a
normative stance on design. Architects may not all agree which type of
architectural design is most appropriate for a project, but few architects would
say that they have no preference whatsoever. These preferences, however, are
often very contentious. A major dialogue in architectural theory during the
twentieth century has been between advocates of abstract, or modern design,
versus those of representational, or historicist design. While both schools of
thought have achieved a high level of recognition amongst theorists, architectural
practice has been a different matter. Residential architecture in the United States
has been dominated by vernacular practice, which has tended to heavily favor
historicist styles of a fairly uniform type. This vernacular suburban architecture
has met with dismissal on the part of many architectural theorists, who dislike the
reductivist and conservative design of most vernacular suburban buildings and
therefore ignore them. The majority of vernacular suburbia is not even designed
by architects (Dunham-Jones 2000). Some architects, such as Robert Venturi,
have embraced the vernacular, attempting to incorporate vernacular features into
their designs. As inner city suburban architecture shares many design features
with vernacular suburban architecture, one would expect many architectural
theorists to have little interest in this type of design. This disinterest, in fact, is
likely to have contributed to the paucity of literature treating suburban
development.
Urban design, as has been previously mentioned, is a field which can be
considered a hybrid between urban planning and architecture. Urban designers
are concerned with design at a scale larger than that of the individual building.
This concern can take the form of an interest in the design of public space, in the
design of neighborhoods, in the design of a city block, or in the design of an
entire city. While urban designers, like architects, are responsible for developing
designs and therefore must have something of a normative stance on design, the
larger scale of the design being constructed means that the public generally
plays a substantial role in the design process as well, and that consideration of
the public benefit to be derived from a project is important. Urban designers must
therefore strike a balance between the wishes of the client, their own beliefs as
designers, and the beliefs of the greater public who will be impacted by the
design.
Because of its partial inheritance from architecture, urban design has maintained
a stronger normative stance than the planning profession. The most persuasive
normative recent theory in urban design has combined elements of both urban
planning and architecture. This movement, known as the New Urbanism,
generally advocates both the concentration espoused by planners and the
historicist architecture advocated by a minority of architectural theorists. It also
completely rejects both the realized design of vernacular suburbia as well as the
bureaucratic standards that essentially require its construction. At a larger scale,
New Urbanists believe that sprawl is "essentially self-destructive... it consumes
land at an alarming rate, producing insurmountable traffic problems and
exacerbating social inequity and isolation." (Duany et. al. 2000). The architectural
design of vernacular suburbia is also rejected. The formal vision of the New
Urbanism has been realized in a series of constructed projects, which have
created walkable residential communities, albeit in locations that are often
remote from urban centers. New Urbanist design principles have also been
applied to the redevelopment of public housing projects across the United States
that were originally built according to Modernist design principles. While not all
urban designers espouse all of the principles of New Urbanism, few argue with
the movement's vision for residential neighborhoods which are denser, more
walkable, and contextual with their surroundings. One might therefore expect
many urban designers to reject the prospect of inner city suburban development,
which negates many of the features of urban neighborhoods in favor of the
vernacular suburban model rejected by the New Urbanists.
As someone who considers himself an urban designer, I naturally felt substantial
ambivalence about the phenomenon of inner city suburbanization. Although this
dissertation is primarily intended as an effort to describe the nature, extent, and
causality of this phenomenon, it is also intended to explore the dimensions of the
conflicting values that make a single interpretation of the phenomenon of inner
city suburbanization impossible from an urban designer's perspective. Below I
describe the structure of the dissertation and the way in which the dissertation
will explore the questions I have described above.
Methodology for the study
The prospect of investigating the potential phenomenon of inner city
suburbanization presented substantial difficulties. Although it was clear from my
anecdotal observations that many new inner-city housing developments bore
similarities to housing that I typically associated with the suburbs, how was I to
transform this observation into an empirically-based study that would sufficiently
demonstrate the occurrence of this phenomenon? Although I could hypothesize
several reasons why inner city suburbanization might be occurring, how was I to
categorically research the causality of this phenomenon? Finally, how was I to
think about assessing this phenomenon, given the competing value systems that
I have previously described? The answers to these three questions form the
subjects of the three core chapters (Four, Five, and Six) of this dissertation.
In order to begin to answer these questions I had to address several
methodological questions. Some of these questions were related to case
selection. I had observed inner-city suburbanization occurring in what I perceived
as declining cities, but a universal study of new inner-city development in all
cities was impossible given the limited temporal and financial resources at my
disposal. How was I then to select appropriate case 'declining' cities for the
study? What did the term 'declining city' mean? Within those case cities, I had
observed inner-city suburbanization occurring in certain neighborhoods that I
qualitiatively perceived as 'inner city', while also observing very different
development trends occurring elsewhere in the city. Which neighborhoods should
I look at? This question was also linked to definitional issues. My initial
descriptions of my research were met again and again with requests to clarify the
terms that I was using. Since declining cities and inner city neighborhoods were
obviously not the same thing, how was I to define what the term 'inner city'
meant? For that matter, what did I mean by the term 'suburb'? Although most
people have a certain image in mind when they use all of these terms,
quantifying their definitions was more difficult. My invented term of inner-city
suburbanization had its own definitional problems. Was I looking for absolute
physical indicators, derived from some quantification of the form of vernacular
suburban development, or was I looking for instead for relative shifts whose
direction indicated a change toward a vernacular suburban physical model? I
also confronted issues having to do with the scope of my research. I had already
ascertained that I could not examine all declining cities. But once I had
ascertained those housing developments which to me indicated inner-city
suburbanization, what level of detail could I study them in? Should I examine the
social and economic indicators of these developments as well? Should I perform
sociological research examining the opinions and perceptions of the residents of
these new communities? Should I examine the impact of these developments,
whatever they were, on their surrounding communities? Should I examine, or
even test, policy measures designed to address the positive or negative aspects
of these communities? Before I even began, it was clear that I would have to
restrict my research to produce a study that would be cogent while also
attempting to be comprehensive.
In order to answer my three primary research questions about the prevalence,
causality, and interpretation of inner-city suburbanization, I was obliged to define
several of my terms before I began my research. I was influenced somewhat in
this task by the fact that many of the terms I was using were either poorly defined
or inconsistently defined in the literature. While this inhibited me from using easily
transferable definitions, it did give me some freedom to create definitions that
were applicable to my research. In previous work I had already confronted the
ambiguity of the term 'declining city', which I linked to the term 'urban decline'
(Ryan 2000). As I was interested in changes in housing, I created my own
definition of urban decline as population loss combined with housing loss. The
term 'inner city' was more problematic. Some authors had defined inner cities
according to income and racial categorizations (Jargowsky 1993, Wilson 1996),
while others had used the term but had not defined it clearly. I decided to define
the term 'inner city' according to the same indicators that I was using to define
urban decline- population and housing loss- both because I was performing a
physical study and because I wished to remain consistent. While this definition
might not define the same geographical areas that other authors' indicators had, I
felt that my indicators were likely to provide a more accurate site for my research
than the socioeconomic indicators used by other authors. Having defined these
two terms, I knew how I would find the places where I would look for evidence of
suburbanization.
Methodology. definitional questions
Now that I knew where I would be looking, how did I know what I would be
looking for? Chapter Three of the dissertation explains the definitional questions
that I undertook to clarify the aims of the study. Answering these questions
necessitated confronting the ambiguous term 'suburb', which like inner city, I
found to be rather widely used but loosely and inconsistently defined in the
literature. I was aided in this task in two ways. The first was that my research was
concerned with the physical attributes of residential suburban development
alone, and that I could therefore ignore a wider search for the meaning of the
term 'sprawl', which is generally considered to describe the form and
consequences of suburbia at a larger scale. Instead, I could look for specific
physical indicators that were characteristic of suburbia. I was also aided in that a
careful physical definition of suburban form had already been created by the
architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, the two architects who
were perhaps most responsible for New Urbanism and who remain two of its
principal theorists and practioners. In their interest in providing an alternative to
what they called 'conventional suburban development', these two architects had
done what few researchers had attempted previously: they had carefully defined
the physical attributes of vernacular suburbia through the creation of an
oppositional model (New Urbanism). By inverting their definitions of New
Urbanist neighborhood form, I was able to create an equally clear definition of
what I meant by the term 'suburb'.
Although I had defined the terms 'inner city' and 'suburb', I still had to confront
the meaning of my central term of 'inner city suburbanization'. Most importantly,
was inner city suburbanization an absolute or a relative measure? My answer to
this question was determined by a preliminary examination of some of the cities
that I was considering as cases. Many of these cities had very different
vernacular housing types. Some older, east-coast cities were built primarily of
attached single-family row houses at densities of up to 30 units per acre. Many
Midwestern cities were less dense, built mainly of freestanding one- and two-
family houses at around 12 units per acre. In the context of these differing
neighborhood types, absolute measurements like unit density and lot coverage
were clearly going to produce different results. An absolute measurement of
suburbanization was therefore unlikely to produce meaningful findings in both
cities. This was reinforced by my observations of new development in these
cities. Midwestern cities had some housing developments which literally
resembled typical suburban development, while even the lowest-density
developments in some eastern cities, which had a much lower density than
typical rowhouse neighborhoods, looked to be about the same unit density as the
pre-redevelopment Midwestern neighborhoods that I had seen! What I was
seeing in both cities were relative shifts in densities rather than absolute ones.
This led me to define inner city suburbanization in part as a relative shift.
Some features of inner city suburbanization, however, seemed to me to be more
absolute. These were design features like the configuration of neighborhood
streets, the placement of buildings on their lots, the treatment of parking areas,
and the architectural style of buildings. Some new developments, for examples,
featured cul-de-sacs, and I decided to interpret design features like these as
absolute indicators, whose appearance, irrespective of the relative shifts of other
indicators, I would interpret as signs of inner-city suburbanization.
Methodology: prevalence
Having clearly defined the terms 'inner city', 'suburb', and 'inner city
suburbanization', I was able to lay out a clear methodology for researching the
prevalence of inner-city suburbanization. Chapter Four describes my selection of
case cities and neighborhoods, and my investigations of new housing
developments in those neighborhoods. Using the variables of population and
housing change, I selected two cities- Detroit and Philadelphia- which were both
large and experiencing declines in both of these categories. Although the were
similar in terms of their decline, these cities occupied different geographical
areas of the country- Philadelphia in the Northeast and Detroit in the Midwest.
They also had predominantly different housing typologies- Philadelphia was a
rowhouse city, while Detroit was predominantly built up with detached housing.
These two became the case cities for the study. Within these cities, using the
same variables of population and housing decline, I was able to select for those
census tracts which I had defined as 'inner city neighborhoods', or those tracts
which were experiencing large declines in both population and housing. These
tracts comprised the case neighborhoods which I would examine for evidence of
suburbanization.
Once I had established my case neighborhoods, it remained to examine the
housing developments which had recently been constructed in those
neighborhoods, and apply the inner city suburbanization criteria which I had
established in Chapter Three to those developments. I examined both relative
and absolute indicators in order to provide a portrait of suburbanization in the
inner cities of Detroit and Philadelphia.
Methodology. causality
Researching the causality of inner-city suburbanization also presented a
challenge. Chapter Five describes this process. Given the occurrence of
suburbanization in multiple cities, and given that the phenomenon was appearing
in diverse forms and types of housing, it was unlikely to be attributable to a single
policy or actor, unlike, say, HOPE VI public housing redevelopment, which is in
large part the result of a Federal government program applied to many different
places. Yet the very occurrence of the phenomenon of suburbanization in
multiple cities and in different types of housing implied that it was neither the
product of an anomalous development condition in one place nor one of
conditions specific to a single housing type or housing developer, but of a
common force or set of forces that were acting in multiple places. The literature
on the causality of urban decline and on suburbanization (in its original sense)
provided an indication of the difficulties that I.would face in reaching a conclusive
determination of the phenomenon's causality. While there was widespread
agreement that both urban decline and suburbanization are occurring, there was
still a wide variety of opinions in the literature on what exactly is causing these
phenomena. In the case of urban decline, explanations ranged from
macroeconomic change to white racism to the growth of suburbs. And as I had
previously found (Ryan 2000), the difficulty of defining the phenomenon of urban
decline was in part responsible for the difficulty of attributing it to a single cause
or set of causes. The causality of the phenomenon consequently remained
undetermined. While inner city suburbanization was clearly a more limited
phenomenon, as well as one that could be more closely defined, the possibility
remained that it was due to an equally broad range of factors.
Nevertheless I believed that researching the causality of inner-city
suburbanization was important, especially given that some aspects of the
phenomenon seemed problematic. Understanding why this phenomenon was
happening would allow for more informed recommendations. If, for example,
suburbanization was the result of deliberate policy decisions, the possibility
existed that recommendations could be made to change these policy measures.
If suburbanization was the result of community wishes or of macroeconomic
market shifts, there was less likelihood of changing the phenomenon and
analysis could perhaps shift to attempting to reconcile conflicting imperatives.
Researching this causality, however, promised to be a challenge. Not only was I
looking at two different cities, the housing that I was looking at had been
produced by a variety of actors, from Community Development Corporations
(CDCs) to city agencies to private developers. Each development was different,
and completely understanding the story of one development would have been a
dissertation on its own. Nevertheless, I believed it was important to survey the
causality of the developments that I saw in order to provide a picture of the
uniformity of the suburbanization trend, rather than analyze it through the lens of
a single development, none of which could necessarily be said to be 'typical' of
the phenomenon.
I therefore decided to undertake a relatively limited analysis of causality, focusing
on pne major housing developments in each city, and examining additional
information on two or three more developments. I intended to obtain most of my
information through secondary material and through limited interviews of those
players whom the secondary evidence had indicated were influential in the
decision-making process of the developments. I selected case developments
through my preliminary observations of each city. I had observed a spectrum of
change in each city, ranging from developments that were less than one-third the
density of the historic contxt to development that were equal to or even exceeded
historic densities. Some, but not all, of these less-dense developments were also
suburb-like in appearance. For my primary case developments I selected those
that were toward the 'suburban' end of the spectrum, for two reasons. First, I
could study economically diverse developments- both market-rate and
subsidized- within this limted scope. This allowed me to examine the different set
of institutional players behind each development. Secondly, I believed that
studying developments which seemed more 'suburban' would provide the
clearest picture of the forces causing low-density design than studying
developments which were not clearly manifesting suburban characteristics. I also
believed that understanding the most 'suburban' developments to follow the
suburban model.
Methodology: interpretation
Finally, how was I to interpret this phenomenon? Chapter Six describes the often
problematic process of evaluation. As I have previously described, my initial
personal attitude toward inner-city suburbanization could best be described as
ambivalent. Theory, as I have indicated, did not make my path much clearer,
because there were conflicting theories both within and between the two
professions from which I would be deriving my theoretical approaches. Choosing
one of these theories and analyzing inner-city suburbanization from within that
framework would have been a convenient, if somewhat simplistic, way to analyze
the phenomenon. Such a device is often used by theorists who wish to project a
singular image of complex phenomena (see Boyer 1983 for a typical example).
Approaching a complex phenomenon through the lens of an ideology also aids
research in that one can select only those facets of the phenomenon for
observation which conform to one's particular theory (see Sandercock 1998 for a
typical example of this approach). Yet researching a complex phenomenon
through single theories also allows one to provide a clear interpretation. Would I
be reducing the impact of my study if I could not come out with either strong
condemnation or strong praise of inner-city suburbanization?
As I considered the prospect of how to approach the analysis of inner-city
phenomenon, I recalled that my personal ambivalence was one that was inherent
to the profession of urban design. In other words, the dilemma that I was
confronting reflected not only conflicting design ideologies, a value conflict which
has been characteristic of architecture since at least the beginning of the
twentieth century, but a conflict of values that stemmed from urban design's dual
responsibility to the professions of both architecture and urban planning. From
architecture, urban designers have a mandate to produce a good design-
although different values might be employed to produce that design. From urban
planning, urban designers have a mandate to realize the vision of the public,
although even in planning this mandate may conflict with planners' normative
visions. While both professions confront internal value conflicts, these conflicts
are even more apparent in the hybrid field of urban design. My evaluation of
inner-city suburbanization was bound to reflect these conflicts. As such, however,
I realized that this conflict, rather than confusing my evaluation, was likely to
clarify the issue of the conflicting responsibilities of urban designers. A conflicted
interpretation was therefore a truer depiction of the field's theoretical approach
than a singular approach would have been. I decided that I would therefore not
attempt to produce a single evaluation, but would recognize that my evaluation
contained potentially conflicing viewpoints and consequently recommendations
that incorporated both of these viewpoints.
Structure of the dissertation
Chapter Two briefly reviews the historical context of the suburbanization and the
urban decline and revitalization movements in the United States. The chapter
describes the history of suburbanization and divides historical residential
suburbia into five phases: early suburbs, railroad suburbs, streetcar suburbs,
prewar suburbs, and postwar suburbs. Postwar suburbs are by far the most
numerous and this form of suburb continues to the present day. The postwar
suburb embodies many of the physical and other social characteristics that many
Americans think of as being typical of suburbia such as curving streets,
automobile dependency, and location well outside the city center. The suburban
definitions created in Chapter Three are therefore based on postwar suburbia
rather than on the other models. Decline and revitalization are interrelated
processes, and the history of these two phenomena reflects this interrelationship.
There have been two major phases in urban revitalization. The first began
around 1940 and was characterized by the introduction of Modernist design
policies, the large-scale intervention of the Federal government in urban
revitalization, and the beginning of large-scale deindustrialization in the industrial
cities of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States. The second began
around 1975 and was characterized by the end of Modernist design influence,
the decentralization of the government role in revitalization, and the beginning of
a substantial shift to a service-based economy in American cities. The chapter
closes with descriptions of recent trends in decline and revitalization and places
the inner-city suburbanization process in the context of this third period.
Chapter Three addresses the definitional problem of what the terms inner city,
suburb, and inner-city suburbanization actually mean. Although the first two
terms are widely used by both professionals and laypeople they have multiple
meanings. In order to both define and measure what inner-city suburbanization
means, it is necessary to have measurable definitions of both 'inner city' and
suburb. Inner cities are defined as neighborhoods which have lost a certain
amount of housing and population. Suburbs are defined by inverting the
neighborhood definition produced by the New Urbanism movement. This design
philosophy rejects what it calls 'conventional suburban development' in favor of a
neighborhood model that more closely resembles that of prewar suburbia. Inner-
city suburbanization is thus defined as a process wherein a historic urban
neighborhood model experiences shifts toward what is called a vernacular
suburban model. The study creates seven variables with which to measure the
degree of inner-city suburbanization and combines them into a suburbanization
index.
Chapter Four applies the methodology created in Chapter Three to produce a
portrait of the extent of the suburbanization phenomenon in the case cities. I
examine the universe of American cities and divide them into four categories
ranging from 'growing' to 'steeply declining' according to their changes in
population and housing units from 1950 to 1990. I then select Detroit and
Philadelphia as case cities which represent the largest cities in the two 'declining'
categories. I then undertake an examination of neighborhood change in these
cities according to shifts in the same indicators (population and housing change)
in order to select case neighborhoods within which to examine housing
developments. In order to produce a clear definition of the terms 'suburb' and
'inner city suburbanization' I undertake a brief examination of the literature that
has confronted this question, as weli as an examination of the New Urbanist
literature. I apply the definitions given in the literature to provide definitions for
these two terms. Finally, I measure the suburbanization indicators of
developments in the inner city neighborhoods of both cities in order to provide a
portrait of the prevalence of inner-city suburbanization in Detroit and
Philadelphia.
Chapter Five investigates the causality of the suburbanization process as
manifested in two or three case developments in each city. The chapter is
comprised of three parts. The first briefly reviews the recent history of urban
decline and revitalization in each case city and examines recent policy and
planning initiatives that are likely to have influenced the developments studied.
The second examines individual developments in each case city. In Philadelphia
I concentrate upon a single large housing development, Poplar Nehemiah,
constructed mainly through the city Office of Housing and Community
Development, and include additional information from two other large housing
developments, Ludlow Village and the Cecil B. Moore Homeownership Housing,
that were developed as partnerships between city agencies and community
development corporations. In Detroit I examine three housing developments.
Two of these, Clairpointe Woods and Victoria Park, are single-family housing
developments constructed by the private sector with differing levels of public
subsidy. The third Marketplace Court, is a multi-family housing development built
by a private developer with limited public subsidies. In the third section of this
chapter I bring together the individual cases to produce a depiction of the
common causes for inner city suburbanization.
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by evaluating the phenomenon of
suburbanization, and indicating future research directions. Inner-city
suburbanization is viewed through the frame of urban planning theory as a
positive phenomenon which benefits both its direct residents and those in
surrounding neighborhoods through the realization of resident desires and
through the positive transformation of neighborhood image. Suburbanization is
also viewed as a positive political outcome for city agencies, who benefit frorn the
implementation of city policies and from the imagistic benefits of new
development. Suburbanization is also viewed through the frame of architectural
theory as a negative phenomenon which negates the urban architectural values
of the existing neighborhoods in favor of an acontextual, reductivist architecture
that imitates negative models already established in vernacular suburbs.
Suburbanization is also criticized for its detrimental effects on larger urban
systems like street grids and mass transit networks. These two policy frames set
the stage for the next section of this chapter, which suggests strategies for
action. These strategies are viewed through an urban design frame, which
attempts to reconcile the competing demands of the previous two frames and
suggests a moderation of some of the more extreme negative changes seen,
while recognizing that the positive values resulting from this transformation
should be continued in order to maintain positive momentum for urban
revitalization in declining cities. Some future research directions that are
suggested include the study of additional declining cities, and the extension of
the research in the existing case developments to include studies of the
socioeconomic consequences of this development, as well as sociological
studies of the perceptions of residents who live in the developments.

Chapter Two
The Historical Context of Inner-City Suburbanization
Introduction
This chapter places the phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization within the
larger context of twentieth-century American urbanism. It does this by briefly
examining the histories of two major urban phenomena that have impacted the
form of the American city: suburbanization and urban decline. The chapter then
briefly examines the history of housing efforts for the poor in American cities in
order to provide an architectural context for the developments that will be
examined in Chapter Five. Finally, the chapter introduces the concept of inner-
city suburbanization by providing a hypothesis for this phenomenon based in
current urban trends in American cities.
The first section of the chapter examines the phenomenon of suburbanization.
Suburbanization began in the United States in the nineteenth century with the
growth of industrial cities and of the transportation technology that allowed
people to live outside those cities while working in them. By the late nineteenth
century the suburb had begun to develop both a distinct cultural meaning based
on its role in American society and a distinct neighborhood form based on a
pictorial representation of a rural setting. Both the cultural import of suburbia as
well as its physical form would grow more widespread as cities grew larger and
as more Americans gained the means to escape them. The section also
discusses the differences between the physical form of prewar and postwar
suburbs and closes with an account of the growth of postwar vernacular suburbia
and of the maturation of the cultural image of suburbia that became associated
with this form of development.
The second section of the chapter examines the phenomenon of urban decline.
Urban decline, as manifested through extensive population loss in residential
neighborhoods, did not begin in earnest in the United States until the second and
third decades of the twentieth century. After that point it occurred simultaneously
with suburbia was older cities both declined and suburbanized. Newer cites did
not experience such severe decline. Though it began before the extensive
suburban development of the postwar era, urban decline often became causally
associated with suburbanization as many of the economic and demographic
shifts which accompanied decline were tied to the decentralization of people,
commerce, and industry. Urban decline became perceived as a major policy
problem after the Second World War and over the next thirty years the federal
government embarked on a series of ambitious programs designed to alleviate
the problem. The chapter discusses the somewhat troubled history of these
efforts as well as the more decentralized revitalization strategies which
succeeded these programs after about 1975.
The third section of the chapter discusses the history of efforts to provide
adequate housing for the poor in American cities during the twentieth century. As
industrial cities grew larger, housing conditions for the poorest city dwellers often
became intolerable. Scattered private efforts to improve housing for the poor
developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in many
American cities, but the federal government did not make a major commitment to
addressing urban housing problems until the Depression. After the Second World
War major federal housing programs were developed, often in tandem with
efforts to address urban decline. Large-scale housing programs for the poor
struggled for about thirty years, after which they were replaced by decentralized
programs which for the most part remain to this day. The chapter briefly
discusses the design of some low-income housing efforts in order to provide an
architectural context for the case developments that will be examined in Chapter
Five.
The fourth section of the chapter provides the background for a hypothesis for
inner-city suburbanization. The section analyzes existing broad physical trends in
American cities in order to propose a location for inner-city suburbanization within
the broad spectrum of changes currently occurring in American cities. This has
the dual purpose of hypothesizing that inner-city suburbanization is the natural
and inevitable product of a certain set of physical changes in American cities.
Inner-city suburbanization is proposed as only one of a number of important
physical trends occurring in American cities, but one that is not insignificant. This
section sets the stage for the definition of the terms required to research the
phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization in Chapter Three.
Suburbanization in the United States
As a nation founded in the English tradition and with an open frontier for the first
three hundred or so years of its history, Americans have always treasured the
open countryside. The American preference for the small town with a close
cctnection to nature has been well-documented and was widespread in
American society even before the existence of large cities (White and White
1962, Campanella 2001). This preference can be thought of as a pastoral ideal
(Marx 1964). As American cities grew rapidly during the nineteenth century
nature grew ever more remote as cities grew and the countryside receded. The
ideal of living in proximity to nature, however, remained.
The history of suburbia has been well-documented (Jackson 1984, Fishman
1987, and Stilgoe 1988 provide excellent accounts, among others) and will
therefore not be reviewed here in detail. This section will concentrate on
describing the formal aspects of suburban neighborhood and architectural
design.
Suburbs distinguished themselves from cities through their architecture before
they did so through their neighborhood design. The first suburbs, however, were
little different than the city in either way. Brooklyn Heights, often credited with
being New York City's first suburb, was a gridded neighborhood of row houses
whose design was indistinguishable, except through its location, from that of
Manhattan. By the 1840s and 1850s, however, distinct suburban architectural
typologies had begun to emerge, based in part on the pattern books developed
by Andrew Jackson Downing and others (Downing 1968). Most suburban houses
were designed as 'villas' and were intended for the upper middle class, a
democratizing shift from the eighteenth century when they were intended only for
the gentry. Unlike the suburban estates of the eighteenth century, however,
these villas were often designed to be grouped together in communities, an idea
first conceived by the English in the late eighteenth century (Fishman 1987). Both
the class structure and spatial relationships of these houses were innovative,
although their architectural inspiration was less so, being derived from historic
styles like the Gothic, Italianate, or Classical. This lack of architectural innovation
could be attributed both to the generally historicist leanings of the nineteenth
century as well as the relatively small proportion of housing being built in the
suburbs at the time.
Technology influenced the growth of suburbia from the beginning. Brooklyn
Heights was made reliably accessible because of the invention of the steam
ferry, and the mass manufacture of housing components made the ornamental
profusions found on Victorian houses widely available and relatively cheap. The
invention of rail transportation was also a major boon to the expansion of cities
and suburbs. Steam railroads, operating over relatively long distances, made the
development of suburbs like Philadelphia's Chestnut Hill and Main Line (named,
of course, after the train) feasible. Railroad suburbs remained an upper-middle-
class phenomenon in part because of their expensive ticket prices (Warner 2002,
pers. comm.), although elevated steam railways in extremely dense cities like
New York became quite important components of urban transportation. The
development of cheap and frequent electric streetcars and subways at the end of
the nineteenth century was a huge boost to urban development, expanding cities
outwards in all directions. Warner (1962) provided a good description of the
development of these neighborhoods in Boston, calling them 'streetcar suburbs'.
Until about 1920 these forms of transportation provided the primary means of
getting to and from cities and suburbs, after which the most recent transportation
innovation, the automobile, the began to play an increasingly dominant role.
While suburbs began to establish an independent architectural typology from that
of the city as early as 1830, the neighborhood design of the majority of early
suburbs was similar to that of urban neighborhoods. Most suburbs were built on
urban grids until well into the twentieth century. This is not to say that the site
planning of these neighborhoods was identical to that of suburbia. In Chestnut
Hill, for example, a railroad suburb that became a part of Philadelphia after 1854,
villas were located in splendid isolation, displaying a spatial separation from the
street and from each other that was definitely not of the city, though Chestnut Hill
was politically a part of Philadelphia. The role of political separation in defining
suburbs will be discussed further in Chapter Three. This relatively distinct site
planning was also seen in many streetcar suburbs. Warner (1962) credited the
relative lack of row houses and profusion of detached dwellings in Boston's
streetcar suburbs to social preferences. The typology of the detached house built
on a city grid consequently became a major feature of American urban form.
Cities which experienced a large amount of growth during the early twentieth
century, like Brooklyn (NY), Detroit, or Los Angeles, spread for miles in this
fashion.
Figures 2.1. and 2.2. While both Oak Park, Illinois (left) and Chestnut Hill, Pennsylvania (right)
developed as railroad suburbs in the late nineteenth century, they did so on urban grids. The
primary residential typologies of both neighborhoods are single-family detached houses. Both
images copyright United States Geological Survey.
The fact that many suburbs were built on urban grids mirrored the fact that many
settlements which were originally considered suburbs became urban as cities
expanded physically and politically in the nineteenth century. Many of the
neighborhoods which are now an integral part of the cities of Boston, New York,
and Philadelphia, for example, were once suburban. Most of Boston's 'streetcar
suburbs' are now part of the city, as is Brooklyn Heights in New York, Chestnut
Hill in Philadelphia, and innumerable other former suburbs. These neighborhoods
are now historical suburbs, though their remaining housing often provides an
indication as to the neighborhood's former status, as in Chestnut Hill. Other
suburbs, like Oak Park in Chicago and Brookline in Boston, were never annexed
politically to their central cities. Today, despite their proximity to downtown and
their sharing of many of the economic and social attributes of their central cities,
they are still, at least politically, suburbs. The question of what constitutes a
suburb for the operational purposes of this dissertation will be addressed further
in Chapter Three.
As early as 1850 a distinctive suburban site design typology began to emerge
that presaged the later commonplace neighborhood form of suburbia. This
neighborhood design was characterized by curving streets and an integration of
houses with the landscape. Riverside, Illinois, designed by Frederick Law
Olmsted in 1869 (Stern and Massengale 1981: 24) was the most famous
example, though it would not be prove to be influential for some time (see Figure
2.3). Inspired by the picturesquely-designed cemeteries and parks of the era,
curvilinear suburbs announced not only through their architecture but through
their landscape design as well that one was in a realm completely distinct from
that of the city. In an era before land use zoning, their neighborhood design also
served as an effective promise that the area would forever resist urban
expansion.
Although we are wont to view the curvilinear landscapes of a few early suburbs
like Riverside as leading in a teleological fashion to the ubiquitous curving streets
of suburbia, curvilinear design constituted only a minor portion of suburban
neighborhood design until the Federal Housing Administration, influenced by
architects like Clarence Perry, began to encourage such design for Federally
mortgaged housing in the 1930s. Southworth and Ben-Joseph (1993, 1997) have
described how the spread of boilerplate municipal street standards based on
such design made the curvilinear landscape ubiquitous in residential suburbia
after World War II. What began as the inspiration of a landscape architect
became encoded as a set of standards whose widespread application quickly
resulted in a landscape that was just as homogeneous as the urban grid had
been before it (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Figure 2.3. The curvilinear landscape of Riverside, Illinois (left half of above photo) contrasts
strongly with the gridded streets of contemporary neighboring suburbs. Although Riverside was
designed in 1868, suburbs would not widely adopt curvilinear street patterns until after the
Second World War. Photograph copyright United States Geological Survey.
Unlike suburban neighborhood design, suburban architecture was less a function
of regulation than of changing construction techniques and architectural fashions.
From the beginning the popular media played an important role in the
dissemination of suburban imagery and house designs (Stilgoe 1988). Downing's
Architecture of Country Houses, an early pattern book for low-cost suburban
villas, has its descendants in the House Plan guides widely available in suburban
supermarkets today. The widespread nature of suburban architectural design
had a homogenizing effect on the American landscape. Many popular designs
spread to all parts of the United States. Today, architectural types like the
bungalow, the cape, and the raised ranch can be found everywhere. Each, in its
day, was promoted as the ubiquitous solution to the problem of the suburban
house; in 1918 Theodore Roosevelt described the bungalow as "the architecture
of an entire nation." (Jackson 1984) This homogenization obscured the original
vernaculars of different parts of the United States that developed according to
climactic variations and historical factors (McAlester and McAlester 1984),
although even today one may still discern variation in suburban architecture in
different parts of the country, from the adobe subdivisions of Santa Fe and
Phoenix to the colonial cul-de-sacs of suburban Boston.
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Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Although 'urban' grids were decried as monotonous, curvilinear suburban
streets are not necessarily less so. The map at left shows a 1920s grid in Los Angeles, while the
map at right shows a 1990s pattern from South Florida. Both maps copyright Mapquest.com.
The architecture of suburbia has continued to evolve. Suburban houses built in
the 1990s were built with designs as distinct from those of the 1970s as those
houses were distinct from their predecessors. The site planning of suburbia has
evolved in two major ways. Single-family houses have steadily increased in size,
while the size of the average single-family house lot has continued to shrink. The
National Association of Home Builders (2001) reported that from 1987 to 2000
the average size of single family homes rose from 1,905 to 2,270 square feet.
The average lot size shrank from 17,600 to 12,910 square feet. The increase in
home sizes has been caused by the rise in the percentages of homes with
amenities like two-car garages, two stories, four or more bedrooms, and central
air conditioning. While the cause and effects of these changes are beyond the
scope of this study, it is worthwhile to note that these economic realities might
influence new construction in urban areas. Consumers would seem more likely to
demand larger homes while accepting smaller lots. Both of these trends are, as
we will see, consistent with the causes of inner-city suburbanization examined in
Chapter Five, as well as with design movements like the New Urbanism, which
advocate exactly the same thing.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7. Two local architectural vernaculars that have persisted as styles for today's
suburban homes are the colonial (left) and the Spanish revival (right). Illustrations copyright
aol.com.
As suburbia became the residential environment of an increasing number of
Americans, Federal housing policies encouraged increases in suburban
construction. The Housing Act of 1934 and the Veterans Readjustment Act of
1944 were both major stimuli for the privately-financed construction and
purchase of suburban housing. There has been much debate over whether these
policies were a cause or an effect of the American preference for suburban living.
While some critics have argued that these policies imposed suburban standards
on the American public (Kunstler 1993), others have argued that existing social
desires caused policies that favored those desires (Gordon and Richardson
1997). While the long history of suburbanization that predated those policies
might support the latter argument more strongly, the causality of suburbanization
is still somewhat unclear. The tortured struggle to provide public housing in the
United States and to provide so-called 'affordable' housing in wealthy suburbs
today provides another argument that social desires often influence policies more
strongly than the other way around (Bauer 1957, Vale 2000).
Exclusivity was a primary goal of suburban development (Fishman 1987).
Suburbanites wanted to escape not only noxious and unpredictable urban uses,
but unwanted urban populations as well. Spatial separation and the restriction of
suburbs to 'high-class' development was an effective means of achieving this
goal. Additional reinforcements for suburban exclusivity came with the creation of
zoning in the 1920s and its spread throughout the United States in subsequent
decades. Zoning was attractive to suburbs because it provided small
municipalities with the power to at least partially control changes to their built
environment. The 1926 landmark United States Supreme Court case Village of
Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Company, which established the legality of zoning, was
motivated by the desire of that 'village' (which was really a suburb of Cleveland)
to restrict the spread of industrial uses. Through zoning, undesirable land uses
could be forbidden, as could housing with densities above certain thresholds. For
the most desirable suburbs, zoning could be used guarantee their exclusive
social nature in perpetuity. In recent years, however, some suburbs have found
that they are not immune from formerly urban ills like poverty and financial crises.
The poorest suburbs like Highland Park, Michigan and East Cleveland, Ohio
suffer from the same ills as their central cities but have fewer resources with
which to cope with them. Suburban decline is beginning to be recognized as a
major policy problem (Orfield 1997, Lucy and Phillips 2000).
As suburbia has grown its deleterious large-scale effects have become more
apparent. 'Suburban sprawl', as the spread of suburbia is called, has been
accused of destroying open space, obliterating indigenous landscapes, creating
massive traffic problems, and draining cities of their population, resources, and
vitality (Downs 1994, Duany et. al. 2000). Other critics, however, have
downplayed these concerns (Gordon and Richardson 1997). Despite the
controversies over the costs and benefits of sprawl, the continuation of
permissive land use regulations combined with an apparent market preference
for suburbia, has lead to its unabated continuation throughout the United States.
There are signs, however, that even fast-growth, permissive regions are
beginning to recognize unabated sprawl as a problem (Calthorpe and Fulton
2001).
Suburbia was never exclusively a residential enterprise. Retail establishments,
offices and even some corporate headquarters have also relocated from cities to
suburban areas, forming automobile-oriented complexes with many of the
economic attributes of cities, but a radically different physical form (Garreau
1991, Rowe 1991). In many American cities the historic core has become almost
irrelevant as the majority of metropolitan activities have relocated to the
periphery. Newer cities like Fort Lauderdale and Phoenix are at the extreme of
this decentralization trend, with downtowns that are notable, as highway signs in
these places remind motorists, only as the "site of historic and cultural facilities".
The American move toward suburbia has not been ubiquitous. The revival of
many downtowns and older urban neighborhoods, discussed in the next section,
indicate that at least some middle-class Americans prefer older urban
neighborhood environments to those of the suburbs. The next section discusses
the phenomenon of urban revitalization and decline in American cities.
Urban Decline and Revitalization
Just as there have always been settlements at the peripheries of cities that could
be considered suburbs, cities themselves have always been regarded as being in
some sense problematic. The rapid growth of the industrial city in the nineteenth
century not only spurred the creation of the modern suburb but created a host of
physical, social, and economic problems. The societal imperative to address
some of these problems was one of the primary impetuses for the creation of the
city planning profession at the beginning of the twentieth century. Since this
origin the planning profession has been closely associated with the resolution of
urban problems.
Early city plans such as Burnham et. al.'s Plan for Chicago (1909) were
aesthetically inspired by the European Beaux-Arts movement and concentrated
on physical interventions like new roadways, parks, and monumental civic
buildings. While many early city planners were architects, landscape architects
like Charles Eliot and the Olmsted firm also played a major role in the
development of the profession (Brown 2002, forthcoming). As might be imagined,
most early city plans were responses to problems of city growth rather than city
decline. Rapidly growing cities badly needed intelligent planning for the design of
amenities like new public roadways and parks.
City planning soon began to concern itself with the problems of poverty as well.
The effort to provide appropriate housing for the poor was one component of city
planning that would survive the economic transition from urban growth to urban
decline. Calls for housing reform grew stronger during the early decades of the
twentieth century, moving from private experimentation with model tenements
(Plunz 1990) to consistent calls for government intervention in low-income
housing production (Bauer 1934). The results of these efforts will be discussed
further in the next section.
City planning efforts were given added impetus by the Great Depression, a crisis
which slowed the growth of cities and forced the federal government to become
involved in wide arenas of policy that had formerly been left to the private sector.
Public housing construction blossomed after the Depression, especially in cities
like New York which were well-prepared to take advantage of new federal
programs. Under the leadership of Robert Moses New York also became a
national leader in highway and parks construction during this time,
foreshadowing the national application of these efforts after the Second World
War.
Through the end of the 1930s the design philosophies of urban improvement
efforts continued to be inspired by the Beaux-Arts movement, but this was soon
to end. Design philosophies influenced by the European Modern movement
would gain dramatic momentum after the Second World War. These designs
were developed beginning in the 1920s by architects like Le Corbusier and other
members of the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM)
(Mumford 2000). The new architectural and urban design principles advocated by
Modernists included the separation of automobile from pedestrian traffic, high-
rise, ahistorically styled architecture, and the fetishization of automobile-based
transportation. After the war these design principles would serve as the basis for
many postwar downtown and neighborhood redevelopment plans and would
influence the design of much of the nation's public housing.
During this period policymakers in some American cities also began to sense that
their cities were declining. Many industrial cities had developed their economies
primarily on the basis of a single commodity such as textiles or machine parts. As
these industries matured, their location in industrial cities often became less
competitive due to the age of their facilities or because wage or plant costs were
lower elsewhere. Many industries relocated and many of those that did not went
out of business. These changes occurred across the northeast beginning as
early as 1940 (Gittell 1992). As the economic bases of older industrial cities
changed, moved, or disappeared, those cities became less desirable as places
to live. Residents who could not find new jobs relocated or joined the ranks of the
underemployed poor. The negative changes experienced by industrial cities
became known as the phenomenon of urban decline. This somewhat hard-to-
define term (Bradbury et. al. 1982, Ryan 2000) communicated several different
things; a quantitative decline in indicators like population or income; a
quantitative increase in negative indicators like crime and other social problems;
and perhaps most importantly a qualitative sense that these cities were
becoming less and less attractive places to live. The postwar public dialogue
around the issue of urban decline has been discussed in detail by Beauregard
(1993).
Cities confronting urban decline had to deal with many extremely difficult
problems. Among other things, they were often saddled with large, obsolete
manufacturing facilities for which there was little demand. They had to confront
the abandonment of their principal commercial arteries as retailers followed
residents to the suburbs. They had to confront the growing problems of the
people, usually minorities, who had moved to the city for economic opportunities
but had found little work, and the abandonment of homes, sometimes by the
thousands, as middle-class residents fled to the suburbs. They had to confront
the sometimes severe fiscal problems brought on by the increase in resident
poverty and the departure of their largest taxpayers. With all of these problems,
the older cities of the northeast and midwest were soon asking the federal
government for help.
The federal government responded in 1949 with a policy that would have radical
consequences for urban downtowns. Housing advocates and developers joined
forces to persuade Congress to pass the Housing Act of 1949. This bill provided
for generous federal subsidies for condemnation, clearance, and reconstruction
of areas that had been determined to be blighted. Cleared sites were sometimes
but not always built up with low-income housing (O'Connor 1999). Other
redevelopment occurred to provide room for new commercial, manufacturing,
and institutional facilities. The Housing Act provided the impetus for what became
known as the urban renewal movement. The 1950s and 1960s became an era of
widespread clearance in American cities as cities leveled acres of old buildings
for highways, new government facilities, office parks, and modern apartment
blocks. By the end of the 1960s almost every sizeable American city had new
downtown facilities, highways, and housing as a result of the housing act,
highway act, and urban renewal programs.
Figure 2.8. Perceiving that they were declining, older American cities like Boston
leveled large areas of their downtowns and neighborhoods as part of the process
of urban renewal. The photograph shows downtown Boston in the early 1960s.
Photograph from Tsipis (2000).
Highways also contributed to the changing landscape of American cities. The
rapid growth of automobile usage after the war led to calls for the construction of
modern roadways, and the passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956
provided federal backing for the construction of limited-access highways between
American cities. Older cities like Boston felt that their economic future was
dependent upon these highways and argued, generally successfully, to have
them routed directly through their centers. Euphoria over this new construction,
however, soon soured. Cities like New York rammed expressways directly
through dense urban neighborhoods, spurring exoduses from already unstable
places. The destabilization wrought by these huge roadways often increased,
rather than reduced blight (Caro 1976). Other forms of redevelopment were often
not much more successful. Cleared sites in the downtowns of cities like
Cleveland, OH and New Haven, CT sat vacant for years before new uses were
found for them. Other cities like Boston destroyed stable immigrant
neighborhoods and vibrant urban commercial districts, replacing them with sterile
plazas and high-rise housing unaffordable to former residents (Gans 1966).
While most poor residents were powerless to halt the destruction of their
neighborhoods under urban renewal, the increasing threats to historic
neighborhoods and significant urban spaces led to a predictable revolt against
widespread urban renewal. Jacobs (1961) was an early advocate for the
preservation of older residential and commercial neighborhoods in the face of
widespread clearance. The continued construction of freeways through urban
centers provided a locus for protests. In the late 1960s and early 1970s
simultaneous 'freeway revolts' halted construction of highways through the
downtowns of Boston, New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco. At the same
time, changing federal funding priorities led to a severe diminution in downtown
and neighborhood redevelopment activities. Federally-funded urban renewal
ground to a halt, and the movement garnered increasing criticism from both
academics and journalists (Anderson 1964, Worthy 1976).
City planners played a key role in the urban renewal movement and ened up
taking much of the public blame for its failure. Even the most enlightened and
well-intentioned planners, like Philadelphia's Edmund Bacon, sanctioned the
destruction of eighteenth-century neighborhoods for office towers, shopping
malls, and expressways (Bacon 1967). In response to these criticisms, city
planners revised their professional stance to spend more attention on the
concerns of neighborhood residents.
A new wave of downtown redevelopments in the 1970s occurred on a more
modest and sensitive scale. Reflecting the negative connotations that were by
then connected with the term urban renewal, many of these developments were
instead called urban revitalization. In general, these developments paid more
attention both to the existing built environment as well as to the preferences of
the private market (Frieden and Sagalyn 1990). These developments often used
historic buildings as a centerpiece of a new development and featured retail
options theat provided a new twist on the standard shopping options available in
suburban malls. Downtown developments like Baltimore's Inner Harbor and
Boston's Quincy Market became iconic tourist attractions in their own right, while
revitalizing both their immediate vicinity and the overall image of the city.
At the same time, a renewed appreciation for the charms of historic
neighborhoods brought growing waves of middle- and upper-income residents
into downtown. These residents were drawn less to the flashy towers of the
urban renewal projects than to older neighborhoods that had previously been
viewed by planners only as clearance sites. This phenomenon, called somewhat
disparagingly gentrification, had both admirers and critics. Admirers appreciated
the ability of gentrification to revitalize formerly derelict neighborhoods, pumping
new residents and capital into cities while preserving many of their most
attractive features (Berry 1985). Detractors criticized the displacement of lower-
income residents and the perceived collusion of the real estate industry and city
government in facilitating gentrification (Abu-Lughod 1994, Smith 1996). Others
noted the limited ability of gentrification to reverse larger-scale trends of decline
in cities (Berry 1985). Gentrification was very much linked to the real estate
market and therefore took a temporary setback in the early 1990s, but by the late
1990s it had returned in full force, improving values in even the most depressed
neighborhoods of certain cities (Wyley and Hammel 1999). As we will see in
Chapter Five, gentrification and inner-city suburbanization are not unrelated
phenomena.
By the end of the twentieth century, the record was mixed on urban revitalization.
Some cities indeed seemed to have revitalized. Cities like Boston and San
Francisco were at least as competitive, if not more so, than their suburbs for the
location of both housing and employment. Downtowns across the United States
had gained population in a resurgence of downtown living (Sohmer and Lang
1999). Others, as we will see, had a more mixed record. Many large cities such
as St. Louis continued to lose population, while others like Kansas City had little
success in redeveloping their downtowns or their declining neighborhoods. Other
cities, many of them declining continued to sprawl, leading to a variety of
problems there (Brookings 1999, Southern California Studies Center 2001).
The relationship between suburban sprawl and urban decline remains a
contentious one. As we saw, cities began suburbanizing approximately one
hundred years before they began to decline. Nevertheless, the coincidence of
suburban sprawl and decline, especially after the Second World War, led many
observers such as Mumford (1961) to believe that they were causally related,
with suburban sprawl causing urban decline. There was substantial confusion
about the relationship of the two phenomena. Urban planners, who played a
rather ambivalent role in promoting or at least allowing for suburban sprawl,
viewed decline as problematic and have also tended to attribute decline to sprawl
(Calthorpe and Richmond 1992, Downs 1994, Nelson and Milgroom 1995,
Kelbaugh 1997). Developers, on the other hand, credited the social desire for the
suburbs as causing sprawl, and saw decline more as a consequence of this
action. Even today (2002), a definitive association between decline and sprawl
has not been conclusively demonstrated (Downs 1999).
Inner-city suburbanization represents a paradoxical combination of urban sprawl
and urban decline. On the positive side, it could be seen as representing a
solution to urban decline through the building of development that is usually
associated with suburban sprawl in a 'new' location- the inner city. On the other
hand, it could be seen as exacerbating urban sprawl by wasting urban land.
Housing the Poor
The economically marginal status of low-income populations in the United States
was not accompanied by physical marginalization, as was the case in European
countries like France where the poor lived at the city edge. In the United States,
the poor were most often confined to close-in, relatively dense districts of poor-
quality housing like New York's Lower East Side. In a country where the ideal of
the single-family home has always been preeminent, those who have been
unable to afford that ideal have had to make do with an often indifferent and
unresolved public attitude toward an appropriate means to house the poor.
Despite a long tradition of almshouses, settlement houses, and other institutions
for the poor (Vale 2000), the majority of poor before the twentieth century lived
either in self-constructed or in low-quality privately-constructed housing.
Housing for the urban poor was as architecturally diverse as the urban conditions
within which it was located. In New York City, tenements for the poor consisted of
4- to 5-story walkup apartment buildings. These were tightly packed and
inhabited, creating some of the densest urban neighborhoods on earth (Plunz
1990). In other cities, the typologies of housing for the poor varied according to
the architectural vernacular of the city. In cities like Chicago and Boston, slum
housing was often constructed in the form of freestanding wooden multifamily
apartment buildings. Other cities like Philadelphia and Baltimore housed the poor
in narrow, single-family rowhouses. Of course, many nineteenth-century poor
lived in informal housing constructed by themselves. This housing is poorly
recorded and little is known about it today. In addition, the poor also inherited
housing from the middle class through neighborhood succession (Burgess 1925).
Homes in Roxbury that are today considered slum housing were once the homes
of upwardly mobile middle-class tradesmen in the late nineteenth-century
(Warner 1962). In older cities like New York City this neighborhood succession
began as early as the mid 19 th century. Greenwich Village, built for a middle
class population, was New York's African-American ghetto of the time.
Neighborhood succession continues today, with many inner suburbs now being
abandoned by their original populations and becoming both poorer and more
minority in composition (Orfield 1997, Lucy and Phillips 2000). The dynamism
with which urban populations have shifted have meant that the environmental
quality of many poor neighborhoods is tied not only to the inherent quality of their
vernacular architecture, but also to overall neighborhood economic health.
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Tenements and shanties were early forms of architecture of the poor. Another
distinct architecture of poverty began emerging through the construction of
government-financed public housing projects beginning in the 1930s through the
1960s. Although these projects went through several distinct design phases
(Plunz 1990), they shared a stylistic and spatial distinction from surrounding
neighborhoods which increased over time. Public housing projects were both
social and architectural experiments, the social novelty of these buildings being
directly reflected in their novel appearance. While the novel appearance of these
buildings initially symbolized their almost utopian aims, mirrored in the successful
lives of the "selective collective" housed within them (Vale 2000), the increasing
placement of the very poor within housing projects combined with their
increasingly alienating architectural design eventually led to their stigmatization
as places of crime and despair.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10. While early New York City public housing developments like the
Williamsburg Houses in New York City (left) had a relatively humane low-rise scale, later postwar
projects (right) exemplified what Plunz (1990) called the 'spatial pathology' of separation from the
street and muted, institutional architecture. Illustrations from New York Housing Authority (1944).
While public housing design varied across the country, it was often characterized
by minimalist brick construction and site planning that treated the city block as an
acontextual space, ignoring all surrounding site features. Spatial relationships
between public housing buildings grew increasingly minimal, leading to what
Plunz (1990) called "spatial pathology". The scale of public housing often ignored
context as well. Many high-rise public housing buildings were constructed in
cities like Newark or Baltimore with little tradition of such construction. Even in
cities like Boston or Atlanta, where public housing was usually low-rise, the
spatial pathology of public housing usually set it well off from surrounding
neighborhoods. Within public housing complexes, spaces were also poorly
defined, leading to a lack of boundaries between public and private, and parking
and play space. This spatial indistinctness, combined with poor maintenance on
the part of housing authorities, led to the spaces between and within public
housing becoming increasingly unkempt and unsafe. Within buildings the
situation was often little better, with exposed hallways and stairways that became
locations for illicit activities. The poor maintenance also meant that features like
elevators were often unusable. Even the poorest of the poor found other places
to live, and abandonment of units grew. For a variety of reasons, many of which
were linked to their physical form, public housing projects were failing.
The policy response to the failures of public housing was at first muted. Writers
like Bauer (1957), Jacobs (1961) and Newman (1972) contributed to the criticism
of Modernist design by pointing out the social, economic, and public safety
deficiencies of modernist public housing design. The Pruitt-Igoe housing project
in St. Louis was demolished, but nothing replaced it, and other demolitions did
not follow for some time. In the early 1970's, government policies changes and
funding for new public housing ground to a halt. Much of the money formerly
dedicated to the construction of new public housing was transferred to Section 8
vouchers to assist the poor to live in existing housing units or housing units built
by the private sector. Modernist design itself also fell out of public favor during
this period. Construction of new public housing ceased almost entirely and
existing complexes were left to the often indifferent maintenance of city-based
public housing agencies.
The widespread reconsideration of public housing design did not begin until the
early 1980's, when cities, including Boston, began redeveloping public housing
on their own (Vale 2000 and 2002, forthcoming). In 1992 a federally appointed
commission recommended that the nation's most distressed housing projects be
reconstructed and redesigned in a new federal program. The "HOPE [Housing
Opportunities for People Everywhere] VI Urban Demonstration Program", as it
was called, began in 1993. By 2002 it is projected to have spent over four billion
dollars to demolish and rebuild 96,000 public housing units in 129 different
distressed housing projects (HUD 2000a).
Under the HOPE VI program, the design of public housing was radically
reconceived (Epp 1996). In many cases, tall towers were demolished and
replaced by townhouses facing recreated street networks. Housing units were
given individual street entrances, hopefully endowing residents with more of a
sense of ownership of their surroundings and improving the security and
maintenance of outdoor spaces. Where existing buildings were not demolished,
they were often altered with the addition of historicist features like gables and
porches, again in attempt to personalize the anonymous nature of the original
structures.
The neotraditional leanings of HOPE VI were formally linked to New Urbanism in
a 1996 HUD publication and with the HUD Secretary's signing of the Charter of
the New Urbanism that same year (Weiss 2000, HUD 2000b). Applicants for
Hope VI funds are awarded points based on their compliance with design
strategies encouraged by HUD. The incentive created by this point system has
meant that the designs of all HOPE VI redevelopments have been influenced by
New Urbanist principles. These principles, which will be explained later in this
section, have again linked public housing redevelopment to a wider design
movement, much as the Modernist designs did in the 1940s and 1950s.
The superficial resemblance of the redesigned public housing to vernacular
neighborhood urban architecture did not mean that all the features the original
neighborhood were replicated. Unit density, for example, usually dropped
precipitously. The Orchard Park housing project in Boston, for example, originally
contained 774 housing units, about the same as the original neighborhood.
Redevelopment of the project under HOPE VI lowered this number to 578, of
which 166 were infill units located off the original project site (Shumaker 2001m
HUD 1996a). This left a total number of 412 units on site, a unit density of only
53% of the original neighborhood. While a 'traditional' neighborhood urban fabric
was reestablished, the unit density of vernacular Roxbury neighborhoods was
not.
Figures 2. 11 and 2.12. While the row house architecture of Baltimore's Pleasant View Gardens (a
HOPE VI public housing redevelopment completed in 1997) is contextual (left), neighborhood
design features like radial streets, dead-end streets, central parks, and large back lot spaces are
not (right). Left photograph copyright Margaret P. Super, Right site plan copyright Baltimore
Housing Authority.
In addition to the new public housing being produced by HOPE VI, much low-
income housing production in inner cities has occurred through the agency of
Community Development Corporations, or CDCs. CDCs are nonprofit
organizations focusing mainly but not exclusively in housing production. They
have been increasingly successful during the 1990s, gaining in both number and
productivity. A National Community Development Initiative (NDCI) survey found
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that CDCs in 25 sample cities produced over 90,000 units of housing between
1991 and 1997 (Walker and Weinheimer 1999). This outnumbers the 61,000 new
units produced by all HOPE VI projects between 1993 and 2000 (HUD 2001).
The NDCI found New York to be by far the largest producer of CDC housing, with
at least 21,595 estimated units produced. Detroit, on the other hand, produced
only 759 units of CDC-sponsored housing during this time. Much of the funding
for CDC housing construction has come from the federal government. In 1995
alone, national CDCs received over $600 million from HUD for the construction of
low-income housing (Walker and Weinheimer 1999). Although the institutional
history of CDCs has been well-reviewed (Stoutland 1999, Rusk 1999, Grogan
and Proscio 2000), there has been limited study of the architecture and urban
design of this housing (Plunz 1990, Campos 1999), despite the fact that CDCs
are producing more low-income housing than HOPE VI.
Figures 2.13 and 2.14. Housing built by Community Development Corporations (CDCs) is
architecturally diverse but generally imitates vernacular styles. Two examples are these small
cottages in Detroit (left) and these twin homes in Boston (right).
By 1990 all three of the trends described above had become well established in
American cities. Suburbia was the leading ideal for American middle-class
housing and was nearly ubiquitous outside of older cities. Many of these older
cities, on the other hand, continued to decline, losing residents, housing, and
jobs, and gaining increasing numbers of vacant buildings, land and social
problems. Housing efforts for the poor had succeeded in alleviating some of
these problems through the reconstruction of some, but not most, urban
neighborhoods.
The next section will show how these three trends have set the stage for inner-
city suburbanization. With the suburb become the dominant American housing
paradigm, it would not be surprising to expect that many city dwellers desired
suburban housing. With the continued decline of many cities, larger and larger
amounts of vacant land were becoming available for redevelopment without the
displacement of residents that had been required in the urban renewal era. And
with the continued decentralization of housing production through programs like
the Community Development Block Grants, one might expect local organizations
to have become both more responsive to citizen desires as well as less
responsive to design paradigms imposed from above. The door was open, in
other words, for the construction of housing derived from vernacular suburban
models to be constructed in the vacant land of the inner city. Section Four places
inner-city suburbanization within the context of the trends described above and
hypothesizes the place of inner-city suburbanization within the spectrum of urban
change.
A hypothesis for inner-city suburbanization
The above three sections described a selective qualitative historical context for
the phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization. These three events-
suburbanization, urban decline and revitalization, and low-income housing
production- were selected because I saw them as likely influences on inner-city
suburbanization. Of course, many other events occurred in American cities at the
same time. Some cities did not decline and thus avoided the cycle described.
Cities built many kinds of housing besides that designated for the poor.
Nevertheless, the events described above influenced a great number of
American cities, especially the older cities which were already large before 1950.
Chapter Four examines the universe of larger American cities in some detail in
order to select the case cities to be studied.
Before examining real cities in Chapter Four to see if inner-city suburbanization is
happening in them or not, it is important to be clear as to the circumstances
under which inner-city suburbanization might occur. This clarification is important
because inner-city suburbanization is only one of many physical phenomena that
might be occurring in any city at any given time. To examine what these different
circumstances are, this section examines a generic city in a rather abstract
manner. This section creates a scenario in which the generic city is sequentially
presented with a series of choices. These choices are somewhat teleological in
that they are designed to get to the point where the city has the option to undergo
inner-city suburbanization or not. Other choices are not followed up as closely;
they are presented as dead ends in the tree of choices, though in reality they are
not.
This scenario is, of course, completely artificial. No real city is ever presented
with the binary choices that the generic city has. In reality, the choices shown in
the scenario are not really binary (nor are they necessarily choices), but can
occur at many points along a broad range. For example, cities experience
population change in many different ways. In this scenario, however, the generic
city is presented with two options, to retain its population or to lose it. This degree
of abstraction is necessary in order to cogently present the place of inner-city
suburbanization within the spectrum of changes that real cities experience.
Nor do the types of choices shown below necessarily occur throughout a city at
the same time. One part of a city might be growing while other parts decline. This
is readily apparent when one compares downtowns to declining areas, or
gentrifying neighborhoods to abandoned industrial districts. The land uses and
physical patterns of cities are diverse and this is reflected in the kinds of changes
that occur in them. The choice tree shows only a highly simplified, abstracted
version of these different types of changes.
The choice tree begins with a couple of assumptions. One is that the city being
described is an older city which is already centralized. The timespan of the
choices is irrelevant, although real cities have been undergoing this process
since about 1950. The only thing that is critical is the sequence of the choices.
Until one decision has been made the next cannot be. We can see that after five
choices inner-city suburbanization is produced as one of the two outcomes. Each
choice, and its consequence, is described after the diagram, and an attempt is
made to illustrate each choice with an example.
CONSEQUENCE older areas have older areas retainilule vacanti land vacant land
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The 'choice tree' above shows, in abstract form, the sequence of events necessary
suburbanization to occur. These events are represented as binary decisions made
'city' at bottom.
The first set of options that the generic city has is either to remain centralized, or
decentralize. What do these choices mean? Centralization is described as having
four variables, though it actually has countless more than that. These are the
land area of the city; the density of population and housing in the city; the degree
of automobile dependency in the city; and the degree of racial and/or ethnic
segregation in the city. Manhattan is perhaps the epitome of centralization in the
United States. It is a relatively small island, yet it houses almost two million
people; the majority of its inhabitants do not own automobiles; and many, thought
certainly not all, of them are ethnically and racially diverse, in part because of the
variety of housing found in its neighborhoods.
If the generic city remains centralized, nothing happens. The conditions which
held previously remain the same. In reality, no American city has remained
completely centralized; Manhattan has a smaller population now than it did in
1910, before it was even completely developed. If the generic city decentralizes,
many changes occur. First, the city expands in area as residents move outward
to occupy additional land. Second, assuming that the new settlements are lower
density and that the population which relocates is not completely replaced by
immigration, then the city dedensifies overall. Third, if the previous two
consequences hold true, automobile dependency will be increased, at least in the
newer, lower-density areas of the city. Fourth, lower-density settlements allow
for, though they do not guarantee, greater spatial separation between different
cost housing and between different class and racial groups, if they choose to
segregate. All four of these consequences can be seen to be true in a city like
Detroit, which will be examined in detail in this dissertation.
As indicated above, the older neighborhoods in a decentralizing city have two
options. One is to retain their level of population, either through increased
immigration or through retention of their original one. In reality, this rarely
happens. Decentralization is a powerful force that tends to draw population out
from all neighborhoods, and consequently the historic densities of these
neighborhoods are generally not matched. Even the Upper East Side of New
York, with far taller buildings today than it had in 1910, contains fewer people
now than it did then (Demographia.com 2002). The second choice, to lose
population, is far more common. The creation of new housing opportunities with
additional amenities, often at a lower cost, at the city fringe leads to the
depopulation of older neighborhoods. Even Cambridge, Massachusetts, a
relatively desirable city, has a smaller population now than it did fifty years ago,
and the Boston region has not decentralized as extensively as some other cities.
More common are neighborhoods like Cincinnati's Over-the-Rhine, a formerly
dense neighborhood whose population is down about 70% from its historic high
in 1930 (Scheer 2001).
Although many changes may occur in an older city neighborhood which is losing
population, the choice tree shows only that change related to the generic city's
number of housing units. An older city neighborhood losing population can either
to retain housing units in the face of this loss or lose them. In reality, both of
these options often occur.* A city which retains its housing units may do so
because there is enough demand for them to keep them occupied by other
people. Or, in the absence of demand, the average vacancy rate of housing in
the city could rise somewhat. Cities which lose housing units may do so in at
least two different ways. They may lose them when two or more units are
combined to create one unit. This uncrowding can happen in wealthy
neighborhoods as single-family houses that have been subdivided into
apartments are recombined to create a single housing unit. Cities may also lose
housing units through destruction. If an empty housing unit is not combined with
an existing one then it will remain empty. Empty units can be sealed up and
maintained, but in reality they are often destroyed due to weathering and
* Sample data for the city of Boston which illustrates many of these options in a more concrete
manner is included in Appendix B. Boston is a good sample city because it has experienced both
growth and decline in different areas, and in different ways.
vandalism. They thus disappear from the city's housing stock and leave behind a
parcel of vacant land.
There two obvious options for vacant land older city neighborhoods: they can
remain vacant or be redeveloped with new uses. Land can be left vacant
because it has little value, or because its owner is holding it intentionally vacant
for it to attain a higher value, and for other reasons as well. Many older cities
have thousands of vacant parcels which were formerly occupied by housing that
was lost. Vacant land may also be redeveloped for a variety of different
purposes. It may not have a building built on it again but instead be intentionally
transformed into public open space like a community garden; or it may be
annexed to an adjoining house to become part of its yard. Vacant land may also
be reused as the site for new buildings.
In reality, vacant land that is being redeveloped with new building can experience
a series of changes related to different attributes like its land use, ownership, etc.
The choice tree shows only those changes that are related to the unit density of
the new development. One option is for the land to be redeveloped at a density
that is equal to or higher than that of the housing which originally occupied the
site. Residential buildings adjoining an office district, for example, may be
destroyed so that office towers can be built on the site, or apartments may go up
on land that once held single-family houses. This option would not intuitively
seem to be a common occurrence on land that was first been abandoned due to
a lack of demand, but it is conceivable. The second option is for land to be
redeveloped at a lower density than that of the original housing. It is this option
that provides the opportunity, though not the guarantee, for inner-city
suburbanization.
We can thus hypothesize that inner-city suburbanization can occur under the
following set of circumstances; an older city decentralizes; it loses population,
then housing, in its older residential neighborhoods. That land becomes vacant
and is then redeveloped for new housing at lower densities than that of the
original. Even under these circumstances, however, it is possible that the result
will not be inner-city suburbanization. We will see in Chapter Four what the
different outcomes of this chain of choices are in the case cities that are
examined.
The next chapter will clarify the hypothesis for inner-city suburbanization by
defining the terms that are necessary to investigate the prevalence of inner-city
suburbanization in real cities. How do we define the constituent elements inner
city and suburb of the term inner-city suburbanization? How do we define the
term inner-city suburbanization itself, and which variables can we use to measure
the degree to which inner-city suburbanization is occurring? Answering all of
these questions is necessary in order to study the phenomenon of inner-city
suburbanization further.
Chapter Three
The Nature of Inner-City Suburbanization
Introduction
This chapter establishes the means by which the phenomenon of inner-city
suburbanization can be measured and therefore researched in actual cities.
Although we have seen both anecdotal and hypothetical evidence for inner-city
suburbanization in the two previous chapters, the extent of its prevalence
remains to be demonstrated. This chapter provides the background for such an
investigation by creating a qualitative and quantitative definition of inner-city
suburbanization.
This chapter has four sections. The first two involve defining the constituent
terms inner city and suburb. Both of these terms are broadly used, often without
a clear definition. The study defines inner cities as census tracts within cities that
have lost a certain amount of both population and housing units within a certain
period of time. The term suburb is used even more broadly and is equally difficult
to pin down. The study acknowledges that many types of neighborhoods could
be called suburbs and defines suburbs according to the physical form which they
took after the Second World War. The study labels neighborhoods which meet
this definition as vernacular suburbs.
The third section of the chapter examines the New Urbanism design movement.
New Urbanism is a hybrid architecture-physical planning philosophy, much like
the earlier Modern movement. New Urbanism is in large part predicated on a
rejection of both Modernist design as well as vernacular suburban physical
design. Although it rejects vernacular suburban design, New Urbanism has
become the first theoretical architectural movement to explicitly acknowledge the
vernacular suburb. The study uses the neighborhood definition created by the
New Urbanists in order to create an equally clear definition of vernacular
suburbia which has both quantitative and qualitative components.
The fourth section of this chapter combines the information from the above three
to create a combined qualitative-quantitative definition of inner-city
suburbanization. The study defines inner-city suburbanization as having seven
components, five of which are quantitative and two of which are primarily
qualitative. The quantitative components are the following: reductions in housing
unit density and lot coverage; homogenization of land uses, building typologies,
and tenure status. The qualitative components are neighborhood patterns which
resemble thos of vernacular suburbia and architecture whose site planning and
style is similar to that of vernacular suburbia. This definition is subsequently
applied to case developments in Chapter Four.
What is an inner city neighborhood?
The term 'inner city' has a single popular meaning which is comprised of two
components. The first is spatial: as befits the word 'inner', inner cities are
generally understood to be neighborhoods that are close to a city's downtown.
These neighborhoods are generally older and denser than other parts of the city.
The second component is socioeconomic: inner cities are generally understood
to be neighborhoods with severe social, economic, and physical problems. These
components are closely associated and neither, if considered alone,
appropriately defined what an inner city neighborhood is. In general, the
socioeconomic component tends to predominate; thus neighborhoods which are
close to downtown but are wealthy, like San Francisco's Telegraph Hill, are not
considered to be inner city neighborhoods. On the other hand, neighborhoods
which are relatively far from downtown, like New York City's South Bronx, but are
very poor are generally thought of as inner city neighborhoods.
'Inner cities' may thus be thought of as urban neighborhoods which are generally,
but not always, close to the urban core, but which always have higher than
average numbers of socioeconomic problems. The geographic connotation of the
term 'inner city' is becoming increasingly historical as neighborhoods that are
increasingly far from city centers begin to experience similar socioeconomic
problems. Nevertheless, the widespread use of the term justifies its use as a
convenient label for the kind of neighborhoods that the study will be examining.
Inner city neighborhoods have been variously, and loosely, defined in the
literature. Many authors use the term 'inner city' synonymously with words like
'ghetto'. Where they have been defined, inner cities are generally demarcated by
the economic status of their inhabitants rather than by the their physical
characteritstics. Wilson (1987), for example, defined ghettos as 'poverty areas'
where over 20 percent of residents were below the poverty line. Wilson uses the
terms 'ghetto' and 'inner city' interchangeably. Jargowsky (1997) defined inner
cities similarly. His careful study established what he called 'ghettos', 'barrios',
'white slums', and 'mixed slums' as neighborhoods with varying dominant racial
characteristics, but which were all 'high-poverty', i.e. with over forty percent of
their residents above the poverty line. Jargowsky's threshold was established by
results of an earlier study which had made qualitative measurements of poor
urban neighborhoods around the United States (Jargowsky and Bane 1991). The
socioeconomic indicators used by these authors to define inner cities reflect their
predominant academic affiliations in the realms of sociology and public policy,
but they certainly do not preclude other ways of interpreting inner cities.
Jargowsky emphasizes this through his reinforcing of his socioeconomic
definition with qualitative physical indicators.
One might imagine that physical definitions of inner cities, ghettos, or however
they might be termed might have been developed during the urban renewal era.
This period, as we saw in the previous chapter, was the one during which urban
redevelopment was primarily funded by the federal government under the
provisions of the national Housing Act of 1949. Yet even this law, which provided
for hundreds of millions of dollars to be spent clearing distressed neighborhoods,
did not provide a careful definition of the areas to be cleared, as Greer (1965)
noted. Greer concluded that the terms 'slum and 'blight' only "represented the
parts of town that the observer finds distasteful... in different ways." This
subjectivity had already been made painfully clear by Jacobs (1961). For his
purposes, Greer defined 'slums' only as "the poor housing in which live the poor
members of society", and 'blight' only as "land use(s) (which are) not as profitable
as some alternative..."
Nevertheless, every community which wished to received urban renewal money
was required to in some way designate those neighborhoods which it viewed as
problematic. As described in Lindbloom and Farrah's Citizen's Guide to Urban
Renewal (1968), any neighborhoods which contained two or more of the
following "environmental deficiencies" was potentially eligible for clearance
funding:
- "Overcrowding or improper location of structures on land";
- "Excessive dwelling unit density";
- "Incompatible types of uses";
- "Obsolete building types";
- "Detrimental land uses";
- "Unsafe, congested, or poorly designed streets";
- "Inadequate public utilities or community facilities";
- "Other equally significant deficiencies".
What is perhaps more impressive than the very attempt to define a vague
concept such as blight is the fact that such an impressively funded program was
dependent on such subjective variables. In practice, of course, the terms above
were, as Greer hinted, applied only to those areas which city officials did not like.
Another, more recent effort to define a distressed neighborhood was made by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) when it
developed the HOPE VI program to rehabilitate "severely distressed" public
housing. HUD's definition, which applied only to public housing, included four
sets of variables, two of which, "barriers to managing the environment", and
"physical deterioration of buildings", reflected physical characteristics of public
housing. While HUD's definition was comprehensive, it was nonetheless
criticized by Vale (1993), who argued that the thresholds created artificial barriers
which inhibited addressing the problems of less 'distressed' housing projects.
Finally, inner cities have been defined most recently in a physical sense by
Duany et. al. in their self-published Lexicon of the New Urbanism (2002). This
publication, which will be referred to again below, provided a clear physical
description of the 'inner city' which we will see was congruent with the case
neighborhoods examined in Chapter Four. According to Duany et. al., inner cities
were:
medium-density, late 19th century neighborhood fabric, often
composed of rectilinear street grids served by alleys. The buildings
are often good-quality row houses or small-lot houses of 1870-1930
vintage... the inner city is vulnerable to, if not synonymous with,
urban blight. The worst areas display widespread abandonment
and brownfields, poverty rates of 40% or more, and
hypersegregation of minorities.
The literature showed the term 'inner city' to be far from a scientific definition.
Instead, it was a widely used term with a generally accepted, but unspecific and
persistently subjective, meanings. This lack of a fixed definition led to different
interpretations, different uses, and, in the case of the urban renewal program,
serious problems. Despite these difficulties of subjectivity, for its purposes this
study created a new definition of the term 'inner city'. This was done not because
the most recent commonly accepted sense of the term reflected in Wilson and
Jargowsky was seen as inaccurate, but because a quantifiable measure was
necessary in order to select case neighborhoods in which to study housing
developments. Reflecting the common sense of the term inner city as having
both geographic and socioeconomic attributes, my new definition had both
physical and demographic components. I did not include socioeconomic
characteristics like a high percentage of residents in poverty and a high
percentage of minority group members as part of this definition.
I therefore defined 'inner city neighborhoods' as those neighborhoods that had
lost 20% or more of both their housing and population during the period 1970-
1990. These inner city neighborhoods were labeled severely distressed,
mirroring the use of this term in the HOPE VI program to describe public housing.
This definition reflected my interest in researching the physical transformations of
declining urban neighborhoods rather than reflecting an effort to provide an
authoritative definition of the term 'inner city'. It did not establish that the
neighborhoods which met the definition of 'inner city' as defined were matched by
qualitative impressions of inner city neighborhoods. However, both of the two
case neighborhoods examined in Chapter Five were commonly acknowledged by
interviewees to be what they considered inner city neighborhoods. The other
components of this definition reflected what were considered to be reasonable
thresholds. 20% was considered a reasonably large degree of change for the
period of twenty years being examined. 1970 was selected as a threshold
because census-tract level data before that year was inconsistent due to large-
scale redrawing of tract boundaries between 1960 and 1970. The 1970-1990
period also fortunately happened to be the period during which much urban
decline occurred. 1990 was selected as an end threshold because the study
wanted to examine recent change, i.e. change which had occurred since that
date.
The research found inner cities to be a relative term. The neighborhoods that
were found to be severely distressed in the two case cities were quite different
physically, reflecting their different vernacular housing construction. They were
also different geographically- some were much farther from the city center than
others but they did share many socioeconomic characteristics. In general they
were very poor, and the majority of their inhabitants were minority group
members. This dominance of the socioeconomic connotation was consistent with
the qualitative sense of the meaning of 'inner city' that was discussed above.
What is a suburb?
Like the term 'inner city', the term 'suburb' has a common popular connotation
but no strict definition. This term, and its cognates 'suburbs' and 'suburbia', has
geographic, physical, social, and economic connotations. The geographic
connotation of 'suburb' is perhaps most important, denoting an area located
beyond the city limits. Suburbs are not 'urban', but neither are they 'rural'- they
are instead, for the most part, low-density carpet of residential, commercial, and
even industrial areas located around cities. Many of the social, economic,
physical connotations of suburbia are related to the residential portion of
suburbia, which is the largest in area and also the most historic. However, most
of the land uses found in cities can now also be found in suburbs.
Many of the scholars who have studied suburbia have concentrated on one or
another of its aspects, leading to specialized definitions. The broadest definitions
of suburbia came from urban historians. Jackson (1985), after reviewing the
difficulty of defining the term 'suburbs', emphasized that nevertheless "one may
... generalize about the American residential experience.. similarities among
American residential patterns are much more numerous than are differences..."
Jackson defined suburbia as an area distinguished by four characteristics: non-
farm homeownership residential; middle- and upper-class residents; separation
from the workplace (i.e. the center city); and low densities (relative to the center
city). Jackson's definition neatly included geographic, social, economic, and
physical elements. While broad, Jackson's definition still had limitations. Non-
residential components of suburbia were omitted from his definition, despite the
fact that commercial and industrial functions are also widespread in the suburbs
(Rowe 1991, Garreau 1991). Jackson also emphasized the single-family,
homeownership component of suburbia at the expense of other forms of housing
arrangements. While the majority of residences in the suburbs are indeed single-
family houses owned by their residents, suburbs also contain many rental
apartments and other types of ownership units like condominium townhouses.
Finally, Jackson's sociological definition of suburbia as a place for upper- and
middle-class residents was somewhat inaccurate. Many suburbs, for example
those of Atlanta, now serve as gateways for poor immigrant families, a function
which was once performed by urban neighborhoods alone.
Fishman (1987) fundamentally agreed with Jackson by defining the suburb as "a
residential community beyond the core of a large city". Fishman emphasized that
suburbs remained culturally dependent on the central city, and that they shared a
common physical form: "a distinctive low-density environment defined by the
primary of the single-family house set in the greenery of an open, parklike
setting." While the components of Fishman's definition are certainly to be found
in existing suburbs, his definition shared some of the limitations of Jackson's.
Many suburbs are no longer dependent on their central cities for most functions.
In sprawling cities like Phoenix or in declining cities like Detroit few traditionally
"central-city' functions remain downtown. Even thriving cities like Boston have
experienced a steady decline in the center city's percentage share of the office
market and residential population. Fishman correctly, however, emphasized the
single-family house as a powerful imagistic component of suburbia. The single-
family house is not only statistically significant as comprising a major proportion
of suburban dwellings, but has powerful symbolic importance as well. The single-
family house sitting in a green lawn has as much, or more, iconic power than its
geographic setting amidst highways and shopping malls. Stilgoe (1988), studying
the origins of the American suburb, agreed with Jackson and Fishman in
emphasizing the importance of suburbia's visual appearance in establishing its
image. According to Stilgoe, suburbia is difficult to tabulate but is nevertheless
instantly recognizable.
The broad definitions of suburbia created by urban historians was useful in
providing a basis for a historical examination of suburbanization, but did not
provide grounds for a physical definition of a suburb. In order to do that, the
temporal location of suburbia needed to be clarified. As American cities have
been suburbanizing since the nineteenth century, many different neighborhoods,
at different points, have been considered suburbs. Some of the different forms of
these suburbs were discussed previously in Chapter Two. Because of the long
time period during which suburbs developed, one can distinguish between
several different types of suburbs. Below are five types of suburbs which I loosely
derived from historical data.
Early suburbs. These were the first suburbs to form around American cities. They
were little different in density and form from their center cities and most were
politically annexed during the nineteenth century. They were common around
1830. Examples: Brooklyn Heights, New York; Northern Liberties, Philadelphia.
Railroad suburbs. These suburbs formed because of the invention of the steam
railroad around 1840. They were accessed by railroad. They were often socially
exclusive and lower density than their center cities. They were sometimes but not
always different in neighborhood form from center cities. Many of these suburbs
remained politically separate from their center cities. They were common around
1870. Examples: Chestnut Hill (later incorporated into Philadelphia); Riverside,
Chicago; Glendale, Cincinnati.
Streetcar suburbs. These suburbs democratized the suburban concept because
they were accessed by relatively cheap horsecar and electric streetcars. They
were working, middle, or upper-class and were somewhat lower density than
their center cities. They were somewhat more linear in their neighborhood form
but usually reflecte a similar grid pattern to their cities of origin. Some of these
suburbs remained separate from their center cities while others occurred within
the city or were annexed to it. They were common around 1910. Examples:
Somerville, Boston; West Philadelphia, Philadelphia; Shaker Heights, Cleveland.
Early automobile suburbs. These suburbs reflected the increasing popularity of
the automobile and were primarily accessed via auto. They were generally
middle-class and were lower density than their center cities. They were
sometimes but not always different in their neighborhood form from the center
city. Many of these suburbs remained separate from their center cities. They
were common around 1930. Examples: Grosse Pointe, Detroit; Mariemont,
Cincinnati, Palos Verdes, Los Angeles.
Postwar suburbs. These suburbs reflected the large-scale societal move out of
cities and were thus very numerous. They were middle-class or exclusive and
were almost exclusively accessed by auto. They were lower-density than their
central city. Most of these suburbs remained separate from their center cities,
especially in older, 'inelastic' cities (Rusk 1995). They were common around
1960. Examples: Southfield, Detroit; Framingham, Boston; Bethesda,
Washington.
The postwar suburb, through its ubiquitousness, has become that category of
suburb which we most commonly associate with the term. Postwar suburbs,
however, are themselves diverse environments. Southworth and Owens (1993)
described several variations of postwar suburban development form at the level
of both the community and the neighborhood. At the community level Southworth
and Owens described street patterns that they called "interrupted parallels",
"loops and lollipops", and "incremental infill". Southworth and Owens' terms were
among the first to attempt to create a typological classification of postwar
suburbia, and their article confirmed what was already an anecdotal certainty:
that postwar suburbia had a particular, and unique, neighborhood form. Perhaps
their most important finding, however, was that postwar suburbia, despite its
seemingly monotonous nature, was far from physically or temporally
homogenous. Large areas of land take a long time to develop, and rural land was
often extensively developed with roads before the postwar suburban period
arrived. The result for many localities was a patchwork of development types,
united in their low densities and automobile dependency, but diverse in their
ages and formal natures.
Much like the biological concept of the species, the categories of suburbs
distinguished above were not hard and fast- they blurred together at their edges.
This made it difficult to establish a definition of the suburb that included every
component. Political separation, for example, was often inaccurate, especially in
fast-growing cities of the Sunbelt where political annexation remained
commonplace. Cities like Houston, which still have undeveloped land at their
edges, were almost completely composed of suburbs of the different types above
within a single political jurisdiction. Very old cities like Boston, on the other hand,
had communities at their edges which have gone through all of the above
phases. Brookline, a town outside of Boston, has been a railroad, a streetcar,
and an early automobile suburb at least. It would have been and perhaps
meaningless to try to force it into any one category.
It was thus something of a relief to escape from this definitional nightmare into an
examination of the physical nature of suburbia. Irrespective of its exact nature,
suburbs, especially postwar suburbs, had a distinctive physical form which was
unmistakably 'suburban'. I used this form of suburbia as the benchmark for what I
considered 'suburban'. The postwar suburb was also a particularly accurate form
of suburb with which to measure inner-city suburbia because inner-city suburbs
were recent forms of development, arriving in the era of the automobile suburb.
Charlotte Gardens, perhaps the earliest inner-city suburb, was only constructed
in 1985.
In order to construct a physical definition of the suburb I closely examined the
phenomenon of New Urbanism. This highly organized design movement
provided the means to construct a definition of vernacular suburbia that was then
applied to the inner-city developments studied in Chapter Four.
The New Urbanism
Architects have for the most part ignored suburbia. This is primarily because the
development of suburbia has been for the most part a vernacular movement.
Although some early picturesque suburbs were designed by landscape
architects, much of the neighborhood design of postwar suburbia was the result
of generalized street standards rather than careful design (Southworth and Ben-
Joseph 1997). The architectural design of early postwar suburbs like Levittown
was more the result of construction efficiency than architectural design. The
result was a landscape that, at least to the upper echelons of the design
profession, displayed very little of interest. These esthetic concerns resulted in
the disappearance of suburbia from the architectural agenda (Dunham-Jones
2000).
Widely constructed but minimally influenced by architectural theory, suburbia
became by far the largest vernacular building movement in the country. Although
previous writers like J.B. Jackson (1997) and Gans (1967) had begun to explore
the meanings and resident perceptions of vernacular suburban environments as
early as the 1950s, Robert Venturi (1972) was the first well-known architect to
advocate the acceptance, and even the embracing, or vernacular, automobile-
oriented architecture. His Learning from Las Vegas, written in 1972 after a studio
project there, was a paean to the commercialization and messiness of the
suburban retail strip. Although Venturi's fetishization of roadside signage never
captured the attention of architectural theorists, the acknowledgement that
suburban landscapes were an exciting and integral part of the built environment
was nevertheless an important contribution.
Venturi's architecture was one of the first stirrings of what would become known
as the postmodern movement in architecture. Postmodernists rejected the
antihistorical nature of modernism, promoting instead the application of
contextual and historicist elements to buildings (Jencks 1987). Although the
postmodernist movement, too, would fall prey to the changing fashions of
architecture, an offshoot of this movement which would become known as the
New Urbanism would survive, in part because it transcended architectural style
to encompass elements of not only other professions like urban planning and
transportation engineering, but environments like the vernacular suburb that
theoretical architects had essentially left for dead.
The earliest promoters of what would become known in the 1990s as the 'New
Urbanism' were the husband-and-wife team of Andres Duany and Elizabeth
Plater-Zyberk. These Miami architects gained initial fame with their design for
Seaside, a small resort town on Florida's Gulf Coast, in the early 1980s (Duany
1991). While Seaside was tiny and would not be completed for years, it quickly
became influential in academia while slowly becoming more influential in
practice.
What Duany and Plater-Zyberk called the New Urbanism constituted a rejection
of the neighborhood form and architecture of suburbia. The New Urbanists
claimed that the suburban built landscape was bad for a variety of different
reasons and that the solution was essentially to return to the form of the prewar
automobile suburb. This, claimed the New Urbanists, would both restore a sense
of community that was missing in postwar suburbs as well as alleviate their visual
blight. It would also, they claimed, open the door for the restoration of mass
transit by reducing automobile dependency. (For studies of individual New
Urbanist projects, see Katz 1994, Dutton 2000, and Lyndon 2000.)
Although New Urbanism began with the proposition of static models for good
neighborhood form (such as Seaside) the movement has grown larger and more
flexible over time, encompassing political and economic attributes as well as
multiple scales of physical design. Most recently (2002) Andres Duany has
begun promoting the idea of what he calls a transect, a term borrowed from
ecology, which describes an ideal 'cut' across multiple environments from rural to
urban. In doing so, Duany is proposing that New Urbanism, rather than being a
development form which is appropriate only for small towns or neighborhoods, is
in fact appropriate for all levels of development, from rural "preserves" to "urban
cores". The transect is a questionable concept on at least two counts. In the first
place, it is not necessarily consistent with other forms of New Urbanism. The
existence of low-density residential developments within the transect raises the
question of how "New Urban" these districts can really be. Second, the transect
proposes an ideal density gradient which is very far from reflecting reality. Edge
cities, for example, are density nodes located somewhere in Duany's "sub-urban"
category, but which are both higher in density and larger in size than what Duany
shows. And, as we will see, the increasingly low densities of many inner city
areas are not shown in the transect. Inner-city suburbanization, as a whole, is a
concept inconsistent with the transect notion.
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Figure 3.1. The 'transect' proposed by Andres Duany in the Lexicon of the New Urban ism (2002)
proposes ideals for a complete spectrum of development from dense, mixed use urban centers to
protected rural preserves. It excludes increasingly common features of metropoltan areas like
edge cities and, as this dissertation shows, inner-city suburbanization.
New Urbanism has also expanded its institutional status, attempting to become,
like the Modern movement before it, a ubiquitous force in American planning and
architecture. Organizations and conferences have grown up dedicated to the
movement (see Leccese and McCormick 2000) and increasing numbers of
developers are also paying attention to the fact that New Urbanist developments
seem to sell. New Urbanism, as we will see, played a role in many of the
development stories examined in Chapter Five. New Urbanism has, of course,
spawned much debate. Many builders claim that Americans want suburbs, not
New Urbanist developments. Others claim that the New Urbanism is simply
another version of the suburb. Others criticize the often historicist architectural
design of New Urbanist developments as being dishonest.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to come to a comprehensive
assessment of the New Urbanism, it is clear the movement has made important
contributions to the study of suburbia's physical form through its carefully laid-out
proposition of a design alternative to what Duany et. al. (2002) called
"conventional suburban development". Below are listed several of the design
components of the New Urbanism, as defined in Duany et. al. (2000). These
components range from large-scale features such as mixed land uses, to smaller
neighborhood design features such as narrow streets. The importance of these
terms in establishing a definition of what I call vernacular suburbia and
consequently of inner-city suburbanization will be discussed subsequently.
Design features of the New Urbanism
- Mixed uses
Commercial and residential areas should be balanced to reduce the distance
between housing and shopping/jobs. This includes placing community
facilities likes schools, houses of worship, and public buildings in close
proximity to residences.
- Connectivity
Residential neighborhoods should maximize their connection to compatible
land uses through roads and pedestrian networks. Streets may curve, but
they may not curve randomly and cul-de-sacs are avoided if possible.
- Site design sensitivity
Natural features such as hillsides, vegetation, and waterways should be
emphasized rather than obliterated by new development.
- Neighborhood hierarchy
Neighborhoods should include density and land use gradients as one moves
through a neighborhood. Duany (2002) calls this hierarchy a 'transect' and
has described it as a gradient from dense urban space to rural space.
- Transit orientation
Neighborhoods should be designed so as to permit and encourage the
development of mass transit systems, even is such systems are not
implemented when a neighborhood is constructed.
- Narrow streets
Streets should be designed for pedestrians rather than automobiles and
excessive widths should therefore be discouraged, as overly wide streets
encourage speeding and are more dangerous for pedestrians.
- Traditional architectural design
Buildings should maintain traditional site planning and architectural features,
including relatively high densities, streetfront, pedestrian orientations, and
ancillary uses.
- Hidden parking
Parking should not be placed at the front of buildings, either commercial or
residential, but should be placed in the back, either in mid-block parking lots
or in alleyways.
The contrast between New Urbanist design features and those of typical
suburbia can be seen in Figure 3.2 below, which shows both neighborhoods
together. The New Urbanist neighborhood is on the bottom half of the diagram.
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Figure 3.2. A new urbanist neighborhood (bottom) is shown in contrast with a vernacular
suburban neighborhood (top). Note the disconnectedness and segregation of uses of the
vernacular neighborhood.
The design features of New Urbanism can be clearly seen in those New Urbanist
developments which have been constructed. The photographs on the next page
show aerial views of two well-known New Urbanist developments in Seaside,
Florida, and Kentlands, Maryland. Both of these developments were designed by
the firm of Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Company. Both have been substantially
completed are considered to be paradigmatic New Urbanist developments
(Southworth 1997).
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Two nearly completed New Urbanist communities: Seaside, Florida (left)
and Kentlands, Maryland (right). Photograph on left copyright United States Geological Survey,
on right copyright Mapquest.
These photographs show some of the primary design features of the New
Urbanism. In both neighborhoods, small retail and commercial uses are located
amidst residential uses. Radial street networks lead from neighborhood centers
into residential areas, and although there are loop streets, there are no cul-de-
sacs. It is difficult to discern the site design sensitivity of the developments from
this scale, but some natural features like woods clearly remain. Both
neighborhoods have also established a hierarchy of densities. At Kentlands one
can see apartment blocks, dense single-family housing, and more spacious
single-family housing spreading away from the village centers. These village
centers would be good locations for transit stops, although none have yet been
established. Although it is difficult to discern in the photographs, both
developments have narrower streets than surrounding communities. While
parking is provided for all uses, it is nowhere formally dominant. Finally, the
architecture of these communities is modelled after local historical models, as
can be seen in the photographs below. Note the site planning of the Kentlands
housing, where houses are arranged in a manner which is more typical of an
urban setting than a suburban one.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Both Seaside (left) and Kentlands (right) have architecture derived from
local historic vernaculars. Unlike typical suburban homes, New Urbanist homes generally
replicate historic architecture more carefully and also attempt to emulate the neighborhood design
scale of the older communities. Photograph on left copyright Seaside Community Realty, Inc. and
on right copyright Kentlands Realty Group.
The design features described by the New Urbanists, predicated as they are in a
rejection of postwar suburbia, can be easily transformed to create a definition of
postwar suburbia as careful as that created by the New Urbanists. It is this
second defintion that creates what I call vernacular suburbia. Like the New
Urbanism, this definition is comprised of physical elements only, although we
have seen that there are many social and economic connotations to suburbia as
well. Although postwar suburbs are diverse, the definition created below
encompasses the physical features of most of them.
Design features of vernacular suburbia
- Single-use developments
Residential, commercial, and industrial uses are constructed in separate,
homogenous developments, and different types of uses within a land use
category, such as single-family and multifamily, or retail and office, are also
constructed in separate and homogeneous developments.
- Disconnected developments
Residential, commercial, and industrial uses are physically separated and are
generally mutually accessible only by automobile. Different types of land uses
within a land use type are also separated and generally mutually inaccessible
by pedestrians. Within developments, through traffic is discouraged in the
form of curvilinear streets and cul-de-sacs.
- Insensitivity to the natural landscape
Natural features such as hills, watercourses, and vegetation are often ignored
and destroyed through the development of vernacular suburban development.
- Lack of neighborhood hierarchy
Similar land uses and housing unit densities extend across multiple
developments, creating homogenous areas which end abruptly at unsettled
land or at other land uses.
- Automobile orientation
Developments are designed to be accessible by automobile alone and are not
necessarily oriented pedestrian access or toward the development of mass
transit networks.
- Wide streets
Streets are correspondingly designed to ease automobile and other motor
vehicle access and are not designed for ease of pedestrian crossing or
pedestrian comfort in general.
- Seemingly unregulated architectural design
Architectural design may be of any style and is not necessarily pedestrian-
oriented.
- Parking in front
Parking is a prioritized use of space in the front of a house or a building,
either as a one-, two-, or three-car garage, or as a parking lot of any size.
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The two photographs below show two examples of typical vernacular suburbia-
one outside of Detroit, Michigan, the other outside of Orlando, Florida. Note that
these suburban areas are very much mixed-use, containing both residential and
commercial uses.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Vernacular suburbs contain diverse land uses, but they are segregated by
wide roads and acres of parking. They are overwhelmingly automobile-dominated environments.
At left is Troy, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit; at right is suburban Orlando, Florida. Both
photographs copyright Mapquest.com.
These vernacular suburbs, both created since 1990, have different land uses
neatly segregated by parcel. Both are what Garreau (1991) referred to as edge
cities. Apartment complexes, offices, shopping malls, and single-family housing
are all located in their own areas. A lack of hierarchy among uses is evident withs
each use extending homogeneously across the site until it ends abruptly and
another use begins. Different uses are connected only by major roads and are
otherwise isolated. Wide arterial roads and large areas of surface parking reflect
the overwhelmingly automobile orientation of these areas. Neither streets nor
buildings have been laid out as part of an overall plan. Buildings consequently
bear little relationship to the road or to each other.
The majority of vernacular suburbia is residential. Both photographs above show
multi-family housing located near offices and retail. These are, however,
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relatively concentrated areas. Other parts of vernacular suburbia are much lower
density and display the familiar curving roads and cul-de-sacs of the residential
landscape. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show typical examples of this residential
landscape from the air and on the ground.
Figures 3.9 and 3. 10. The neighborhood design of postwar residential vernacular suburbia is
characterized by curving loop roads and cul-de-sacs. Houses are often quite large with variable
yards. The photograph at left shows a development in West Bloomfield outside of Detroit; the
photograph at right shows a house in a development in North Andover, Massachusetts. Both
developments were constructed after 1990. Photograph at left copyright Mapquest.com.
These photos show many of the site planning features typical of vernacular
residential suburbia. The developments shown have only one land use, single-
family houses. They are connected to neighboring roads via only a few curving
streets. Most roads are curving cul-de-sacs. Construction of the development has
removed essentially all of the original forest and little natural context remains.
There is no hierarchy of land uses visible either in either photograph- both are a
continuous carpet of single-family houses. Access to these neighborhoods is by
automobile alone, and long driveways, reflect the prominently located garages at
the front of houses. Both of the developments shown above are higher-end
developments where houses sell in the neighborhood of $400,000 to $500,000.
The value of these suburbs is reflected in their large houses rather than large
lots- as we saw, lot sizes have been steadily decreasing in suburbia. The
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architectural style of the houses in North Andover could best be described as
Colonial Revival.
The above definition of vernacular suburbia provides a language with which the
phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization can also be defined. The major
difference between the two phenomena is that one is essentially an object
(vernacular suburbia) while the other is a process (inner-city suburbanization).
Why the difference?
Inner-city suburbanization is defined as a process rather than as an object
because it is occurring in many different types of urban environments. This will
be seen most clearly when we examine the case cities and developments but a
hint of it can be seen in the two photographs below, which show typical
residential neighborhoods in Philadelphia and Detroit.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12. Typical Detroit neighborhood houses (left) are freestanding and built in a
variety of styles, in this case bungalows. Typical Philadelphia houses (right) are attached and
almost always built of brick, with relatively flat roofs. Photograph on right by Daniel Campo.
These photographs show very different types of urban housing. Philadelphia's is
row housing, built end-to-end with no side or front yards. Row housing is high
density, with up to 50 units per acre. Detroit's housing, on the other hand, is
detached. Although some of the houses are two-family homes, the density of this
neighborhood is much lower, about 12 units per acre.
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Although both of these neighborhoods would be considered 'urban' in their own
contexts, placed in each other's contexts their impressions would be very
different. In a Philadelphia environment, Detroit housing would seem to be very
much out of place, and quie low density. To the casual passerby it would seem
reminiscent of the outer edges of Philadelphia or even the suburbs, rather than of
a typical Philadelphia neighborhood. Yet in Detroit, this same housing would
seem unbelievably dense.
We can now see why inner-city suburbanization is better considered as a relative
process rather than as an absolute neighborhood or housing form. A Philadelphia
neighborhood that was rebuilt at half its original density would still be twice as
dense as an urban neighborhood in Detroit. A Detroit neighborhood rebuilt at half
its original density, on the other hand, would become less dense than Levittown,
a typical postwar vernacular suburb. Does this mean that the rebuilding of one
neighborhood constitutes suburbanization and the other does not?
This study argues that it does not, and that the experience of the same types
changes in different urban environments, so long as they are beyond a level
which remains to be determined, constitutes inner-city suburbanization. With this
in mind, we can examine the seven constituent changes that are proposed to
measure the phenomenon. The quantitative changes are relative; the qualitative
changes are absolute. The quantitative changes measure shifts from a historic
neighborhood pattern to a redeveloped one. The qualitative changes describe
the degree to which the new neighborhood patterns are visually suggestive of
those of vernacular suburbia as described above. The quantiative changes are
the following: the degree of reduction in housing unit density; the homogenization
of land use mix; the homogenization of building typology; and the
homogenization of property tenure status, and the degree of reduction in lot
coverage. The qualitative changes are the following: the presence of vernacular
suburban neighborhood design patterns; and the presence of vernacular
suburban architectural styles. Each of these characteristics is described below.
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Seven characteristics of inner city suburbanization
1) Large reductions in housing unit density
The reduction in the number of housing units per acre of new inner-city
residential developments from that of historic housing.
Most new inner city residential developments are significantly less dense than
the historic housing (that which formerly stood on the site.) Charlotte Gardens in
the South Bronx represents an extreme case of dedensification (it is measured
later in this chapter).
2) Homogenization of building typology
The degree to which the building typology of new inner-city housing
developments is more homogeneous than that of the historic housing.
Vernacular suburban neighborhoods are generally composed entirely of one type
of development. Residential suburban neighborhoods are generally entirely
single-family homes, multifamily apartments, attached condominiums, etc. Urban
neighborhoods, in contrast, are often a mix of apartments, rowhouses, two-
family, and single-family houses.
3) Homogenization of tenure status
The degree to which the property tenure (homeownership or rental) of new inner-
city housing developments is more homogenous than of the historic housing.
Property tenure types are usually segregated in vernacular suburban
neighborhoods. Single-family housing developments are often entirely owner-
occupied, apartments are often entirely rental, etc. In contrast, urban
neighborhoods often contain a mix of rental, ownership, and sometimes
cooperative units, sometimes even within the same building.
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4) Homogenization of land use mix
The degree to the land use mix of new inner-city housing developments is more
homogeneous than that of the historic neighborhood.
Vernacular suburbs are characterized by a segregated mix of residential,
commercial, and industrial uses, whereas urban neighborhoods are often a mix
of these uses. Commercial and residential uses are often found in one building in
urban areas, with, for example, apartments located over stores. This is almost
never the case in vernacular suburban neighborhoods.
5) Change in street designs
The degree to which new street networks in inner city developments resemble
the wide, curvilinear, streets of vernacular suburbia.
Suburban streets are characterized by wide, curvilinear residential streets, cul-
de-sacs, and other features (Southworth and Owens 1993). These street layouts
symbolize the bucolic, antiurban nature of the suburban landscape. Urban street
grids are traditionally rectilinear grids, although there are both multiple variations
of this form and multiple exceptions to it.
6) Suburban site planning
The degree to which the lot coverage (percentage of a building lot is less than
that of the historic housing.
Vernacular suburban residential neighborhoods are generally characterized by
buildings standing in yards. The size of houses and lots, and their ratio, varies
somewhat by the socioeconomic status of the development. Duany et. al. (2002)
described a spectrum of densities, where suburban houses surrounded by yards
on all four sides are defined as 'edge yard' dwellings. Denser, more urban
houses built up to at least one side lot line are defined as 'side yard' dwellings,
where yards are located along only one side of a house, and houses attached on
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both sized are called 'rear yard' dwellings (i.e. rowhouses). Many older houses in
Detroit re edge yard types, and the rowhouses of Philadelphia are of course rear
yard types. Postwar suburban houses, or apartments, of course, are almost
always of the 'edge yard' type.
7) Suburban architecture
The degree to which new inner-city housing is designed in a vernacular suburban
architectural style.
Suburban architectural typologies differ greatly from older urban architectural
typologies. Although these styles have changed over time, there are distinct
stylistic differences between, say, a late nineteenth-century rowhouse and a
modern suburban tract home. These differences are tied to materials,
fenestration, and architectural features like gables, bay windows, etc.
Each of these seven variables can be applied to any new housing development,
whether it is in an inner city or not, as long as the development replaced a former
dwelling and/or neighborhood. They would be inapplicable in a suburban
development that was constructed on land that was formerly agricultural or
otherwise undeveloped. Together, they provide a combined quantitative and
qualitative indication of the degree of inner-city suburbanization
Once a development has been measured, how can its degree of inner-city
suburbanization be compared with those of other developments? To do this the
study constructed an index of inner-city suburbanization. The index is simply the
sum of the five quantitative indicators for a development. Each is assigned equal
value, with a maximum of one. The neighborhood design variable is also crudely
qualified, as will be explained below. The maximum score for any development
would therefore be six. Since each indicator is a rate of change, negative scores
are also possible. This would be the case for a development that was urbanizing
rather than suburbanizing. The qualitative architecture variable is not part of the
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suburbanization score, reflecting the fact that inner-city suburbanization, like any
type of physical change in cities that involves design, is in part a qualitative
phenomenon.
The inner-city suburbanization index
The formula for the inner-city suburbanization score is the following:
I(S)
where S = (percent value of a characteristic / 100)
The highest possible suburbanization index is 6.
A sample suburbanization index calculated for Charlotte Gardens follows. A
sample block bounded by Charlotte Street, Boston Avenue, 17 2nd Street, and
Seabury Place was used for the calculation. Formulas are given below the
characteristic.
I. Reduction in housing unit density 98%
100 -[(New Housing Units/ac) / (Old Housing Units/ac) * 100]
New HU/ac = 6.76
Old HU/ac = 287.5
Charlotte Gardens's density is far less dense than the historic development,
giving about as close to a full dedensification score as can be imagined.
2. Homogenization of building typology 0%
(%New Housing Type- %Old Housing Type)
New HT = 100% units in single-family homes
Old HT = 100% units in multifamily buildings
Although the redeveloped Charlotte Gardens was homogenous, the historic
sample block was also homogenously built up with multifamily tenements. On
this count the development thus scored zero.
3. Homogenization of property tenure status 0%
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(%New Tenure Status - %Old Tenure Status)
New TS = 100% homeownership
Old TS = 100% rental
Although the historic Charlotte Gardens neighborhood was completely rental
tenements before redevelopment, rental status alone does not communicate
'suburban'. The homogenous nature of the sample block both before and after
redevelopment means that its score on this count was zero.
4. Homogenization of land use mix 0.12%
-(%New mixed-use - %Old mixed-use)
New mixed-use = 0%
Old mixed-use = 12%
The sample Charlotte Gardens block was almost entirely residential before
redevelopment, and completely residential afterwards. Its score is thus low.
5. Shifts to suburban street pattern 0%
(%New street pattern)
This measurement has only five percentage values: 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100.
0 reflects no change in the street design of the development.
25 reflects the removal of all alleys.
50 reflects the removal of all alleys and moderate changes to through streets.
75 reflects the removal of all alleys and substantial changes to through streets.
100 reflects a complete alteration of the street system.
Charlotte Gardens, though it radically rebuilt the neighborhood, did not alter the
existing street system. Even the name 'Suburban Place', shown in the cover
photograph, preceded the development!
6. Shift to suburban site planning 70%
Lot coverage is used as the variable to indicate a shift to a lower-density living
pattern.
100- [(New lot coverage/Old LC) * 100]
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New LC = 19.2%
Old LC = 63.7%
The single-family ranch houses of Charlotte Gardens covered far less land than
the dense historic tenements, giving a high site planning score.
7. Degree of suburban architecture N.A.
This is a qualitative variable and can only be discussed, not measured, though
the radical typological differences between the new and historic architecture of
Charlotte Gardens clearly indicate a shift from 'urban' tenements toward
'suburban' single-family housing.
The six S values for Charlotte Gardens are 0.98, 0.0, 0.0, 0.12, 0.0, and 0.7. The
sum of these S values, and therefore the suburbanization index for this
development, is 1.8 out of a possible 6. Somewhat surprisingly, despite its
obviously suburban appearance, and despite the dense, obviously urban nature
of the historical neighborhood, the suburbanization index of Charlotte Gardens is
,rather low, indicating that the index may have some limitations. These limitations
will be discussed in the following chapter.
The suburbanization index is, of course, merely an abstraction. It does, however,
provide a convenient, though incomplete, means of quickly comparing the
difference between the environments created by new and old housing
developments. Of course, this index can be applied to any situation where
redevelopment has occurred. Urban growth could be measured as well as inner-
city suburbanization.
The definition of terms laid out in this chapter provides the means with which to
both determine and measure the case neighborhoods and developments that will
be examined in Chapter Four. This Chapter also describes a methodology for
selecting the two case cities of Detroit and Philadelphia. By the end of Chapter
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Four, a portrait will have been created of the prevalence of inner-city
suburbanization in those two cities.
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Chapter Four
The Prevalence of Inner City Suburbanization
Introduction
The previous three chapters described the inspiration and aims of this
dissertation, the historical contrast of recent inner-city and suburban
development in America, and a definition of the term inner-city suburbanization,
as well as an explanation of how that term would be measured. The next three
chapters constitute the core of this dissertation and are intended to address the
three research questions framed in Chapter One. Chapter Four addresses the
question of where, and to what extent, inner city suburbanization is occurring in
the two case cities of Detroit and Philadelphia. Chapter Five investigates the
reasons for the suburbanization phenomenon occurring in those cities. Finally,
Chapter Six makes the triple inquiry of whether or not the inner-city
suburbanization phenomenon is really significant; how it should be evaluated by
architects, planners, and urban designers, and finally, how these evaluations
might guide future design and policy action in America's inner cities.
This rather lengthy chapter describes the nature and extent of inner city
suburbanization in Detroit and Philadelphia in four sections. Section One
describes the methodology for the study's selection of case cities and
neighborhoods to be examined. In Section Two the study examines population
and housing shifts within the two case cities in order to select the case
neighborhoods to be examined. Sections Three and Four examine development
trends within the city of Detroit and Philadelphia from 1990 to the present (2002),
and apply the suburbanization criteria described in Chapter Three to measure the
prevalence of inner-city suburbanization in both cities. The chapter concludes by
comparing the inner-city suburbanization phenomenon in the two case cities,
setting the stage for Chapter Five's investigation of the causality of inner-city
suburbanization through the examination of case developments.
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Population and housing change in large American cities
This section provides a methodology for the selection of case cities and
neighborhoods by examining population and housing change in America's largest
cities. As was described in 'a hypothesis for inner-city suburbanization' in
Chapter Two, large declining cities, and the distressed neighborhoods within
those cities, have the most potential to be the locations for inner-city
suburbanization. This section therefore examines the universe of large American
cities in order to select two which have lost significant amounts of both population
and housing.
American cities are dynamic environments whose numbers and mix of population
and housing are constantly shifting. The change experienced by cities is only a
piece of the larger portrait of social, economic, and physical change occurring in
their metropolitan areas, and at a greater scale, in the United States as a whole.
The types of change occurring in cities is at first overwhelming, threatening to
make any analysis of change difficult. Different parts of a city may be
simultaneously growing, shrinking, changing in social composition, or remaining
static. The complexity of change in cities makes it difficult to reduce these myriad
events to a single conceptualizable portrait. People nevertheless create such
simplified portraits of cities, perhaps due to some human desire to be able to
grasp even the most complex of events. These simplifications are widespread in
the popular press and in common parlance. One such simplification is the
conception that a city is declining, 'on the way down'. Conversely, a city may be
widely perceived as rebounding, or 'on the way back'. While these conceptions
can be linked to quantifiable events, they are not necessarily closely so. We may
find proclamations of urban rebirth in cities which are steeply declining
statistically, or proclamations of urban distress where many indicators show a
healthy city. Such simplified conceptions of cities' well-being are mirrored in
popular conceptions of other large, complex entities, such as the state of the
national economy.
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While it is easy to discount popular conceptions of cities as oversimplifications,
these images are powerful and often have a wider influence than statistical facts.
Cities that can do little about negative statistical indicators can undertake other
actions to alter their popular perception, creating a new image out of the ruins of
an old one (Vale and Warner 2001). Cities such as Baltimore and Cleveland
have been notably successful in improving their popular images in the face of
statistical decline, mainly through large, charismatic downtown redevelopment
projects (Burgess et. al. 2001). Many authors have contributed to this reductivist
formula for urban analysis. The plethora of recent works proclaiming urban
rebirth can be though of as part of this school (see Gratz and Mintz 1998, Hudnut
1998, and Grogan and Proscio 2000 among others). In similar fashion, a 'decline
school' in the 1960s and 1970s warned of the large-scale decline of cities
(Gottehrer 1965 and Bradbury et. al. 1982 are typical examples). In contrast to
the reductivist school, only a few authors, such as Beauregard 1993, have
cautioned against creating singular portraits of trends such as decline or rebirth
in cities.
Nevertheless, this study operated on the premise that urban change was
quantifiable. This aim of this section was not to create a unitary portrait of urban
change, but to show changes in two specific variables- population and housing
change- in large American cities. This data demonstrated that population loss
was a major theme in large American cities, especially among those that
experienced significant growth before 1950 ('older cities'). While many older
cities lost population, far fewer experienced similar significant losses in housing.
As indicated in Chapter Three, I combined these two variables to those cities that
sustained significant losses in both as 'severely distressed', a term I considered
to be synonymous for my purposes with the term 'inner city'. As we will see,
population loss alone was insufficient to describe those cities and neighborhoods
which were potential locations for inner city suburbanization.
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The table below shows population figures for the 20 largest American cities in the
years 1950, 1980, 1990, and 2000. These figures are centered around the top 20
1980 cities in order to show how cities moved in and out of this range. Cities that
moved into the top 20 cities from 1950 to 1980 are shaded gray in the 1950
range, while cities that sustained a net population loss over the entire period are
shaded gray in the 'change' field.
Table 4.1. Population figures for the 20 largest American cities
Source: United States decennial census
1950-2000, ranked by 1980 order
New York 7,891,957 7,071,639 /,322,b04 0,UU0,2/0 +1 /1o
Chicago 3,620,962 3,005,072 2,783,276 2,896,016 -20%
Los Angeles 1,970,358 2,966,850 3,485,398 3,694,820 +88%
Philadelphia 2,071,605 1,688,210 1,585,577 1,517,550 -27%
Houston 596,163 1,595,138 1,630,553 1,953,631 +227%
Detroit 1,849,568 1,203,339 1,027,974 951,270 -51%
Dallas 434,462 904,078 1,006,877 1,188,580 +174%
San Diego 334,387 875,538 1,110,549 1,223,400 +266%
Phoenix 106,818 789,704 983,403 1,321,045 +1137%
Baltimore 949,708 786,775 736,014 651,154 -32%
San Antonio 408,442 785,880 935,933 1,144,646 +180%
Indianapolis 427,143 700,807 731,327 791,926 +85%
San Francisco 775,357 678,974 723,959 776,733 no change
Memphis 396,000 646,356 635,230 650,100 +64%
Washington 802,178 638,333 606,900 572,059 -29%
Milwaukee 637,392 636,212 628,088 596,974 -6%
San Jose Not in top 100 629,442 782,248 894,943 >794%
Cleveland 914,808 573,822 505,616 478,403 -47%
Columbus 375,9l 564,871 632,910 711,470 +89%
Boston 801,444 562,994 574,283 589,141 -26%
American cities experienced dynamic population shifts during the 1950-200
period. Eight of the 20 largest cities were replaced between 1950 and 1980.
(These cities' 1950 populations are shown in gray in the leftmost column.) The
eight cities that moved out of the top 20 did so not only because other cities
gained population, but because they also lost population. In similar fashion, 10 of
the 12 cities that remained from the top 20 1950 cities lost population by 1980.
These cities were, from large to small, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Baltimore, San Francisco, Washington, Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Boston. Los
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Angeles and Houston were alone of the 20 largest 1950 cities that gained
population to 1980.
Between 1980 and 2000, seven of the 10 cities which lost population to 1980
suffered further net losses in population, while the other three (New York, San
Francisco, and Boston) reversed these declines to gain population during this
period. New York and San Francisco did so to the extent that by 2000 their
populations were larger than they had been in 1950. Chicago lost additional
population between 1980 and 1990 but regained some population between 1990
and 2000. Only six of the 20 largest 1980 cities lost population consistently
between 1950 and 2000. From large to small, these cities were Philadelphia,
Detroit, Baltimore, Washington, Milwaukee, and Cleveland.
The population losses of these cities were reflected in the changes in their
relative population densities. While a city's population density is obviously
determined by both its area and its population, most older cities have
experienced little change in their boundaries in decades. Rusk (1993) called
these inelastic cities. Looking at the top 10 1950 cities in the next table, we can
see that their population densities were almost entirely dependent upon their
population shifts. Rusk considered all of these cities to have zero elasticity
except for Los Angeles, which he considered to have low elasticity. Included here
for contrast is the city of Houston, which Rusk considered to be highly elastic,
expanding its area 237% between 1950 and 1990 in tandem with its rapid
population growth.
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Table 4.2. Population densities of ten largest 1950 cities in 1950 and 2000
Source: United States decennial censuses
New York 7,891,957 25,046 25,925 104%
Chicago 3,620,962 17,450 12,747 73%
Philadelphia 2,071,605 16,286 11,233 69%
Los Angeles 1,970,358 4,370 7,873 180%
Detroit 1,849,568 13,249 6,858 52%
Baltimore 949,708 12,067 8,059 67%
Cleveland 914,808 12,197 6,056 50%
St. Louis 856,796 14,046 5,625 40%
Washington 802,178 13,065 9,317 71%
Boston 801,444 16,767 12,172 73%
Houston 596,163 3,726 3,619 97%
Most of the largest 1950 cities were less dense in 2000 than in 1950. Since their
municipal boundaries did not expand (except slightly in Los Angeles), this density
shift was primarily attributable to population loss. There were two exceptions.
New York City was slightly more dense in 2000 than in 1950 because of its slight
net population gain, and Los Angeles having gained significant population within
its 1950 boundaries was almost twice as dense in 2000 than it was in 1950. The
2000 population density of Los Angeles surpassed that of Detroit, Cleveland, and
St. Louis, and was nearly equal to that of Baltimore. Houston, on the other hand,
expanded its municipal boundaries as it gained population. Despite a 227%
population gain, Houston therefore had a slightly lower population density in
2000 than it had in 1950.
While city population changes reflected the overall movement of persons, they
did not necessarily provide a complete picture of the changes occurring in urban
neighborhoods. Other types of change, such as increases in poverty (Jargowsky
1997), have also been used in tandem with population loss as indicators of urban
distress. This study used the indicator of housing loss in addition to population
loss. Housing loss, a variable which is rarely included in indices of decline, was
used because the core of this study was an examination of physical change in
urban neighborhoods. I also saw housing loss as an important indicator because
it provided a clearer link to other qualitative indicators of neighborhood-level
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health. Abandoned or derelict buildings, for example, are one of the most obvious
indicators of neighborhood problems, but these indicators rarely appear in
studies of inner city problems. Lest one underestimate the power of physical
change to communicate urban health, one should consider the plethora of new
buildings like sports arenas and convention centers that so often serve as
symbolic indicators of the health of downtown areas.
Below we can see the numbers of housing units in the top ten 1950 cities in both
1950 and 2000. The rapidly expanding large city of Houston was again included
for comparison. Unitalicized cities marked in gray did not lose housing units
during this period.
Table 4.3. Housing units in ten largest 1950 cities in 1950, peak year, and 2000.
(source: United States decennial censuses)
Name # units, 1950 # units (peak year) # units, 2000 2000 units/ 2000 popi
1950 units 1950 pop.
New York 2,433,465 (2000) 3,200,912 132% 101%
Chicago 1,106,119 1,214,958 (1960) 1,152,868 104% 80%
Philadelphia 599,495 685,629 (1980) 661,958 97% 73%
Los Angeles 698,039 (2000) 1,337,706 192% 188%
Detroit 522,430 553,199 (1960) 375,096 68% 51%
Baltimore 277,880 305,530 (1970) 300,477 98% 69%
Cleveland 270,943 282,914 (1960) 215,856 76% 52%
St. Louis 263,037 (1950) 176,354 67% 41%
Washington 229,738 278,489(1990) 274,845 99% 71%
Boston 222,079 (2000) 251,935 113% 74%
(Houston) 191,681 (2000) 782,009 408% 328%
Housing unit figures told a somewhat different story than population figures. First,
no city lost as many housing units proportionally as it did population, and not all
cities that lost population also lost housing units. New York City and Los Angeles,
the only two of the top ten 1950 cities to gain population, had 32% and 92% more
housing units respectively in 2000 than they did in 1950. Boston and Chicago,
both of which lost population between 1950 and 2000, also had more housing in
2000 than they did in 1950, although Chicago was still down somewhat from its
1960 peak. The remaining six top ten 1950 cities lost both population and
housing from 1950 to 2000. These six cities fell roughly into two categories. The
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first category, which I called moderately declining cities, lost only a slight amount
of housing on average (2%), while the second category, which I call steeply
declining cities, lost a substantial amount of housing (30%). Steeply declining
cities lost more population, on average, than moderately declining cities (52% vs.
29%). According to these categories, Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis were
steeply declining cities, while Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington were
moderately declining cities. These cities are tabulated on page eight.
What do these figures tell us about housing unit loss in large cities, and by
extension, about the potential for inner city suburbanization to be occurring in
these cities' distressed neighborhoods? First, although it was not shown by this
data, housing unit change in cities was localized (this trend was extrapolated
from the two case cities discussed later in this Chapter.) In other words, a city
may have gained housing units in certain neighborhoods while losing them in
others, and a net gain of units did not mean a city gained housing units in all
neighborhoods. The South Bronx, for example, sustained a large net loss of
population and housing units in recent decades (Birch 2001), during which New
York City's population and housing grew to record levels. While all of the sample
cities, except perhaps Los Angeles and Houston, lost housing units in certain
neighborhoods, the balance between gain and loss was clearly different in
different cities. Cities in the middle of the spectrum, such as Philadelphia and
Baltimore, lost housing in certain neighborhoods but gained nearly as many units
in other neighborhoods. At the other end of the spectrum, few neighborhoods in
steeply declining cities gained any housing units at all, and whatever gains these
cities may have had have was heavily outmatched by losses elsewhere in the
city.
Large amounts of housing loss have tremendous consequences for a city's
physical environment. This can be clearly seen in a photograph of St. Louis in
1993 (see below). In some areas where most of the buildings have vanished,
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even the street grid seems to be evaporating. Distressed neighborhoods such as
these are prime locations for potential inner-city suburbanization.
Figure 4.1. Severely distressed neighborhood in St. Louis, 1993
Photo copyright U.S. Geological Survey
Given their different trends in population and housing change, the 10 largest
1950 cities had different potentials for inner city suburbanization. Steeply
declining cities, with their large losses in populations and housing, were clearly
the most likely places for inner-city suburbanization to occur. Declining cities,
cities losing population only, and cities gaining both population and housing had,
respectively, decreasing potential for being the location for inner-city
suburbanization. Of course, localized severe housing and population loss could
conceivably occur in any city, meaning that inner city suburbanization could
conceivably occur even in cities like Houston or Los Angeles, where population
and housing unit growth was rapid.
I categorized the top ten 1950 cities and their potential for being the location for
inner-city suburbanization in the following table. Remember that this table only
assesses the likelihood that a city will have neighborhoods in which the
conditions are possible for inner-city suburbanization occur. It does not assess
the probability of inner city suburbanization occurring in these places, nor does it
predict inner-city suburbanization. The second column describes the probable
distribution of inner-city suburbanization in that city. All American cities would fall
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into one of these four categories and their suburbanization potential could
therefore be assessed in future research.
Table 4.4. Inner-city suburbanization potential of top ten 1950 American cities
Detroit Highly likely Widespread
Cleveland Highly likely Widespread
St. Louis Highly likely Widespread
Declining Cities
Philadelphia Likely Fairly common
Baltimore Likely Fairly common
Washington Likely Fairly common
Cities Gaining
Housing Only
Chicago Possible Localized
Boston Possible Localized
Growing Cities
New York City Unlikely Rare
Los Angeles Unlikely Rare
This table provided a clear rationale for the selection of case cities. One or more
steeply declining cities were obviously appropriate cases, but declining cities
were also possible choices. Cities that gained housing only or growing cities had
less potential as locations for suburbanization and were therefore less desirable
as cases. Cities that gained both population and housing were the most
undesirable as cases. While selecting a steeply declining city such as Detroit as
a case was an obvious choice, there were also good reasons to select one of the
declining cities as an additional case. The declining cities happened to differ from
the steeply declining cities in two ways. First, they differed locationally: the three
declining cities were eastern seaboard cities which were settled relatively early,
while the steeply declining cities were located in the Midwest and were settled
somewhat later. Second, these two groups of cities differed in their predominant
vernacular housing types. The declining cities had more rowhouses than
detached houses (rowhouses were by far the predominant unit type in both
Philadelphia and Baltimore), while the steeply declining cities had housing stocks
composed principally of freestanding single- or two-family homes, with
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rowhouses comprising only a tiny percentage of total housing (see table below)
Selecting a declining city as a second case offered the opportunity to widen the
scope of the study geographically and typologically, as well as to examine the
prevalence of inner city suburbanization in two large American cities
experiencing different amounts of decline.
Table 4.5. Types of housing stock in declining and steeply declining top ten 1950 cities, 1980
(source: 1982 Annual Housing Survey, United States Census Division)
City Philadelphia Baltimore Washington Detroit Cleveland St. Louis
Total units 688,300 305,800 279,800 461,500 251,000 201,800
% 1 detached 4.4 11.7 12.2 56.6 39.3 38.3
% 1 attached 61.9 51.8 25.4 2.0 3.7 1.3
% 2-4 units 16.3 18.5 14.1 23.5 36.1 41.6
% 5+ units 17.4 17.9 48.3 17.9 20.8 18.9
Given these conditions I selected Detroit, Michigan and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania as the two case cities for the study. Detroit and Philadelphia were
the two largest cities, respectively, in the steeply declining and declining city
categories, and as of 2000 they were both among the top ten largest cities in the
United States (1 0th and 5 th). The following section describes how I examined
neighborhood change from 1970 to 1990 in these two cities, thereby selecting
the case neighborhoods for the study.
Population and housing change in Philadelphia and Detroit: overview
The study examined neighborhood change in Detroit and Philadelphia in order to
select those neighborhoods which had the highest potential for inner-city
suburbanization to occur. Using similar criteria to those used to select the case
cities, the study used decennial census data to select for severely distressed
neighborhoods, which for the purposes of this study were considered to be
synonymous with declining neighborhoods and with inner cities. Tracts which had
lost more than 20 percent of both their population and their housing stock from
1970 to 1990 were considered to be severely distressed, and these tracts
therefore became the case neighborhoods within which new housing
developments were examined in Sections Three and Four of this chapter.
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The dates 1970 and 1990 were chosen for several, interrelated reasons. The
first, most practical reason was that 2000 tract-level data was unavailable at the
time of the study. The second reason was that I wanted to separate the study of
neighborhood change in Section Two from the development studies in Sections
Three and Four. 1990 was a convenient threshold because it was a date by
which much neighborhood decline had already occurred, and since I
hypothesized inner-city suburbanization to be trend dependent upon decline to
occur, it was also a convenient threshold after which I could examine
development activity in declining neighborhoods. I therefore somewhat artificially
temporally divided the examination of decline and development. Of course,
population decline continued in the case cities after 1990, as we saw above.
1970 was chosen as a lower threshold for two reasons. The practical reason was
that the census bureau redesignated ('retracted') the geographical limits of many
tracts between 1960 and 1970, making time-series comparisons at the tract level
before 1970 extremely difficult. Fortunately, neighborhood decline only began in
earnest in the 1960s (Wilson 1996), which reinforced 1970 as a convenient
starting date.
As we saw in Chapter Three, neighborhoods which lost significant population and
housing generally did so because they experienced what is often called severe
neighborhood decline. Neighborhood decline is a complex phenomenon with
diverse causes but whose consequences are generally consistent. (Bradbury et.
al. 1982 provide a good overview of this phenomenon as it was manifested in the
1970s.) These declining neighborhoods share many physical, social, and
economic characteristics. Socially, declining neighborhoods are generally
inhabited by people who are members of minority ethnic and racial groups.
These populations often suffer from high rates of social pathologies such as
crime, disease, and family breakdown. Economically, distressed neighborhoods
have relatively low amounts of economic activity, leading to high rates of
unemployment among residents (Wilson 1996).
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Physically, severely distressed neighborhoods are characterized by large
numbers of vacant buildings and vacant lots. A variety of theories have been
proposed to explain the reasons for residential abandonment in declining
neighborhoods. These theories were well summarized in Featherman (1976), in
a study of the early stages of abandonment in Philadelphia. Some of these
theories included uncertainties resulting from racial transition in neighborhoods;
the 'filtering' of the worst units to the bottom of the market; inadequate public
services; irresponsible absentee landlords; and the burdens of code
enforcement. Featherman, however, found that there were different reasons for
abandonment in neighborhoods where abandonment levels were relatively low.
These reasons included a depressed real estate market, which made it difficult to
quickly dispose of properties; changing family situations such as relocation or
death of older homeowners. Once abandoned, Featherman found that properties
were quickly vandalized, thereby discouraging renovation by the absentee
owner. Finally, as more and more properties became abandoned and blighted,
neighboring properties would be also abandoned as a consequence of the
growing blight.
Government responses to abandonment are varied (Cohen 2000) but generally
follow the same pattern. Vacant buildings are eventually seized by the city for
nonpayment of property taxes, and severely dilapidated buildings are demolished
in a piecemeal fashion, creating a vacant lot. The resulting patchwork urban
fabric can be seen in the photographs of Detroit and Philadelphia neighborhoods
in this chapter. Given the depressed economic conditions of declining
neighborhoods, demand for redevelopment of these vacant lots is often low, and
cleanup and maintenance of the lots becomes a city expense. Many abandoned
lots are never rebuilt with housing. They may be annexed by the owners of
nearby remaining houses for yards or parking, or become new public parks,
playgrounds, or community gardens. In areas of severe decline, however, there
are far too many vacant properties for reuse as open space or as redevelopment
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(see photo below) These cities are therefore saddled with thousands of vacant
lots which produce no tax revenue and whose maintenance, however minimal, is
a public expense. Philadelphia is a typical large city with severe abandonment
problems. As a consequence, the city estimated that it had approximately 27,000
vacant residential structures and 15,000 vacant lots citywide in 1995
(Pennsylvania Horticultural Society 1998). The fate of these vacant properties is
an increasingly major policy issue in Philadelphia, and in other cities with severe
vacancy problems like Detroit.
Figure 4.2. Cities with high levels of abandonment like Detroit (above) face severe challenges in
reusing their vacant buildings and land. Will inner-city suburbanization be the answer to the
problems of these cities? Photo copyright Alex MacLean; from Daskalakis et. al. (2001)
Neighborhood population and housing change in Philadelphia 1970-1990
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, experienced significant population loss in recent
decades. Between 1970 and 1990 the city of Philadelphia lost a net total of
363,032 people, dropping from 1,948,609 to 1,585,577. This loss comprised 19%
of Philadelphia's 1970 population. This citywide population loss was not,
however, matched by citywide housing loss. At a citywide level, Philadelphia
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gained rather than lost housing units during this period, but the gain (676 units)
was minute. The total housing stock thus rose from 674,233 units to 674,899.
Between these samplings, however, Philadelphia reached its peak housing figure
of 685,629 units in 1980. Over the 1980 to 2000 period the city consistently lost
housing, losing 10,730 units by 1990 and a further 12,941 units by 2000. This
loss, however, was still much smaller in a relative sense than the city's
population loss, as we will see below.
The study examined Philadelphia's population and housing change at the level of
individual census tracts from 1970 to 1990. The following maps illustrate this
change. For the purposes of discussion the study divided Philadelphia by census
tract into five 'macroneighborhoods', which corresponded to commonly used
terms in the city. For convenience's sake, downtown, or Center City, was
grouped with the 'north' macroneighborhood. These macroneighborhoods are
shown on the map below.
Figure 4.3. Philadelphia's five 'macroneighborhoods': North, South, West, Northeast, and
Northwest. These divisions correspond to commonly used terms in the city. Boundaries are
shown in red and the municipal boundary is shown in black.
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Below we can see how Philadelphia's population changed at the tract level from
1970 to 1990. The map and table below show and tabulate this change.
Figure 4.4. Population change in Philadelphia, 1970 to 1990
Dark gray indicates >20% population loss; light gray 5-20% loss; white +1-5% change; light red 5-
20% gain; dark red >20% population gain. Data from United States decennial censuses of 1970
and 1990.
Table 4.6. Population change by census tract in Philadelphia, 1970-90
Total population loss 363,032 19%
Total 1990 tracts 365 _
> 20% loss (severe) 167 46%
5-20% loss (moderate) 109 30%
+/-5% change (stable) 28 8%
5-20% gain 24 7%
> 20% gain 28 8%
No data 9 2%
The preponderance of dark gray on the map communicates the severity of
Philadelphia's population decline during the 1970-1990 period. Almost half of the
city's census tracts lost over 20 percent of their population. An additional 30
percent of tracts lost between five and 20 percent of their population, leaving
fewer than a quarter of the city's tracts with minimal population losses or actual
population gains. Geographically, the overall picture of severe population loss
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was relieved in only a few areas. Nine of the tracts in Philadelphia's downtown
(also called Center City) gained population, reflecting the rise in downtown living
reported by Sohmer and Lang (1999). Population gain was otherwise almost
entirely restricted to the periphery of the city. Northeast Philadelphia, the most
recent area of the city to have been developed, had eleven tracts gaining
significant amounts of population, while far northwest and far southwest
Philadelphia also saw some gains. Some isolated tracts also gained limited
amounts of population amidst declining areas. The presence of institutions such
as the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University, whose student
populations probably expanded during this time, were responsible for some
gains. There were also aberrant areas of population loss. Two tracts experienced
severe losses due to the closure of residential institutions there, and Center City
also experienced some losses, most likely because of the expansion of the city's
business district at the expense of residential areas.
Population loss was especially severe in the tracts to the north and south of
Center City, with almost all tracts in these areas losing more than twenty percent
of their population. The far north of the city fared somewhat better. Although
many tracts in the far north and near northeast areas of the city lost population,
the losses of these tracts, at 5 to twenty percent of their population, was not as
severe as those areas closer to Center City.
Philadelphia's population changes can be abstracted, as shown in the diagram
on the following page. Population change in the city can be divided into four
categories, each of which is experiencing different types of change in a different
physical environment.
129
Figure 4.5. Philadelphia population change diagram
The innermost zone was one of growth. In Philadelphia, this zone is called
Center City and is the location both of the office core and of the wealthy
residential neighborhoods around downtown. The gentrifying fringe in
Philadelphia is located on the sharp border between the downtown growth zone
and the next zone, which is one of severe population loss. This transition occurs
within just a few blocks in Philadelphia's dense urban fabric. The zone of severe
population loss is the location for severe housing loss and consequently for
inner-city suburbanization. As we will see below, however, severe housing loss is
not always coterminous with population loss. Beyond the zone of severe
population loss is a zone of lesser population loss and population stability. In
Philadelphia these neighborhoods date from around 1920 to 1940. Beyond these
neighborhoods are the outer growth neighborhoods of Philadelphia. These are
the lowest-density areas of the city and much of their development resembles
that of the suburbs beyond the city limits. In Philadelphia, these four population
zones also signify different demographic characteristics. The growth zones are
generally white, although downtown is more diverse than the outer fringe. The
decline zones, however, are mixed. Much but not all of the zone of steep decline
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is African-American, though some steeply declining neighborhoods are white and
others Hispanic. The lesser decline belt is generally one of racial transition from
white to black, although some stable lower-income white neighborhoods occupy
this zone.
These diagrams would be different for every city, but some similarities can be
seen in the Detroit data that follows. Of course, individual characteristics
influence each city. Philadelphia happens to have a large, stable population
downtown; it also happens to have stable low-density areas at the fringe. Detroit,
as will be seen, has neither of these areas.
We will now examine Philadelphia's housing unit change. The map and table
below show this change during the same period of 1970 to 1990.
Figure 4.6. Housing unit change in Philadelphia, 1970 to 1990
Dark gray indicates >20% housing unit loss; light gray 5-20% loss; white +1-5% change; light red
5-20% gain; dark red >20% housing unit gain. Data from United States decennial censuses of
1970 and 1990.
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Table 4.7. Housing unit change by census tract in Philadelphia, 1970-90
Total housing gain 676 <1%
Total 1990 tracts 365
> 20% loss (severe) 53 15%
5-20% loss (moderate) 74 20%
+/-5% change (stable) 128 35%
5-20% gain 42 12%
> 20% gain 53 15%
No data 10 3%
Severely distressed 48 13%
The overall stability of the number of housing units in Philadelphia in 1970 and
1990 was mirrored in the city's tract level figures. The numbers of tracts that
experienced extreme housing growth or decline were exactly equal, each totaling
about one-seventh of the total number. Somewhat more tracts lost moderate
amounts of housing than gained moderate amounts, and the largest group of
tracts experienced little change in their numbers of housing units.
As with population growth, many tracts which gained housing units were located
either in Center City or at Philadelphia's periphery. Large areas of the Northeast
gained housing. Similarly, many tracts in the Northwest or far Southwest of the
city also gained housing units. Almost all tracts in Center City either gained
housing or remained stable. Overall, housing unit stability at the neighborhood
level was common in Philadelphia.
In contrast to population decline, housing unit decline was concentrated in only a
few parts of Philadelphia. 53 tracts lost severe amounts of housing, and almost
all of them were located near Center City. North Philadelphia had the majority of
these steeply declining tracts: 31, or almost 60 percent of the total. West and
South Philadelphia were much more stable and had together only 16 severely
declining tracts. The remaining six severely declining tracts were scattered
through Northeast Philadelphia and there was a sole declining tract in Center
City. Northwest and far North Philadelphia had no severely declining tracts.
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How were population and housing loss related in Philadelphia? Severe housing
loss was closely correlated with severe population loss, but not the reverse. 48 of
the 53 tracts which lost over 20 percent of their housing also lost over 20 percent
of their population. I categorized these 48 tracts as severely distressed. While
these severely distressed tracts comprised 91 percent of the those tracts that
had severe housing loss, they comprised only 28 percent of those tracts that had
severe population loss. These 48 tracts, shown in the map below, were the case
neighborhoods which were examined in Section Three for evidence of inner city
suburbanization.
Figure 4.7. Severely declining Philadelphia neighborhoods
What can we say about Philadelphia's limited interrelationship between
population and housing loss? While the dependence of housing loss on
population loss was unsurprising, the lack of a reverse relationship indicates that
Philadelphia's population loss may not all have been of a similar nature. North
Philadelphia's population loss appeared to be closely linked to housing loss,
either because population was directly displaced through the destruction of
housing or because the loss of population in that neighborhood resulted in the
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abandonment and destruction of housing units. The high numbers of vacant units
in North Philadelphia (see map below) indicated that the second scenario, that of
neighborhood destabilization through the abandonment of housing, was the more
accurate.
Figure 4.8. In 1999 Philadelphia had about 27000 vacant structures (above). While much of this
vacancy was concentrated in North Philadelphia's severely distressed neighborhoods (compare
with Figure 4.6), the high levels of vacancy in South and West Philadelphia may foreshadow the
spread of severe neighborhood distress to those areas. Map copyright Philadelphia Mayor's
Office of Information Services; from Saidel et. al. 1999.
The two measures of severe population and housing loss did not perfectly reflect
qualitative notions of what would constitute an inner city neighborhood. Center
City's one severely distressed tract lost both population and housing through the
expansion of the city's Central Business District. The construction of large office
buildings in that area in the 1970s and 1980s no doubt necessitated the
destruction of many houses and displacement of much of the area's population.
Other tracts in Northeast Philadelphia lost major institutional facilities (a prison
and a mental hospital) which caused their losses in population and housing. The
majority, however, of tracts which showed up as severely distressed were in
neighborhoods that would have registered as 'inner city' through other indicators.
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The differential declines of Philadelphia's macroneighborhoods merit a brief
discussion. Only North Philadelphia had a large number of severely distressed
neighborhoods, although West Philadelphia and South Philadelphia also lost
large amounts of population. 29, or 55 percent, of North Philadelphia's tracts
were severely distressed, compared to only seven (20 percent) of West
Philadelphia's tracts and nine tracts (35 percent) of South Philadelphia's tracts.
The reasons for North Philadelphia's higher levels of distress were unclear. While
clearance for urban redevelopment has often been cited as having caused
displacement in poor neighborhoods, the relatively limited scale of post-1970
redevelopment in North Philadelphia indicates that redevelopment was unlikely to
have been responsible for the majority of the losses seen. In other
neighborhoods such as near Northeast Philadelphia where population loss was
not closely associated with housing loss, population loss may have been
achieved through the uncrowding, but not the abandonment, of existing units.
Uncrowding could have occurred either through children leaving the household or
through the replacement of larger households with smaller ones. Social factors
may also have played a role. Both North and West Philadelphia had large black
populations with significant levels of poverty, but their levels of housing loss were
very different. Lower-income white areas in South Philadelphia and near
Northeast Philadelphia were more stable, losing large amounts of population
without losing large numbers of housing units. Whatever the reasons for these
different rates of change, North Philadelphia was clearly the city's loss leader,
with the largest concentration of severely distressed census tracts in the city.
According to the study's criteria it was therefore the macroneighborhood with the
most potential for inner-city suburbanization. Section Three will show that this
expectation was accurate.
Neighborhood Population and Housing Change in Detroit 1970-1990
Detroit, Michigan, experienced enormous population and housing decline in
recent decades. Between 1970 and 1990 Detroit lost a net total of 483,508
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people, shrinking in size from 1,511,482 to 1,027,974. This loss was higher than
Philadelphia's in both absolute and relative terms. Detroit lost over 100,000 more
people during the same period than did Philadelphia, and its 1970-1990 loss
comprised 32% of its 1970 population whereas Philadelphia's 1970-90 loss
comprised 19% of its 1970 population. Detroit also lost a substantial number of
net housing units during this period- 118,895 units, or 22% of its 1970 total.
Discussion of neighborhood change in Detroit is complicated by the city's lack of
clearly defined neighborhoods. This is a product both of Detroit's flat topography
and of its street layout, which is a nearly uniform grid. To distinguish between
different areas of the city I divided Detroit into four macroneighborhoods bounded
by major radial streets. Unlike in Philadelphia, these boundaries are not
commonly used as neighborhood demarcations by residents. Detroit's
macroneighborhood boundaries are shown in the figure on the following page.
The radial streets used for boundaries are, from west to east, Grand River,
Woodward, and Gratiot Avenues. I designated the area south and west of Grand
River as West Detroit; to the area between Grand River and Woodward as
Northwest Detroit; the area between Woodward and Gratiot as Northeast Detroit;
and the area south and east of Gratiot as East Detroit. The two "island
municipalities" of Highland Park and Hamtramck are shown bounded in black in
the center of Detroit and were not included in this analysis. The existence of
tracts outside the municipal limits in the Detroit maps reflect the fact that Detroit
comprises only a portion of its county, the level at which tract maps are
generated.
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Figure 4.9. Detroit's four macroneighborhoods: West, Northwest, Northeast, and East.
Neighborhood boundaries are shown in red and Detroit municipal boundaries in black. Note the
two 'island municipalities' of Highland Park and Hamtramck between Northwest and Northeast
Detroit.
On the following page we can see how Detroit's population changed at the tract
level from 1970 to 1990. * The map and table show and tabulate this change.
* Between 1970 and 1990 many of Detroit's census tracts were retracted as a result of the city's
severe population decline. The total number of tracts in the city shrank 30 percent from 460 to
319. This contrasted with Philadelphia, despite population loss there was little retracting. Detroit's
retracting resulted in substantial changes in tract boundaries from 1970 to 1990. In most cases
larger numbers of 1970 tracts were combined and redivided to make a smaller number of 1990
tracts. For example, five 1970 tracts would be combined into three 1990 tracts which would share
the outer boundaries of the 1970 tracts, but be redrawn inside that common boundary. This made
it impossible to compare tract-level data without combining the data from the retracted tracts. To
compare 1970 and 1990 data in retracted areas I combined all 1970 tract data within the common
boundaries of the tracts and averaged it out over the number of 1990 tracts. The results for each
of these tracts were thus common to the group of tracts from which their figure was derived. The
averaging process may have led to erroneous gain or loss data for tracts within tract groups.
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Figure 4.10. Population change in the city of Detroit, 1970 to 1990
Dark gray indicates >20% population loss; light gray 5-20% loss; white +1-5% change; light red 5-
20% gain; dark red >20% population gain. Data is from United States decennial censuses of
1970 and 1990
Table 4.8. Population change by census tract in Detroit, 1970-90
Total population loss 483,508 32%
Total 1990 tracta 320
> 20% loss (severe) 175 55%
5-20% loss (moderate) 83 26%
+/-5% change (stable) 38 12%
5-20% gain 16 5%
> 20% gain 7 2%
No data 1 <1%
Population loss was almost ubiquitous in Detroit neighborhoods. Over half of
Detroit's tracts lost over 20 percent of their populations, and an additional quarter
of all tracts lost between five and 20 percent of their populations. Only 19 percent
of the city's tracts maintained or increased their populations, and only two
percent, or seven out of over 300 tracts, increased their populations by 20% or
more. As in Philadelphia, population growth was concentrated in neighborhoods
near the city limits. In Detroit, however, the limited numbers of growing edge
tracts did not form spatially cohesive areas. Downtown growth was also limited-
138
only three tracts near the center of Detroit showed significant population gains.
Population loss was most extreme in a large, spatially coherent belt that
surrounded the center of Detroit. Severe population loss tracts extended from
downtown all the way to Detroit's east and west city limits, and almost completely
surrounded the island municipalities of Highland Park and Hamtramck. Beyond
the belt of severe population loss was a belt of lesser decline, interrupted in only
a few spots by stable or growing tracts. The map and table below show this
change during the same period of 1970 to 1990.
Figure 4.11. Housing unit change in the city of Detroit, 1970 to 1990
Dark gray indicates >20% housing unit loss; light gray 5-20% loss; white +1-5% change; light red
5-20% gain; dark red >20% housing unit gain. Data is from United States decennial censuses of
1970 and 1990
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Table 4.9. Housing unit change by census tract in Detroit, 1970-90
Total housing loss 118,895 22%
Total 1990 tracts 320
> 20% loss (severe) 119 37%
5-20% loss (moderate) 74 23%
+/-5% change (stable) 82 26%
5-20% gain 27 8%
> 20% gain 19 6%
No data 1 <1%
Severely distressed 111 35%
Housing loss was also widespread in Detroit's neighborhoods, though not so
much as population loss. Over one-third of Detroit tracts lost over 20 percent of
their housing units, and an additional quarter lost over five percent.
Approximately one-quarter of the city's tracts were stable, and the remaining 14
percent grew by five percent or more. Housing unit growth was limited and
scattered. In east and northeast Detroit housing growth was limited to downtown
tracts, a single tract along the Detroit River, and a few tracts near the city limits.
Stable tracts were for the most part limited to areas near the city limits. In
northwest and west Detroit, a few isolated tracts significantly increased their
numbers of housing units amidst large steeply declining areas. The outer
portions of Northwest and West Detroit were mostly stable, with scattered tracts
gaining housing units in these areas.
Detroit's severe housing loss was also located in a broad, consistent belt around
downtown. Less steep declines of between five and 20 percent were mostly
found outside of this belt. The overall picture of housing change was one of
concentrated losses around the city center declining in the north toward the city
limits, and of scattered growth which was limited to parts of the downtown, the
near Northwest, and the outer Northwest and West of the city.
As in Philadelphia, severe housing loss was closely correlated with severe
population loss, but not the reverse. 111, or 93 percent, of Detroit tracts which
lost severe amounts of housing also lost severe amounts of population. These
severely distressed tracts comprised, however, only 63 percent of those tracts
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which lost over 20 percent of their population. The map below shows the location
of these severely distressed tracts.
Figure 4.12. Severely distressed Detroit neighborhoods
It can immediately be seen that Detroit had far more severely distressed tracts
than Philadelphia, and that these tracts were more widely distributed in Detroit
than in Philadelphia. This different picture was primarily due to the more
widespread nature of housing loss in Detroit. In Philadelphia, widespread
housing loss, and consequently neighborhood distress, was limited to North
Philadelphia. The two cities had roughly equivalent percentages of severely
declining population tracts (55% vs. 46%), but Detroit had over twice as many
severely declining housing tracts (37% vs. 15%). As a result Detroit had far more
severely distressed tracts than Philadelphia in both an absolute and a
proportional sense. Despite having fewer total census tracts and a smaller
population than Philadelphia, Detroit had over twice as many severely distressed
tracts (111) than Philadelphia (47), comprising a much higher percentage of
Detroit's total tracts (35%) than Philadelphia's (13%). Because of its severe
decline, Detroit therefore had a much larger number of neighborhoods which had
the potential for inner city suburbanization.
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Why did Detroit lose so much more housing, over a wider area, than
Philadelphia? The scope of this study did not allow for a complete investigation,
but Detroit's different demographic and physical characteristics may have played
a role. Between 1970 and 1990, Detroit underwent a massive demographic
transformation, changing from a predominantly white city to a predominantly
black one. By 1990, the city's population was over 70 percent black. During those
two decades, Detroit experienced extensive white flight and the abandonment of
many of its homes and businesses. Its severe population losses- one-third of the
city's 1970 population was gone by 1990, and probably two-thirds of its
population was exchanged during this time- may have led to more instability in
Detroit's neighborhoods. Detroit's higher rates of population loss may have
resulted in more abandoned housing units.
Detroit's city form may also have contributed to its steeper decline. It differed
physically from Philadelphia in that its cityscape was mostly undifferentiated,
uninterrupted by topographical features like rivers, valleys, or hills. This uniform
urban landscape, built up with an equally uniform grid, no doubt contributed to
the weaker identity of Detroit neighborhoods compared to Philadelphia, where
river and creek valleys both separated and distinguished neighborhoods from
each other. Detroit's housing stock was also both newer and different in
architectural nature from Philadelphia's. As we saw in Table 4.5, Philadelphia
was primarily a rowhouse city, especially in its older neighborhoods, while Detroit
was mostly developed with freestanding single-family or two-family houses. The
predominant materials of these houses were also different. Philadelphia's
rowhouses were almost entirely brick, while much of Detroit's housing was
constructed of wood.
Abandoned freestanding wooden housing stock is more vulnerable to a variety of
problems that make it less durable than an abandoned brick rowhouse.
Freestanding housing is vulnerable not only to weathering but also to vandalism
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and arson, both major problems for Detroit in the 1980s (Chafetz 1990). This
doubtless contributed to Detroit's higher rates of housing loss. The relative lack
of boundaries between Detroit's neighborhoods may also have resulted in the
more rapid spread of decline. Of course other factors, like more active city
demolition programs, could also have contributed to the higher rates of housing
loss seen in Detroit. A closer examination of abandonment data would be
required to illuminate the reasons for the differences in housing losses between
the two cities.
The following two sections describe the prevalence of inner-city suburbanization
in the distressed neighborhoods of Detroit and Philadelphia.
The prevalence of inner-city suburbanization: overview
Despite severe losses in population and housing in the distressed neighborhoods
of Detroit and Philadelphia, many new housing developments were constructed
in these neighborhoods from 1990 to the present (2002). This construction was
the result of multiple forces, fiscal and institutional. Much housing resulted from
the continued efforts of the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to provide funds or otherwise encourage the development of
new housing in distressed urban neighborhoods through Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG) and other programs. A second force was the
increasing capacity of nonprofit organizations, generally known as Community
Development Corporations (CDCs), to use HUD and other funds to construct
new, often affordable, housing in urban neighborhoods. A third force was the
growing realization on the part of the private sector that a market existed for new
development, both housing and otherwise, in distressed urban neighborhoods.
The methodology for Sections Three and Four was as follows. All new housing
developments in Detroit and Philadelphia which totaled over 20 units in size and
which was constructed after January 1, 1990 were tabulated. The locations of
this housing were then mapped against the severely distressed neighborhoods
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defined in Section Two, and those developments which lay outside of those
neighborhoods were excluded for analysis (except in limited cases in Detroit.)
Developments smaller than 20 units were excluded both in order to reduce the
study number to a manageable size and because these developments were
generally too small to make significant design decisions at the neighborhood
level. Rehabilitations, renovations, and additions were also ignored since these
developments did not make exterior design decisions.
The sources for the development data were diverse. Detroit development data
was compiled from the City of Detroit Department of Buildings monthly records;
the City of Detroit Planning Department; the Michigan Capital Fund for Housing;
and press reports from the Detroit News, the Detroit Free Press, and Crain's
Detroit Business. Philadelphia development data was compiled from the Office of
Housing and Community Development, and the Philadelphia Association of
Community Development Corporations (PACDC). This process is described in
further detail in the Afterword. While in both cities the study attempted to be
comprehensive, the diversity of source, and the size of the cities, meant that
comprehensiveness could not be guaranteed.
The prevalence of inner-city suburbanization: Detroit development summary
The map below shows new housing developments in Detroit built since 1990.
Developments were mapped over severely distressed neighborhoods, and are
tabulated on the following page. In the table, developments located within
severely distressed census tracts were shaded in gray. These shaded
developments were measured and examined in the subsequent section for
evidence of inner-city suburbanization. Developments were dated in
chronological order by year of building permit. Italicized developments were
located in 'island' non-distressed tracts, described later. Developments were also
subject to an initial qualitative survey, described later. The results of this survey
(Y or N) were labeled in the 'S' column.
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Figure 4.13. New housing developments in Detroit, 1990 to 2001
Developments are mapped over severely distressed census tracts, shown in
Developments of over twenty units in size and built before 1990 are excluded.
Table 4. 10. Large (>20 unit) housing developments in Detroit since 1990
Developments shaded gray are in severely distressed tracts; island tracts are italicized
College Park Manor 2001 Puritan & Dexter Aartment 30 Y
Newberry Homes 2001 31Street & Jackson Single- 120 N
famril
Petoskey Place 2000 Petoskey Ave & Collin swood Apartment 96 Y
Utown Row 1999 870 Lothrop Townhouse 47 N
English Village 1999 unknown Townhouse 95 N
Friendsh'p Meadows N/ 1999 965-1001 Leland St Aartment 100 Y
Mildred Smith Manor // 1999 1301 West Forest Aartment 24 N
Brightmoor Homes 1998 14438 Braile Single- 50 N
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yellow.
family
Creekside Housing 1998 440 Conner St. Single- 25 N
(Habitat for Humanity) family
Islandview Housing 1999 1044 Townsend St. Single- 20 N
family
Wabash Homes 1998 1746 Wabash Single- 20 N
(Corktown) family
Clairpointe of Victoria 1998 620 Clairpointe St. Single- 42 Y
Park family
Pablo Davis Elder Living 1998 9200 West Vernor Highway Apartment 80 Y
Center/ D.J. Healy
Apartments
Pilgrim Village 1998 Puritan & Petoskey Apartment 24 N
Morningside Commons 1998 4267 Wayburn Single- 40+ N
(U-SNAP-BAC) family
Bagley Houses I 1998 18t Street & Porter Single- 22 N
family
Mildred Smith Manor / 1998 1303 West Forest Avenue Apartment 28 Y
Alberta W. King Village 1998 Wabash & Myrtle (MLK Blvd.) Apartment 120 Y
Ariel Square 1998 109 West Euclid St. Condo 28 N
Shore Pointe Village at 1998 152 Keelson Drive Townhouse 51 Y
Grayhaven
Windward Court at 1997 3400 East Jefferson Condo 22 Y
Harbortown
Lakewood Manor 1997 Lakewood & Kercheval Apartment 30 N
Bethany Presbyterian 1996 8737 14'" Street Apartment 50 Y
Village
Berry Subdivision 1996 Jefferson & Parkview, Single- 20 N
(Avondale, Warren, Lodge family
Sts)
Eden Manor 1996 18040 Coyle Apartment 65 Y
Field Street I 1996 1458 Field Street Two-family 49 N
Campau Farms in 1996 2198 Prince Hall (Campau Townhouse 180 Y
Elmwood Park Farms Circle)
Grayhaven 1995 1 Keelson Drive SF condo 301 Y
Virginia Park Estates 1995 1701 Seward (Estates Drive) Single- 45 Y
family
Brightmoor Homes 1995 14322 Auburn St. Single- 35 N
(Habitat for Humanity) family
Ida Young Gardens 1995 2250 East Vernor Apartment 56 N
Marketplace Court 1995 940-1003 Leland Street Apartment 120 Y
Helen Odean Butler 1994 3100 East Vernor Apartment 97 Y
Apartments (Elmwood
VISION 1ll)
Friendship Meadows // 1994 940-1003 Leland Apartment 53 Y
Faith Manor 1994 15321 Archdale Apartment 52 N
McGirney-Bethune 1994 16850 Wyoming Street Apartment 80 Y
Apartments
Ellis Manor 1993 19200 Shiawassee Rd. Apartment 89 Y
Victoria Park 1991 Freud & Piper Single- 157 Y
family
Circle Drive Commons 1991 1450 Robert Bradby Apartment 128 Y
Riverfront Towers 1990 West Jefferson & 3r St. Apartment ? N
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A total of 50 housing developments were found to have been completed in
Detroit between January 1990 and December 2001. Of these 50 developments,
a total of 30, or 60 percent, were constructed in severely distressed
neighborhoods. Since distressed neighborhoods comprised only 35 percent of
Detroit's total number of census tracts, this meant new developments were
almost twice as likely to be built in a distressed tract than in a non-distressed
one. The relative abundance of new housing in distressed neighborhoods could
have been due to the availability or low cost of land in distressed neighborhoods
or to specific incentives to construct in those places, such as the Detroit
Empowerment Zone*.
The methodology for measuring the suburbanization of housing developments
was as follows. All developments were subjected to an initial visual qualitative
assessment through field visits. The criteria used in this assessment are
described below. This assessment was intended to prevent the repetitive
measurement of developments that were unlikely to show evidence of
suburbanization. Developments which qualitatively resembled suburban housing
were subsequently measured using the suburbanization criteria described in
Chapter Three. A housing development which was not qualitatively suburban
was also measured to provide a 'control' for the qualitative assessments.
Detroit Developments: qualitative analysis
The qualitative assessment of developments was comprised of the following
criteria. Two aspects of the developments were examined: the development's
neighborhood-level design and the site-level design of individual buildings. These
criteria were generally consistent with each other. The following five major points
were examined:
* Empowerment Zones were created by the Clinton administration in 1994 and were designed to
leverage private economic investment, including new home development, in distressed urban
neighborhoods. Detroit was one of the six cities initially designated as an empowerment zone. *
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- Did the development appear to have preserved the original street grid
of the neighborhood? If the street network had been altered, how?
- How did the development relate to the street? Were there fences,
plantings, or other major barriers between buildings and the street?
How far were buildings from the street?
- How did automobiles access the development? What was the
placement and distribution of parking with respect to the buildings? Did
parking inhibit pedestrian access to the site?
- What was the quantity and nature of open space on the site? Was
open space bounded by buildings or was it designed as a barrier or
neutral zone between the development and the street? How was open
space apportioned to each individual building of a development?
- What was the architectural style of the individual buildings of each
development? Were these buildings reminiscent of typical** suburban
structures?
13 out of the 30 developments in Detroit's severely distressed neighborhoods
were judged to be qualitatively suburban. This comprised 45 percent of the new
housing developments constructed there. 15 developments were not qualitatively
suburban, and too little data were available for two developments (Puao Plaza
and Genesis Villa) for a qualitative determination to be made.
The percentage of qualitatively suburban housing developments in non-
distressed neighborhoods was similar. Ten out of 20 developments, or 50
percent, were judged to be to be qualitatively suburban, while ten developments
were not. The two photographs below show typical qualitatively suburban and
non-suburban developments.
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The HUD website (www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/ezec/about/ezecinit.cfm) contains detailed data on
this still-growing initiative.
For a discussion of what could be considered to comprise 'typical' suburbia please see Chapter
Three.
Figures 4.14 and 4.15. About half of all new Detroit developments (typical example on left) were
qualitatively judged to be non-suburban, while the other half (typical example on right) were
judged to have suburban characteristics and were therefore measured.
Qualitatively, inner-city suburbanization in Detroit seemed to be occurring in
distressed and non-distressed neighborhoods with approximately equal
frequency! This was somewhat surprising as I had initially thought that the large
amounts of vacant land in Detroit would have served as a suburbanizing
influence on new development. This did not appear to be the case. Why? I
hypothesized four possible reasons.
First, it was conceivable that my hypothesis was wrong, and that large amounts
of vacant land played little role in influencing development form. In this scenario,
inner-city suburbanization did not seem to be dependent upon an inner-city
location at all!
Second, it was conceivable that most of Detroit's non-distressed neighborhoods
were newer (as we saw, they were primarily located at the outskirts of the city),
and thus were lower-density to begin with. This would have meant that
qualitatively suburban developments in non-distressed neighborhoods were
being built in a contextual manner.
149
Third, it was conceivable that my inner city hypothesis was correct, but that the
criteria used to establish neighborhood distress were inaccurate. This would
have meant that the locations of qualitatively suburban developments were a
truer indicator of neighborhood distress than the loss criteria I had used.
Fourth, it was conceivable that my qualitative impressions were inaccurate and
that they would not necessarily correspond with the measured quantitative
indicators.
Although all of the above possibilities were conceivable, I concluded that the
second and third were the most likely to be playing a role in my findings. Detroit's
outer edges were developed for the most part after World War II, in some cases
as late as the 1960s. Although they were built on grids, the residential
neighborhoods of these areas were quite low in density and resembled the
vernacular suburbia being built in actual suburbs at the time. The retracting that I
had found could also have played a role in skewing the figures for neighborhood
distress within a limited area. To attempt to correct for this problem I decided to
include developments in 'island' non-distressed tracts, or those tracts which
were surrounded by distressed tracts, in my analysis. These tracts can clearly be
seen on the previous map. Four of the seven 'island' developments were
qualitatively suburban.
Detroit Developments: quantitative analysis
In order to measure developments, I examined both current and historical
building information. The most current development could only be assessed
through site visits and measurement of these developments was not possible.
Other new developments were measured using aerial photography and historical
Sanborn Map Company maps from the Rotch Library collection at MIT. Historical
maps dated from 1951, the latest date for which these maps were available.
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1951 was also a date well before Detroit began to experience major decline, but
by which most of its 'historic' development had already occurred.
17 of the 23 qualitatively suburban Detroit developments were eligible for
measurement (the remaining six were in non-distressed tracts). Of these 17
developments, 13 were located in distressed tracts and four developments were
located in island tracts. Not all of these 17 developments, however, were actually
measured. Eight of the 13 distressed tract developments and all four of the island
developments were measured. Three distressed tract developments (Grayhaven,
Shorepointe, and Pablo Davis Elder Housing) were not measured because they
were built on greenfield sites; i.e., they did not directly replace historic
development, and two (St. Anne's Apartments and Bethany Presbyterian Village)
had no available site plans. One qualitatively urban development in a distressed
neighborhood (Woodward Place at Brush Park) was measured as a control. This
development was measured for change over two periods, 1896 to 1951, and
1951 to 2002, because of the degree of change that had already occurred in that
neighborhood before 1951. These measurements are tabulated on the following
page. (Measurements for each development are provided in Appendix A.)

Table 4.11. Quantitative inner-city suburbanization measurements for Detroit housing developments
Development Name Density Density Land Use Unit type Tenure Site Planning Street Pattern Architecture/Notes Index Score
(Du/acre Score type (Lot Coverage)
Qualitatively suburban developments located in severely distressed neighborhoods
Bradby Townhomes 5.5 0.53 0.0 0.92 0.52 0.40 1.0 (all streets altered) Townhouse style 3.37
Clairpointe of Victoria Park 3.1 0.70 0.0 0.20 0.10 0.72 1.0 (all streets altered) Single-family home 2.72
Alberta W. King Village 8.1 0.13 0.28 0.96 0.94 0.72 1.0 (all streets altered) Garden apartment 4.03 H
Campau Farms 16.0 -0.43 0.12 0.92 0.46 0.42 1.0 (all streets altered) Garden condominium 2.49
Helen Butler Apartments 14.7 0.14 0.07 0.86 0.43 0.55 0.5 (alleys removed) Garden apartment 2.55
Virginia Park Estates 2.8 0.9 0.12 0.56 0.28 0.56 1.0 (all streets altered) Single-family home 3.42
Circle Drive Commons 13.2 -0.16 0.02 0.5 0.56 0.44 1.0 (all streets altered) Condominium 2.36 L
Victoria Park 2.9 0.78 0.04 0.96 0.56 0.56 0.75 (most streets Single-family home 3.65
altered)
Bethany Presbyterian ? No site plan available
Village
St. Anne's Cooperative Apts ? No site plan available
Shore Pointe Village N.A. Greenfield site
Grayhaven N.A. Greenfield site
D.J. Healy Apartments N.A. Greenfield site
Woodward Place at Brush N.A. -0.12 1.0 0.54 0.06 0.05 0.0 (no streets altered) Urban townhouse 1.53
Park (1951-200 1) (control development)
Woodward Place at Brush 8.1 -4.28 0.38 1.0 0.0 -0.72 0.0 (no streets altered) -3.62
Park (1896-2001)___II
Qualitatively suburban developments located in island tracts
Marketplace Court 12.6 -0.09 0.38 0.70 0.36 0.55 1.0 (all streets altered) Garden apartment 2.90
Mildred Smith Manor / 12.0 0.20 0.0 0.92 0.46 0.49 0.5 (all alleys removed) Garden apartment 2.57
Friendship Meadows // 9.4 0.18 0.26 0.90 0.64 0.44 1.0 (all streets altered) Garden apartment 3.42
Friendship Meadows // 10.0 0.07 0.10 0.786 0.55 1.0 (all streets altered) Garden apartment 3.26
Detroit average 9.2 0.29 0.12 0.77 0.51 0.53 0.90 N.A. 3.06(A
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As we saw in the qualitative analysis, inner-city suburbanization was not a
ubiquitous phenomenon in Detroit's declining neighborhoods. Qualitatively
suburban developments comprised only about half of all new developments in
those neighborhoods. Nevertheless, a substantial number of developments
qualitatively indicated inner-city suburbanization. The quantitative measurements
of these developments on the whole bore out the hypothesis that these
developments differed significantly in form, land use and ownership patterns from
the historic residential neighborhoods that preceded them.
Scores. The average suburbanization score for the 12 developments measured
was 3.19 out of the maximum of 6. A score of 6 would have signified a complete
change from the historic condition (and would have been impossible, since the
neighborhood would have had to dedensify to zero units per acre), while a score
of zero would have indicated a net absence of change in the indicators. A
negative score would have indicated a densification or diversification in the
indicators. Of these 12 developments, Alberta King Village had the highest
overall suburbanization score of 4.03. Victoria Park had the next highest
suburbanization score of 3.65. Circle Drive Commons was the lowest-scoring
qualitatively suburban development with a 2.36, The control development of
Woodward Place had the overall lowest suburbanization scores: 1.52 for the
change between 1951 and 2001, and extremely low -3.62 for the change from
1896 to 2001.
Unit density. Most new developments were lower density than the housing that
formerly occupied the site. Density reduction scores ranged from a low of -0.43
(Campau Farms) to a high of 0.9 (Virginia Park). The average density score was
0.25. Woodward Place had two negative scores, with the change from 1896 a
very low -4.28, and the change from 1951 a -0.12. A negative score, it should be
remembered, means that the new development, although it may have been
qualitatively suburban, was higher density than the developments which
preceded it. Three qualitatively suburban developments (Marketplace Court,
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Campau Farms, and Circle Drive Commons) also had negative density scores,
and all were multifamily apartment developments. The remaining nine
qualitatively suburban developments, however, were lower density than the
developments which preceded them on the site.
Land use. The land use mix of new developments was generally only slightly
more homogenous than that of the neighborhoods those developments replaced.
Land use homogenization scores ranged from a low of 0, scored by three
developments, to a high of 0.38 (Marketplace Court). Note that land use scores,
as with unit type and owner type scores, reflect differences in percentages and
therefore cannot be negative. A higher score means that the previous
neighborhood was more mixed-use than the new development. Nine of the 12
qualitatively suburban developments were less diverse in terms of their land use
than the development which preceded them, while the remaining three were
already homogenous before redevelopment. The average land use score was
only 0.12, reflecting the fact that the historic neighborhoods were mostly
residential and that their land use mix was therefore already quite homogenous.
Marketplace Court, which had the highest land use score, was only 19%
commercial before redevelopment. The control development of Woodward Place
scored a maximum of 1.0 in the change from 1951, and a lower 0.38 in the
change from 1896. Both of these scores reflected the historically high mixed-use
character of this neighborhood close to the downtown.
Housing unit type. The diversity of housing units in Detroit's vernacular
neighborhoods was generally replaced by homogenous developments with only
one unit type. Unit type homogenization scores ranged from a low of 0.20
(Clairpointe) to a high of 1.0. The average unit type score was 0.77, reflecting
large reductions in the diversity of new units, although not necessarily in the type
of units constructed. Woodward Place scored high in this category, with scores of
0.29 (1951) and 1.0 (1896). Unit type shifts were relative and did not reflect a
typological change. The high scores, however, reflected the fact that whatever
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the type of units in Detroit's new housing developments, they were far less
diverse than the unit types in the historic neighborhoods which preceded them.
Tenure type. As one might have expected from their reduced unit diversity, the
diversity of tenure type was also lower in the new developments than in the
historic neighborhoods. The average tenure type score was 0.51, and scores
ranged from a low of 0.10 (Clairpointe) to a high of 0.94 (Alberta King Village).
Woodward Place scored lowest of all the developments measured, with scores of
0.0 (1896-2001) and 0.06 (1951-2001). These scores reflected the historically
low diversity of unit, and tenure types in this neighborhood, despite radical
swings in the form of tenure. In the late nineteenth century the Woodward Place
neighborhood was an almost wholly homeownership development of single-
family houses. By mid-century it had shifted to an almost entirely rental
neighborhood before being redeveloped with ownership units as Woodward
Place. Woodward Place's low scores indicated the danger of stereotyping urban
neighborhoods as diverse in all of their aspects. In fact, many dense historic
urban neighborhoods, as we saw in Charlotte Gardens, were no more diverse in
terms of their unit types than suburban neighborhoods. The fact, however, that
no qualitatively suburban development scored zero indicates that all of the
historic Detroit neighborhoods had at least some diversity of tenure (either a few
rental or a few homeownership units) while all of the new housing developments
had very little diversity.*
Lot coverage. Every new development reduced its lot coverage through
redevelopment. Lot coverage reduction scores ranged from a high of 0.72
(Alberta King Village) to 0.14 (Clairpointe). The average lot coverage score was
0.48. In other words, new developments on average occupied only half as much
of their lots as previous developments. This statistic, combined with an average
unit density reduction of 25%, was the clearest quantitative physical indicator of
* Homeownership and rental rates generated for the historic developments were only estimates
and therefore should not be taken as authoritative. This is described further in Appendix A.
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Detroit's shift toward lower-density development. Woodward Place, on the other
hand, scored only 0.05 in its change from 1951, and a negative -0.72 in its
change from 1896, indicating that the new development had an increased lot
coverage. Woodward Place was the only development to increase its lot
coverage through redevelopment.
Street pattems. Almost every development surveyed greatly altered its
neighborhood street pattern. Street pattern shift scores averaged 0.92, reflecting
distinct changes in the neighborhood design of new developments. Since street
redesign was only loosely quantifiable, developments were assigned only five
values: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0. Only Woodward Place scored a 0. A score of
0.5 indicated that no major streets were closed and/or redesigned, but that mid-
block alleys were eliminated. Ten of the 12 developments measured eliminated
both streets and alleys, and only Woodward Place preserved its original street
layout in its entirety. A few general trends were evident. The first and most
obvious was the elimination of alleys, which appeared to be a vanishing aspect of
neighborhood design in Detroit. This was likely the result of the desire to ease
automobile access through the provision of parking lots or garages in the front of
developments. This design feature, of course, was in keeping with that of the
majority of vernacular suburbs. A second general trend was the elimination of
intermediate streets (and therefore multiple blocks) in favor of loop access roads
with only one or two entrances to the development. Except for Woodward Place,
none of the developments studied preserved the rather finely grained original
Detroit street grid, and in developments like Victoria Park the closure of adjoining
streets created serious impediments to pedestrian travel to and from adjoining
neighborhoods. A third general trend was the widening of roads adjacent to the
developments. These widenings, seen in Alberta King Village, Marketplace
Court, and Victoria Park among others, were part of a larger-scale
automobilization and suburbanization of Detroit's neighborhoods. This shift will
be discussed more fully at the end of this section.
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Architecture. The shifts in architecture which occurred through redevelopment
were harder to generalize. All of the new developments were built in vernacular
architectural styles which, like many suburban buildings, were of minimal
architectural interest. Although the site planning and densities of these
redevelopments were inconsistent with historic patterns, all of the new
developments were built in vaguely historic styles, including brick facing or wood
siding; punched windows with mullions; and gabled dormer windows or
doorways. Despite these historic details, the new developments resembled their
historic contexts very little. Some developments, such as Clairpointe and Bradby
Park, reflected their higher cost through slightly more detailed ornamental
features, and larger unit sizes. Clairpointe houses, for example, had profusions of
gables and Palladian windows, a stylistic feature common in 1990s suburbia.
While the architectural nondescriptness of the new developments might be
attributed to the fact that their neighborhood architectural contexts were generally
weak, it is more likely that architectural detail and contextuality were not major
concerns for the designers of these buildings.
A few developments seemed to especially exaggerate the trend toward
architectural banality. The neighborhood context of Virginia Park was rather
distinguished and included sizeable two-family and ornate multifamily dwellings.
This context was rejected, however, for both the neighborhood design and site
planning of Virginia Park, and the rather blandly-designed houses could hardly
have differed more from their neighborhood context. Other developments,
including some like English Village and Kercheval Place that were not closely
examined, were designed far more carefully. Woodward Place attempted to
address its historic context at both its neighborhood design and the architectural
level. Its surrounding neighborhood of Brush Park was once one of the most
distinguished in Detroit containing many of the city's oldest and largest single-
family houses. Woodward Place's prominent location at the very northern edge of
the Detroit CBD, on one of Detroit's major streets, probably also contributed to
the higher architectural level of this development.
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Detroit Developments: narratives
The rather abstract measurements described above take on new life when they
are examined in the context of individual developments. Below I describe six
Detroit developments: Virginia Park Estates, Victoria Park, Clairpointe, Alberta
King Village, Marketplace Court, and Woodward Place. These narratives, which
describe the design and other characteristics of these development, provide a
prelude to Chapter Five's examination of the causality of inner-city
suburbanization in Victoria Park and Clairpointe. They also cover a spectrum of
development types, including single-family houses, apartments, affordable
housing, and high-end homeownership units. Each narrative discusses the
connectivity, pedestrian/automobile orientation, neighborhood design, and
architecture of the development.
Virginia Park Estates
Virginia Park was one of the most iconically suburban of the developments
studied. It also had one of the highest suburbanization scores (3.42) of any of the
developments. Virginia Park was a subdivision of single-family houses with large
yards located on a loop road amidst a declining urban neighborhood. The
suburban appearance of Virginia Park was all the more ironic because the
neighborhood which it replaced was dense for Detroit. The historic
neighborhood's unit density of 27.75 units per acre was the highest of any of the
historic neighborhoods measured. At 2.8 units per acre, Virginia Park, on the
other hand, was one of the lowest-density redevelopments. With this
dedensification of almost 90 percent, combined with its other changes, Virginia
Park could be considered to be the epitome of inner city suburbanization in
Detroit.
Virginia Park's extreme suburbanization had major consequences for its
relationship to its urban context. The development de-emphasized connections
with surrounding neighborhoods in favor of an internally focused site design. The
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street grid which formerly overlaid the site was demapped and a single road,
Estates Drive, was laid out in its place. Estates Drive was a loop road with a
single connection on the west to Rosa Parks Boulevard. The entire development
was surrounded by a fence and the development's houses faced inward to the
loop road, backing onto the surrounding neighborhood.
Like all of the developments studied, Virginia Park was an automobile-oriented
development. Emphasizing the automobile orientation of the development,
houses in Virginia Park Estates all had attached two-car garages with wide
driveways. In contrast, the historic surrounding neighborhoods had garages
located along alleys. The lack of connectivity to the surrounding neighborhood
made pedestrian access difficult except via the single entrance onto Rosa Parks
Boulevard. Although this street had bus service, Rosa Parks Boulevard was a
six-lane divided roadway with little of interest to the pedestrian.
Figures 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19
Location of Virginia Park in Detroit Aerial view of Virginia Park
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
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Typical Virginia Park house Typical Virginia Park streetscape
The internal street design of Virginia Park reinforced the development's
automobile orientation. Estates Drive is a wide, curving road, wider than most
nearby urban streets, with the exception of Rosa Parks Boulevard. Estates Drive
was divided as it entered the development, creating a location for decorative
plantings and signage at the entrance. At its corners, Estates Drive widened to
create three semicircular paved areas with small planting areas in their centers.
These paved areas, which somewhat resembled cul-de-sacs, appeared to serve
little function except to distance houses on corner lots somewhat from the main
roadway.
Virginia Park was a homogenous residential environment. The development was
composed of 45 single-family houses and there were no commercial or
community facility uses built with the development. The development also
contained two parks, Rosa Park North and Rosa Park South. These parks were
only accessible from within the development, and although they may have been
public, their private, 'for residents only' message was clear. Suburban single-
family home iconography was obviously explicit in the site planning of the
development. along their ends, Virginia Park homes faced the street along their
sides. While both Virginia Park Estates and surrounding neighborhoods had
deep front yards, there was about twice as much space between homes in
Virginia Park as in surrounding neighborhoods, and Virginia Park's lot coverage
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was much lower (about 13%, down from about 28%). There were no fences
between houses, and all houses along the interior side of Estates Drive backed
onto large, undivided lawn. Architecturally, houses in Virginia Park were
constructed in variants of a vaguely Colonial style with prominent gables, brick
facing, and front porches.
Victoria Park
Two other single-family home developments, Victoria Park and Clairpointe of
Victoria Park, bore many similarities to Virginia Park Estates. Victoria Park's
suburbanization score was higher (3.65), but Clairepointe's was lower (X). These
differences reflected the new developments less than they reflected differences
in the characteristics of the historic neighborhoods which they replaced.
Clairpointe, for example, was historically a homogenous neighborhood, and
therefore, despite the significant dedensification (70%) that occurred through
redevelopment, its score was lower.
Victoria Park was one of the largest of all the new developments studied, and it
was the largest composed entirely of single-family houses. With one of the lowest
unit densities of the developments surveyed (3.1 DU/acre), Victoria Park
consumed an enormous amount of land- the greater amount of ten city blocks.
Due to this large size, the development contained a larger amount of
neighborhood-level design changes than many of the other Detroit
developments.
The neighborhood design changes wrought by Victoria Park were not as radical
as those of Virginia Park, but they were larger in scale. An entire neighborhood of
ten blocks was closed off and fenced, and a single entrance created along the
western edge of the development, connecting to a redesigned Dickerson Street.
This street was a wide, divided, automobile-oriented street, designed to provide
an imposing gateway to the development. Dickerson Street provided for easy
automobile access to Jefferson Avenue, a major regional artery three blocks to
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the north, and to the strip commercial facilities found there, as well as to other
new developments like the gated Greyhaven development located two blocks
southwest of Victoria Park. The reshaping of Dickinson Street in the interest of
the automobile was an excellent example of the suburbanization of the inner city
extended beyond the level of individual developments in Detroit.
Figures 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23
Location of Victoria Park Aerial view of Victoria Park
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
Typical Victoria Park streetscape Typical Victoria Park house
Victoria Park was surrounded by a fence with no entrances except at the main
gate. This fence was supplanted in some places by vegetation and in other
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places by earthen berms. Pedestrian access to the development was obviously
impossible except via the main gate. As in Virginia Park, houses faced the
interior streets and had deep back yards backing onto the fence and the
surrounding neighborhoods.
The single entry to Victoria Park was gated, but was not manned on the dates
that it was visited. A guard did, however, patrol the streets of the development in
an automobile. Within the development, the formerly rather long city blocks of the
neighborhood were reshaped into cul-de-sacs that ran halfway down the block.
Three of the six formerly through streets ended in this way, while two streets
running around the interior perimeter and one street in the center of the
development ran through. The new streets ran along the beds of the old ones,
preserving their original block dimensions.
Victoria Park was an entirely residential neighborhood. Its residential character
was consistent not only with the surrounding neighborhood but with the
structures that formerly occupied the site. The historic neighborhood was about
three quarters single-family houses, but these houses contained only half of the
neighborhood's units. Victoria Park's homogenously single-family nature gave it
an extremely high unit type score of 0.96. As the historic neighborhood had
almost no commercial uses, however, its land use score was extremely low
(0.04). The only historic commercial developments had apparently served local
retail needs. The existence of a residential neighborhood with diverse unit types,
but very little commercial or industrial uses, was a relatively common condition in
the historic Detroit neighborhoods examined.
As in Virginia Park, the houses of Victoria Park were designed in a rather
nondescript vernacular suburban style, with attached garages and various styles
and types of facing materials. On the whole, they were remarkable less for their
architecture, which was typically banal, than for their neighborhood context
amidst a severely distressed neighborhood. The large size of Victoria Park large
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allowed for the creation of an entirely new neighborhood context in which the
surrounding neighborhood was invisible. Within Victoria Park one might imagine
oneself to be in a typical Michigan suburb rather than in Detroit. Victoria Park
thus altered an already relatively low-density, homogenously residential urban
neighborhood model in favor of an antiurban, obviously suburban one. Chapter 5
discusses the particular reasons for the suburban design of Victoria Park.
Victoria Park succeeded in replicating a vernacular suburban environment nearly
perfectly. The complete enclosure of the development negated the decayed
urban realm outside the walls. The urban street grid was converted to a system
of loop roads and cul-de-sacs. Despite the design attention paid to features like
Victoria Park's fence, gatehouse, and streetscape, the development's internal
public space was little more than a large expanse of grass and as such did not
encourage diverse outdoor activities. In its lack of attention to a public realm
Victoria Park also resembled vernacular suburbs, which often prioritize the
private realm of the house over the public realm of the citizen.
Clairpointe of Victoria Park
Clairpointe of Victoria Park, as its name implied, was a single-family home
development located near Victoria Park. Seven blocks to the west, the
development was three city blocks long and only one city block wide, giving it a
long, narrow shape very different from Victoria or Virginia Park, which were both
more or less rectangular. Despite these site constraints, Clairpointe also
substantially transformed its neighborhood environment to produce a site design
that also recalled vernacular suburbia, if not quite as convincingly as in the
previous two developments.
Index score. Despite its suburban appearance, Clairpointe's total suburbanization
score (2.72) was in the lower half of the Detroit housing developments measured.
This lack of agreement between qualitative and quantitative indicators signalled
that while the presence of high scores was likely to indicate qualitative
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suburbanization, the presence of lower scores did not necessarily indicate a lack
of qualitative suburbanization. Clairpointe's relatively low score was the result, as
previously mentioned, of the development replacing a neighborhood which had
already been almost entirely composed of single-family houses. The significant
changes resulting from the construction of Clairpointe were in density and lot
coverage reductions as well as in neighborhood and housing design, but not in
shifts in land use, unit type, or owner type. Despite the lack of change of the
latter indicators, the suburban appearance of Clairpointe signalled that not all of a
development's suburbanization index components needed to change radically in
order for a neighborhood's qualitative appearance to become suburban.
Clairpointe's neighborhood was constructed relatively late. Sanborn maps from
1951 showed the neighborhood still only partially built up. This late date was due
to the neighborhood's location far from the center of Detroit, less than half a mile
from the suburb of Grosse Pointe Park. The vernacular neighborhood fabric was
one of small single-family Cape-style houses. Many postwar suburbs such as
Levittown were built up with houses similar to these, but with neighborhood
designs different from Clairpointe's urban grid. As Detroit was quite large, many
of its outer neighborhoods were built up during the first major period of suburban
expansion in the 1950's or 1960's.
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Figures 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27
Location of Clairpointe in Detroit Aerial view of Clairpointe
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
Typical Clairpointe streetscape Typical Clairpointe house
Like Virginia and Victoria Parks, Clairpointe deemphasized connections with
surrounding neighborhoods in favor of an internally focused site design. Streets
formerly extending through the site were demapped or shifted to allow for a new
road, Clairpointe Woods Drive, to be laid out. The development was located in
two discontinuous sections, both of which had similar site designs. Clairpointe
Woods Drive was located in the bed of the former Clairpointe Street, which was
relocated to the west to serve as a through street. Clairpointe Woods Drive
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ended in cul-de-sacs on both its north and its south ends connecting to
Clairpointe Street through a single entry along the west of the development. The
development was surrounded by a fence on its eastern side while a low earthen
berm was built along its western side to visually screen the development from the
road. Clairpointe Woods Drive was no wider than neighboring streets, but it was
somewhat redundant given the presence of Clairpointe Street running parallel
only a few yards away. The roadway redesign was clearly intended to give the
development a secluded atmosphere within its relatively constrained site.
Clairpointe Woods Drive widened into cul-de-sacs at both its north and its south
ends, providing space for a small grassy park at its southern end. While
neighboring streets were straight, Clairpointe Woods Drive curved slightly, giving
it a somewhat sinuous appearance.
Pedestrian access into Clairpointe was limited to a single entrance along
Clairpointe Avenue, although it was unfenced along its western edge. No
entrances were provided at the southern end where the development faced a
public park. Only the east side of Clairpointe Woods Drive had sidewalks.
Clairpointe was composed of 41 single-family houses. Suburban single-family
home iconography was explicit at Clairpointe although the site was cramped
between the access road and the surrounding neighborhood. All houses in
Clairpointe had attached two-car garages, unlike surrounding neighborhoods
which had on-street parking or parking in alley garages. These highly visible
garages emphasized the automobile-oriented nature of the Clairpointe
development. Although the houses were large, Clairpointe's average lot
coverage was much less than the surrounding neighborhood (12% vs. 42%), a
shift explained by the larger front and side yards of the new development.
Architecturally, Clairpointe was the most elaborate of the three single-family
developments described. Houses were constructed in variants of a vaguely
Colonial style with prominent gables, brick facing, and small front porches. These
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houses were larger than either Victoria Park or Virginia Park, and they were
significantly larger than the single-family houses which formerly occupied the
site. Despite the additional attention paid to their design, it was difficult to
characterize the Clairpointe houses as being architecturally sophisticated. They
were typical examples of upper-mid-range suburban houses that were rare within
the city of Detroit, but that were extremely common in surrounding suburbs.
Clairpointe's constrained site served only to emphasize the development's
almost desperate desire to separate itself from its surroundings. Clairpointe
provided such relatively cramped suburban space standards in part because it
used half of its site area for a relatively redundant access road, and for open
space to buffer the development from a through road. At the same time, the
development failed to utilize the limited open space created for the benefit of its
residents. The southern cul-de-sac was a barren grassy space at the time of
research (Fall 2001), although it was intended to be more heavily landscaped
when the development was completed. Although it made every attempt to
distance itself from the neighborhood which surrounds it, Clairpointe did not
provide a compensatory private realm in its place.
Alberta King Village
Alberta King Village, unlike the previous three developments analyzed, was a
multifamily housing development consisting of several garden-apartment-style
buildings loosely organized around the periphery of a large block. This
development, as well as Marketplace Court, a description of which follows, was
convincing evidence that multifamily housing could contribute to inner city
suburbanization as much as single-family home development, despite the higher
unit densities and larger buildings of this type of development. In fact, King
Village had the highest overall suburbanization score of any of the developments
studied. Surpassing the three previous single-family home developments. As will
be seen, this high score was less the result of dedensification than of substantial
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shifts in the diversity of unit types, owner types, and in site planning from old to
new.
Figures 4.28, 4.29, 4.30, and 4.31
Location of King Village in Detroit Aerial view of King Village
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
Typical King Village streetscape Typical King Village units
Like the previous three developments, King Village de-emphasized connections
with its surrounding neighborhood in favor of an internally focused site design.
The street grid which formerly overlaid the site was demapped and a single
interior loop service road was created. Because of these changes, King Village
received a street pattern score of 1.0. The loop road connected to Martin Luther
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King Jr. Boulevard on the south side of the development through two driveways.
Martin Luther King Drive, like Rosa Parks Boulevard, was another example of a
widened urban street which deurbanized a wide stretch of cityscape. Although
the interior access road of King Village was not wider than neighboring streets,
the previously mentioned end-in parking made its effective width much wider.
The western end of the interior drive was effectively a large surface parking lot.
The interior drive curved to reflect exterior site conditions but did not appear to
have been purposefully designed in a picturesque manner, unlike the previous
developments of Virginia Park and Clairpointe.
King Village was composed of garden apartment buildings containing 120 one,
two, and three-bedroom apartments. The unit density of the development was
high compared to the single-family developments (8.1 DU/ac), and because of
the correspondingly low historic density of the site King Village's density score is
only 0.13. There were no commercial facilities, although there was a community
center on the site with facilities for residents. A park was located behind this
community center, although it was not clear whether it was for neighborhood
residents or residents of the development. The development was unfenced, and
housing units backed onto surrounding streets with balconies and deep rear
yards. The lot coverage of King Village (11 %) was the lowest of any of the
developments studied, including the single-family home developments. This led
to King Village's high lot coverage score of 0.72, the highest of any of the
developments measured.
The automobile orientation of King Village was clear. Pedestrian access to the
surrounding neighborhood was possible through the back doors of ground floor
units, but there were no sidewalks connecting the interior space of the
development to surrounding streets, except along the driveways to King
Boulevard. There were no garages, but the interior court provided a plethora of
surface parking spaces for residents, indicating that automobile access was
expected for even affordable housing in Detroit. Although bus service ran along
172
Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevards, these streets were wide and
moderately hostile to the pedestrian. The interior court of this development was
pedestrian-unfriendly due to the large amount of space provided for parking.
King Village was not composed of single-family homes, though the interior
facades of units were designed to emphasize the individual nature of each
dwelling. King Village instead replicated the equally common suburban prototype
of the garden apartment, with buildings surrounded by ample green space on
both their front and back. As King Village faced urban streets, it suffered
somewhat from having its rear entrances appear to be somewhat like its
entrances. This confusion was probably reduced by the fact that much access to
the development was by automobile. The rear facades were attractively designed
with wide balconies for both upper and lower units. King Village units were
designed in a vaguely colonial style, with prominent gables, brick facing, and
small entrance porches.
King Village's generous open space standards permitted a substantial withdrawal
from its surrounding neighborhood at the same time as they permitted a large
interior open space to be created. That being said, these open spaces were
designed in a far less creative manner than they might have been, turning these
spaces into barriers rather than amenities. While King Village did succeed in
providing substantial privacy and isolation for its residents, it did not provide a
compensatory private realm which residents might have enjoyed in the stead of
the public realm which was abandoned.
Marketplace Court
Marketplace Court was also a multifamily development, built at the highest
density (12.6 Du/acre) of any of the six developments described in this section.
Despite it being higher density than its historic neighborhood, Marketplace Court
appeared to be qualitatively suburban from its site planning and design. Its
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overall suburbanization score was 2.90, placing it in the middle third of the
developments surveyed.
Although it was dense, Marketplace Court was less diverse than its historic
neighborhood. This neighborhood had been a relatively mixed-use neighborhood
with a high percentage (19%) of its parcels occupied by commercial units.
Marketplace Court, in contrast, was entirely residential development, resulting in
a high (0.38) land use score. The unit mix of the historic neighborhoods was also
diverse with a mix of single-family and two-family houses. Marketplace Court
replaced this mix with an entirely multi-family apartment complex, giving it a high
unit score of 0.70. This mix was also reflected in the development's ownership
score of 0.36.
Figures 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, and 4.35
Location of Marketplace Court Aerial photograph of Marketplace Court
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
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Typical Marketplace Court streetscape Typical Marketplace Court units
Marketplace Court's most distinguishing characteristic was its contrast of a
relatively high unit density with relatively low lot coverage. Its low lot coverage
(26%) gave Marketplace Court a lot coverage score of 0.55, among the highest
of all the developments measured. While we are accustomed to finding a
combination of high density with low lot coverage in Modernist tower blocks, it is
perhaps more surprising to find the same features in a low-rise apartment
complex like Marketplace Court. This contrast can be explained by the high unit
capacity of multifamily buildings, which left much of the rest of the lot for open
space and parking. Although the site planning of Marketplace Court was not as
self-consciously antiurban as many Modernist public housing complexes, the site
planning of these two types of development was not dissimilar. The contrast
between apparent and real density was also seen in other Detroit multifamily
complexes. Campau Farms, another multifamily development, contained 42%
more units than the previous developments on the site but covered 42% less of
its lot! The demapping of through streets also contributed to the low lot coverage
of the multifamily developments as the area of the street was added to the
buildable area of the lot.
Marketplace Court's site planning was dominated by the withdrawal of its
buildings from the street. This withdrawal was doubtless in part a response to
completely automobile-oriented nature of the surrounding neighborhood. Unlike
many of the other developments studied, no historic neighborhood fabric
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bordered Marketplace Court. Mack Avenue, the development's south border
street, had been widened to a rather astonishing 150 feet and served as a major
east-west artery and entrance to Interstate 75. While Marketplace Court was
conveniently located, the heavy traffic and antiurban character of Mack Avenue
did not encourage residential development along it to face the street. This
contrasted with the historic pattern on other boulevards like Woodward Avenue, a
busy artery which was once relatively firmly bounded by urban fabric. The
placeless surroundings of Marketplace Court meant that it was not out of
character with its context. More surprising, perhaps, would have been a
development that attempted to bring the freeway-like character of Mack Avenue
back to an urban, pedestrian-oriented scale.
Marketplace Court was bordered by a low black fence which prevented easy
pedestrian passage across the development. Vehicular entrances were located
on the east and west sides of the development at midblock, accessing an interior
perimeter road off of which parking is located. While every unit was therefore
close to a parking space, the majority of units were deprived of a view of anything
but a sea of parking. The two buildings on the northern edge of the development,
however, did have an interior court which received good sun exposure. This site
arrangement was not repeated to the south, presumably because of space
constraints where the lot narrowed. A small community building and
management office was located at midblock and was surrounded by a loop
access road.
Marketplace Court displayed the tradeoffs of increasing density while maintaining
the imperatives of easy automobile access and withdrawal from surrounding
streets. The result was a development with the most poorly configured open
spaces of any of the six developments studied, but one that did, like the other
qualitatively suburban developments studied, succeed in neatly segregating itself
from a context, a context which in this case had been entirely transformed into an
automobile-oriented environment by redevelopment.
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Woodward Place at Brush Park
Woodward Place at Brush Park was a 'control' development that did not appear
qualitatively suburban. Its quantitative measurements in large part supported this
qualitative assessment as a development that was an example of urbanization
than suburbanization. As will be seen, the qualitative aspects of Woodward Place
played a major part in defining its urban character.
Woodward Place was located at the northern edge of the Detroit CBD in a
neighborhood called Brush Park. This neighborhood was an early high-income
district of Detroit and, although it was always politically part of the city, it
developed physically in a manner that would be considered "suburban" today.
Because of its location to the CBD, the district lost prestige and became a mixed-
use, mostly residential district in the first part of the twentieth century. With
Detroit's later decline, Brush Park slid into a state of semi-abandonment. In
recent years, however, Brush Park's proximity to downtown, to the major street of
Woodward Avenue, and to two recent professional sports stadiums, has once
again spurred a resurgence.
Figures 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, and 4.39
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Typical Woodward Place streetscape Typical Woodward Place units
These historical trends were clearly visible in the Woodward Place's quantitative
measurements. Reflecting the area's shift from a quasi-suburb to an urban
district, and then to a revitalized urban district, Woodward Place's overall
suburbanization scores were very low. Its score over the 1896 to 2001 period
was by far the lowest of any of the developments sampled, reflecting the area's
net urbanization during that period. Since 1951, however, Woodward Place's
neighborhood has suburbanized slightly, giving it a score of 1.53. This score,
however, was still the lowest of any of the developments studied, indicating that
whatever changes have occurred through the development of Woodward Place
were not as radically different as those of other developments. The majority of
Woodward Place's score was generated not by density or lot coverage changes
but by reductions in land use and tenure diversity.
Although it was low-rise, Woodward Place will be denser when eventually
completed than in either of the previous two periods sampled. Its density score
from 1896 was an extremely low -4.28, reflecting a low 1896 unit density of only
1.6 DU/ac. Its density score from 1951 (-0.12) was also slightly negative. Much
development occurred in the Woodward Place area between 1896 and 1951,
primarily the conversion of single-family homes into multifamily rooming houses
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and the redevelopment of lots that had previously been occupied by single-family
houses with multifamily apartment buildings.
Woodward Place's status as a wholly residential development gave it high land
use homogenization scores (1.0 from 1951 and 0.38 from 1896). These scores
reflected the fact that by 1896 the neighborhood was already somewhat mixed-
use. In the days before zoning small commercial and industrial establishments
could locate legally in back yards or along alleys, giving even single-family
districts like Brush Park a somewhat mixed-use character. By 1951 the
neighborhood was entirely mixed-use, with commercial and industrial uses
outnumbering residential ones. Brush Park was the only neighborhood sampled
which attained this level of mixed-use character, and this character was no doubt
due to the neighborhood's proximity to the rapidly developing Detroit CBD.
Woodward Place also differed significantly from past developments on its site in
its homogeneity of housing unit types. All of Woodward Place's housing units
were located either in 5+ unit buildings or in single-family attached rowhouses, a
relatively rare housing type in Detroit. This unit mix differed entirely from that of
1896 and somewhat from that of 1951, giving Woodward Place unit type scores
of 1.0 (1896) and 0.54 (1921). The lower score for 1951 reflected the
construction of multifamily apartment buildings which contained the majority of
the housing units in the sample area. The 1896 score again indicated the
urbanization of the district since that date.
Woodward Place's owner type scores reflected the rapid shifts that occurred
between 1896 and 1921, when the district shifted from one that was entirely
homeownership to one that was almost entirely rental. Since both of these
districts were relatively homogenous, however, these changes scored very low,
giving owner type scores of 0.06 (1951) and 0.0 (1896). The 1951-present owner
type score would shift if a large apartment building currently (2002) vacant on the
Woodward Place site was ever rehabilitated as rental housing.
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As with its density scores, Woodward Place's lot coverage scores reflected the
sharp changes that occurred between 1896, 1951, and 2002. The development's
1896 score was -0.72, the only negative score of any of the developments
measured. This score reflected an increased lot coverage (39%) in 2001 over
that of 1896 (23%). Lot coverage in 1951, however, was slightly higher (41%)
than in 2001, resulting in a lot coverage score of 0.05. Woodward Place's 2001
lot coverage of 39% was again the highest of any of the developments sampled,
indicating that lot coverage, among other factors, was an important element
contributing to the qualitative assessment of a development as urban rather than
suburban.
Woodward Place's neighborhood design also contributed to the development's
urban character. All of the streets and alleyways which made up the sample
block were preserved by the new development, and new alleyways were added
in order to access the garages located under the multifamily units. Despite the
provision of parking for each unit, the houses resolutely faced the street,
although they were sheltered from busy Woodward Avenue by a planted berm.
Nevertheless, Woodward Park contrasted strongly with the other developments
studied, which on the whole shrank back from public streets rather than
addressing them through their site design. The architecture of Woodward Place,
as mentioned previously, also attempted to address, though rather
conservatively, the exuberant brick architectural character of the surviving
Victorian-era single-family houses that were still scattered throughout the Brush
Park neighborhood.
Detroit Developments: lessons
The individual studies of qualitatively suburban developments in Detroit told
much about the nature and extent of the inner city suburbanization process in
that city. This section discusses some general lessons derived from the individual
studies examined above.
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Many Detroit developments literally resembled vernacular suburbia- they were
'suburb-like' This could be seen in the qualitative analysis, where developments
were screened whether or not they featured suburban attributes. Because Detroit
was historically a low-density city, it was relatively easy to recreate suburban
environments within formerly urban neighborhoods, as in Victoria Park.
Inner-city suburbanization is a relative process. As it was described in Chapter
Three, inner city suburbanization in Detroit was defined as a relative process, not
an absolute one. This process encompassed more than dedensification alone.
As we saw, some of the new Detroit developments had unit densities higher than
their original neighborhoods. Nevertheless, most developments experienced a
dedensification relative to that of the original neighborhood. Even those
developments that did not experience dedensification differed in significant ways
from the developments previously on the site, as will be discussed below. The
issue of a new development's characteristics relative to its historic context will be
even more relevant in the study of Philadelphia, a city with much higher ambient
residential densities, and where even large amounts of dedensification do not
promise to produce the kind of qualitatively suburban developments seen in
Detroit.
Measurements did not tell the whole story- design mattered. Qualitative
assessments of suburbanization were not necessarily matched by quantitative
statistics. Clairpointe had a relatively low suburbanization score, yet it was
visually identical to vernacular suburbs on the urban fringe. However, because
Clairpointe replaced an already low-density, homogeneous residential
neighborhood, its suburbanization score was low. Similarly, Marketplace Court
was denser than its historic neighborhood, giving it a high score, yet it visually
resembled suburban condominium developments. Measurements did not always
communicate the same messages as design. The lack of agreement between
these indicators reinforces the need to examine both types of indicators when
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examining a phenomenon like suburbanization which is in large part a design-
based phenomenon.
Historic urban neighborhoods were not all mixed-use environments. Clairpointe
demonstrated that many historic Detroit urban neighborhoods were almost
completely residential, with little mixed uses. Although our ideal of an urban
neighborhood may be one where different types of dwellings are mingled with
commercial and other uses, this ideal was uncommon in Detroit in 1951.
Although the neighborhoods examined are not a perfect sample, no
neighborhood, except for Brush Park, had more than 20% of its parcels
dedicated to commercial or other land uses. Most neighborhoods examined were
primarily, or even completely, residential. Nevertheless, the qualitative
impression of these neighborhoods as 'urban' persists. This indicates that many
of the characteristics which guide our perception of what is 'urban' are derived
from neighborhood-level and development-level design features. The role of
these specific design features in creating qualitative impressions will be
discussed later in this section.
The grain of new developments was coarser. Although many Detroit
neighborhoods were not particularly mixed-use, almost all of them contained a
substantial diversity of types of residential units. In the Detroit of 1951, at least in
the neighborhoods studied above, it was rare to find a block that did not contain
at least one, or more, two-family houses. Even the Clairpointe neighborhood
contained several such units. Whatever the unit types chosen for new Detroit
developments, this diversity of units within developments appears to be a thing of
the past. Lynch (1981) noted similar changes in his studies of city form. Why has
this diversity vanished? Although this topic will be explored more fully in Chapter
5, some hypotheses can be put forth here. One is that the grain of Detroit
development has shifted; all of the developments studied here were conceived
as single entities, although they may have been constructed in phases, as in
Woodward Place and Victoria Park. Was this the case in the past? Although the
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historic phasing of development was not studied in the neighborhoods examined,
it seems difficult to believe that development occurred in an entirely incremental,
parcel-by-parcel manner. Research on the process of historic vernacular
residential development in Boston indicated that it occurred in increments of
small quantities of parcels, with construction occurring on perhaps three or four
houses per year (Warner 1962). If the Detroit construction process was similar in
the early twentieth century, the result would have been small clusters of houses
designed as local developers saw fit, perhaps as single-family, perhaps as two-
family. A second possibility is that developers chose to construct diverse types of
dwellings within single developments, perhaps to appeal to multiple markets.
Whether or not this occurred, the built result in Detroit was, as Warner described
it, a 'weave of small patterns'. This weave produced diverse unit types within the
larger predetermined framework of the Detroit grid block system. In contrast, the
larger grain of the new developments produced large-scale change with little
diversity of unit types except within the framework of multifamily apartments,
where one- or two-bedroom apartments might be interspersed. Two-family
houses, however, were not provided within any of the new developments, and
only in Woodward Place did unit diversity taken a form in any way similar to that
of the past, when multifamily and single-family dwellings coexisted on the same
block. The result of this lack of unit diversity was a more monotonous built
environment, especially when combined with the larger-scale site planning
changes previously described.
Individual developments were not the only changes to suburbanize the urban
fabric in Detroit. Larger-scale site planning shifts were observed in several cases
and might have impacted the design of developments in those neighborhoods.
All five of the qualitatively suburban developments described were located along
urban streets which had been widened. The result for many of the development
neighborhoods was an urban context which was already well underway to being
reconfigured for the automobile. There was substantial precedent for this type of
change in Detroit. One of the city's largest urban renewal-era redevelopments,
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Lafayette Park, was predicated on the near-total elimination of the urban street
grid and on the placement of buildings in classic modernist fashion rather loosely
throughout the greatly enlarged parcels. The adjoining area of Elmwood Park, in
which four of the surveyed developments were located, was also designed in this
fashion. No original urban context remains (2002), and the street network has
been reconfigured to favor the automobile over the pedestrian with wide, winding
roadways. Pedestrian activity in these neighborhoods is correspondingly low. In
this sense the suburbanization of individual developments could be seen as a
natural response to an environment which had already been reconfigured away
from an urban setting.
Design features played a major role in the perception of new developments as
'suburban'. A natural design response to the suburbanization of an urban
environment might be to advocate higher unit densities. Indeed, some of the
developments studied were much lower density than the previous
neighborhoods. On the whole, however, dedensification among the
developments was on!y moderate. Detroit was never a particularly high-density
city. Although the highest historic unit density was almost 28 units per acre (in
the Virginia Park neighborhood), the historic unit density average for the
neighborhoods examined was only 12.8 units per acre, less than twice the unit
density of Levittown, NY with its unit density of 7.3 units per acre (Plunz 1990).
The major physical difference between the new developments and the historic
housing was in their neighborhood-scale and site-level design. All of the
multifamily developments studied were designed to 1) withdraw from public
streets; 2) prevent through pedestrian passage; and 3) prioritize automobile
access and parking. The result were developments which either actively repelled
through pedestrian access with fences or at least discouraged it with large
expanses of neutral green space as in King Village. Pedestrian access was
probably a low-level consideration in the design of the developments examined.
The great majority of access to new developments was doubtless by automobile,
and the developments were correspondingly designed to facilitate this access.
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While this feature is doubtless advantageous for residents, the result, for the
pedestrian, was a hostile and unappealing built streetscape.
Inner-city suburbanization was widespread in Detroit, but not ubiquitous. Though
the sample size of developments measured was small, the majority of housing
developments in Detroit's distressed neighborhoods were not qualitatively
suburban. A few such as Woodward Place were clearly the opposite:
developments that consciously attempted to establish 'urbanity' in a
neighborhood which had been experiencing decline. Many other developments,
however, effected the opposite change- a suburbanization of the inner city.
Whether in partnership with larger-scale deurbanizing changes or in isolation, the
developments studied altered the city environment toward a more homogenous,
automobile-oriented, pedestrian-hostile end. This change was manifested both in
quantitative indicators like unit density and lot coverage and in the design of
these developments. Thus, although the inner city of Detroit is in many places
being rebuilt with new housing, the scale and form of these neighborhoods is in
many cases very different from that of the past.
Part Three of this chapter describes the nature and extent of the inner city
suburbanization process in Philadelphia, a city with many similarities to Detroit,
but also significant differences. The subsequent chapter will examine the causes
of the inner city suburbanization process through an examination of specific
developments in Detroit and Philadelphia.
The prevalence of inner-city suburbanization: Philadelphia development
summary
The figure below shows large (over 20 unit) new construction housing
developments constructed in Philadelphia since 1990. Development addresses
were mapped over severely distressed neighborhoods. These new housing
developments are tabulated afterwards. Developments located within severely
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distressed census tracts are shaded in gray. Developments are organized
chronologically by date of construction.
Figure 4.40. New housing developments in Philadelphia
Developments are mapped over severely distressed census tracts, shown in yellow.
Developments of over twenty units in size and built before 1990 are excluded.
Table 4.12. Large (>20 units) Philadelphia Housing Developments built since 1990
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Nehemiah West Philadelphia 1997 46n and Market SFA 160
Interfaith Action Housing
Jameson Court 1997 45th and Parrish 72
Villa E;eranza 11 197 100 blockW . York Street SPA 15
Frankford Group Ministry
Meadow House
MDHRA Ransom House
Fran
Mea
ord Group Ministry
%%A/ II
1996 4 24
WCRP Adolfina Villanueva Il 1995 719-735 West Somerset SFA 30
Gray's Ferry Apartments 1994 32"n and Wharton SFA 70
Kearsley/Christ Church 1994 2001 North 49h Snrhsg 60
Housing
APM Jardines de Borinquen 1994 2008-M North 6t Street SFA 45
Norris CDC Los Balcones 1994 100 block West Norris SFA 21
Project HOME Kairos House 1994 1440 N. Broad St. Rehab 36
TiogafGardens 1994 1801 W. Tioa SFA 32
GGHDC Elders Place 1993 Germantown and Wister ? 47
ACDQ Gratz Commons 1993 .19" and Diamond. SFA 39
Francisville 1Il 1993 Ridge and Wylie SFA 49
NE Villa Esperanza 1993 1727 North Hancock Street ? 29
11 APM Plaza 1993 2300 bock North 7" Street Rehab 41
A total of 49 new housing developments were constructed in Philadelphia
between January 1, 1990 and the date of research (March 2002). These
developments comprised a total of 2,508 housing units. This inventory was the
best available synthesis of the sources available and appeared to represent the
majority of new housing constructed during this period (new construction data
from Philadelphia's Department of Licenses and Inspections was unavailable).
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As new unsubsidized residential construction was rare in Philadelphia during this
period (New York Times 2/17/02) and the data therefore shows mainly
subsidized construction.
Of the 49 developments constructed, 29 (59%) were constructed in severely
distressed neighborhoods. This 59% comprised 53% of the total number of new
units constructed. Distressed neighborhoods comprised only 13% of
Philadelphia's total census tracts, and new development was therefore over four
times as likely to occur in distressed tracts than in non-distressed ones. Many of
the other new developments constructed were built near these distressed tracts.
Some possibilities for the relative scarcity of new housing in Philadelphia's stable
neighborhoods were factors like less land availability, or insufficient land markets
in those neighborhoods. In contrast, distressed Philadelphia neighborhoods were
likely to have more available land, lower land prices, and to be influenced by both
organizations, like CDCs, and public policies which encouraged the development
of new housing.
Because Philadelphia's housing was much higher density than Detroit's, I did not
perform a qualitative screening of developments for suburban visual
characteristics. Instead, I measured all of the new housing in distressed
neighborhoods for which data was available. The table on the following page
shows the resulting inner-city suburbanization scores.
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Table 4.13. Quantitative measurement of suburbanization of new inner-city housing developments in Philadelphia
Housing Development Density Density Land Use Unit type Owner type Lot Coverage Street Pattern Index Score (Total)
(DU/ac) Score
Cecil B. Moore Housing 14.7 0.77 (H) 0.22 0.82 0.8 0.69 (H) 0.25 3.55
APM Taino Gardens 20.0 0.54 0.19 0.1 0.17 0.46 0.0 1.46
Francisville V Vineyard Place 18.0 0.53 1.0 (H) 0.8 0.54 0.56 0.0 3.43
Poplar Nehemiah Houses 14.9 0.70 1.0 (H) 0.52 0.92 (H) 0.67 0.75 (H) 4.56 (H)
Ludlow Village Ill 14.0 (L) 0.67 0.44 0.54 0.84 0.58 0.5 3.57
Ludlow Village IV 18.8 0.66 0.73 0.94 0.84 0.55 0.5 4.22
ACDC Eleanor Mills Houses 43.7 0.13 0.09 0.64 0.42 0.29 0.0 1.57
Universal Court il 39.3 0.37 0.29 1.0 (H) 0.8 0.09 0.0 2.55
WCRP Lillia Crippen Townhouses 26.2 0.41 0.0 (L) 0.0 (L) 0.0 (L) 0.30 0.0 0.71 (L)
Universal Court I 42.3 0.0 (L) 0.0 (L) 0.91 0.73 0.0 (L) 0.0 1.64
WCRP Johnnie Tillman Townhses. 21.7 0.59 1.0 (H) 0.42 0.42 0.65 0.5 3.58
West Diamond Street Townhses. 22.7 0.65 0.25 0.0 (L) 0.66 0.52 0.0 2.08
APM Jardines del Borinquen 48.2 (H) 0.18 0.31 0.9 0.74 0.26 0.0 2.39
Norris CDC Los Balcones 37.9 0.34 0.5 0.0 (L) 0.0 (L) 0.46 0.0 1.3
ACDC Gratz Commons 28.3 0.07 0.0 (L) -0.06 0.8 0.12 0.0 0.93
Villas de HACE 44.1 0.23 0.40 0.84 0.85 0.48 0.0 2.80
Average for Philadelphia 28.4 0.43 0.40 0.58 0.60 0.42 0.16 2.52 (A)
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Philadelphia Developments: quantitative analysis
Scores. The average suburbanization score for the Philadelphia developments
measured was 2.52 out of 6. Of the 16 developments examined, the Poplar
Nehemiah houses had the highest score with 4.56. The Ludlow Village IV
development had the next highest score with 4.22. The Lillia Crippen
Townhouses scored lowest with 0.71. 13 developments were not measured
because there was no data available.
Density changes. Density reductions were ubiquitous among new Philadelphia
inner city developments; all except one of the new developments were lower
density than the buildings which had historically been located on the site. Density
reduction scores ranged from a high of 0.77 in the Cecil B Moore
Homeownership Zone housing to a low of zero in the Universal Court
development. (A zero score means that the new development had the same unit
density as the historic development.) The average density reduction score was
0.43, meaning that new Philadelphia developments were almost half the density
of their predecessors. The average historic density score (dwelling units per
acre) for the developments sampled was slightly over 40 units to the acre.
Although new developments were quite dense, they were even less so than the
historic developments. New developments averaged 28.4 units per acre, and the
highest density development, the Jardines del Borinquen, was a quite high 48.2
Du/acre. The lowest-density new development in Philadelphia, Ludlow Village Ill,
was 14.0 units per acre.
Land use. New Philadelphia developments were much more homogeneous in
their land uses than the historic developments, Land use homogenizations cores
averaged 0.40. As all the new developments had one land use (residential) only,
this figure indicates that many historic Philadelphia residential neighborhoods
were quite mixed-use, with at least 20 percent commercial or industrial parcels
by number. This figure is unsurprising given the density and design of many of
the historic neighborhoods examined. At 40 units per acre, Philadelphia's dense
rowhouse neighborhoods could easily support local retail and neighborhood
services interspersed with housing. Many stores were observed located on the
corners of streets, and major streets were often entirely commercial on the
ground floor in 1951. Philadelphia was formerly a major industrial city, and many
small industrial uses such as garages or workshops were also found intermingled
with rowhouses in 1951. Several new housing developments, were found to have
been located on these former industrial parcels, as these parcels offer some of
the few opportunities to redevelop reasonably large parcels of land in the dense
urban fabric of Philadelphia. (Another consequence of this extreme density has
been to make large-scale urban redevelopment difficult in Philadelphia except in
cases of severe decline.) Three developments (Francisville V, the Poplar
Nehemiah Houses, and the Johnnie Tilman townhouses) scored 1.0 for land use
homogenization, indicating that their historic neighborhoods had been completely
mixed-use. Similarly, three developments had land use homogenization scores of
0.0, indicating that their historic neighborhoods were already completely
residential.
Unit types. New Philadelphia developments were even more homogeneous in
terms of their housing unit types than they were in terms of their land uses.
Although Philadelphia residential neighborhoods were and are often visually
monotonous, the tight network of row houses of 1951 contained a diversity of
housing unit types. While few of the neighborhoods sampled were built up with
multiunit apartment houses designed for that purpose, many of rowhouses were
large enough to be easily convertible into apartments. The average unit type
homogenization score in the developments examined was 0.58, indicating that
on average, the historic Philadelphia rowhouse neighborhoods sampled had
about 30% of their residential units in the form of converted to apartments. Some
developments were extremely diverse. Universal Court II had the highest unit
type score of 1.0, indicating that the historic development had been a completely
heterogeneous mix of row house and apartment units. Three developments (the
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West Diamond Street townhouses, Lillia Crippen Townhouses, and Los
Balcones) had unit type scores of zero. Meaning that these developments
replaced neighborhoods that were already completely homogeneous. Two of
these historic neighborhoods were completely single-family houses, but the third
development replaced a rowhouse neighborhood that had been completely
converted to apartments.
Tenure types. The diversity of unit types in Philadelphia's historic neighborhoods
also translated to a diversity of tenure types. As with unit types, the new
developments examined substantially homogenized this tenure diversity.
Philadelphia's neighborhood pattern of row houses had historically provided for
many homeownership opportunities- even the working poor could afford a tiny
rowhouse. Equally so, the conversion of larger rowhouses to apartment provided
for rental units, presumably of lower cost, to coexist with ownership units in
almost all of the neighborhoods examined. This diversity of tenure patterns was
replaced in the new developments examined by homogenous rental or ownership
patterns. The average owner type homogenization score in the developments
sampled was 0.60, indicating that about 30 percent of the units in the historic
neighborhoods had been available as rentals. (Of course, many single-family
houses might also have been converted to rental units in 1951, but the status of
these units was unavailable and they were therefore assumed to be
homeownership units.) All new developments were more homogenous than the
historic neighborhoods that they replaced. The highest owner type score (0.92)
was found in the Poplar Nehemiah development, reflecting the high historic
diversity of that neighborhood. At the other extreme, two of the three
developments with unit type scores of zero also scored zero on their owner type
changes, indicating that the historic neighborhoods were equally homogeneous
in terms of their ownership patterns.
Lot coverage. Just as new developments in Philadelphia's inner city
neighborhoods were less dense than their predecessors, they also covered less
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of their lots. The average lot coverage score was 0.42, showing that new
developments covered on average less than 60 percent of the lot area of their
predecessors. Of all the suburbanization changes measured, this reduction in lot
coverage was obviously the most apparent physically. Historically, the
Philadelphia residential neighborhoods measured had a very high lot coverage of
almost 70 percent. This lot coverage was translated architecturally into
rowhouses which fronted directly onto the street, occasionally had narrow side
alleys, and which reserved their limited open space for backyard courts which
fronted onto equally narrow pedestrian alleys. New developments, in contrast,
covered only 40 percent of their lots on average, and some covered far less: the
Cecil B Moore development covers only 22 percent of its lot. Only one
development (Universal Court I) matched the historic lot coverage of its
predecessors. This reduced lot coverage had clear site planning and
architectural implications for the new developments. Newly available open space
was used for hitherto unknown front and side lawns as well as parking, and
houses could be rearticulated as standalone structures with decorative open
space rather than rhythmatic articulations comprising a streetwall. The result was
a dramatic contrast of new development with surviving historic fabric (see photos
in the development case studies following this section).
Neighborhood design. Despite the significant changes seen in the other
suburbanization characteristics measured, new Philadelphia developments did
not significantly alter their existing historic street patterns. The average street
pattern score was only 0.16, and 11 of the 16 developments examined made no
changes whatsoever to their surrounding street patterns. Only the Poplar
Nehemiah development scored as high as 0.75 through the closure of several
alleys and two through streets, and even this development did not completely
alter its street pattern. The persistence of Philadelphia's rectilinear grid street
system in the developments studied can be attributed to the rather limited scale
of the new developments examined. The historic density (about 40 DU per acre
in the examples measured) of residential development in Philadelphia had two
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consequences for redevelopment. First, because of the high density of residential
development in Philadelphia, even the most blighted blocks are rarely completely
empty. Site assemblage at the block scale is therefore difficult, and multiblock
developments are a problematic proposition. Only a few new developments
extended beyond more than one or two blocks. Secondly, this limited land
availability translated into relatively discrete new developments which, although
they were lower in density than their predecessors, did not occupy many blocks
and could therefore not consider street closures. The Jardines de Borinquen
development, with ninety houses, only occupied parts of two blocks. Only the
largest developments like the Cecil B Moore and the Poplar Nehemiah houses
were able to consider street closures, and even these developments could not
consider the closure of the major numbered north-south streets or the equally
important east-west streets, both of which are important for circulation.
Philadelphia's small-scale grid system, with its distributed circulation, therefore
encouraged the retention of streets in redevelopment, and the neighborhood
change in Philadelphia has therefore not yet translated to significant street
closures.
Architecture. The architectural shifts found in Philadelphia's new inner-city
housing developments were often significant and were even more distinctive
because of the architectural homogeneity of the city's residential districts. As
mentioned above, some of these shifts were a consequence of the reduced lot
coverage and resulting newly available space of new developments. Other shifts
were related to the use of new domestic spatial configurations, cladding
materials, and decorative features. (These shifts will be seen with respect to
specific developments later in this section.) While the internal construction of
these new developments was also doubtless different from the historic pattern, it
is not germane to the suburbanization phenomenon and is not discussed here.
Changed exterior domestic materials, however, reflected shifts not only in
construction but had decorative and semiotic value as well. Many new
developments reflected shifts in the exterior cladding of houses through their use
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of vinyl siding designed in imitation of wood siding. While this material was
doubtless used in part as a cost-saving measure, its use has particular
significance in Philadelphia because of the overwhelming prevalence of brick
cladding in the city's rowhouse neighborhoods. Vinyl siding not only conveys an
appearance of 'difference' but also recalls the housing of the urban fringe, where
vinyl siding is a common exterior material. Taino Gardens and Ludlow Village IV
were among the housing developments to use this new material. Other
architectural features found in some new developments, like pitched roofs,
gables, and front porches, had semiotic value, distinguishing these developments
from their surroundings which lacked these features and recalling the vernacular
dwellings of the urban fringe where these features are common. Other
developments such as the Moore and Poplar housing maintained brick cladding,
at least on the front of the dwelling, as a contextual gesture. Still other
developments (such as the Jardines de Borinquen), particularly those developed
by CDC's in the heavily Latino neighborhoods of eastern North Philadelphia,
used materials like stucco to both announce the difference of the new dwellings
and to consciously recall the domestic architecture of the Caribbean countries
where many Latino Philadelphians have originated (Vitiello 2000).
Philadelphia Developments: narratives
The substantial changes wrought by the inner-city suburbanization process in
Philadelphia can be better understood by examining a few developments in
detail. Below I will discuss three housing developments- the Poplar Nehemiah
Houses, the Cecil B Moore Homeownership Zone Houses, and the Ludlow
Village IV development- in further detail. These developments exemplify many of
the most significant aspects of suburbanization in Philadelphia. This section,
however, will only discuss the aspects of these developments which are related
to the quantitative and qualitative measurement of suburbanization. These
projects will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter in order to
uncover the reasons behind the changed urban and architectural design of new
Philadelphia inner-city housing.
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Poplar Nehemiah Houses
The Poplar Nehemiah houses were a recently (2001) completed housing
development in the southern section of the North Philadelphia neighborhood.
Because of its large size (176 units) the Poplar development was able to
significantly reshape the neighborhood in which it was situated, including closing
neighborhood streets and establishing a new, radically dedensified housing
pattern. Although it did not literally resemble vernacular suburbia, the Poplar
Nehemiah housing had the highest suburbanization score of any of the new
housing developments (4.56) and it could thus be considered the apex of inner-
city suburbanization in Philadelphia.
The high suburbanization score of Poplar Nehemiah was in large part the result
of the development's replacement of a mixed-use neighborhood with many
single-family and multi-family rowhouses, as well as scattered retail and
manufacturing facilities. This historic neighborhood was quite dense, at just over
50 units per acre in 1951. The Poplar development, in contrast, consisted of
single-family houses, generally attached as twins but occasionally built as
isolated units ('twingles') where site conditions required it. It was built at a much
lower density than the historic pattern, at just over 14 units per acre. The
homogenous character of the development gave it high land use, unit type, and
owner type homogenization scores (1.0, 0.52, and 0.92 respectively), and the
first and third of these scores were the highest for any of the developments
studied.
The neighborhood design of the Poplar development strongly differentiated the
housing from its context, though it did not completely isolate it. Two short east-
west through streets were transformed into cul-de-sacs, a neighborhood design
feature unknown in the historic neighborhoods of Philadelphia but one that was
used widely in the nearby urban renewal-era development of Yorktown.
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(Yorktown is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.) North-south streets were not
altered, no doubt because these streets are important transportation arteries
(13th Street carried a trolley line until recently).
The Poplar development was significantly more automobile-oriented than the
typical Philadelphia rowhouse, which historically had no off-street parking spaces
except for larger houses with rear alley garages. Both the neighborhood and site-
level design of Poplar supported this orientation, especially the two new cul-de-
sacs of the development, which with their limited pedestrian accessibility
encouraged automobile usage. At the site planning level, each housing unit had
an off-street concrete 'parking pad' large enough to hold two cars. These pads
also necessitated the existence of several curb cuts per block so that cars could
access the pads. The resulting streetscape was radically different than the
traditional Philadelphia rowhouse block (see below). The development's
automobile orientation was the more ironic given the proximity of Broad Street, a
major artery under which ran one of the city's two subway lines (a station was
two blocks from the development at Broad and Girard Streets.). The
appropriateness of universal parking in what must have been at least a
somewhat transit-dependent neighborhood was debatable at best. Despite its
accommodation of the automobile, the Poplar development was still relatively
pedestrian-friendly, with wide sidewalks, street trees, and abundant on-street
parking.
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Figures 4.41, 4.42, 4.43, and 4.44
Location of Poplar Nehemiah houses Aerial view of Poplar Nehemiah Houses
Image copyright Mapquest.com Image copyright Mapquest.com
Typical Poplar Nehemiah streetscape Typical Poplar Nehemiah twin houses
Despite its minimalist nature, the architecture of the Poplar houses had several
distinguishing features. The limited lot coverage of the Poplar homes provided
them with relatively large yards and they were freestanding on three sides. This
gave the houses a green setting which is rare in the surrounding neighborhood.
The houses also featured porches which projected into the front yard and
provided the front of the house with additional articulation. Porches were
generally unknown in Philadelphia rowhouses (except in West Philadelphia) so
this feature was highly distinctive. The front cladding of the Poplar houses was
brick as a contextual gesture, but the sides of the houses were clad in vinyl
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siding, another relatively unusual feature. The other exterior architectural
features of note were the houses' pitched roofs and gables, many of which faced
the streets. These features were also novelties in Philadelphia's older
neighborhoods. Most nineteenth-century rowhouses had roofs which sloped
toward the rear of the house, making the roof invisible from the street. Their
combination of architectural features gave the Poplar houses a unique
appearance when viewed in the context of the typical Philadelphia rowhouse.
Cecil B Moore Homeownership Zone Houses
The Cecil B Moore Homeownership Zone houses comprised the largest new
housing development constructed in Philadelphia since 1990, with an eventual
total of 297 new and renovated units. The development was designed to have
several phases, and as of May 2002 only the first of an eventual three phases
had been designed and completed. Though they were neither as spatially
coherent nor as architecturally unified as the Poplar development, the design of
the Moore houses incorporated additional architectural features which gave them
additional interest. Their suburbanization score of 3.55 placed the Moore houses
lower than the Poplar houses but still over one full point above the Philadelphia
suburbanization average.
The Cecil B Moore homes altered neighborhood density more than any other
development studied, with a unit density score of 0.77. This score was the
reflection both of a low overall unit density (about 15 units per acre) and of a high
historic unit density (about 70 units per acre- the highest of any neighborhood
measured). This high density was the product of the historic development of that
area of North Philadelphia with relatively large rowhouses (see below). These
houses were easy to convert to apartments and this had been done in large
numbers by 1951.
The Moore homes' land use score was quite low (0.20), reflecting the historic
residential character of the area of North Philadelphia in which the houses were
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built. This part of North Philadelphia was far from railroad lines and the waterfront
and therefore never had the small industrial uses which pervaded many other
neighborhoods. Local retail uses were common in 1951 but were entirely
eliminated in the Moore development. The Moore homes' unit and owner scores,
however, were quite high (0.8), reflecting the historic diversity of units resulting
from the large-scale conversion mentioned above. The new development
changed the neighborhood back into a single-family homeownership
development, eliminating the rental units that had comprised the typical
neighborhood fabric since before 1951.
Figure 4.45. Existing rowhouses in the Cecil B. Moore Houses neighborhood
The Cecil B. Moore development did not effect the same level of neighborhood
design changes found in the Poplar Nehemiah homes. Unlike the neighborhoods
closer to Center City, alleys were not a common historic feature of this part of
North Philadelphia. Instead, small secondary streets cut between the blocks
bounded by through streets, creating small interior blocks. These blocks were not
altered by the development of the Moore homes except where one block of an
east-west street (Sharswood) was eliminated and reoriented to extend an
existing north-south street (Gratz). Nor have any cul-de-sacs yet (2002) been
created in the Cecil B Moore homes. Thus, although the Moore homes differed
architecturally from their surroundings, they were seamlessly linked to their
rowhouse context by the street system, and the new blocks could therefore be
easily traversed by pedestrians.
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At the site level, the Moore homes differed significantly from the historic pattern.
Although many of the existing rowhouses in the neighborhood were actually built
as twins with five-foot-wide pedestrian alleys, the historic lot coverage was still
quite high (over 70 percent). As elsewhere in Philadelphia, the historic
rowhouses had no front yard and only a shallow back yard. The new houses
covered less than a third of the area covered by the historic rowhouses. As in the
Poplar Houses, this additional lot space was used to provide front, side, and
deeper rear yards (see below).
Architecturally, the Moore houses were quite distinctive. As can be seen from the
photos below, the new houses had forms and materials that were not commonly
found in the surrounding neighborhoods. The houses had pitched roofs and
street-end gables steeper than those of the Poplar development, giving them a
somewhat Victorian appearance. Small front porches with gables reinforced the
gabled image. The polychromatism of Victorian housing was accentuated by the
diverse materials used to clad the houses. Brick cladding was used for the street
facades, but vinyl siding was used on the gables and on the side walls of the
houses. Brilliant blue front doors and porch columns added to the colorful nature
of the houses. Some of the Moore houses also featured single-car garages in
their basement levels, a feature obviously unknown in the historic rowhouses and
one that was also rare among the new Philadelphia developments studied,
doubtless because of its cost. Due to problematic subsurface soil conditions in
the Moore homes area, this feature was not planned to be included in future
phases of the development. Except for their design as twins, the Moore houses
would not have been out of place in the residential district of a much smaller city.
But in the context of North Philadelphia, they were quite distinctive, and even
extraordinary.
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Figures 4.46, 4.47, 4.48, and 4.49
Location of Cecil B. Moore Houses Site plan of Moore houses
Image copyright Mapquest.com
Typical Moore houses streetscape Typical Moore twin houses
Ludlow Village IV Houses
The Ludlow Village IV housing development was much smaller than the two
developments discussed above, containing only 25 houses and occupying the
entirety of a city block. Even at this scale, the Ludlow development significantly
transformed the urban environment through the distinctive site planning and
architecture of its component houses. The Ludlow houses' suburbanization score
of 4.22 was the second highest of any of the developments surveyed. Because of
its limited size, the Ludlow development was a more easily replicable
development than the previous two, each of which required substantial public
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sector funds and institutional efforts. The Ludlow development established a very
different paradigm, one for a, incremental, low-density reshaping of blighted north
Philadelphia blocks.
As with the previous two developments, the Ludlow houses were substantially
lower in density than the historic developments. Their density score of 0.66
showed that the historic block held about 75 units to the Ludlow houses' 25. As in
the Moore homes neighborhood, many rowhouses had been converted to
apartments by 1951 in the Ludlow neighborhood, producing a higher unit density
than might otherwise have been found with rowhouses alone. Land use, unit
type, and owner type scores were all high (0.73, 0.94, and 0.84), reflecting the
historic neighborhood's status as a mixed-use neighborhood with diverse
commercial and industrial units and many converted rowhouses.
Figures 4.50, 4.51, 4.52, and 4.53
Location of Ludlow IV Houses
Image copyright Mapquest.com
Site plan of Ludlow IV Houses
Image copyright Powell Buell Kratzer
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I
Typical Ludlow Village IV streetscape Typical Ludlow Village IV house
The most distinctive neighborhood-level design feature of the Ludlow
development was the widening of Franklin Street for one block to create a
planted mall in the center. This widening occurred at the expense of the Ludlow
IV block, but provided a pleasant organizing feature for the development. The
creation of the Franklin mall was undertaken in conjunction with the construction
of the Ludlow Ill development located across Franklin Street. Despite these
alterations of the neighborhood block pattern, the confining of the Ludlow
developments to one block each allowed the pedestrian character of the blocks
to be maintained.
Architecturally the Ludlow houses were quite distinctive, both when compared to
their neighborhood context and to their companion development Ludlow III,
completed in 1999. The neighborhood context was one of four-story brick
rowhouses (see below), with little outdoor space, similar to the Moore houses
area. Ludlow Ill (see below) was designed to stylistically recall this housing.
Ludlow III houses were three-story and faced in brick, but they had side yards,
shallow front porches, and front yards that were not found in nearby row houses.
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Figures 4.54 and 4.55. At left, a typical street with remaining three-story rowhouses in the vicinity
of the Ludlow IV development. Many houses have been demolished, producing a streetscape of
"missing teeth". At right the Ludlow Ill phase has houses designed to resemble nearby
rowhouses, but at a lower density.
The Ludlow IV houses were quite different stylistically. They had only two stories,
and had pitched roofs and front-end gables, as well as wraparound porches on
their fronts and sides. In addition, they had no brick cladding whatsoever but
were clad in vinyl siding. While the Ludlow Ill houses attempted, despite their
different site planning, to recall their context architecturally, the Ludlow IV houses
made no such effort. They recalled instead the typical vernacular wooden
housing of Detroit, a type which was rare in not unknown in Philadelphia. Only
the design of the Ludlow IV development as twin houses prevented an even
closer approximation of this urban model.
Philadelphia Developments: lessons
Inner-city suburbanization was common in North Philadelphia, but no
developments were 'suburb-like. The quantitative measurements for
Philadelphia showed that inner-city suburbanization was occurring in some, but
not all of the large new housing developments being built in the inner city. 11 of
the 16 developments measured had overall suburbanization scores above 2.0.
Of these 11 developments, six scored above 3.0, while only two scored above
4.0. The remaining five developments had very low suburbanization scores,
indicating that in form and heterogeneity they were almost identical to the historic
developments which previously existed on the site. No new developments,
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however, literally resembled suburban housing in the way many of Detroit's did.
Some of the reasons for this will be discussed below. Large developments had
more potential to alter their neighborhood designs. Only two developments in
distressed neighborhoods had over 100 units, and both of these developments
(the Cecil B. Moore houses and the Poplar Nehemiah houses) had high
suburbanization scores.
The grain of development was coarser in new Philadelphia developments. Two
generalizations held true for all developments, whether or not their total
suburbanization scores were high. No new developments contained mixed types
of units or tenure types, and none contained commercial uses. Thus the net
effect of all developments, whether or not they were lower density or occupied
less of their lot, was to produce a more homogenous cityscape, one where the
grain of development was larger than the highly differentiated urban pattern
found in most of the historic neighborhoods. This homogeneity was especially
regrettable given the relatively high density of some of the developments studied-
enough to support neighborhood retail in the pattern of the historic
neighborhoods. The relatively small scale of most developments, however,
meant that intact historic streets with surviving neighborhood retail were never far
from the developments. Redevelopment on a larger scale, however, as in the
Poplar houses, was lower-density and also tended to produce barren retail
environments because of the projects' lack of inclusion of commercial activities.
In Philadelphia, most CDC developments were too small to effect neighborhood
design changes. The size of the housing developments observed in Philadelphia
merits some discussion as this scale, as previously noted, had substantial
bearing on the potential for neighborhood design changes in Philadelphia's
dense environment. Not counting the two largest developments mentioned
above, the average development size for a new housing complex in
Philadelphia's inner city was only 30 units. (Remember that the study only
examined housing developments of over 20 units.) This relatively small number
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was probably related to the limited capacity of the community development
corporations (CDCs) responsible for the production of most of this housing. In
contrast, the large Poplar and Moore developments were primarily city-organized
and -funded, and required several years to develop and construct. CDC projects
were more limited in scope and were therefore presumably more achievable
within a limited budget and timeframe. On the tight blocks of North Philadelphia,
30 units often occupied less than one block. The result of this relatively small-
scale housing production was that most new housing developments in
Philadelphia were too small to make neighborhood-level design changes. Many
of the smaller projects measured were located on one block only, and street
closures, widenings, etc. were therefore outside of the design scope of the
project. Given these conditions, one can predict that neighborhood-level design
changes will be unlikely to be found in Philadelphia except in the case of large-
scale projects. If past patterns continue, there will be only a few of these projects
in the inner city at any given time.
Philadelphia's density inhibited the assembly of large sites. The lack of larger-
scale neighborhood design changes was also tied to the high durability and
existing density of housing in Philadelphia. With up to 100 houses per block,
some houses were likely to be remaining in even the most blighted of conditions
(the Ludlow neighborhood photo shows a typical condition). The difficulty of site
assemblage doubtless also contributed to the limited scale of most new housing
developments in Philadelphia. It was probably also the reason why quite a few
new housing developments were located on the site of former industrial uses.
Despite the likely cleanup costs, the large sites occupied by industrial uses made
site assemblage, and therefore housing production, more feasible.
Although new Philadelphia developments were not suburb-like, they featured
lower-density amenities. At the site level, none of the developments measured
were suburb-like, qualitatively resembling suburbia in the way of many Detroit
developments. Yet many possessed site planning and architectural features that
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were characteristic of low-density neighborhoods more than they were of
Philadelphia. Though the historic pattern of residential developments in the
neighborhoods studied was universally comprised of rowhouses, many housing
developments were built as twins rather than rowhouses. None, however, were
designed primarily as single-family detached dwellings. The design of houses as
twins permitted additional site features like lawns, parking pads, and porches that
gave many of the new housing developments a distinctive appearance amidst
the uniform rows of brick housing that surrounded them. Contextuality was also
not a concern of many of the architectural designs observed. While brick was
used on many developments, others used siding materials such as vinyl or
stucco in order to distinguish the houses from their context rather than making
them fit in. Many of the massing decisions observed, like front-end gables and
pitched roofs, were also anticontextual.
Despite the limited degree of neighborhood changes observed, the uniformity of
the Philadelphia inner-city residential environment, and the anticontextual site
planning and architectural designs of many of the new developments, gave the
new neighborhoods a distinctly different appearance, one that did not literally
resemble a vernacular suburb but one that in many cases shared many of its
attributes. Even the least dense of the new developments, however, was over
twice the unit density of Levittown, resulting in neighborhoods that were closer in
appearance to typical historic urban neighborhoods in cities like Detroit rather
than postwar suburbs. All of the new neighborhoods maintained pedestrian
amenities such as sidewalks, street trees, and on-street parking, and the lack of
closure of streets except in a few cases meant that the easy pedestrian
permeability of the Philadelphia grid was preserved. Inner-city suburbanization, in
Philadelphia, did not seem to threaten the transformation of the inner city into a
replica of a vernacular suburb. It did, however, demonstrate that the rowhouse
was no longer a desirable model for development, and that the accommodation
of the automobile, and the homogenization of the neighborhood fabric, were the
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wave of the future, even amidst the highly transit-dependent blocks of North
Philadelphia.
The Prevalence of Inner-city Suburbanization: conclusions and lessons
This section concludes the examination of the prevalence of inner-city
suburbanization by summarizing the lessons from the phenomenon as observed
in Philadelphia and Detroit. Detroit and Philadelphia were very different cities, yet
in many ways their new inner-city neighborhoods were suburbanizing in similar
fashions. While only some of the new developments studied were suburb-like,
many were suburbanizing, indicating that the suburbanization trend was
widespread in the inner-city neighborhoods of both cities. This trend was all the
more interesting given that Detroit and Philadelphia's inner-city residential
neighborhoods were very different places, with different housing types,
neighborhood patterns, and vernacular architecture. The first section describes
findings from the historic neighborhoods, the second describes findings from the
new developments, and the third describes findings from the suburbanization
research and process.
The historic neighborhood fabrics of Detroit and Philadelphia were distinctly
different. In Detroit, inner-city neighborhoods were composed almost entirely of
detached housing, most of it single-family, with some multifamily housing
interspersed and with occasional districts of apartment buildings. Philadelphia, on
the other hand, was almost universally composed of attached rowhouses,
designed as single-family, but many of which, especially the larger houses in
neighborhoods like the Moore homes, had been converted into small apartment
buildings. None of the Philadelphia neighborhoods featured the larger apartment
buildings, designed for that purpose, that were seen in some of the Detroit
neighborhoods studied.
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The table below provides comparative figures for the suburbanization
measurements performed in Detroit and Philadelphia and provides a basis for the
discussion that follows.
Table 4.14. Inner-city Suburbanization in Detroit and Philadelphia
Average suburbanization score 3.06 2.52
Average, historic unit density 12.8 DU/acre 66.0 DU/acre
Average new development density 9.2 DU/acre 28.4 DUacre
Averaige historic % mixed-use ~ 6% 20%
Average historic % diverse housing 38% 26%
Average historic % diverse tenure 25% 30%
Average historic lot coverage 46.7% 69.7%
Average new ot coverage 22.0% 40.3%
Detroit was historically a much lower density than Philadelphia. Detroit had an
average historic density of only 12.8 units per acre to Philadelphia's 66.
Philadelphia, in other words, packed over five times as many dwellings onto an
average acre of residential land than Detroit did. Given this much denser fabric, it
was unsurprising that the new developments measured in Philadelphia were
almost twice as dense as the historic Detroit neighborhoods examined. While
Detroit was on the whole a newer city than Philadelphia, it was always a lower-
density-one. Even in 1950, when both cities had substantial amounts of
undeveloped land within their boundaries, Philadelphia had almost 1,000 housing
units per square mile more than Detroit (4,713 Du/sq. mi. in Philadelphia to 3,742
in Detroit.) These differences could be clearly seen in the historic neighborhoods
examined.
Detroit's housing also occupied less land than did Philadelphia's. Detroit's
houses, on average, occupied less than half of their lots, while Philadelphia's
occupied almost 70 percent. The consequence of this reduced lot coverage was
increased open space around each housing unit and a consequently more open
cityscape. Attached dwellings were unknown in the Detroit neighborhoods
examined. Even apartment buildings were freestanding, although their open
space was limited. Houses, whether multifamily or single-family, were also
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always freestanding, with limited front and side yards but sometimes sizeable
backyards. Lot coverages did not seem to correspond with neighborhood age in
Detroit. Clairpointe, which was one of the newest historic neighborhoods
examined, had an average lot coverage of 42%, a figure close to that of many
older neighborhoods. The lowest historic lot coverage seen in Detroit was in the
oldest neighborhood measured, the Woodward Place neighborhood of 1896,
where lot coverages were only 23%, a figure close to that of the new
developments measured! The low density of nineteenth-century Woodward Place
indicated that, at least for Detroit's upper class, the low-lot coverage, single-
family detached dwelling, which we saw was a primary feature of suburbia, was
an early preferred housing type. Philadelphia, though also a city of single-family
dwellings, was not one where private open space was a common amenity. No
historic neighborhood had lot coverages below 60%. One may conclude that the
differences between the Detroit and Philadelphia lot coverages- approximately
the difference between 45 and 60 percent- is the point where detached dwellings
become impossible and dwellings must become attached to raise lot coverages
any higher.
Philadelphia's historic neighborhoods were more mixed-use than Detroit's.
Philadelphia, on the average, was a much more mixed-use city than Detroit in the
neighborhoods examined. Philadelphia's average land use score of 0.40 was
over three times the average Detroit score of 0.12. These scores meant that on
average, 20% of the structures in the Philadelphia neighborhoods examined
were non-residential, while only 6% of the structure in the Detroit neighborhoods
were. These differences were probably attributable both to the density and to the
age of the neighborhoods examined. Philadelphia's neighborhoods were so
dense that even small neighborhood areas could probably easily support retail
uses, as well as support a diverse mix of small industrial uses. Detroit
neighborhoods were lower density and built at a later date when streetcar transit
and automobiles were shaping city form rather than pedestrian-scaled walking
distances. Detroit neighborhoods were not only lower density, they were more
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differentiated, with more or less homogenous residential neighborhoods bounded
by major arteries where the majority of commercial uses were located. A few
older neighborhoods, such as Brush Park, were more universally mixed-use, but
most of the Detroit neighborhoods examined conformed to this differentiated
pattern, a precursor of the even more highly differentiated land use patterns
found in today's suburban communities. This differentiation was due more to
functional requirements than to zoning, as Detroit did not enact a zoning
ordinance until 1940 (Thomas 1997). Nor were industrial facilities in Detroit
interspersed in residential neighborhoods to the degree that they were in
Philadelphia. Many of Detroit's industrial facilities were located in discrete
industrial areas in the form of large automotive plants, some of which had already
located in the suburbs by the 1920's. The historic Philadelphia neighborhoods
were thus much closer to the stereotypical mixed-use urban neighborhood than
those of Detroit.
Detroit's historic neighborhoods had a more diverse housing stock than
Philadelphia. Though Philadelphia had more mixed land uses in its historic
neighborhoods than Detroit, Detroit had a higher diversity of dwelling types within
those neighborhoods. Detroit's dwelling type score was 0.77 to Philadelphia's
0.58, indicating that almost 40% of dwelling units in the Detroit neighborhoods
examined were of another type than the dominant unit. In Detroit this dominant
unit was generally the single-family detached house. In Philadelphia this number
was somewhat lower: almost 30% of units were found in apartments rather than
in single-family attached houses. Given that almost all apartments were found in
converted rowhouses, this figure indicates that only about ten percent of the
residential buildings in the historic Philadelphia neighborhoods were converted
rowhouses. Detroit contained a much higher diversity of dwellings. Most of the
neighborhoods examined contained single-family detached houses, two or three-
family houses, and different types and sizes of multifamily apartment buildings.
While the apparent monotony of Philadelphia's unit types was in part an artifact
of areas sampled (West Philadelphia, for example, has a much higher
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percentage of apartment buildings but was not a heavily sampled neighborhood),
it is also likely that the relatively low density of Detroit afforded more flexibility for
developers to construct diverse units, while the tight scale and the overwhelming
rowhouse precedent of Philadelphia seemed only to promote further extensions
of that fabric.
Philadelphia seemed to have a higher diversity of tenure types. Despite its less
diverse assortment of unit types, Philadelphia had a higher diversity of tenure
types than did Detroit. Philadelphia's tenure type score was 0.60 to
Philadelphia's 0.51, indicating that 30% of Philadelphia units were rental while
only 25% of Detroit's were (in almost all cases, rental units were in the minority
and homeownership units were in the majority). How might this discrepancy be
explained? A likely reason lies in the prevalence of two- and three-family
detached houses in Detroit, a unit type which did not exist in Philadelphia.* These
houses likely had a higher percentage of owners than did the Philadelphia
multifamily units. Whatever the exact percentages of owners/renters in the
multifamily housing of historic neighborhoods, the differences in tenure diversity
can be attributed to the strongly different residential patterns found in the two
cities.
The inner-city suburbanization process had different results in the two cities. We
would not necessarily expect the results of the suburbanization process to have
been the same, and indeed they were not. Instead, a similar process was seen
operating in both cities. A similar process, inner-city suburbanization, operating
on different physical fabrics, produced different results. These results, however,
were more akin to each other than were the original historic urban fabrics of the
* For these houses the study assumed that one of the units was owned while the others were
rented, an arrangement which existed in Boston in those types of units, though not all owners
lived in their multifamily units there (Warner 1962). In Philadelphia, the study assumed that all
rowhouses which had been converted to apartments were composed of rental units, and in both
cities, the study assumed that all single-family dwellings were ownership units. There is little
doubt that some of these assumptions are inaccurate, and a more detailed study would no doubt
be able to uncover patterns that were in some cases different from those that this study assumed.
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two cities. New developments in Detroit and Philadelphia were both lower
density, more homogenous, and occupied less of their lots. In addition, both
cities featured neighborhood design changes that accommodated the automobile
and introduced architectural iconography which, if it was not always necessarily
suburban-like, was certainly less than the 'urbanity 'found in the previous historic
neighborhoods.
Philadelphia is dedensifying more than Detroit. Although both Detroit and
Philadelphia are becoming lower-density cities through their new inner-city
development, they are not dedensifying to the same degree. Philadelphia is
dedensifying more- its average new inner-city development is only 43% as dense
as what it replaced. Detroit, already much lower density, is not dedensifying as
significantly- new developments are about 70% of the historic density.
Philadelphia, however, remains a much denser city than Detroit- its new
developments were still over twice the density of Detroit's historic average, and
over three times as dense as new Detroit developments. Detroit's relatively
smaller density loss may in part be attributed to the high proportion of multifamily
dwellings among the developments measured. These developments were
relatively dense, and some, as we saw earlier, exceeded their historic densities.
Where Detroit built new single-family houses, however, they were very low
density- around three to four units to the acre. This level of dedensification- about
75%- was on par with Philadelphia's least dense developments, which were
around 14 units per acre. Had Philadelphia built as high a proportion of
multifamily dwellings in its new developments as had Detroit, its average
dedensification would no doubt have been less.
Detroit's new developments had very low lot coverages. Although Detroit's new
inner-city developments did not dedensify to the extent that Philadelphia's did,
they reduced their lot coverages more. On average, new Detroit developments
covered less than half the lot area of historic developments, whereas
Philadelphia developments, though they had lost more unit density, had about
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two-thirds of the lot coverage of the historic developments. There is no easy
explanation for the lack of correspondence between density and lot coverage, but
it again may lie in the differences in housing types seen in the two cities.
Multifamily apartments can cover less of their lots while maintaining a high unit
density, a quality that was used to great effect by modernist architects. Most of
Philadelphia's new housing was built in the form of single-family houses, and as
the average unit density of these developments was still quite high, one might
expect that the lot coverage of these development would not be as highly
reduced. In Detroit, on the other hand, the relatively high density apartment
complexes built there had higher unit densities, but lower lot coverages.
Almost all the new developments were homogeneous. New developments were
homogeneous in terms of its land use, unit type, and tenure type. In this sense
inner-city suburbanization in Detroit and Philadelphia seemed to be taking almost
exactly the same course. The developments measured were not diverse; they
never contained commercial uses, they rarely contained different forms of
dwelling units, and the consequently rarely had differentiated types of tenure
within them. It is clear that the new large developments homogenized urban
neighborhoods. Given that much new development in both cities was occurring
through the construction of larger (over 20 unit) housing developments, this trend
seems to be likely to continue. Absent a return to the differentiated, diverse grain
of development seen in the historic neighborhoods, there is little promise for a
return to the differentiated cityscapes that seen in the historic neighborhoods.
The consequences of this shift appeared to be mixed in the case cities. In
Philadelphia, many developments, as note, were small enough that there were
still mixed-use areas nearby. The larger developments, however, produced
islands of solidly residential uses that were uncharacteristic of the historic fabric.
In Detroit, the large expanses of the new developments severely inhibited
pedestrian travel both through their design, as previously noted, and by reducing
potential places to walk to. Where many of these developments were combined,
the result was a desolate streetscape.
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Neighborhood design changes were more widespread in Detroit. Neighborhood
design changes were easy to observe but hard to measure. The historic
neighborhood fabrics played major roles in shaping the new developments that
were built within them. This historic palimpsest, especially in Detroit, "hampered
and obstructed" (Lynch 1981) the imposition of completely new neighborhood
designs. Detroit in general had a relatively low-density, irregular grid, could easily
accommodate the automobile and some cases was designed for it. Philadelphia,
on the other hand, had a tight, nineteenth-century grid that was heavily
dependent upon mass transit and pedestrian movement. Philadelphia's city form
was far more resilient than Detroit's- it was difficult to violate or remove, whereas
Detroit's grid was routinely reconfigured or even completely removed to
accommodate new developments. The Detroit street network appeared to be far
less robust. This lack of robustness could have been a consequence of the far
greater unit density of Philadelphia, which appeared to make clearance and
reconfiguration more difficult, as previously noted.. It also may have been a
consequence of less severe decline, or of institutional or development processes
that were not immediately evident from a physical analysis. It was apparent,
however, that even in its severely distressed neighborhoods Philadelphia did not
have the large expanses of vacant lots which characterized regions of Detroit.
The low densities and abundance of contiguous abandoned lots clearly seen in
Figure 4.1a show the higher potential for large-scale neighborhood change in
Detroit.
The architecture of new developments was dramatically different than the historic
pattern in both cities. While neighborhood level design changes were much more
dramatic in Detroit than in Philadelphia, site-level and architectural changes were
equally dramatic in both places. Detroit's architectural changes were in large part
determined by the neighborhood changes which occurred. With the advent of
large, undivided blocks accessed solely by automobile came housing
developments with large yards and abundant off-street parking. New Detroit
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developments were not spatially constrained- their lots were large and buildings
could occupy the site in many different ways. The site plans seen varied from the
simple repetitive frontal placement of the single-family home developments to the
loose courtyard arrangements of the multifamily homes. Architecturally, Detroit's
historic neighborhoods were diverse environments, with no one predominant
style that could be taken as a 'signature' of Detroit. This lack of context was
mirrored in the new developments, many of which were designed in a style that
could only be called generic suburban. This style had vaguely colonial elements,
with pitched roofs and brick and vinyl siding cladding. Beyond that it was difficult
to make distinct conclusions about the styles of the new Detroit developments
except that they resembled typical suburban developments constructed across
the country. Philadelphia had a much stronger vernacular context. In the context
of the regimented brick rows of Philadelphia's historic housing, simple site
planning and architectural decisions like small front yards, porches, gables, and
vinyl siding had strong impacts on the streetscape. These design decisions also,
by rejecting the overwhelming contextual references of the rowhouse
neighborhoods, made strong references to an architectural version of the other,
the vast landscape of later urban and suburban dwellings surrounding the
rowhouse neighborhoods of Philadelphia. Since much housing within
Philadelphia's city limits is built in a lower-density fashion, the addition of porches
and gables to dwellings was not literally a suburban reference. These features
did, however, seem to indicate an intention on the part of the designer to evoke
other residential environments and structures than the rowhouse. The author, at
least, has little doubt that this perceived reference was the suburb, and Chapter
Five will investigate this issue further.
"Urbanity" is a relative concept. The suburbanization process in Philadelphia
produced housing that in density, at least, was somewhat similar to what would
historically have been considered relatively dense housing in Detroit. If we apply
Duany's transect concept to the two cities, we can see that they would have very
different transects. Detroit's housing transect would stop at around 15 units per
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acre, while Philadelphia's would move up to around 60 units per acre. Other
cities, of course, would be more or less dense depending on their relative
housing stocks. Despite their absolute similarities, the relative impacts of the
"low-density" new housing of Philadelphia and the "high-density" historic housing
of Detroit were completely different. One violated its context and introduced what
were suburban amenities for North Philadelphia, while the other formed a context
and provided what was considered the urban fabric of Detroit. These
comparisons reiterate the point to which concepts of "urban" and "suburban",
while based in absolute values, are also to some degree relative concepts.
This closes the chapter on the extent of suburbanization in Detroit and
Philadelphia. We have seen how the suburbanization phenomenon impacted
new developments in the inner city neighborhoods of both cities: both cities
constructed different development models from those that were historically
constructed there; and both cities were moving toward a lower-density,
automobile-oriented, more functionally and visually homogenous future through
the process of redevelopment. The major question that remains to explored is the
question of why this phenomenon was happening. What were the cause or
causes for the imposition of suburban design and functional norms on housing
located in some of the densest city neighborhoods of the very different cities of
Detroit and Philadelphia? The next chapter explores this question by examining
case developments in both cities. Although Chapter Five focuses primarily on
one development in each city, it augments these studies with supplementary data
from two other developments in each case. These cases provide answers to why
the suburban ideal is becoming the ideal of the inner city as well.
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Chapter Five
The Causality of Inner City Suburbanization
Introduction
The previous chapter described how the phenomenon of inner-city
suburbanization was occurring in a widespread fashion in the severely distressed
neighborhoods of Detroit and Philadelphia. This chapter addresses the equally
significant issue of why this inner-city suburbanization is occurring. To do this,
the study examined several new inner-city housing developments in the case
cities in further detail. Narrowing the scope of the study to individual
developments allowed the study to examine individual issues that contributed to
suburbanization, such as specific decisions made by different players in the
development process, as well as to examine the motivations for those decisions.
While all of the developments examined in this chapter were clear examples of
inner-city suburbanization, they were economically and typologically diverse,
ranging from completely subsidized semi-attached housing in Philadelphia to
completely market-driven detached housing in Detroit. Each development was
also the product of a unique combination of circumstances, ranging from the
impacts of policies and laws which governed development, to the personal
motivations of the individuals who contributed to each development process. This
chapter presents the broad phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization as being
the sum of the design decisions of the multiple actors who participated in the
different development processes examined. While every development examined
was the result of a different process, they all contributed to inner-city
suburbanization.
Examining individual developments was critical to the study because inner-city
suburbanization had multiple and diverse causes. Some of these causes were
common to both cities while others were unique to the particular case city. In
both cities, inner-city suburbanization was the physical response to the poor land
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market of inner-city neighborhoods. Depressed property values and a
consequent lack of market confidence in the future of these neighborhoods led
actors in both cities to conclude that lower-density development was the optimum
solution for redevelopment. In Philadelphia, lower densities were perceived as
making new assisted housing both more marketable and more effective in
meeting expected housing standards, while private developers in Detroit saw
suburban-style housing at extremely low densities as answering a market need
for this kind of housing. Both cities consequently saw lower-density housing with
suburban attributes as improving the land market in inner cities. We may thus
attribute the desire to improve the land market in inner cities as the most
fundamental cause of suburbanization.
Suburbanization was also encouraged because a diverse set of actors-
residents, policymakers, and developers- all stood to benefit from it. In
Philadelphia, disadvantaged community residents were eager to obtain housing
amenities like lawns and parking, while in Detroit, middle-class African-
Americans desired new homes without having to leave the city. While these
groups were eager to live in suburban-style housing, even those community
residents 'outside the gates' had little objection to such housing being
constructed because of its potential to improve the neighborhood.
Policymakers in both cities encouraged suburbanization. In Philadelphia, housing
officials created a policy mandate for suburbanization through the publication of
policy documents and through their strong role in the planning and design
process for new inner-city housing. In Detroit, officials from the mayor down were
desperate for new middle-class housing in the city and were therefore eager to
facilitate whatever proposals might come their way. These proposals came from
the third group that stood to benefit from inner-city suburbanization in Detroit- the
private sector.
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Entrepreneurial developers in Detroit believed, correctly as it turned out, that
there was a strong market for new, suburban-style housing within the city limits.
Upon the success of the initial suburban development of Victoria Park the private
sector became the strongest advocate for inner-city suburbanization in Detroit. In
Philadelphia, however, the private sector remained uninterested in constructing
in the inner city due to market failure- new housing in North Philadelphia could
not make a profit.
Design and planning professionals played significant but somewhat ambivalent
roles in the inner-city suburbanization process. In Detroit, architects protested the
suburban nature of one project but were overruled. Other architects generally
cooperated with the overriding mandate to produce low-density housing with
suburban attributes. Planners in both cities, especially Detroit, were both
relatively powerless and relatively uncritical, at least initially, of inner-city
suburbanization. Philadelphia planners for the most part recognized the needs
for lower densities and cooperated with housing officials. Detroit planners initially
supported suburbanization but became critical of it upon a regime shift in city
government.
Ideological stances toward inner-city suburbanization were limited. The
vernacular suburb was pragmatically viewed for the most part as a popular form
of habitation and therefore a desirable one. Most actors seemed to be
opportunistic, believing that different forms of housing were appropriate in
different areas and that suburban form was not particularly problematic in inner
cities. Design and planning professionals were the only actors with strong
ideological objections to inner-city suburbanization. Some were opportunistic,
others advocated the New Urbanist approach, while still others objected to
suburbanization but expressed confusion as to what constituted a correct
approach to redevelopment.
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This chapter begins with a brief overview of the housing development process in
inner-city neighborhoods. Since the developments examined were diverse, the
picture created is a general one. Following this introduction, the body of the
chapter examines several development stories in Detroit and Philadelphia. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences between
the development contexts of the inner cities of both cases.
The Philadelphia section examines three large housing developments that were
planned and constructed from 1994 to 2002 in the North Philadelphia
neighborhood: the Poplar Nehemiah Houses, the Ludlow Village Houses, and the
Cecil B. Moore Homeownership Zone Houses. (Later phases of the latter two
projects are still in construction as of May 2002.) Philadelphia encouraged inner-
city suburbanization in North Philadelphia, its hardest-hit inner-city neighborhood,
despite a dense urban pattern and the proximity of the neighborhood to the
healthy central business district. The suburbanization process was largely
motivated by fiscal imperatives. Since land values were low and redevelopment
expensive, the city decided that redevelopment would have a greater impact with
lower-density housing. Lower densities would provide additional amenities to
residents while consuming more land. This was seen as spreading the positive
impact of redevelopment over a wider area. The Poplar Nehemiah houses,
whose construction began in 1995, were the flagship development of the city's
new approach to redevelopment, and their design history is described in detail.
The other two housing developments were smaller in scope but confronted
additional issues inherent in suburbanization.
The Detroit section examines three interrelated housing developments which
were planned and constructed after 1990 in the east side neighborhood of
Jefferson-Chalmers. Two of these were constructed and one was not. These
developments were called Victoria Park, Clairpointe of Victoria Park, and Victoria
Woods. Suburbanization in Detroit was encouraged by a partnership of private
developers and city officials who, for different reasons, supported the
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construction of new housing in the inner city. The Detroit developments were
comprised of suburban housing models transplanted to urban sites. Victoria Park
was the first and largest of these developments and set the stage for a variety of
changes in the Detroit housing market. Its design process is discussed in detail.
The other two developments were progeny of Victoria Park and illustrated the
potential for privately-sponsored suburbanization as well as the limits of such a
process in Detroit.
The development process in inner cities: a brief overview
Housing development in a typical inner city neighborhood differs from
development in other parts of the metropolitan region in several ways. These
differences are linked to the economic, social, and physical issues particular to
inner city neighborhoods. Perhaps the most important difference is that much
housing development in inner cities is not a profit-driven enterprise. In many
cases it is impossible for housing construction to occur without subsidies. As a
result, government assistance is critical for most inner-city housing. The market
for inner-city housing is also different from other areas. Buyers who can afford
market-rate housing are likely to select stable or newer neighborhoods over
inner-city neighborhoods because of the dilapidated condition and negative
environmental variables of housing in these areas. Many potential buyers or
renter of inner-city housing are poor and are therefore unable to afford housing
priced at market rates. Other potential buyers are willing to live near dilapidated
housing if they can obtain new housing with desirable amenities. We will see in
the case studies that these desirable amenities are those traditionally associated
with suburban housing. Since much inner-city housing is subsidized, construction
is generally as cheap as possible. Subsidized houses therefore feature fewer
amenities than would be found in market-rate housing and often, as we will see
in Philadelphia, have a somewhat minimalist architectural aspect. Market-rate
housing, however, is competing for customers with housing elsewhere in the
metropolitan area and is therefore designed to be comparable with that housing
in many ways. In Detroit, as we will see, this means that market-rate housing
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often has a suburban aspect to it. Below I describe each of the above aspects of
inner-city housing development in turn.
The land market in inner city neighborhoods is often severely depressed. Values
are very low for vacant lots, existing buildings, and for new construction. Values
can be depressed for several reasons. Vacant lots often require substantial work,
such as repair of sewer or electrical lines, removal of rubble, or environmental
decontamination, in order to be buildable. This can add thousands of dollars cost
to construction on these lots. Existing houses are often dilapidated and in need of
substantial repairs. The value of new houses, which would potentially be much
higher in other neighborhoods, is lowered by the adjacency of nearby dilapidated
properties.
Both Philadelphia and Detroit suffer depressed markets in their distressed
neighborhoods. In Detroit, existing houses in good repair in depressed
neighborhoods often sell for as low to $30,000 or $40,000. In parts of
Philadelphia, values are so low that rehabilitated housing is worth less than it
costs to restore it. In the Germantown neighborhood, for example, housing which
cost $70,000 to restore in 2000 sold for only $40,000. Similarly, new housing in
North Philadelphia which cost over $100,000 to build had a value of less than
$50,000 (Heavens 1997). Where new housing is worth less than it costs to
construct it, private developers are unable to make a profit and can only operate
in the presence of subsidies. The necessity for subsidies is a major limiting factor
in the production of new inner-city housing- subsidies are not always available,
and they often come with a variety of conditions that make them more difficult to
use than traditional financing.
The funding mechanisms for subsidizing the construction of new inner-city
housing are diverse and it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss them in
detail. Unsubsidized housing construction financing is relatively simple- banks
will lend money to a builder or owner to construct housing, which is then
226
generally repaid over 15 or 30 years in the form of a mortgage. Where subsidies
are involved, the process is more complex. Subsidies can occur at every stage of
the development process. Vacant sites, if owned by the city, can be sold for a
token amount, essentially subsidizing the cost of land purchase for the
developer. Site improvements can also be subsidized, with government paying
for items like cleanup and new infrastructure such as utilities and streets. Finally,
direct construction costs can be subsidized, with government absorbing some or
all of the cost of building new houses. All of these subsidies occurred to some
degree in the construction of Victoria Park.
Subsidies can be recovered to greater or lesser degrees. New housing can be
sold or rented at market- or below-market costs. Selling housing at market value
will not necessarily recover all costs. In Philadelphia, the Poplar Houses sold for
only $40,000, meaning that at least $60,000 in housing construction subsidies
alone were lost. The cost of condemning the site from previous owners and
preparation of the site for construction were additional costs that were not
recovered. On the other end of the scale, the Clairpointe development was
entirely profit-driven and involved no subsidies. The developers purchased the
land from the city, paid themselves to prepare the site and sold the housing at a
profit. The other developments in this chapter fell somewhere between these two
extremes of extreme unprofitability and moderate profitability. Rental housing can
be subsidized even after construction. Public housing, for example, is provided at
rents far below that of the market. These rents are so low that they can repay
only some of a development's operating costs (Vale 2002, pers. comm.).
Other subsidies are unrelated to individual housing units and can instead be
linked to individuals. Section 8 certificates, issued by the Federal Government,
are issued to individuals and are designed to subsidize the costs of their living in
market-rate (and presumably market-produced) rentals, rather than living in
housing units whose cost was directly subsidized by the government.
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The source of many of the largest housing subsidies in the United States is the
Federal government, but others come from state and city sources. Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG), for example, were first created in 1974 and
are disbursed by HUD. CDBGs take the form of direct cash grants to
municipalities for the construction or rehabilitation of housing. All three of the
Philadelphia developments studied were primarily funded through CDBG funds.
Cities may also pay for housing-related costs out of their own operating budgets
by issuing bonds. Many of the site costs for Victoria Park were absorbed by the
city of Detroit through the issuance of bonds. Other HUD subsidies, such as
Economic Development Initiative funds, are linked to geographically bounded
areas which meet certain criteria of economic and physical distress. Within these
areas, additional funds are available to subsidize new housing. The Cecil B.
Moore homes in Philadelphia were partially funded by these means.
Just as ordinary land market mechanisms do not function in many inner-city
neighborhoods, ordinary purchasing mechanisms do not either. As the average
inner-city resident is generally much poorer than other residents of the
metropolitan area, these individuals are often unable to purchase housing, even
at the depressed prices of the inner city. Purchasing homes in the inner city was
historically subject to additional difficulties, such as banks refusing to offer
mortgages in 'blighted' areas (a practice known as redlining). In the last two
decades, however, spurred by measures like the Community Reinvestment Act
of 1977, banks have been required, among other responsibilities, to offer more
mortgages in low-income neighborhoods (Federal Financial Institutions
Information Council 2002). These measures have made funds more available for
residents of inner-city neighborhoods so long as they can meet requirements for
a mortgage.
Inner-city neighborhoods have also suffered from the departure of many
residents who have had the option to leave. Patterson has described such
departures as causing 'social isolation', as remaining residents lost exposure to
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ordinary patterns of economic and social well-being (Wilson 1987). There have
been two means, however, by which higher-income residents have been
interested in returning to inner-city areas. The first is by means of gentrification,
where the perception or reality of rising property values leads higher-income
households to invest in property in neighborhoods, generally historic and with
attractive housing stock, which may be primarily lower-income. Gentrification has
been extensively studied and is the subject of some debate as to its positive or
negative attributes (Smith 1996, Wyley and Hammel 1999).
Another case where higher-income residents choose inner-city neighborhoods is
linked to the creation of completely new built environments within these areas. I
call this phenomenon, for lack of a better word, 'enclave settlemenf. Enclave
settlements, sufficiently isolated from their surrounding inner-city context and
often designed in a completely different fashion, are able to attract higher-income
residents who would not otherwise be drawn to the inner city. Both Victoria Park
and Clairpointe are clear examples of enclave settlements. While much inner-city
suburbanization is comprised of enclave settlements, this phenomenon dates
back to at least the 1950s, when urban renewal built many new middle- and
upper-income developments designed in enclave fashion in the midst of
depressed urban neighborhoods. These enclaves, unlike the ones studied in this
chapter, were not all built in suburban fashion. Lafayette Park in Detroit, for
example, contained tall towers which were more urban than those found in
Detroit's vernacular neighborhoods. Philadelphia's Yorktown, in contrast,
followed a clear suburban model. These historic enclave settlements have been
successful in retaining their middle-class or lower-middle-class residents while
surrounding neighborhoods have declined. Consequently, Yorktown was
explicitly cited as a model for future subsidized housing developments in North
Philadelphia (OHCD 1993). Enclave settlements differ from gentrification in that
gentrification appears to be almost entirely a market-driven activity. In contrast,
most of the enclave settlements, both historic and current, examined involved
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substantial public subsidy, although there is evidence that market-financed
enclave settlements in Detroit have a vigorous future.
It is not easy to make generalizations about the architectural output of the inner-
city housing development process. Public housing was historically stigmatized for
its forbidding, minimalist appearance. Recent subsidized housing has avoided
the individualistic aspect of older public housing in favor of a contextual
appearance. Nevertheless, subsidized housing, since it is built under severe cost
constraints, is obviously rather minimalist, with features like basements and
garages often lacking. The use of ornamental features like brick and wood siding
are reduced, and materials like vinyl tile are used in place of more expensive
ceramic tiles. The architectural results are generally quite modest, producing
housing with minimal details and a reductivist appearance. For these and other
reasons, subsidized housing is rarely architecturally innovative- a shift from the
public housing of mid-century, which often made architectural innovation an
explicit goal, albeit within limited budgets. Higher end-housing, however, can be
indistinguishable from housing produced elsewhere. The Victoria Park and
Clairpointe houses, for example, were designed along the same lines as mid-
range suburban house models, and they are thus indistinguishable from their
suburban counterparts in both appearance and, in the case of Clairpointe, in
cost.
The causality of inner-city suburbanization in Philadelphia
Inner-city suburbanization in Philadelphia is closely linked to the latest chapter in
the physical transformation of the city's North Philadelphia neighborhood to a
lower-density environment. West and South Philadelphia, the other two areas of
the city where large numbers of severely distressed neighborhoods are located,
received far less new housing in the 1990s than North Philadelphia, and their
transformation was consequently much less. North Philadelphia was the location
for all three of the case housing developments discussed in this chapter.
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Public policy actions have played a major role in the transformation of North
Philadelphia. Over the past sixty years the majority of the city's expenditures on
housing were consistently focused on this neighborhood, the city's major black
ghetto. This focus persisted despite steady changes in housing funding and
policies. Housing efforts in North Philadelphia began in the 1940s with the
construction of some of the city's first public housing projects there. They
continued in the 1950s, with the great majority of urban-renewal-funded housing
demolitions and public housing construction being located there, in the 1960s
with the majority of Model Cities monies being spent there, and into the 1980s
with the majority of the city's CDBG funds being spent there (Philadelphia City
Planning Commission 1985, Adams et. al. 1991). Despite the city housing
director's caution in 1993 that Lower North Philadelphia (the area south of Lehigh
Avenue), had received the lion's share of the city's monies for subsidized
housing up to that point, the neighborhood's continued severe needs justified a
continuation of the historic focus (Kromer 1993). After 1993, when the city's
Office of Housing and Community Development (OHCD) began implementing its
explicit policy to lower the density of new subsidized housing being constructed
in the city, North Philadelphia was naturally the neighborhood where these
planning efforts occurred.
The low-density policy pursued by the city in North Philadelphia after 1990 was
not arrived at de novo but had substantial precedent in housing developments
constructed there before 1990. Chief among these was the Yorktown middle-
income housing development, built with urban renewal monies in the 1960s. This
development embodied both two ideals which were appealing in the 1990s. The
first was a physical ideal of a low-density neighborhood which completely
transformed the existing environment and spread change and investment across
a larger area. The second was a socioeconomic ideal of housing which was
owned by working families. Unlike public housing, Yorktown's working-class
housing displayed an admirable stability in the face of considerable surrounding
decline. North Philadelphia's public housing, on the other hand, embodied a
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discredited socioeconomic ideal of concentrated, largely nonworking poor, and it
was therefore not cited as a model for the future development of North
Philadelphia.
Early public housing in Philadelphia, however, did feature several of the same
design innovations later used both in Yorktown and in the three 1990s
developments examined. The 1990s developments differed, however, in their
use of a twin housing model, a housing type that had not been built in North
Philadelphia before 1990. Twin homes addressed the needs of both residents
and city agencies. They offered lower densities (Poplar was built at 14 units per
acre, approximately half that of Yorktown), more open space, and off-street
parking, while selling for more than row housing would. Twin housing also
consumed larger amounts of land than rowhousing, achieving the city's goal of
making a wider impact. They also provided the closest realization of the
suburban ideal that had yet been created in North Philadelphia.
The suburbanization of North Philadelphia can be thought of as having three
phases. The first was the mid-century development of low-density housing which
served as partial precedents for the post-1990 twin house developments. The
second was the creation of two policy documents in the 1990s by OHCD which
explicitly envisioned a lower-density housing model for lower North Philadelphia.
The third phase was the actual development of the new housing complexes
designed according to these policies. The design process for the twin house
developments integrated this policy framework with the desires and concerns of
area residents and market realities. Each of these phases will be discussed in
turn.
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Introduction to North Philadelphia
Figure 5.1. Map of North Philadelphia, showing the case housing developments and severely
distressed census tracts. The boundary of North Philadelphia is shown as a dashed line. Lower
North Philadelphia comprises that area below Lehigh Avenue.
Parts of North Philadelphia, which the Philadelphia City Planning Commission
considers to be that part of Philadelphia north of Spring Garden Street and south
of Roosevelt Boulevard, were developed as early as the eighteenth century as
the growing city spread north along the Delaware River. At this point North
Philadelphia was politically separate from the city, but it, along with the remainder
of Philadelphia County, was incorporated into the city in the Consolidation Act of
1854. The urban development of North Philadelphia did not begin until the mid-
nineteenth century, when the city grid was extended northward and built up with
a dense mixture of residences and industry. Both the Lehigh and Pennsylvania
railroads built lines across North Philadelphia, spurring the massive industrial
development of the neighborhood. Industrial facilities were built both along the
railroads and within the residential neighborhoods which comprised most of
North Philadelphia's land. Apart from Fairmount Park on the neighborhood's
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western edge, very little of North Philadelphia was dedicated as open space.
Instead the land was developed with a dense network of two- to four-story brick
rowhouses. By the 1920s North Philadelphia had been developed far enough
north to be contiguous with Germantown, a nineteenth-century railroad suburb.
By about 1930 all of North Philadelphia (shown in dotted lines on the map above)
had been completely developed.
Though parts of North Philadelphia had originally been wealthy, the
neighborhood became increasingly poor, and black, as the twentieth century
progressed. Blacks began settling in lower North Philadelphia in large numbers in
the 1920s and by 1950 the nonwhite population of lower North Philadelphia
(south of Lehigh Avenue) comprised almost half its total population. From 1950
to 1980 the population of lower North Philadelphia became increasingly
dominated by minority group members so that by 1980 the neighborhood was
almost 90% nonwhite. Housing abandonment spread in lower North Philadelphia
in parallel with a 55% population loss between 1950 and 1980. Many blacks
leaving lower North Philadelphia moved northward into upper North Philadelphia
and Germantown. This population shift happened in such large numbers that by
1980 upper North Philadelphia, almost entirely white in 1950, was almost 80%
nonwhite. After 1950 Hispanics, mainly Puerto Ricans, also began settling in
lower North Philadelphia in large numbers (City Planning Commission 1985).
Public Housing
In response to the growing poverty and needs of North Philadelphia, the city
selected the neighborhood as the site for several public housing projects in the
1930s, 40s, and 50s. Two of Philadelphia's earliest housing projects were
located in North Philadelphia: the Glenwood Homes, constructed at Diamond and
2 2nd Streets, and the Richard Allen homes, constructed at 1 1 th and Poplar
Streets. In the racially-segregated era of the 1930s, these projects were explicitly
intended to house black tenants, reflecting the growing concentration of black
residents in North Philadelphia. These two projects were completed by 1941.
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Both of these projects were inspired by zeilenbau thinking borrowed from
Germany. Streets were closed and transformed into pedestrian passages and
open spaces were created at the center of superblocks where residents were
encouraged to congregate. Despite the generosity of open space, the housing
structures, designed mostly as garden apartments with a few high-rises, were
stark and functional, with few amenities surviving the strict budgetary constraints
of the Housing Authority (Bauman 1987). (The Allen Homes would be one of the
first two Philadelphia public housing projects demolished under the HOPE VI
program in the 1990s.)
Upon the passage of the Housing Act of 1949 millions of additional federal
dollars were made available for slum clearance and public housing construction
in Philadelphia. As part of the larger East Poplar redevelopment project, another
public housing project, the Spring Garden homes, were added to the roster in
1952. Like the Allen Homes, the entire East Poplar redevelopment (which
included the middle-income Penn Towne apartments) was premised on the
closure of all streets except major through streets and the orientation of
townhouses, whether they be moderate- or low-income, along green walkways
and open spaces designed for community gatherings. Unlike the Allen Homes,
the Spring Garden homes were kept low-rise to conform to the rowhouse
landscape of lower North Philadelphia. Louis Kahn, a Philadelphia architect who
would achieve later prominence for his monumentally designed buildings, also
participated in the greening of North Philadelphia with his mid-1950s design for
the Temple urban renewal area plan. This plan, with its wide streets, cul-de-sacs,
and parks contrasted strongly with the existing neighborhood design of North
Philadelphia, and created, according to Bauman (1987), "an incongruously
nonurban environment in the heart of the city."
Both the East Poplar and Temple plans contained seeds of the suburbanizing
transformations that would occur in the1990s with the Poplar Nehemiah houses
and others. The well-publicized failure of public housing to achieve its social
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goals (Bauman 1987, Vale 2000, HUD 2000a) should not obscure the original
physical intentions of the projects. While this housing did not emulate vernacular
suburbia (an evolving concept from the 1930s to 1950s), these public housing
projects distinctly rejected the urban grids and tightly built houses that
characterized North Philadelphia in favor of lower-density dwellings closely
connected to green space. The design failure of these projects has not been
attributed to their lower densities so much as with their failure to provide
residents with defensible space and with an appropriately domestic housing
model. The Yorktown project would achieve both of these goals and
consequently have much greater success.
Yorktown
Public housing was not the only new housing constructed in Philadelphia during
the urban renewal era. In 1952, the 173-unit Penn Towne Apartments were
constructed for middle-income tenants in the East Poplar neighborhood (Bauman
1987). Somewhat to the north, an even larger planned community called
Yorktown was laid out between 1950 and 1960 on a site bounded by 13th and
11th Streets on the east and west and Oxford and Girard Streets on the north and
south. The site, located in the middle of lower North Philadelphia, was at the time
built up almost completely with rowhouses, most of which were in dilapidated
condition. Once the site was officially declared a slum, two-thirds of acquisition
and clearance costs, which totalled over $5 million, were paid for by the Federal
government under Title I of the National Housing Act of 1949. The site was
vacated by 1958 and the construction of 635 new houses was complete by the
early 1970s (Office of Housing and Community Development 1996). In all of
these respects Yorktown was a typical urban renewal project- expensive, large in
scale, completely reshaping its neighborhood, and a long time- over twenty
years- in the making.
In other ways, however, Yorktown was differed significantly from the stereotypical
urban renewal image of isolated towers of public housing for the very poor.
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Yorktown, in contrast, was designed to provide homeownership opportunities for
the lower middle class. Units were sold for between $10,500 and $14,000, mainly
to working-class African-Americans. The design of the community was also
distinctly different from typical urban renewal projects. Yorktown was a low-rise
development of rowhouses located in staggered rows along cul-de-sacs carved
from the Philadelphia grid (see site plan below). The city grid, however, was
preserved, providing easy access through the site, while the cul-de-sacs
provided seclusion from the through streets. Yorktown thus maintained the
relationship of houses to the street, a relationship which was lost in many urban
renewal projects. Homes, while built as rowhouses, featured deep front and back
yards as well as garages on most models. While the architectural designs were
undistinctive, the pitched roofs and generous site plans strongly differentiated the
houses from other neighborhoods in North Philadelphia.
Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The staggered cul-de-sacs and short rows of Yorktown houses can be
seen in a site plan (above). Yorktown streets are configured as cul-de-sacs (left, next page),
while houses are built in a style that might be best described as rowhouses crossed with
suburban homes (right, next page).
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Though it is composed of rowhouses, Yorktown today looks, and feels, suburban.
This differentiation from the context of North Philadelphia was perceived in a
positive light by residents in a 1995 city survey (Office of Housing and
Community Development 1996). A resident emphasized that her home was "in
Yorktown, not North Philadelphia". Yorktown's distinctiveness was noted both in
terms of the community's affinity with the suburbs- "suburban style housing" and
"a suburb within the city" were two comments- and in terms of the sense of
community created through its distinctive physical form- "neighbors look out for
children", "cohesiveness of spirit", and "a sense of family and community" were
some of the comments received. Residents also appreciated the area's physical
amenities- "less traffic, large yards, play areas" and "no corner stores" were
noted as benefits. The last comment indicates that Yorktown, like the typical
suburb, is an automobile-dependent development. Over 75% of respondents
indicated that they used automobiles to shop, either because of a paucity of local
shopping options or because of the auto-oriented nature of nearby retail.
Yorktown's most significant achievement is that, unlike the majority of urban
renewal projects, it is today perceived as a success both by its inhabitants and by
the outside world. Houses have gained in value, though not tremendously- the
median sale price in 1991 was $54,000, and by 1997 houses there sold for
$60,000 to $70,000 (Philadelphia Inquirer 11/12/97). Though low in comparison
to the suburbs, Yorktown's average house value was much higher than the
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median sale income of tracts directly adjoining the development (Adams et. al.
1991). To city housing policymakers studying Yorktown in 1996, there was little
doubt that the community's stability was due in large part to its design features.
Yorktown possessed physical amenities that attracted, and retained, people who
might otherwise have left the inner city. Yorktown is one of the rare Modernist
inner-city developments where physical determinism seems to have succeeded,
and the new developments constructed in the 1990s took the lesson of Yorktown
to heart.
Three policy documents for North Philadelphia
Three policy documents which were issued in the 1980s and 1990s had a
bearing on the Philadelphia case housing developments. The first was the North
Philadelphia Plan: A guide to revitalization, issued by the City Planning
Commission in 1985. The second and third were issued by the Office of Housing
and Community Development in 1993 and 1996, and were entitled respectively
Home in North Philadelphia and Learning from Yorktown.
The North Philadelphia Plan was significant because it is the most recent
areawide plan to have been issued for North Philadelphia. It thus presumably
reflected the vision of the City Planning Commission for this large area of the city
throughout the 1990s when much new housing was being planned and
constructed there. The plan was ambitious, documenting both the extensive
problems and opportunities that existed, and attempting to resolve
recommendations to a fine level by focusing on several smaller locations within
North Philadelphia. Unfortunately, this document suffered from the shortcomings
of many large-scale plans in that it was not closely linked to implementable
actions by either the public or the private sector. The North Philadelphia Plan did
not, for example, accurately forecast or recommend the construction of any of the
three housing developments studied. Given that these developments were
initiated only five years after the plan was issued, we can see the North
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Philadelphia Plan as an excellent documentation of the neighborhood, but a poor
guide for future action there.
The second and third documents were shorter than the Plan, being little more
than pamphlets. They also differed in that they were issued not by the city
agency responsible for planning, but by the city agency responsible for
coordinating the development of subsidized housing construction in Philadelphia.
Home in North Philadelphia was issued in 1993 and was both a response to
housing plans that had already been announced in lower North Philadelphia, as
well as an statement of the city's desired form for new housing. Home explicitly
advocated low densities in lower North Philadelphia, suggesting an area-wide
housing density of 10 units per acre. This suggested density was much lower
than Yorktown, built at about 28 units to the acre (OHCD 1996), and even lower
than the Poplar Nehemiah Homes built after the issuance of the plan. The major
beneficial consequence of dedensification, according to the plan, was that lower-
density housing would both "generate more benefit to the acre" and "produce
results over a broader area". The plan briefly considered the design
consequences of dedensification, arguing that "site plans and building prototypes
for sales housing (should) include driveways and open space where practical and
desirable". Home in North Philadelphia was influential both because it advocated
a specific strategy and because it was issued by the same agency that was
responsible for implementing the strategy. Home did not need any exhortatory
power; it merely codified OHCD's policy on the form of future housing in lower
North Philadelphia.
Learning from Yorktown was issued in 1996 and was also written by OHCD. This
plan was primarily a research document which focused on the Yorktown
community. The plan both reviewed the history of the development and
recapitulated the results of a limited survey administered to Yorktown residents
during the fall of 1995. The basic conclusion of the study was that Yorktown was
a successful community which had maintained its desirability. The implicit
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conclusion of the study was that Yorktown possessed features which would be
desirable to replicate in future developments in the area. The study questioned,
however, whether the resources existed to carry out such large-scale
transformations again in the absence of a substantial federal commitment. As
Learning from Yorktown was also issued by the agency responsible for funding
and influencing new assisted housing construction, it could be seen as bolstering
the recommendations of Home by providing a successful precedent for low-
density homeownership housing in North Philadelphia. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the three developments whose stories follow replicated several of Yorktown's
features.
The Poplar Nehemiah Houses
The Poplar Nehemiah Houses are a homeownership development of 176 houses
completed in 2000. As the largest housing development in North Philadelphia
since 1990, the Poplar Houses was the first development constructed under the
housing policies established by the city in 1993. The design process for the
Poplar Houses provides a fascinating window into the causality of inner-city
suburbanization because of the incremental nature of the decision decisions
made. Faced with an existing high-density, rowhouse environment and an
imperative to rebuild at a much lower density, the committee charged with
determining the form of the Poplar development had to resolve a myriad of
issues, each of which incrementally impacted the suburban nature of the
development. The result of this design process was an interesting hybrid
between vernacular suburbia and the Philadelphia rowhouse which had, as we
saw in Chapter Four, the highest suburbanization score of all the Philadelphia
developments measured.
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Figure 5.5. The design of the Poplar houses resembled a hybrid between the traditional
Philadelphia rowhouse and a vernacular suburban single-family dwelling.
The design process for the Poplar houses took place between 1991 and 1995. In
1991 the project was first suggested to the city by a community group. By 1995
outstanding interior design issues had been resolved as construction of its first
phase of the project began. The development of the Poplar houses was a
complex process, and its design was only part of the story. Nevertheless, design
was a critical component of the project policies which were formulated by a team
during 1994, and only after design issues had been resolved could other
components of the project move forward. The design of the Poplar houses was
not entirely a result of team decisions- many features of the project which
influenced its design were determined beforehand. For example, features like the
all-residential and all-homeownership nature of the development were the result
of funding requirements and were therefore never a part of the design
discussions.
The design discussions which determined the form of the Poplar houses were
comprised of four phases. The first consisted of the initial designs created in
1990 and 1991 by the Poplar Enterprise Development Corporation, the
community group which initiated the project. The second phase consisted of the
preliminary decisions made by the city in 1992 and 1993 before OHCD
committed to funding the project. The third and most important phase, in 1994,
consisted of a formal design decision process carried out by a Project
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Development Team (PDT) throughout 1994. The fourth phase in 1995 and
afterwards consisted of the resolution of minor design options that occurred
during the construction process of the development's different phases.
In October 1991 HUD approved an application by the Poplar Enterprise
Development Corporation (PEDC) of Philadelphia for a Nehemiah Housing
Opportunity Grant totalling $3.075 million. This grant, which would cover only a
small part of the total construction costs, was the generator of the Poplar
Nehemiah project. The grant was itself the result of a two-year partnership
process between the Poplar Community Development Corporation (a
neighborhood-based CDC in the area) and Philadelphia Neighborhood
Enterprise, the local office for the Enterprise Foundation, a nationally-based
affordable housing developer. HUD agreed to provide $15,000 in forgivable loans
to each low- or moderate-income homeowner (an income of below 80% of the
city's median household income was required) who was approved for a mortgage
on one of the new houses. In January 1992 PEDC testified before OHCD asking
for assistance in funding the development of the proposed 205-unit housing
complex. Already, in September 1991, Mayor Wilson Goode had stated a
commitment of over $8 million in city money (mostly from CDBG funds) to
support the development. The mayor's commitment was somewhat premature.
As the director of OHCD would later note, it "supported... ventures which had not
been derived from comprehensive neighborhood plans, had not been
substantively reviewed by City planning and development agencies... and were
not authorized by City Council." (Kromer letter to Blanks, April 6, 1993)
Several characteristics of the Poplar project were determined by the funding
structure of the Nehemiah grant. The Poplar development was required to be an
entirely residential, homeownership housing development, since the purpose of
the Nehemiah program was to increase low-income homeownership. In addition,
one of the programmatic requirements for the grant required that the housing
take the form of "detached dwellings, townhouses, and condominium projects
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(with no more than) four units". The terminology of these parameters implied a
somewhat anti-urban bias, although rowhouses were considered to be
'townhouses'. The preliminary design produced for PEDC reflected a relatively
dense rowhouse arrangement, with contiguous rows of up to six houses
depending on the land available. Several back streets were shown as alleys
providing access for rear parking, and several new alleys were also
contemplated. An apparently public open space was also provided at the end of
one block, forming an elongated central green at the core of the development
area.
There is little indication that this preliminary design was ever seriously
considered by OHCD. There was no explicit discussion of this design during the
1994 team meetings which determined the project design. The central green
space, a core conceptual feature of the original design, did survive to be included
in the development as constructed. OHCD felt that the rowhouse design for the
project was problematic because of its marketability, and that more study needed
to be done to see what types of houses would have value in the Poplar
neighborhood. The director of OHCD justified delaying the onset of the project on
this basis (Kromer, April 6 1993). The release of the Home in North Philadelphia
report in July 1993 codified the city's position on marketability: redevelopment in
lower North Philadelphia would be only supported at much lower densities than
the extant fabric. Kromer noted in his April 1993 letter that OHCD was "...now
focusing on a smaller, lower-density first phase which will enable us to test the
market potential for sales housing in Poplar..." In September 1993 the Enterprise
Foundation, co-developers for the project, agreed to the city's lower-density
approach, citing a desire to conform to the policies described in Home.
With the city believing that housing form was closely related to housing value, the
suburbanization of the Poplar development was at its most fundamental level the
result of financial imperatives. Rowhouses were perceived to be financially
unsustainable; only lower-density housing was believed to have values high
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enough to merit the public expenditures that would be required for the project.
OHCD felt obliged to encourage low-density development both to receive the
highest financial results per unit and to spend public funds in the most
responsible manner. Thus, by the time committee design discussions began in
earnest in 1994, one of the most important design decisions for the Poplar
Nehemiah houses had already been resolved. The project would be not only
completely residential and homeownership, but it would be low-density, at a
stated level of 10 units per acre (OHCD 1993).
To obtain land for the Poplar development, other regulatory agencies in the City
participated in the development process. The regulatory standards used by these
agencies may also have influenced the design of the project. In order to obtain
land for the Poplar houses swiftly, the city's Redevelopment Authority (RDA)
committed to using urban renewal legislation to condemn land. In September
1993, the RDA applied to the Philadelphia City Planning Commission (PCPC) to
certify the Poplar neighborhood a 'blighted area'. Three urban renewal blight
criteria were declared to be applicable to the Poplar area: the presence of
"unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate, or overcrowded conditions", the presence of
"faulty street or lot layouts", and the presence of "economically or socially
undesirable land uses".
The urban renewal criteria used to condemn land for Poplar were dated by 1993,
having clearly been designed to portray dense, overcrowded, mixed-use
neighborhoods as slums. The historical nature of these standards forced some
peculiar interpretations to be appropriate in the half-deserted Poplar
neighborhood of 1993. For example, the city cited abandoned lots and buildings
as 'unsafe and undesirable uses'. Other condemnation standards displayed an
antiurban bias. The 'faulty street layout' clause allowed the Redevelopment
Authority to problematize the existing physical configuration of neighborhood
streets. Not only were these streets problematic under the urban renewal
legislation, but the application noted that ten streets in the neighborhood were
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narrower than 30 feet and were therefore also illegal under the current
Philadelphia zoning ordinance. In addition, one of the through streets in the
Poplar area was "not fully aligned, nor offset by the minimum of 125 feet as
required by the Code". To add to the problems caused by these 'faulty' streets,
the urban renewal petition noted that over 400 properties in the area were legally
unbuildable because they were smaller than the minimum area of 1440 square
feet required by City zoning, though the application did not specify what that
minimum size was (Wilds 2002, pers. comm.).
While the urban renewal and other city standards were not directly responsible
for the low-density form of the Poplar houses, it is clear that the intentions of
these standards were to produce a built environment different from that which
characterized much of Philadelphia. Under the standards applied in 1993 for the
Poplar development, the dense network of streets and rowhouses that
characterized the majority of older Philadelphia neighborhoods would have been
impossible to construct. The inability to replicate historic urban environments
under existing city regulations is a common complaint of the New Urbanism
movement, and Philadelphia's street and zoning standards shared this problem.
Therefore, even if the city's explicit policy had not been to construct a low-density
housing in North Philadelphia, replicating the existing rowhouse environment in
the Poplar neighborhood would probably have been difficult under the 1993
standards. These standards, however, have since been altered to allow for more
clustered development in association with open space (Wilds 2002, pers.
comm.).
In February 1994 the architectural firm of Kise, Franks, and Straw (KFS) were
selected as consultants to produce the area plan for the Poplar development. To
determine the policies that would guide the design of the development, a Project
Development Team (PDT) met from March to October 1994 on a weekly or
biweekly basis. The PDT was composed of both city and community
representatives: RDA, OHCD, PCPC, PHS (Pennsylvania Horticultural Society)
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comprised the city representatives, while ESIC (Enterprise Social Investment
Corporation) and Poplar Enterprise Development Corporation (PEDC)
represented neighborhood interests. KFS also sent representatives to the
meetings. Design at the neighborhood and site level was the chief issue
discussed by the team. As a result of the team meetings KFS produced a plan for
the Poplar area in February 1995 which was nearly identical to the housing
development as it was constructed. The following section discusses the key
design decisions made by the team during this period, and the reasons given for
these decisions as recorded in the PDT meeting minutes.
Table 5.1 clarifies the timing and relationship of the project development team's
design decisions by itemizing the decisions and the dates on which they were
discussed. The table is followed by a discussion of individual design decisions.
Table 5.1. Design Decisions of the Poplar Project Development team, 1994
Design component Design decision Dates discussed,
Street and block design Eliminate alley streets 4/19
Parallel parking along major streets 8/3
Provide cul-de-sacs 4/19, 4/28, 5/12,
5/25, 6/9, 7/8
Housing type Twin houses 4/19, 4/28, 5/4
Access to houses Front entrance facing street 4/19, 5/12, 5/18,
7/8, 8/19, 9/21,
9/22, 9/29, 10/6
Automobile access Individual driveways 4/19, 5/4, 8/19,
9/21, 9/22
Distance of house from 5 to 10 feet 4/19
street
Architectural image Gabled, pitched roofs 4/19, 5/18, 10/6
Materials of house Brick and stucco facades 4/19, 5/18
Internal site planning Number, location of rooms, amenities 5/18
Neighborhood open space Form and location of open space, relationship 4/19, 4/28, 5/4,
I to neighboring houses 5/12, 8/16
Street and block design
Three street and block configuration issues were discussed. Two of these
decisions produced physical features not previously found in the neighborhood,
while the third rejected a feature usually associated with lower-density
environments. The first decision, to eliminate back streets and alley streets, was
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resolved quickly by the team and was not raised again. Security and sanitation
problems were cited as the reasons why back streets were undesirable. In
keeping with this decision, the design for the first phase of the project eliminated
three back streets and several smaller alleys that ran through the interiors of
blocks. The second street design decision dealt with the orientation of parked
cars on the major north-south streets running through the development. Angled
parking was proposed by the architects as a possibility but was rejected by the
City Planning Commission on August 3 rd. The Commission believed that angled
parking would interfere with cars pulling out of driveways and that it was
therefore "not desirable". The third street design issue was perhaps most
significant, as it involved a substantial departure from historic Philadelphia
neighborhood designs. This design change transformed two of the shorter east-
west through streets into cul-de-sacs. This idea was suggested to the architects
on April 19 by the team as a measure which would "enhance security and
privacy" in the development. There was little dispute about the desirability of the
cul-de-sacs, although questions about their appropriate dimensions were raised
in subsequent meetings. The cul-de-sacs were designed as true dead-ends; the
team "considered and dismissed" the idea of connecting the end of the first cul-
de-sac through to the north-south through street. Although no reason was given
for this decision, it is likely that team members believed the privacy of units on
the cul-de-sac would be compromised by such a connection.
Automobile access
Since back streets and alleys were to be removed in the redesign of the Poplar
neighborhood, automobile access to the houses was from the front. The low
density of the developments provided plenty of room for off-street parking. Off-
street parking was also a statutory requirement in the zoning code. The team
considered several parking alternatives: shared rear parking, individual front yard
parking, front-accessed rear parking, and private side yard parking. The first two
of these alternatives were associated with rowhouse-type houses, and the
second two were associated with twin house types. The form of off-street parking
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was thus dependent on the form of housing chosen. Twin housing was chosen
relatively quickly (see housing type below), and side yard parking pads were
quickly chosen as the preferred location for cars. The PCPC questioned the
numbers of curb cuts that would be required for individual parking, but it was
agreed on May 4th that houses would have individual driveways with shared curb
cuts to access the side yards. The location of parking would come up again when
the location of front doors was decided upon (see access to houses below).
Housing type
The team initially considered many housing types, ranging from rowhouses to
single-family detached housing. Twin houses immediately attracted positive
interest from the team, and by mid-May twins had been agreed upon as the
dominant housing type for the development. No explicit reason was given, but
the twins apparently provided an appropriate compromise between density and
cost considerations. In order to study the visual impact of different housing types,
KFS presented a range of housing types found in different Philadelphia
neighborhoods to the team. The housing models preferred by the team were
those found in the East Falls and Mt. Airy neighborhoods. These were early
twentieth-century 'streetcar suburbs' in which the majority of houses were either
detached or twins. Single-family detached housing also appears to have been
seriously considered as an option. On April 28 the team asked the architects to
consider single-family detached housing, apparently as the result of interest at
OHCD. The architects found, however, that the low density of this option would
significantly increase per unit infrastructure costs, and single-family detached
housing was not discussed again after May 4. While single-family houses would
have more literally replicated the suburbs, the decision to break up the standard
Philadelphia rowhouse block by providing twins was nevertheless a significant
step in creating a more suburban image for the Poplar houses.
Distance of house from street
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On April 19 the team agreed that houses should have a 'modest setback, 5 to 10
feet from the sidewalk'. This provision for a front yard significantly differentiated
the Poplar houses from nearby rowhouses, which had minimal setbacks from the
street. The team's stated aim of providing these setbacks was to enhance the
privacy and security of houses while leaving adequate space for a back yard.
The presence of a front yard accentuated the difference of the Poplar houses
from their context and reinforced the suburban image that they sought to present.
Architectural image
The team also agreed on the type of image that the houses should present. At its
second meeting in April the team declared that the houses 'should not look like
public housing', a preference which translated to the new housing having pitched
rather than flat roofs. (The minutes noted that the Richard Allen Homes, a HOPE
VI public housing project adjoining the Poplar site, would soon have pitched roofs
as well!) The decision to have pitched roofs was a clear rejection of the low-rise
modernist architecture which characterized most of Philadelphia's housing
projects, many of which were near the Poplar neighborhood. The pitched roof
decision also differentiated the Poplar houses from adjoining rowhouses, which
generally had flat roofs sloping toward the rear of the house. In May the team
also asked the architects to consider fagade variations to reduce the uniformity of
the block streetfronts. Another image issue was linked to the dispute over where
the front entrances should be located. In its last meeting the team requested to
KFS that the house elevations be refined "to imitate the appearance of a single
house". This final decision was a clear statement that the team favored a single-
family detached house model, even if financial exigencies had required twins.
House materials
Brick, stucco, and imitation wood siding were the fagade options considered by
the team on April 19th. Residents selected brick and stucco as preferred fagade
materials and the issue was discussed only once again on May 18, when as part
of the issue of providing variety to the street, KFS suggested providing two or
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more fagade treatments- an all brick front and a brick-and-stucco front. It was
agreed that the sides and backs of the houses would be stucco. As constructed,
all houses were built with brick front facades and stucco side and rear facades.
The decision to use brick was a contextual decision since historic rowhouses in
the Poplar neighborhood were built of brick. The Ludlow houses would later use
house materials to reject their nearby context, but the Poplar houses did not take
this step.
Access to houses
The issue of where front doors would be located on the houses was the thorniest
design issue discussed and was a subject of nearly continuous discussion during
the later team meetings. The door location issue was also the only design
decision where community and city preferences diverged significantly. The issue
ended not with a compromise, but with the city successfully insisting that
entrances would be located on the fronts of houses. The location of the front
doors polarized the design team because it brought the debate between the
suburban and urban nature of the houses down to a single, easily visible issue.
Despite their significant departure from their context, so long as their entrances
faced the street the Poplar houses could be still be thought of as urban. Having
the houses completely reject the street was a step that the city agencies on the
team would not take.
The location of front doors was a design issue that could not be discussed until
the issues of parking location and housing types had been resolved. On May 12
OHCD suggested that driveways have an entrance to the kitchen in order to
"ease the unloading of groceries". According to a Philadelphia planner, however,
this suggestion did not indicate an OHCD preference for a relocated front door,
but rather an agreement with the concept of an additional, side door (Wilds 2002,
pers. comm.). By mid-July the team was evaluating unit plans. Team members
from the Enterprise Foundation suggested the idea of side doors at the July 19
meeting as a way of introducing some variety into the types of units available.
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ESIC recognized, however, that placing entrances on the sides of the houses
would reduce the useable side yard space or require more space between
houses, reducing the density of houses. ESIC therefore recommended that side
doors be used minimally. On August 16th the City Planning Commission weighed
in against side entrances, also citing the likelihood of entry porches infringing
upon side yards. Paradoxically, the PCPC noted that the open, "somewhat-
suburban" character of the development would be lessened by side entrances.
After July 19, however, ESIC apparently altered its position against side doors,
perhaps as a result of meetings with the community. The unit plans which were
approved by ESIC in August had side entrances, and on September 21 the
PCPC sent a letter to ESIC which again rejected the use of side entrances.
In a September 21 letter the PCPC cited two major reasons for promoting front
entrances. The first cited defensible space concerns. As described by Newman
(1972), defensible space advocated the placement of entrances and windows
facing public space in order to promote higher levels of activity and watchfulness,
and presumably public safety, in those areas. Jacobs (1961) had earlier praised
the "eyes on the street" provided by vernacular urban housing. The PCPC was
also concerned that side entries would give "undue prominence to the
automobile" by forcing cars to be located further into the front yards of houses.
This would also, said the PCPC, increase the possibility of vandalism to cars.
Other members of the team soon weighed in on the dispute. On September 22
the Horticultural Society discouraged side entrances, citing defensible space
concerns for the 'village green' open space along 13th Street (see below). The
PHS also believed that side entrances would reduce the ability of homeowners to
"create a pleasant and attractive arrival zone for themselves and for visitors."
Also on September 22, the Poplar Enterprise Development Corporation sent a
letter to the team testifying that the community favored side entrances. Residents
cited several reasons for this preference. The first was that houses 'felt bigger'
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when entered from the side. The second was that side entrances permitted split-
level plans with an entry half-way between a finished basement and the first floor.
PEDC also argued that side entrances were in fact more contextual as "front
porches are not a prevalent feature in this neighborhood... (side entrances) will
help to maintain the character of West Poplar." PEDC also felt that side
entrances offered more privacy, made front yards more usable, and provided
space for a bay window on the front of the house. Finally, PEDC argued that front
steps would not serve a social function in some areas, as people would not want
to sit facing Twelfth Street and Cambridge Street. These border streets faced
vacant commercial space along Girard Avenue and the vacant (in 1994) Richard
Allen Homes.
PEDC consulted with members of the Philadelphia Police Department, who did
not agree with the defensible space concerns cited by many team members. On
September 29 a representative of the local police district testified that side
entrances "(did not) pose a security issue". The officer suggested that features
like outdoor lighting, motion sensors, and window guards could adequately
address the security concerns raised by side entrances.
The side entrance versus front entrance dispute was not resolved until the last
PDT meeting on October 6th. At this meeting, RDA, OHCD, and PCPC reiterated
their "strong opposition, at both the staff and director level, to an all-side yard
entrance site plan", and vowed that "(they) would only support a plan similar to
the preliminary plat plan that featured mostly front entrances". The adamant
position of the city apparently won the day and on October 12 the PEDC board
voted to approve the preliminary plan with front entrances.
Interior space planning
Interior design issues were nowhere near as contentious as the entrance location
dispute, although interior site plans could not be resolved until entrance locations
were finalized. The team reached early agreement on several interior planning
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options such as the overall size of the house; the location and type of bathrooms;
the location of amenities like the washer/dryer, furnace, and storage shed; and
the location of the kitchen and master bedroom. The location of stairs was left
unresolved until after October 6 due to the entrance location dispute.
Neighborhood open space
The first plan proposed by PEDC and ESIC in early 1992 featured a
neighborhood open space, or 'village green', located along 12 th Street. This open
space was transformed by KFS in its April 19, 1994 site plan into a rectangular
square occupying the end of one of the city blocks. The location and size of the
open space were not altered through the design process, but there were several
discussions on the type of landscaping, amenities, and maintenance that would
be appropriate for the park. The neighborhood residents on the team and the
horticultural society representative played a strong role in determining the form of
the open space. Security concerns dictated the planting of low shrubs and the
absence of seating from the finished park. Maintenance of the green and the cul-
de-sac open spaces was not taken on by the city but was funded by a
homeowner's association and administered by Philadelphia Green, a nonprofit
foundation.
The Poplar design process and the causality of suburbanization
The Poplar design process was characterized by an overall consonance of vision
between the major actors. No one contested the low-density paradigm which had
already been established by OHCD, and almost everyone agreed on basic
concepts like the housing type, architectural image, fagade materials, and both
the presence and form of the open space. The location of the entrance was the
only design issue which polarized the team members, and the city, which
controlled the funding for the project, got its wish despite strong community
wishes to the contrary. While the rest of the design process was the product of
both community and city desires, the front entrance dispute clearly demonstrated
that the city's imperatives would be realized in the project. The entrance dispute
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was as much about image, esthetics, and ultimately urbanity as it was about the
security which was so often cited as the crux of the problem.
IM i
Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The April 1994 version of Phase I of the Poplar development (left) contained
twin houses facing the street and a neighborhood open space. The February 1995 final design
(right) was similar except for the transformation of a street into a cul-de-sac. (Illustrations
courtesy of Philadelphia Office of Housing and Community Development and copyright Kise,
Franks, and Straw Architects)
While the street-facing front doors of the Poplar houses were a vote for the urban
nature of the houses, many of the other design decisions made favored suburban
attributes. Explaining the causes of these decisions goes far toward explaining
the suburbanization of the Poplar neighborhood. While we might say that the
overall inner-city suburbanization of the Poplar neighborhood was contributed to
by the construction of the Poplar houses, what were the causes of the suburban
attributes displayed by those houses?
The design decisions of the Project Development Team were responses to many
of the conditions that existed in the Poplar neighborhood. Perhaps the easiest
way to break down the causality of inner-city suburbanization in the Poplar
neighborhood is to reexamine the six inner-city suburbanization conditions that
were described in Chapter Three and applied to developments in Chapter Four.
255
Together, these conditions explain the causality of inner-city suburbanization in
the Poplar development.
1) Density Reductions. Density reductions were recommended by OHCD in the
Home report while the Poplar project was in its early planning stages This report
provided a rationale for a low-density policy in the Poplar neighborhood and was
never seriously questioned. It should also be noted that the city zoning
encouraged lower-density zoning than existed on the site.
2) Homogenization of building typology. Although diverse types of units were
initially considered, the committee chose a homogenously twin-house
neighborhood for reasons of economy and because the unit type chosen
promoted the established ideal of low density (Wilds 2002- pers. comm.).
3) Homogenization of land use mix. This characteristic was pre-determined by
the conditions of the Nehemiah grant. This grant provided funds for housing
construction only and did not fund mixed-use buildings.
4) Shift to a suburban street pattern. The design decision to build two cul-de-sacs
was made by the team early in the design process and appears to have been
promoted by OHCD more than by residents, ESIC, or KFS. Cul-de-sacs were
suggested, as mentioned previously, to improve privacy and security for the
houses on those streets. It should be noted that the street standards in place in
the city discouraged the existing street pattern and provided an additional
rationale for the transformation.
5) Shift to suburban site planning. The directive to built at a low density
established that the Poplar houses would occupy relatively little of their site. The
team decision to build twins allowed for many lower-density amenities to be
provided. Many other design decisions, like the placement and depth of
driveways, the depth of front yards, and the locations of entrances, were resolved
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in committee. As we saw in the front door debate, some decisions that would
have contributed additional suburban characteristics, such as reducing the
relationship of the house to the street and further prioritizing the automobile, were
ultimately rejected by the team.
6) Degree of suburban architecture. The team was very aware of architectural
image issues and image decisions were made quickly. Most architectural
decisions served to differentiate the houses from their context, while one decision
was clearly contextual. As twins with off-street parking and front lawns, the
Poplar houses were obviously distinct from nearby row houses, but the decision
to provide brick facades visually related them to the rowhouses. Almost all other
architectural decisions, including the pitched roofs, gables, and front porches of
the Poplar houses, were intended to differentiate the Poplar houses from their
context, including both historic rowhouses and Modernist public housing.
The resulting "semi-suburban" character of the Poplar houses was apparent to all
of the parties involved in the design decisions. Both visually and historically, the
Poplar houses represented the most significant incorporation of suburban
attributes into Philadelphia inner-city housing that had yet occurred. The two
developments described in the following sections illustrate some additional
dimensions of the development-level decisions that contributed to inner-city
suburbanization in lower North Philadelphia.
Cecil B. Moore Houses
Around the time that the Poplar CDC was applying to HUD for the Nehemiah
grant which would eventually generate the Poplar houses, another Nehemiah
application was made by the National Temple CDC, a neighborhood group
located in an area of North Philadelphia to the northwest of Poplar. While Poplar
was built relatively quickly, it would be four years before the city would consider
funding the Temple Nehemiah project because of organizational problems in the
CDC. By 1995 the Nehemiah funding had been withdrawn but the city had
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committed to funding the project nevertheless, so additional sources of funding
had to be found. These funds came from an Economic Development Initiative
grant which OHCD received from HUD in April of 1997, creating the Cecil B.
Moore Homeownership Zone. This program, initiated by the Clinton
administration, provided Federal money to construct homeownership housing
within areas designated as 'homeownership zones' that met specific economic
and physical distress criteria (OHCD 1996, HUD 1996b, and OHCD 2002).
Housing would be funded anywhere within this zone where land was available.
Unlike the Nehemiah grant, which was intended to create low-income
homeownership opportunities, the Cecil B. Moore houses could be sold to
households earning up to 20 percent more than the city's median household
income. The zones were intended by HUD to encourage middle-income
homeowners to invest in distressed neighborhoods. With the homeownership
zone funding in place, OCHD committed to constructing 214 new houses and
rehabilitating 82 more existing houses.
Following the precedent of the Poplar houses design committee, a project
development team was convened for several months in 1995 to establish design
policies for the Cecil B. Moore houses, which at the time had not yet been
funded. This team's composition was similar to the Poplar team and included
several community residents. Although minutes for this team's meetings were not
taken, the team's recommendations of this team were published in a
"Neighborhood Housing Strategy for the Cecil B. Moore Area" in February 1996.
The Cecil B. Moore site confronted the project development team with conditions
that were quite different from the Poplar site. The Moore houses' 'site' was much
more dispersed, and included several blocks of existing rowhouses that were
both physically intact and historically distinguished. Total site clearance was
therefore out of the question, even had there been adequate funds to construct
housing in the entire Zone. This meant that the continuous new neighborhood
fabric created by Poplar would not occur in the Moore project. Because of its
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dispersed nature, the new Moore houses would in many cases adjoin existing
row houses, which were up to four stories in height and often quite large. Many of
the houses in the Moore area had actually been built as 'twins', with five-foot
alleys between pairs of rowhouses. The team therefore had to confront the
design issue of introducing a new, lower-density housing typology into this
urbane setting.
Despite the somewhat different site conditions, the Moore team reached design
conclusions that were quite similar to the recommendations of the Poplar team.
In its final report the team emphasized the following design decisions:
- New housing would be low in density and would generally take the form of
twin houses. It was important to provide houses which were relatively
inexpensive to construct. Twins also allowed for "contemporary amenities
such as yards and off-street parking."
- The existing rowhouse fabric should be preserved where groups of buildings
with "significant architectural merit" existed, or where there were "existing
strong blocks" of occupied homeownership houses.
- Where there was sufficient land to acquire entire blocks, streets should be
"eliminated and redesigned to provide more generous sites for new houses
and to help reduce densities."
- Neighborhood and building designs should "contrast with the older
deteriorating fabric of the area and project a new image for the community."
- Where there was sufficient room to construct new houses, these houses
should be set back from the street and have side yard parking, porches, and
rear yards. These twins should have pitched roofs, again to "contrast with the
existing fabric."
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Many of these recommendations were similar to those decided upon by the
Poplar team. The emphasis on low density was repeated, likely as a result of
both the city's extant (by 1995) low-density policy for Lower North Philadelphia,
as well as resident desires. Residents clearly sought to differentiate the new
houses from extant rowhouses, despite the architecturally distinguished nature of
many of these houses and the fact that the Homeownership Zone was committed
to restoring over 80 rowhouses. While features like yards and side parking could
be seen as the natural byproducts of a lower-density twin form of house, the
emphasis on different architectural imagery- pitched roofs and front porches-
showed the residents' wishes to, as they said, "provide a new image" for the
community. This desired image was clearly not urban in the Philadelphia sense:
there can be little doubt that the residents desired to produce a neighborhood
fabric similar to that of a much lower-density neighborhood. While the built
product of the process could not be called suburban, like the Poplar houses it
was nevertheless a significant step in that direction. The ideal house, at least for
the residents participating in the team meetings, was one that was very different
from the rowhouses typical of the neighborhood. The two drawings below show
the architectural image of the project determined by the team design process.
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Figures 5.8 and 5.9. The proposed Cecil B. Moore houses (left) produced by the 1995 design
process were much smaller and lower in density than the existing rowhouses. The collective
effect of these houses was a very different kind of neighborhood (right). Illustrations courtesy of
Philadelphia Office of Housing and Community Development. Left drawing copyright Urban
Partners, Inc. and right rendering copyright Kise Straw and Kolodner.
In the section above it is interesting to compare the street relationships of the
rowhouses at top left and bottom right with the new houses in the center. The
new houses, as recommended by the design process, are shorter, with pitched
roofs, street trees, front yards, and back yards with patios. Off-street parking is
not shown in the section nor is the fact that the houses are actually twins, not
single-family. Nevertheless the analogy to suburban neighborhood and housing
form is clear.
As constructed, Phase I of the Cecil B. Moore houses differed slightly from the
houses shown in the section above (see photographs in Chapter Four). As the
project team had foreseen, the lack of a large contiguous site did not allow for the
creation of cul-de-sacs and a 'village green' as in the Poplar development. One
change reflected contextual considerations: high gables were added to the
houses to better match the height of the twins with those of nearby four-story
rowhouses. Other house features like bay windows and garages contributed to
the 'new image' of the Moore houses.
As at Poplar, the Moore design process reflected both the preexisting imperative
to build at lower densities and the strong desire of neighborhood residents to
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have the new houses look different from the existing context. The form and
design of the Moore houses provided desired amenities for their buyers and, just
as importantly, provided an suburban image which, to the residents on the
project team, was synonymous with success.
Ludlow Village Houses
The architectural designs of both the Poplar and the Moore houses represented
compromises between the conflicting desires to differentiate the houses from
their surroundings while retaining enough contextual features to allow the new
houses to relate to nearby rowhouses. The Ludlow Houses, a relatively small
housing development constructed between 1998 and 2002, represented a more
ext of the Ludlow Houses were similar in virtually all respects save their radically
different architectural designs. The contrasting nature of these designs
underscored the critical role of architectural design and style in determining the
image of new housing in North Philadelphia.
Phase Ill of the Ludlow Houses was planned and constructed between 1996 and
2000, while Phase IV was planned and constructed between 1998 and 2002.
Both of these phases were constructed as twin, homeownership housing
developments with front porches, side yard parking, and sizeable back yards.
The two phases faced each other across a street that had been widened with a
planted mall as part of the overall development plan. Both phases sold for
approximately the same amount (between $42,000 and $45,000) and were
available for sale to first homebuyers who met income guidelines of less than 80
percent of the Philadelphia metropolitan area's median income (Wilds 2002,
pers. comm.). Despite their programmatic similarities, the two phases as built
could not have appeared more different, as the photographs on the following
page show.
The Ludlow Ill houses were clearly designed to emulate the row house stock of
the surrounding neighborhood. Their brick and red stucco facades are similar, if
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not identical, to the brick bearing wall construction of nearby historic rowhouses
(see below). The Ludlow Ill houses also imitated the three-story heights and
almost-flat roofs found in these rowhouses. The result is a development which
resembled a rowhouse block with half of its houses removed. Ludlow IV made
none of the contextual gestures of the previous phase. Where Ludlow III was
three-story, Ludlow IV had only two. Where Ludlow Ill was rectangular in shape,
Ludlow IV was L-shaped, providing a nook for a wraparound side porch and entry
to the house. Where Ludlow Ill had a flat roof, Ludlow IV had a pitched roof with
front and side gables. Where Ludlow Ill was red brick, Ludlow IV had white vinyl
siding.
Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13. Phase Ill of the Ludlow Village houses (left above) is
designed to resemble adjoining rowhouses (right above), while Phase IV of Ludlow (left, next
page) has architectural features not commonly found in Lower North Philadelphia. Nearby
developments like Taino Gardens (right, next page) have similar acontextual features like
gables, pitched roofs, and vinyl siding.
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While the overall esthetic effect of Ludlow Ill was of a development that in style, if
not in density, was trying to be contextual, the overall effect of Ludlow IV was of a
development trying to distinguish itself from its context as much as possible
through architecture. None of the architectural features found on the Ludlow IV
houses were commonly found in North Philadelphia and they consequently did
not resemble any of the historic housing found there. Like the Poplar and Moore
houses, the Ludlow IV houses did not appear literally suburban. Nevertheless,
they incorporated stylistically many of the features that, especially in the context
of North Philadelphia, were reminiscent of suburban housing.
Why did Ludlow IV make such distinctive design changes from its contextual
predecessor, created under the same institutional arrangements? Unlike the
Poplar houses, where many design decisions were made by committee, much of
the architectural design in Ludlow IV was left to the architecture firm of Buell
Kratzer Powell (BKP) which designed the development. This firm was different
from the one which designed Ludlow Ill. There were two possible motivations for
creating a distinctly different design.
The first reason was the community's desire for a different architectural image
than the previous design. According to the architects, the mandate for housing
with "more suburbanlike" qualities" came directly from the community group
spearheading development, the Ludlow Development Corporation (LDC). This
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group played a stronger role in the development process than did the CDCs of
the other two housing developments studied, mainly due to the determination
and stability of its leadership. The personal preferences of the chairperson of
LDC were therefore influential in the design process.
The second reason may simply have been that BKP wished to differentiate their
design product from the previous project. In this the architects were well-served
by their choice of materials and design for Ludlow IV, which were particularly
cost-efficient at the same time as they radically changed the appearance of the
houses from the previous phase. The product differentiation seems to have been
successful- BKP have been commissioned again for Ludlow V, the next phase of
the development, which will begin construction in late 2002. Yet at the same
time, the LDC is apparently interested in housing that looks "more like the older
neighborhood fabric" than Ludlow IV (Wilds 2002, pers. comm.). Ludlow IV may
have gone too far in projecting a suburban image for the community.
The majority of changes wrought to the Philadelphia neighborhood landscape by
the Ludlow houses were unrelated to their architecture and were caused by the
same factors that brought them about in the previous two development
examined. The low density, homogenous single-family nature of both phases of
Ludlow were the consequence of the policy and funding decisions guiding the
project, though like the previous two developments these features were
consistent with community wishes. The most striking spatial feature of the
development as a whole was the widened mall of Franklin Street, a feature that
was found neither in the previous two developments nor in the Philadelphia
vernacular landscape as a whole. This feature was intended by the community
group to "differentiate" the Ludlow project from its surroundings, something which
it achieved quite successfully. The mall also introduced an openness into the
development which was quite in keeping with the low densities of the houses.
Architecture, however, played perhaps the most key role in determining the
suburban image of Ludlow. While Ludlow Ill may have been more suburban in
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many ways, its architectural style placed it firmly in the context of its rowhouse
surroundings. The architecture of Ludlow IV was, compared to the previous
phase, a brutal acknowledgment of inner-city suburbanization. It explicitly
rendered as architecture the changes that the project's low densities and
homogeneous nature had already made. The success of this move will be seen
in the form taken by future phases of the Ludlow Houses.
Conclusions- Philadelphia
Suburbanization in Lower North Philadelphia was caused by the combined
actions of different actors in the housing development process. Motivated by
different reasons, these actors together advocated for and produced lower-
density twin housing with significant neighborhood- and architectural-level design
changes from the historic context. At the most basic level, inner-city
suburbanization occurred in the new housing developments of Lower North
Philadelphia because everyone wanted it to occur. Although there were some
minor disputes over the degree of suburbanization, no one among the many
actors involved questioned the basic goal of transforming dense, mixed-use
rowhouse neighborhoods into tracts of low-density housing with acontextual
architectural features. Without this consonance of vision among the diverse
parties, there is little chance that the changes seen in the above developments
could ever have been realized.
The policies which dictated that the city would push for lower-density construction
in lower North Philadelphia were established by the 1993 publication of the Home
in North Philadelphia discussion document. The 1996 publication of Yorktown
expanded this policy mandate by showing a successful precedent for housing
which had significantly transformed its neighborhood design and established a
new housing prototype for the area. These two plans reflected OHCD's strong
preference for low-density housing, and this preference was enforced through
OHCD's major role in financing and organizing the development of all three of the
case developments examined.
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The homogeneous nature of the new housing was essentially mandated by the
funding requirements of the subsidies that paid for the new housing. Both Poplar
and Moore were specifically designated as homeownership projects and none of
the three developments had funding for commercial components. Finally, the
cost exigencies of the developments mandated that designs be standardized,
allowing for very little differentiation in the unit types of the developments.
The majority of neighborhood-level and site-level decisions were established
through collaborative action between government and community
representatives. Major neighborhood-level design changes like the village green
and the central mall of Ludlow were initiated by community groups, reflecting
these groups' preference for open space and features that would organize and
differentiate the new developments. Other features like the cul-de-sacs of Poplar
were the result of joint government-community actions.
Architectural features were also generally reached through joint actions.
Communities, especially in Moore and Ludlow, displayed strong preferences for
the new housing to stand out from the surrounding rowhouses. This preference
likely reflected both a desire for additional amenities and the sense that only
through the establishment of a strong new image could these communities
escape the decline which had devastated surrounding neighborhoods. The sense
of community felt by residents of Yorktown was evidence that strong spatial and
architectural differentiation could indeed build social bonds within a new housing
community in North Philadelphia. In the case of Ludlow, the architecture firm
designing the development also had major role in establishing the new image of
the development.
Despite the major changes seen in all three of the developments studied, inner-
city suburbanization in Philadelphia faced significant constraints. Large,
contiguous sites were difficult to obtain; only in Poplar did the city have a
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relatively free hand in neighborhood design. Despite the derelict state of the
neighborhood, this freedom was only reached through significant condemnation
because the density of housing on the site meant that every block had a few
remaining houses. The high density of Philadelphia's historic blocks- sometimes
up to 60 units per acre- meant that even a radically dedensified block, as in
Poplar, which was less than one-quarter of this density- was still about twice as
dense as Levittown, the epitome of postwar vernacular suburbia.
Philadelphia's neighborhood design was also somewhat resistant to major site
changes. North-south through streets were major traffic arteries and could not be
closed off. This left a maximum dimension of about 400 feet from east-to-west
which precluded the level of neighborhood design changes that were seen in
Detroit. Finally, the overwhelming context of brick rowhouses influenced the
design of most new housing, though not all, giving even the Poplar houses a
iightly contextual appearance.
Philadelphia's hardest-hit city neighborhoods are due to experience even more
significant transformations in the next few years. The city's Neighborhood
Transformation Initiative is committed to spending tens of millions of dollars to
demolish, clear, and redevelop vacant rowhouses in the inner city. The
experiences of the three developments studied show that significant
transformations are indeed possible, though it is likely that they will never
produce a literal replication of vernacular suburbia, even in lower North
Philadelphia. The single-family detached house, that iconic symbol of suburbia,
has so far remained a forbidden object in the Philadelphia inner city. As of this
writing OHCD remains committed to not funding these houses because of cost
constraints.
Finally, the role of the private market should be noted. In contrast with the
developments studied in Detroit, the private sector played no role whatsoever in
the decent transformations of lower North Philadelphia because of the chronically
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low value of housing. Would housing which transformed its environment more
radically, as in Detroit, have more value and begin to make privately-funded
development in the Philadelphia inner city profitable? For the time being, the
answer to this question will have to remain unknown.
The causality of inner-city suburbanization in Detroit
The story of inner-city suburbanization in Detroit, like that of Philadelphia, can be
viewed through the story of a single neighborhood. All three of the case
developments examined in this section were located in the far East Side
neighborhood of Jefferson-Chalmers. Jefferson-Chalmers, and Detroit in general,
had several physical characteristics which led to it being a very different
environment for inner-city suburbanization than North Philadelphia. As we saw in
Chapter Four, these differences led to Detroit having much more literally
suburban developments.
Some of the differences between the neighborhoods were geographic in nature.
While North Philadelphia was the sole location of inner-city suburbanization in
Philadelphia, Jefferson-Chalmers was far from unique in Detroit. This was both
because it was a much smaller neighborhood, comprising only eight census
tracts to North Philadelphia's 54, and also because Detroit was a more severely
distressed city, which meant that Jefferson-Chalmers' distressed tracts
comprised a much smaller percentage of the total- less than ten percent- in
Detroit. Jefferson-Chalmers was consequently only one of the several distressed
Detroit areas in which qualitatively suburban developments were located.
Detroit was, on the whole, a much newer city than Philadelphia, with the majority
of its growth occurring during the twentieth century, and within Detroit Jefferson-
Chalmers was one of the city's newer neighborhoods, located at the eastern
edge of the city and built up for the most part between the World Wars. Its
neighborhood pattern, however, was as typical of Detroit as North Philadelphia's
was of Philadelphia, comprised mainly of freestanding single and multiple
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dwellings located in a rather casual grid pattern (see neighborhood map in next
section).
Detroit's steeper decline and different urban fabric might lead one to believe that
the inner-city suburbanization process would be different in that city, and indeed
it was. Inner-city suburbanization in Detroit occurred by an entirely different
process than it did in Philadelphia, though we will see that the causes of this
process were actually quite similar. Suburbanization in Detroit occurred almost
completely outside of a policy framework, both because the city did not have any
effective policies in place and because the process in Detroit was in large part
motivated and executed by the private sector, though the public sector also
played a substantial role.
Inner-city suburbanization was also a more contentious process in Detroit. The
physical transformations wrought by the process were much greater, creating
gated enclaves which had very little to do with their surrounding neighborhoods.
Their exclusive physical nature made them easier to criticize on those grounds.
Race and class also played a role in the problematization of suburbanization in
Detroit. Unlike in Philadelphia, the Detroit developments were not affordable
housing. They were expensive and affordable only to the middle class. And while
both the surrounding neighborhoods and the new developments were almost
entirely purchased by African-Americans, the fact that the majority of the actors
creating the developments were white made them easier to criticize on grounds
of exclusivity and exploitation.
Inner-city suburbanization in Detroit can be thought of as having two phases. The
first phase began in 1991 and lasted about five years during the planning and
development process for Victoria Park, the first of the case developments
examined in this chapter. Although there was substantial precedent for Victoria
Park as a typical development deal, there was little precedent for its formal
nature as a self-enclosed enclave of suburban-single family houses. The creation
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of Victoria Park was more or less single-handedly responsible for the second
phase of suburbanization, which began around 1996 and has continued to the
present (2002). The second phase was initially comprised of the 'follow-up'
developments inspired by Victoria Park. One of those developments, Clairpointe,
is the second case development examined in this chapter. The second phase
also involved a substantial questioning of the benefits of suburbanization,
brought on again mainly by Victoria Park but by other developments as well. One
of those developments, a proposal called Victoria Woods which was planned for
a riverfront public park, is the third case development examined in this chapter.
The exclusive design of inner-city suburban developments came under criticism
and led to a cooling of political enthusiasm for this type of development.
Ironically, the more extreme nature of suburbanization in Detroit may therefore
have discouraged its progress, at least temporarily.
Introduction to Jefferson-Chalmers
In many ways the Jefferson-Chalmers area of Detroit's east side was typical of
many Detroit neighborhoods. Like much of Detroit it was not particularly old,
dating back only to the early twentieth century, and like much of Detroit it was
relatively low-density though not suburban. Also like many Detroit
neighborhoods, it had a relative lack of distinct physical character, leading to its
being named, like other parts of Detroit, after the intersection of two of its major
streets. Finally and most tragically, like much of Detroit Jefferson-Chalmers
experienced almost unbelievable disinvestment and decline during the 1970s
and 1980s.
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Figure 5.14. The Jefferson-Chalmers neighborhood of Detroit experienced serious decline and
disinvestment during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Recent development projects (shown above)
are starting to rebuild the neighborhood. Colored squares show different development projects.
Photograph copyright Windham Realty, Inc.
Although Detroit was founded by the French in the early eighteenth century, the
city did not experience extensive growth until the beginning of the twentieth.
Much of this growth was tied to Detroit's being the home of the automobile
industry, whose factories mushroomed in and around Detroit after 1910. Detroit's
population grew in tandem with the auto industry, rising from less than 300,000 in
1900 to almost 1,600,000 by 1930. The city's population would peak in 1950.
During that time much of Detroit's physical growth occurred and the city spread
out in all directions.
While Philadelphia built rowhouses, Detroit built single-family detached homes.
Even during the nineteenth century rowhouses were almost unknown in the city.
Instead, the city favored single and two-family houses like many other
Midwestern cities. Brush Park, examined in the last chapter, was a typical
nineteenth-century upper-middle-class neighborhood in Detroit and was built at
the surprisingly low density of about two dwelling units per acre. The average
density of developments would rise somewhat to about thirteen units per acre
(see Table 4.14), but with its commitment to the detached dwelling Detroit never
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developed in a high-density fashion. As the 1941 Federal Writers' Project said of
Detroit, then at the peak of its growth, "the city has no plans to construct a
subway and there is little indication that it would ever pay its way if constructed"
(Federal Writers Project 1941, 232). There was something appropriate in the fact
that this Midwestern version of Los Angeles was where the powerfully
suburbanizing force of the automobile came into being.
Jefferson-Chalmers was located at the eastern edge of Detroit along the shore of
the Detroit River. Beyond it lay the wealthy suburbs of the Grosse Pointes, home
to many of the wealthiest citizens of the region. Because of its relatively distant
location from the city center, Jefferson-Chalmers did not develop extensively until
the 1920s. Like the rest of Detroit, however, it developed quickly and by World
War 1l the outer reaches of the neighborhood were built out. Jefferson-Chalmers
therefore had a relatively brief life as a built-out neighborhood; it would only exist
in this form for about twenty-five years before it began to decline.
As one might expect, Jefferson-Chalmers was not a particularly high-density
environment. In 1950, the area where Victoria Park would later be built averaged
only about 13 dwelling units per acre, slightly higher than the historic (1950)
average found for Detroit. This density was about twice that of postwar
vernacular suburban developments like Levittown. The development of
Jefferson-Chalmers was contemporaneous with that of early automobile suburbia
and as such it shared many characteristics with that neighborhood form. (The
fabric of Grosse Pointe Park directly to the east, for example, was almost
identical to that of Jefferson-Chalmers.) Residential, commercial, and industrial
uses were relatively segregated, with streetfronting commercial uses located in
long strips along major avenues while residential areas occupied the blocks
behind. Industrial uses were mainly confined to railroad corridors and occupied
large, relatively contiguous blocks of land in a fashion quite unlike the older
scattered-site industrial facilities of North Philadelphia. The houses of Jefferson-
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Chalmers also made substantial accommodation for the automobile: most were
built with off-street garages.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16. Although the housing stock and neighborhood design of the Detroit
neighborhood of Jefferson-Chalmers (left) and the suburb of Grosse Pointe Park (right) are not
that different, Jefferson-Chalmers has experienced extensive disinvestment and decline, while
Grosse Pointe Park has remained prosperous.
Jefferson-Chalmers differed substantially, however, from postwar vernacular
suburbia. Its neighborhood block pattern was pedestrian-friendly, being built as a
grid of rather long north-south blocks. Commercial uses were located on in
relatively close proximity to residential areas and were pedestrian-accessible.
Though it accommodated the automobile, the neighborhood also provided for
mass transit. Jefferson Avenue was a major trolley route which linked the
neighborhood to downtown. Jefferson-Chalmers was also much denser than the
developments that would be built in the 1990s (Victoria Park was less than four
units per acre). Finally, the neighborhood contained a diversity of unit types, from
apartments located near the major east-west streets to the mix of two-family and
single-family homes that made up most of the residential blocks. Like much of
the rest of Detroit, Jefferson-Chalmers represented a hybrid between a late
nineteenth-century streetcar suburb and the automobile-dependent postwar
suburbs.
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Jefferson-Chalmers was never one of Detroit's wealthiest neighborhoods. Its
proximity to a major Chrysler automobile plant and other manufacturing facilities
meant that many of its homes were designed for the working class. Nevertheless,
Jefferson-Chalmers was relatively well-placed. Unlike many other
neighborhoods, it was not lost in the anonymous grid of Detroit due to its location
in a relatively small and distinct area. Its convenient location along Jefferson
Avenue made it both easy to get to and accessible to downtown, while its
location along the Detroit river provided a location for a few mansions of the
wealthy during the boom years of the 1920s. Finally, its proximity to the
extremely exclusive suburbs of Grosse Pointe gave it some of that area's cachet.
Many of these features would again be seen as advantages Jefferson-Chalmers
when redevelopment began in the 1990s.
The industrial development of Jefferson-Chalmers planted the seeds of the
demographic change that would envelop the neighborhood after 1940. During
World War 11 the defense industry located a number of facilities nearby (Flies
2002, pers. comm.). Like other industrial cities, Detroit received an influx of black
workers from the South during the war years to fill a shortage of manufacturing
jobs. Although black Detroiters were initially confined to a few small
neighborhoods on the city's northeast side, they began to expand outward after
1940, in part because of the increasingly distributed work opportunities available
throughout the city. As Detroit was an overwhelmingly white city at the time, the
diversification of its neighborhood was not an easy, nor peaceful, transformation.
Sugrue (1996) has expertly described the hostility with which whites met black
expansion into their neighborhoods during this time, laying the groundwork for
the racial divisions that would devastate Detroit in the 1960s. Jefferson-
Chalmers, like other Detroit neighborhoods, began to change and experienced
an influx of black residents along its western edge during the war. After World
War 11 the area's black population grew rapidly. Tragically, the simultaneous
deindustrialization of Jefferson-Chalmers at the same time left the area with only
about half of its industrial plants and jobs by 1960 (Sugrue 1996: 149). The 1967
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Detroit riots, among other events, accelerated white flight from the city and most
of the neighborhood's remaining white residents left during the 1970s, although
some remained along the boundary with Grosse Pointe Park.
After 1950 Detroit's population growth began to reverse itself. While some of this
loss was due to uncrowding, the city also experienced a massive surplus of
housing as hundreds of thousands of whites relocated, along with the automobile
industry, to the suburbs. This immense population exchange greatly destabilized
city neighborhoods and left many dwellings vacant. In a vicious cycle that has
been well described by Chafetz (1990), abandonment in Detroit neighborhoods
led to their subsequent destabilization, leading to additional abandonment, etc.
As described previously, Detroit residences were particularly vulnerable to
weathering and arson because of their detached nature and wooden
construction. Jefferson-Chalmers was unable to resist this tide of negative
change, losing over 20 percent of its housing units to abandonment and eventual
demolition between 1970 and 1990 (see Figure 4.10). While some areas of the
neighborhood maintained their stability, other parts became virtual wildernesses,
with only occasional surviving houses amidst empty city blocks of weeds . Public
policies were able to do little to stop this decline and in some cases may even
have accelerated it, as we will see in the Victoria Park discussion.
Despite the grim state of the Jefferson-Chalmers neighborhood in 1990,
significant positive change was on the near horizon. The majority of
abandonment and destruction had already happened and the vast empty tracts
of land were beginning to be seen as "opportunities to remake the city", as one
city official said. The neighborhood's locational advantages remained and were
strengthened by the adjacency of the stable, prosperous Grosse Pointes. It was
this depressed environment that the first case development of Victoria Park
would transform so radically. Victoria Park would be a pioneering development in
several ways. It would be not only the first single-family housing development to
be built in Jefferson-Chalmers in many decades, it would be the first in the entire
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city of Detroit in almost forty years. It would also be the first residential project in
Detroit that sought to directly emulate every design aspect of vernacular suburbia
from its neighborhood form to its architecture. Finally, it would be one of the first
developments to appeal to a growing demographic market in Detroit whose
housing interests had previously gone unmet: the African-American middle class.
The construction of Victoria Park would be, as one developer said, "a major leap
of faith" in the belief that new market-rate housing was actually a realistic
prospect in Detroit. It would prove to be a very successful gamble.
Victoria Park
Victoria Park, built between 1992 and 1995, was a 157-home development
located near the corner of Freud and Dickerson Avenues on the Jefferson-
Chalmers neighborhood. It was two blocks south of Jefferson Avenue and less
than ten blocks from the border with the suburb of Grosse Pointe Park. As the
first new single-family home development in Detroit in several decades, Victoria
Park was a powerful symbol of residential revitalization in the city. As we saw in
the previous chapter, the form of Victoria Park emulated that of vernacular
suburbia in a literal fashion. The development was surrounded by a fence and
planted berms and accessed via a single, gated entrance. Inside, homes were
located on wide, curving streets, many of which ended in cul-de-sacs.
Architecturally, the homes were identical to those found in suburbia, with
attached two-car garages, grand entranceways, brick fronts, and the profusion of
gables popular on suburban houses of the 1990s.
The suburban character of Victoria Park was very different from that of the case
developments examined in Philadelphia. Whereas those developments could be
seen as hybrids of typical affordable housing with vernacular suburban housing,
Victoria Park was literally intended to be suburbia. Though they were located in
Detroit, the homes were built by suburban developers and builders for a market
that otherwise would have been considering housing in the suburbs. Its similarity
was thus both physical as well as institutional. The factors that led to the
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suburban aspect of Victoria Park were therefore identical to the factors that led to
the development itself. Unlike the Poplar development, there were few points of
debate on the suburban nature of Victoria Park. As one city official said, 'We
created a site plan, and of course it was suburban." To most of the actors
involved in the creation of Victoria Park, its similarity to vernacular suburbia was
what one called "the entire story" of the development's success.
Origins
Although Victoria Park is today (2002) less than ten years old, its beginnings
have become somewhat apocryphal. By all accounts the development was in
large part inspired by a boat trip on the Detroit River, a wide and attractive body
of water connecting Lake St. Clair with Lake Erie. During the 1920s many
luxurious apartment houses were built eastward along its shore, where Detroit
met the wealthy suburbs of the Grosse Pointes. Pleasure boat trips along this
channel have long been a favored activity of Detroiters, and it was on one of
these boat trips in the summer of 1990 that Garry Carley, vice president for the
Michigan-based Standard Federal Bank recalled thinking that* this
underdeveloped eastern riverfront was "a great place to do single-family
housing". In 1992 the Detroit News described a similar origin for Victoria Park on
a boat trip where Carley, a building society official, and the developer of
Greyhaven, a riverfront housing development under construction at the time,
considered the idea.
Whatever the exact nature of its founding boat trip, Victoria Park's creation
proceeded very quickly. This rapid progress was in large part due to the pro-
development attitude of then-Mayor Coleman Young, who in 1990 was nearing
the end of his legendary 20-year tenure in office. Young had demonstrated little
respect for traditional urban planning but had shown himself to be extremely
responsive to deal-oriented development planning, producing major downtown
projects like the Joe Louis Arena, the Renaissance Center, and the Riverfront
Apartments as a result. Victoria Park was thus conceptually accessible to Young
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as another development deal involving a direct partnership between the mayor's
office and the private sector. According to Carley, soon after he had mentioned
the idea to the Mayor's office he was told that there was "land that they wanted
to propose for a project" in the Jefferson-Chalmers area. When asked why the
mayor had been so responsive, Carley replied that he thought "the Mayor was
happy to hear that there was a banker interested in the city."
There is little doubt that this assessment was correct. By 1990, Young had
achieved some notable downtown redevelopment successes and was about to
embark on two major industrial redevelopment schemes to keep Chrysler and
General Motors automobile plants from leaving Detroit (Thomas 1997). What he
had thus far failed to achieve, however, was a notable neighborhood
redevelopment success. Since Young's tenure had begun in 1973, Detroit's
residential neighborhoods had experienced only a wearying cycle of white flight,
abandonment, and arson. The city had shrunk inexorably while its neighborhoods
disappeared. By 1990 Detroit's population had fallen to just over 20% white, a
drop from well over 50% in 1970 (United States Department of Commerce 1977
and 1994). Relations with the overwhelmingly white suburbs had been damaged
in no small part because of Young's flamboyant and sometimes confrontational
political style, making cooperation with the private sector more difficult. Even if
Young did not care much about the suburbs, however, he needed a
neighborhood success. The suggestion of a housing development in a blighted
city neighborhood was thus extremely well-timed. This fortunate confluence of
private and public interests is likely to have to the Victoria Park proposal getting
off the ground swiftly before anyone had even decided what the development
would look like.
Victoria Park was the suburban child of urban renewal. The large site, covering
most of twelve city blocks, was available because of an urban renewal plan
which had been designated in 1974. The plan had intended the area for
rehabilitation rather than clearance, reflecting the changed priorities of the late
279
urban renewal era (Keyes 1969 provided an account of this process as it
unfolded in Boston.) The plan, however, was not successful. A city official who
had been involved in this process says that it, "like many HUD programs, was
designed to fail." The original intent to provide rehabilitated housing to low-
income tenants resulted in abandonment rather than upgrading when tenants
could not maintain their homes. The city official described this process as "using
the home as a bank account." In other words, money that could have gone into
upgrading housing was instead spent on operating expenses, and when the
home became unlivable, tenants simply moved on to other housing. Whether or
not the HUD program was structurally flawed, low-cost housing was abundantly
available in the Detroit of the 1970s and 1980s as the city sustained massive
population losses. Like many other neighborhoods, there was simply little
demand for the housing in Jefferson-Chalmers and so, the official said, "the
urban renewal program became one of acquisition and clearance." By the late
1980s the great majority of the land which would comprise Victoria Park was
vacant and in city ownership.
While the large numbers of vacant housing units in Jefferson-Chalmers made it
sadly typical of many Detroit neighborhoods, in other ways the neighborhood was
atypical As described above, amenities like the river and the Grosse Pointes
were not far away. There were also promising signs of redevelopment. In both
the immediate and more distant vicinity of the Victoria Park were what one
developer called "good focal points" for the neighborhood. Immediately to the
west was a garden-style rental apartment complex called Jefferson Village which
had been built for low-income tenants in the 1980s, and immediately to the north
was the recently constructed Golightly Vocational Center (Gage 2002, pers.
comm.) which enjoyed a positive reputation due to its activist principal. There
was also precedent for middle-class development in the area: the gated
Greyhaven development was already under construction on an artificial island
along the river.
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History
Despite the site's urban location and amenities, the dominant vision of Victoria
Park's planners was of a suburban community. According to Carley, "We thought
that if we brought the suburban concept here, then people would want to live
here too." Existing redevelopments had also established a precedent for a
suburban prototype. Both Jefferson Village and the Golightly Center were built on
superblocks surrounded by parking and extensive green space, and the new
school was also surrounded by a fence. Redevelopment along Jefferson Avenue,
had transformed it into an eight-lane speedway to the suburbs lined with auto-
oriented strip commercial developments. These developments thrived while the
street's pedestrian-oriented retail withered. (Ironically, suburban Grosse Pointe
Park would successfully maintain its street-oriented retail.)
By all accounts the suburban form of Victoria Park was to a large degree
influenced by Carley, who insisted upon the large and wide housing lots, the
surrounding fence and plantings, and the curving streets and cul-de-sacs that
provided Victoria Park with its suburban flavor. The majority of the other players
involved in the creation of Victoria Park either had little objection to or actively
supported its suburban form. This support ranged from Coleman Young himself,
who had apparently supported a "town within a town" concept for the area before
Victoria Park was created, to the multiple city officials, developers, and builders
who constructed the development. At the time of the development's construction,
few voices were raised in protest and those voices were uninfluential.
The conceptual plan for Victoria Park did not emulate vernacular suburbia. The
architect who designed the plan described it as having attached single-family
houses in a townhouse configuration. Densities were about two-third of historic
densities, which would translate to approximately eight dwelling units per acre.
The existing street grid was preserved, and houses were located close to the
street. Upon the presentation of this design to the development team, the
architect said "I was told that they wanted suburban houses." The initial plan was
281
abandoned and Victoria Park was redesigned to the form that it took as built.
Although the architect did not personally favor the design as built, a city official
who worked on the project said "he was told what to design." The architect was
quick to credit the development team with the form of the development as built.
The differences between the designs reflected dilemmas which will be discussed
later in this section and in the next chapter.
The transformation of the Victoria Park site into one that closely approximated
suburbia was designed to attract builders as well as buyers. The development
plan for Victoria Park was simple. The city agreed to donate the site, which it
already owned, and pay for certain site improvements. Private builders were
invited to come in, construct houses on the site, and sell them for market value.
The major challenge was thus to attract private builders to the development.
Although the city required a certain number of minority-owned builders to
participate, finding these builders was not the major issue. Suburban builders
were extremely doubtful that houses built in Jefferson-Chalmers could generate a
profit. According to members of the development team, it took several months to
persuade builders that the development was a viable option.
The reluctance shown by builders in getting involved in Victoria Park was less a
reflection of their avarice than of their total inexperience in building in Detroit.
This was true even of the city-based minority contractors, who comprised at least
five of the around 20 builders. At the time of Victoria Park's development, Detroit
had experienced very little new single-family housing construction in decades.
Consequently, no suburban builders had ever built single-family housing in
Detroit, Builders thus feared losing the construction cost of the house if they
could not find a buyer. Standard Federal Bank therefore agreed to provide
construction mortgages for the development and to make builders immune from
loss until houses were completed. Given the risk-adversity of the real estate
industry, especially in the recession of the early 1990s, Victoria Park was a
substantial gamble. As a developer said, "he really put his neck on the line on
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this one." Carley's strong faith in the potential of the development was critical to
its being constructed. The builders' doubts underscore the extent to which the
construction industry had ceased to believe that unsubsidized residential
development was possible in Detroit.
The means by which builders were persuaded to participate in Victoria Park was
creative and was derived from the suburban building industry. To allow both
small and large builders to invest and to test the market for the houses, the
Southeast Michigan Builder's Association (check name) was persuaded to mount
its 1992 Home-a-rama" in Victoria Park. Home-a-ramas were a suburban
institution designed to attract buyers to subdivisions by building several model
homes. Multiple builders would each construct a model home on a subdivision lot
to show to the general public. This process was designed to generate both
buyers for the model homes and to generate demand to fill up the rest of the
subdivision. Victoria Park's home-a-rama opened in June 1992 and was a
resounding success. Even before then, however, demand had been strong. Most
of the 70 or so homes in the development's first phase were committed before
the home-a-rama had even opened. The burst of market confidence not only
reassured the public-private development team that they were on the right track,
it quickly attracted other banks, who "wanted in" to Victoria Park once they
realized the size of the pool of previously untapped first-time homebuyers in
Detroit.
The city of Detroit was a full partner in the development of Victoria Park, not only
donating the site but contributing considerable financial subsidies to the project.
Although the site was vacant, its streets, sewer lines, and other infrastructure
were old and had been poorly maintained during the area's decline. The city
therefore agreed to pay for the cost of preparing the site for construction. This
translated to both clearing building sites by removing any existing debris that
remained as well as reconstructing the public ways and the infrastructure that lay
underneath. The costs of this work eventually exceeded over $17 million,
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translating to an extremely high cost per house of over $125,000. This compared
unfavorably to suburban builders' usual estimate of spending only 20% of
construction cost on site preparation. Nevertheless, the development team
agreed that the cost of site preparation was worth the expense. One developer
believed that "it took this much city money get this done... and after (Victoria
Park's success) we wouldn't have asked for subsidies any more." Another
believed that the higher taxes generated by the new houses would eventually
pay off: "Victoria Park taxes are triple those of other houses in the neighborhood,
and with those, we are moving in on paying off the subsidy." Despite these
subsidies, builders were still skeptical: "The builders wanted more... they were
worried that the houses wouldn't sell." Builders asked for several thousand
dollars cash payment per lot from the city, "...but the city couldn't give it to
them... they got additional site improvements, which were remissible." As a final
contribution the city agreed to pay a share of the costs of constructing the
houses' foundations, further reducing builders' expenses.
Not everyone believed that Victoria Park was worth the cost of construction. The
City Council in particular was skeptical. Described by one city official as
"socialist" and "preferring that all housing in the city be for the poor", members of
the Council were upset with the amount of city money required to complete the
project, and dragged their feet approving funds for the project, despite the
Mayor's strong support for the project. In mid-1991, the council shifted over $2
million designated for Victoria Park to community groups throughout the city
(Detroit News 1991a). This raised the ire of Mayor Young, who said that the
project was "seriously threatened" by the council's reluctance to approve money.
The council was eventually won over by executive political pressure.
With the home-a-rama completed, development of Victoria Park proceeded
quickly. Many of the developers who constructed model houses went on to build
additional houses, and although Standard Federal Bank had committed to
approving mortgages for all eligible Victoria Park buyers, the bank soon
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experienced competition for these mortgages. By 1995 the last houses in the
development were being completed. Most houses ended up selling for $100,000
to $125,000, resulting in profits for the builders and the satisfaction of a sold-out
single-family home development for the city.
Buyers
Unlike the Philadelphia case developments, Victoria Park was not intended for
low-income homebuyers. Who were the homebuyers? The demand for Victoria
Park showed that by 1992 a substantial number of African-Americans had both
the desire and the means to live in large homes in a suburban setting, albeit one
inside the city of Detroit. There were multiple reasons for this demand. Because
of past racial tensions in the Detroit areas, many surrounding suburbs were not
particularly appealing; as a black builder said, "a lot of African-Americans feel
they're not wanted out there." According to this builder, most area blacks still live
in Detroit today: "there are suburbs where blacks live, but I couldn't say that there
are any black suburbs." Existing suburban communities were not only
uncomfortable but remote: "Why would I want to have to drive half an hour to visit
my family and friends?" Therefore, most African-Americans in Detroit would live
in the suburbs only if obliged to for work reasons: "If they're way out there, then
at least they're making a whole lot of money." In this context, it was unsurprising
that most of Victoria Park's purchasers came from inside the city of Detroit, and
that "something like 98%" of them were black, with mixed marriages and a few
Asian families making up the difference, according to a developer. According to
this developer, Victoria Park was in fact more racially homogeneous than its
surrounding neighborhood, which as previously noted still contained substantial
numbers of white residents in the blocks bordering Grosse Pointe Park.
Coming something as a shock to everyone involved, the buyers for Victoria Park
were surprisingly wealthy. According to a planner, the original houses were too
small and "there was a push from the market to make them more upscale".
Houses which were originally planned to be priced for between $65,000 and
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$120,000 were soon selling for between $90,000 to $150,000. The city was as
surprised as the developers by the surge in demand. As a city official described
at the time, "We have all been taken off guard by the willingness of people to
snap up the property... we were thinking the market would not be quite as rich."
Today (2002), houses in Victoria Park sell for over $300,000, reflecting the truth
of a developer's comment that "the first people who got in to (Victoria Park) got
an amazing deal." Thus while Victoria Park had originally been intended as
affordable (though middle-class) housing, it soon became, in both perception and
reality, a rather high-end development. The surprising financial capacity shown
by Victoria Park's buyers had two effects. Builders, said a developer, immediately
began to inquire "where's the next site?". Doubters on the City Council, however,
wondered "Why the city should put money in, when people already have
money?"
Causes
Many justifications were given for the suburban form of Victoria Park. Garry
Carley believed the most important justification for a suburban development in
Jefferson-Chalmers was that it met the demands of the market. "We didn't do this
because we wanted a suburban development, but because people wanted... all
the different features (of the houses)... this is what you get in the suburbs."
According to Carley, "If you were to go (to the suburbs) and build a house the
way it was fifty years ago, people wouldn't buy it... houses are built the way they
are because people want them that way." The demand for the homes indicated
that there were indeed Detroit residents who were eager to live in suburban
homes.
As in the suburbs, everything in Victoria Park, according to the development
team, was designed to appeal to the market, from the boulevarded entrance
drive to the development off Jefferson Avenue (created by widening an existing
city street) to the two-car garages and "sexy great rooms and master bedrooms"
of the houses. The fence and plantings were described as having at least three
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purposes: to "provide the development with an identity" by distinguishing it from
its blighted surroundings; to "carry on the idea of the school" next door, which
was also surrounded by a fence; and to address security concerns. Analogies to
suburban imagery also provided justification for Victoria Park's design. Members
of the development team said "these fences are all over the suburbs too", and as
for the planted berms, "many suburban sites are surrounded by (them)". The
development's cul-de-sacs were described as being created for esthetic as well
as safety reasons. As a developer described, referring to the rather long blocks
of the local grid, "we wanted to break up the streets so they wouldn't be
runways... long streets with a hundred houses in a row aren't desirable". Nor
could cul-de-sacs become speedways: "people can't go so fast on shorter
streets." Another component of Victoria Park's neighborhood design were its
building lots, which were created by combining three existing lots into one. This
created approximately 70-foot-wide lots roughly equivalent to many suburban
lots, and allowed front-loaded garages. As a developer explained, "People didn't
want (the old lots) because they had to park behind their house," which raised
both climatic and safety concerns. The developer continued, "I would never
support a house in this city without an attached garage... people have them in
the suburbs, so why not here?"
Consequences
Victoria Park's success set the stage for multiple transformations in the Detroit
housing field. First, it convinced developers and builders that there was a market
for further new housing, especially suburban-style, in Detroit. Second, it spurred,
or at least preceded, a renaissance of the values of existing housing in Detroit.
Third, it persuaded at least some city officials that subsidizing what one official
called "loss leaders" was well worth the cost. Fourth, it forced a previously
passive planning department to confront the costs and benefits of inner-city
suburbanization. While Victoria Park may have been a loss leader, it also
immediately became the standard against which all other Detroit housing would
be compared for the next ten years. In many ways, as the Detroit News (1991b)
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said, it was "the most significant construction in Detroit since the Renaissance
Center in 1977".
New developments were quick to follow Victoria Park. The similar, suburb-like
development of Virginia Park was begun in late 1994 and several other
developments were proposed around the city. Two of those developments,
Clairpointe of Victoria Park and Victoria Woods, are discussed as the second and
third case developments for Detroit. Although they had demanded substantial
subsidies for Victoria Park, developers quickly became more accommodating
when they observed the development's success.
On all sides it was agreed that Victoria Park had transformed the image of
Jefferson-Chalmers from an abandoned wasteland to an area worthy of
substantial investment. Although the project's architect disowned the design of
Victoria Park as constructed, he was quick to admit that "everything stepped up
in Detroit after Victoria Park... there was a major market transformation in the
city." He noted that this transformation had not only spurred additional
construction, it had boosted the values of existing homes in the city substantially,
making it possible to obtain loans on houses that banks had previously
considered to be risky investments. "Part of the goal of Victoria Park was to have
it make sense for people to invest in the neighborhood", said a former city official.
A planner agreed that the positive impact of Victoria Park "was starting to ripple"
outward to areas beyond the immediate periphery of the project. He added that
"Residents in the area were pleasantly surprised- values shot up for other homes
(in the neighborhood) too. People began investing in (existing) homes and it
created a market where there wasn't one before." A builder who had participated
in the construction of both Victoria Park and Clairpointe noted that "the Victoria
Park neighborhood had the highest appreciation rates in the Detroit area". While
this was not completely true, sales prices in the far east of Detroit increased over
80% from 1996 to 2002, an increase which outpaced all but four neighborhoods
in Wayne County (Detroit Free Press 2002a).
288
What did urban planners have to say about Victoria Park? Although the city's
Office of Planning and Development had played a major role in managing the
development of Victoria Park, it had little to say about its form. According to one
planner, the department "never really took a stand" on what it wanted to see in
Victoria Park. This passivity was in part the result of the department's two-
decade marginalization under Coleman Young, who had little interest in
procedural planning and therefore ignored it. This attitude shifted dramatically,
however, when Young retired in 1993 and Dennis Archer took his place.
According to a developer, the department's new planning director felt that
Victoria Park "was the wrong thing to put in the neighborhood" and that
consequently, "there would be no more of this kind of development."
The director's concerns were apparently based on cost as well as on aesthetics.
Aesthetically, the new director felt that the enclave-like nature of Victoria Park
"was too fenced-in... it prevented others from taking part" in the benefits of the
development, such as a new park that was created. The planning department
therefore decided not to support extensions to Victoria Park, saying that the cost
"would simply be too high". The director's principled refusal was likely bolstered
by Archer's political desires to establish his own redevelopment credentials
rather than continuing one of Young's projects. Developers expressed some
bitterness over the city's decision to leave Victoria Park unexpanded. Although
they did not directly criticize the planning department, they noted that the city was
willing to spend substantial monies on housing elsewhere. In that vein, Archer
would in 1997 and 1998 support the development of a nearby large-scale middle-
class housing project which would cost the city "about 25 million dollars",
according to one developer. The project promised to reestablish some of the
urban features, like a continuous streetscape, that had been removed in Victoria
Park, though developers were skeptical. One, referring to the long blocks of the
existing grid, said that the planners "didn't learn their lesson about these straight
streets." The project remains incomplete as of this writing (2002).
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The planning department had additional ideological ammunition with which to
criticize developments like Victoria Park- the New Urbanism. According to
developers, Mayor Archer's new director favored New Urbanist solutions for the
Jefferson-Chalmers neighborhood rather than the vernacular suburban solutions
seen in Victoria Park and other developments. To this end a developer-driven
reshaping of the neighborhood north of Jefferson Avenue was rejected in late
2001 in favor of a New Urbanist solution which preserved existing street and lot
configurations while adding new through streets and public spaces. This plan met
with little developer approval. One developer commented, "If people wanted the
old lots and houses, then why would the neighborhood have been abandoned?"
Suburban developers felt instead that a solution similar to Victoria Park, with
wider lots and "some cul-de-sacs", was most likely to meet market needs. To this
end, the Builders' Association again committed to mounting a home-a-rama in
Jefferson-Chalmers. This time around, however, the city administration was not
so enthusiastic, and the event did not occur. Although it remains to be seen
whether the insistence on New Urbanism will succeed, there are signs that
developers are willing to make some concessions. As of 2002, a "traditionally-
designed townhouse" development called Towne Square is planned along
Jefferson Avenue on the site once envisioned as the expansion for Victoria Park
(see site plan below).
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Figure 5.17. The 'Towne Square' development currently (2002) planned for the Victoria Park
expansion site is built as townhouses, rejecting the vernacular suburban paradigm used for
Victoria Park. The preferred form of residential development in the Jefferson-Chalmers
neighborhood remains a contested topic. Photograph copyright JCT, LLC.
In many ways inner-city suburbanization was a far more literal process in Victoria
Park than it was in the Philadelphia case developments. Victoria Park was
literally a suburban project in conception, design, and execution. Most of the
actors involved in creating it had gained their experience in suburban housing
developments. It was therefore unsurprising to find that the development was a
faithful recreation of vernacular suburbia. The suburban form of Victoria Park
was, as previously described, "the whole story" of the project. The swift rejection
of the architects' initial contextual plan left little doubt that the powerful public and
private players supported a suburban-style plan. The private side perceived an
enclave-like suburban development as being critical to building builder and buyer
confidence in the viability of the development. While Mayor Young's personal
views are not known, his office was quick to support the suburban form of the
development as well. Actors who might have criticized a suburban development
were weak or otherwise focused. The city council was apparently overruled by
the mayor, while the planning department was focused on operational concerns
and was therefore apparently uninterested or unable to formulate an alternative
strategy. Community concerns were minor and were focused other things
besides the exclusive nature of the development.
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The design of Victoria Park played a major role in the project's evaluation by the
various persons involved in its creation. Support for the project's suburban form
was strong. To some, the dereliction of Jefferson-Chalmers justified its
transformation into a suburban area. As one planner said, "This area is literally
pheasant habitat... it can be whatever we want it to be". Other city officials
agreed, saying that Detroit could and should accommodate different densities in
different areas. One official proclaimed, "We should build suburban housing
where it fits... (density) is appropriate in the older core area of the city, but
otherwise, no way." On their part, developers seemed convinced that only
suburban amenities, especially large houses on large lots, could succeed in
persuading middle-class residents to return in numbers to the Jefferson-
Chalmers neighborhood. Though residents were not surveyed, a Detroit builder
agreed, saying that "There should be hundreds more Victoria Parks... people
want these houses."
Victoria Park got built because it met the needs of both the public- and private-
sector players involved. Its construction required extensive cooperation between
the public and private sectors. Only the public sector had the authority to release
large tracts of land for development; only the private sector had the funds to
ensure that housing could be constructed on that land. Where both of these
agencies agreed that a suburban enclave was an appropriate form of
development for vacant urban land, Victoria Park was built. The objections to the
development were few and the forces compelling its construction were powerful.
Although other vernacular suburban developments would follow Victoria Park,
the powerful political ingredient of Coleman Young was not repeated. The next
mayor had less interest in such projects or less authority to carry them through.
The planning department became a more powerful player and objected to
additional enclaves. The development community, having become reinterested in
Detroit, was disappointed to find that the project was not so easy to repeat.
Despite the private sector's willingness to build housing again with fewer
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subsidies, the city held its ground. Whether this heralds an end to or merely a lull
in the inner-city suburbanization process in Jefferson-Chalmers remains to be
seen.
It is worth commenting briefly on the dilemmas raised by Victoria Park, though
this will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. The architect who designed
Victoria Park was the most conflicted actor in the process. He admitted to not
liking suburban environments and called Victoria Park "the worst project I've ever
been associated with". Despite these reservations, the architect recognized that
Victoria Park had spurred a lot of benefits and that the majority of players had
little problem with the development as it was built. He nevertheless admitted that
the project had been good for the area and that "residents lined up to purchase
these homes." He concluded, "This project is a real dilemma for me... (it
illustrates) the disagreement between architects and society as a whole." When
asked to propose an alternative, the architect admitted that there was no easy
answer for the city: "Detroit is certainly not rural, it's not a suburb, but it's not
really a city... what is it? I don't know yet."
Planners were less conflicted. The initial planning team that worked on the
development had few criticisms, and only under an ideologically committed new
director, operating under a new political regime, did the department voice
criticisms of inner-city suburbanization. Politicians were more pragmatic, voicing
concerns not with the project's design but only with its cost and with its taking
resources away from other constituencies in the city. Developers were least
conflicted, in part because they displayed little affinity with design ideologies. If
Victoria Park paid, then it was good. Since there was money to be made,
allowing further Victoria Parks was also good. They were skeptical about other
forms of housing design the area but felt that if they had a market, then they were
good. This approach was simplistic but unbiased; no developer indicated a
resistance to building in Detroit for its own sake, nor did they display a dislike of
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cities. They were simply eager to build what they saw as having the potential for
success.
The next two case developments illustrate additional dimensions of the
suburbanization process in Jefferson-Chalmers. The first, Clairpointe, was an
example of the scope of development that could occur without city subsidy, while
the second, Victoria Woods, showed that there were limits to suburbanization.
Clairpointe of Victoria Park
Begun in 1996, Clairpointe was a 42-house development built along a stretch of
Clairpointe Avenue in the southwestern corner of Jefferson-Chalmers. Like
Victoria Park, Clairpointe's physical form reflected the institutional arrangement
which created it. The development involved many of the same players who had
created Victoria Park, although the city's role was much more limited. Though it
was smaller, Clairpointe had many of the same design characteristics of Victoria
Park. Its developers described it as "carrying on the Victoria Park development."
If Victoria Park was the child of urban renewal, Clairpointe was the child of
Victoria Park. The development was planned and executed as Victoria Park was
wrapping up construction, and many of the same players were involved:
Standard Federal Bank financed the development's mortgages, while two of the
builders, one suburban, one city-based, who had built at Victoria Park formed a
partnership to develop the site. The site was a vacant city-owned strip of land
which lay close to the Detroit River and to the undeveloped Maheras Park.
Although the site was less contiguous than Victoria Park, being stretched along
the avenue, its developer described it as "what was available" in the area.
Clairpointe reflected the new financial landscape of residential development in
Jefferson-Chalmers after Victoria Park. The city did not subsidize the project,
instead earning $200,000 (Crain's Detroit Business 1995a) from the sale of the
land to the developer. The lack of city subsidies translated to a much higher sale
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price for the houses: Clairpointe houses originally sold $150,000 to $230,000 and
now (2002) sell for $275,000 to $300,000. (A few houses were still available as of
this writing.) This high cost, which buyers were apparently willing to pay, reflected
the enormous increase in housing values that had occurred in Jefferson-
Chalmers since Victoria Park was constructed.
Like Victoria Park, Clairpointe was planned and executed by actors accustomed
to operating in the suburbs. Reflecting their conviction that relatively large homes
in a suburban setting were what the market demanded, Clairpointe was designed
as closely as possible to emulate a suburban development, as we saw in
Chapter Four. Absent city assistance in acquiring land, however, the site was
substantially more limited than Victoria Park, necessitating some compromises
on the part of both developer and buyers.
Clairpointe's most significant difference from Victoria Park was that houses at
Clairpointe were not completely isolated from their surroundings. The site backed
upon a poorly-maintained alley shared by a row of houses on the next street.
While this neighborhood was not extensively deteriorated, the houses were much
smaller than those of Clairpointe and clearly housed a somewhat lower-income
population. This proximity did not deter buyers, however. When asked why, a
black Detroit builder replied, "When you live in Detroit, you get used to it... if (a
dilapidated house) isn't next door, then it's two blocks away- it's everywhere in
Detroit." The developer for Clairpointe agreed, saying that "people wanted that
kind of house, and they accepted the neighbors to get the house. If there had
been more Victoria Parks, people would probably have gone in there."
Though Clairpointe was a small-scale development, it required political actions
that were not to the liking of the City Council. Council permission was needed to
strike the abandoned alley that lay behind the houses from the official city map.
According to a developer, the Council was "fed up with street closings" after
Victoria Park and took over two years to approve the closing. This led to
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substantial financial difficulties as the developers were unable to legally sell the
houses when the lots were not completely theirs. Although they built twelve
houses "on the faith that the city would strike the alley", the developers had to
wait two years to sell them.
Who lived in Clairpointe? According to the developer, the market was similar to
that of Victoria Park- an African-American middle class who had a surprising
amount of money. "One guy walked up and paid cash for his house- he was a
pipe fitter, and he'd been saving his money." This same individual was credited
with buying what the developer thought might be the most problematic lot in the
subdivision. "It was (the lot) right next to the factory, but he wanted that one, he
said he wanted quiet. He even built his driveway on the left to give himself more
privacy." The lot in question was located at the end of one of the development's
cul-de-sacs.
Clairpointe's relations with its neighbors demonstrated the somewhat ambiguous
attitude of the Jefferson-Chalmers community toward the enclave-type
developments that being built there. According to the Clairpointe developer,
"residents hated the Victoria Park fence- they thought it was insulting." This may
have been because the fence provided such an explicit image of exclusion from
that development. At Clairpointe, however, "we built a four-foot fence in back, but
the neighbors suggested that we change it to six feet high." Although the
developer did not have a reason for this neighborhood support for a stronger
boundary, it is likely that residents were more amenable to its construction
because they benefited from the Clairpointe fence (it fenced their back yards as
well.) The fence was also popular with Clairpointe residents. According to the
developer, "they'd like a fence in the front too," but have not yet decided who
should pay for it.
In some ways Clairpointe was a more compelling manifestation of inner-city
suburbanization than Victoria Park precisely because of its limited nature.
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Requiring no city funding and relatively little political cooperation, Clairpointe was
more incremental and much less capital-intensive than Victoria Park. It was
consequently unable to achieve the scale of environmental transformation that
Victoria Park did, but this did not seem to hurt its marketability, even at its much
higher house prices. As it was relatively easy to develop, additional suburban-
style developments like Clairpointe would seem to be a distinct possibility,
whether in Jefferson-Chalmers or elsewhere, assuming the continued existence
of a market. The black Detroit builder had perhaps the final word on the potential
for smaller-scale suburbanization, even down to a house-by-house basis. "My
aunt is doing that [building a large, suburban-style house] in Dearborn. It looks
funny to put a big new house next to an old one, but she's got the house."
Victoria Woods
Victoria Woods was a suburban-style housing development in Jefferson-
Chalmers that failed. Its failure, however, was instructive in that it illustrated a
clear threshold beyond which inner-city suburbanization was unlikely to go. Its
failure also illustrated the differences in thinking between those individuals
financing and organizing suburban-style housing in the inner city and those
individuals who were responsible for living with its consequences. Finally, the
Victoria Woods failure illustrated the potential of surrounding communities to play
a role in determining neighborhood form, a potential which had been little
exercised in Detroit.
As a development product, Victoria Woods was a well-conceived idea. It was
planned to occupy a portion of city-owned land located along the Detroit River.
Unlike the sites for Victoria Park and Clairpointe, however, the Victoria Woods
site was already in use- as a city park. Called Maheras Park, the site had been
owned by the city since the riverfront land was created in the 1920s, but had
never been completely developed. In 1996, despite its spectacular views across
to the Canadian shore of the river, the park was overgrown, with minimal
amenities. It consequently received little use.
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Like Clairpointe, Victoria Woods was also proposed by members of the
development team that had participated in Victoria Park. Standard Federal Bank
agreed to finance both construction loans and purchase loans for the houses
(Crain's Detroit Business 1996a). The development proposal involved
transforming much of the park into single-family housing, which would then be
sold off. The remaining park land along the river would be improved and receive
new facilities.
The developers saw the creation of Victoria Woods as an amenity that would
benefit the neighborhood. "It has long been our dream to have Maheras Park
developed for single-family housing," said one. The same developer saw Victoria
Woods as "the ultimate extension of Victoria Park." Later recalling the incident,
this developer said, "(Victoria Woods) would have been a higher end subdivision,
bringing back people from the suburbs... it would have had houses of an Indian
Village type." Indian Village is one of Detroit's most valuable neighborhoods
where houses now sell for $500,000 and up. The local citizens council agreed
with the developers. Said its president, "We feel strongly that the Maheras area
should be developed into single-family housing... everyone I've talked to is in full
support of residential and commercial development. The Victoria Park area has
done nothing but blossom." (Crain's Detroit Business 1996a) The president of the
association also happened to be a Victoria Park resident.
Like the other two case developments, the construction of Victoria Woods hinged
on public action. In order for the development to be constructed, planning
commission action was required to rezone the land to permit single-family homes
from an "open space" designation. The developers pressured the commission to
rezone the land. "It is important that the planning commission have an alternative
viewpoint of what can happen on this land," said one. One citizen's group,
begged to differ. This was "a group of homeowners, mostly white as it turned
out", in a developer's words, who felt that the city should instead designate the
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park, and all of the other city-owned parcels along the river, as open space so
that they would be forever protected. "(The park) is a hot point for community
residents," said the group's president. "The highest percentage of residents say
they don't want housing on park land."
The stage was set for a classic development protest, a showdown between
rapacious developers and angry citizens intent on protecting their threatened
neighborhood amenities. But in the Victoria Woods case the showdown never
happened: the developers simply backed off. "(The community group) got a
lawyer from the University of Michigan, so we just let it die," said one, recalling
the incident. 'We didn't have a war chest- it was just an idea. I'm glad they fixed
up the park this way, anyway." The city has since renovated part of the park as
playing fields, though the portion along the riverfront remains unimproved.
Victoria Woods was a somewhat audacious idea that promised to confront a
persistent problem- the underfunding of city park land in a declining city- by
removing the land from city jurisdiction altogether and converting it into private
property. Unfortunately for the developers, at least some area citizens preferred
the promise of accessible public space to the guarantee of a high-end housing
development. Although the developers had a successful track record and had
close contacts in the city administration, as well as support from the primary
citizen group in the area, they preferred to abandon the idea rather than risk what
threatened to become a lengthy and potentially expensive battle that would
almost certainly generate some negative press as well as dissipate some of the
positive consequences of the Victoria Park development. A controversy might
also have potentially reduced the political support which had proved to be critical
for the success of Victoria Park.
Race played a somewhat surprising role in the Victoria Woods controversy.
Although developers sometimes credited racial politics with making development
issues more complicated in Detroit, these politics were reversed in the Victoria
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Woods situation. One of the primary developers was black, and the development
was supported by a primarily black citizen's council, headed by a Victoria Park
resident no less. The citizen's group, on the other hand, which opposed the
development was "mostly white", and they objected to a development, that, more
than either of the other two case developments, had the potential to attract
wealthy whites into the neighborhood. The Victoria Woods controversy was more
of a class-based controversy than a race-based one, where relatively poor area
residents saw themselves as being deprived for the benefit of wealthy
homeowners. The fact that many of the poor were white, while many of the
wealthy were likely to be black, did not lessen the severity of the problem. While
there are no hard and fast conclusions to be drawn from this situation, it does
illustrate the fact that the stereotype of rich white versus poor black so often
projected upon Detroit, both by outsiders and by Detroiters as well, was not
necessarily true.
Perhaps equally as importantly, the Victoria Woods failure illustrated a threshold
for inner-city suburbanization. While significant neighborhood reshaping might be
tolerated in the interests of revitalization in Detroit, the demapping of public
parkland and the privatization of the city's riverfront was likely to be problematic.
More abstract features that would have potentially made Victoria Woods
attractive to the city, like its additions to the tax base and the fact that the project
did not require city subsidies, were of little interest to the citizen group protesting
the development. Unlike the other two case developments, Victoria Woods did
not have a relatively united constituency supporting it. Without that constituency,
what would have been one of the more spectacular examples of inner-city
suburbanization withered and died.
Conclusions: the causality of suburbanization in Detroit and Philadelphia
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What happened
The two city neighborhoods in which the case developments were constructed
shared certain characteristics but differed in others. Obviously, they were both
distressed: this was the criterion which allowed them to be studied in the first
place. Beyond that, both neighborhoods had experienced severe decline since at
least 1970. As such both had experienced previous revitalization efforts,
especially North Philadelphia. In 1990 neither neighborhood was a blank slate-
both had previous developments, housing and otherwise, to examine. In north
Philadelphia there was a long history of assisted housing, while Jefferson-
Chalmers, being much newer, had fewer.
What was significant about the housing developments that occurred in both
neighborhoods after 1990 was not that they were the first revitalization attempts
in those neighborhoods, nor that the new developments were in many respects
antiurban. What was new in both neighborhoods was the construction of housing
that was to a large extent inspired by the suburban single-family house. In
Philadelphia suburban single-family attributes were carefully hybridized with the
rowhouse to create a new housing typology for the neighborhood. In Detroit the
suburban house was literally transplanted to the inner city.
The analogy of the new houses to those found in vernacular suburbs was explicit
and acknowledged by every player involved. Whether they liked it or not, each
player who had been involved in the creation of the houses recognized that the
city was trying out a radically new strategy. Perhaps like the founders of many
new urban strategies, players in both Philadelphia and Detroit believed that this
new strategy, at last, would bring success. In North Philadelphia previous efforts
were seen as having been too high-density to succeed, while in Detroit
developers felt that they had at last uncovered the key to awakening market
interest in derelict neighborhoods.
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Why it happened
The various players involved were also united in their reasons for what they were
doing. Policymakers in Philadelphia, Developers in Detroit, and citizens in both
places agreed that providing lower-density houses with suburban attributes was
the best thing for the neighborhoods. Only this surprising consonance of vision,
based in the social desires of residents, could have led to the large-scale
physical transformations seen, residential transformations which were larger than
any of those attempted in either city in the years before.
Inner-city residents felt that the physical attributes of suburban homes were
desirable. In Philadelphia residents, mostly low-income, were adamant that their
new homes resemble neither the modernist public housing of the past nor the
monotonous blocks of rowhouses that surrounded them. In Detroit residents
wanted suburban house amenities and were willing to pay considerable amounts
of money for them.
What were those amenities? The amenities perceived by residents were both
linked to the endogenous physical nature of the suburban house and the way in
which that artifact interacted with its surrounding environment of dilapidated
urban housing. Suburban houses seemed to offer two major amenities. The first
was that they were new. New houses had at least three perceived advantages
over older houses. In the first place they were, of course, new, and were
therefore in better condition, with more modern amenities than typical older
houses in the neighborhood. In the second place, since they were new, they
offered the owner the ability to personalize their dwelling. This was especially the
case in Detroit where homeowners could select from a variety of house models.
Even in Philadelphia where houses were similar, the more flexible built fabric
offered the potential for personalization of the environment in the form of front
lawns, etc. Substantial personalization of this type was seen at Charlotte
Gardens, where homeowners have added back decks, garden walls, etc. in the
fifteen years since that development was constructed.
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In both of these ways, of course, the new houses were very similar to those of
suburbia. Vernacular suburbia, despite its seeming monotony, actually permits
homeowners a surprising amount of personalization. Even the Levittowns are
today diverse communities, with each house containing different plantings and
painted different colors, with different additions, etc. Such a promise was
undoubtedly appealing to residents of the new houses built, although further
study would be required to ascertain this.
The attraction to suburbia and to the suburban house model was likely to be
strong for residents of inner city neighborhoods. In both cities the great majority
of neighborhood residents and of the case developments were African-American.
African-Americans have long been confined by a variety of factors to some of the
worst housing in American cities, and it is of little surprise that residents in both
cities were eager to obtain better housing. The image of suburbia is inescapable
in American society, and to residents of neighborhoods where the majority of
housing was in poor condition the idea of brand new houses that were much like
those in the suburbs was doubtless attractive. Nevertheless, the new houses
also offered residents the opportunity to remain in the city. This seemed to be
important in Detroit where at least some black residents with money felt that it
was preferable to live in new housing in the city of Detroit rather than in new
housing in the suburbs. Given the extent of suburban sprawl in Detroit, residents
would probably have had to move a considerable distance outside the city to
obtain equivalent housing.
A second major amenity that suburban inner-city housing offered was privacy.
This was a substantial advantage of new housing designed at low densities,
especially in Philadelphia where existing row housing was positively crowded,
offering very little outdoor space and often relatively little indoor space. The new
housing provided privacy at many different scales. At the scale of the house,
privacy was available in the front yards, back yards and garages or parking pads.
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At the scale of the street, privacy was available in cul-de-sacs, which prevented
through traffic, turning the street into a shared public space for the houses
around it. At the scale of the neighborhood, street reconfigurations discouraged,
but did not prevent, through traffic as well as residents from outside the
development from entering. There is little doubt that these amenities were
valuable to residents. Clairpointe residents, for example, wanted a fence around
their neighborhood. Poplar residents wanted front doors to face away from the
street so that they might not have to face their surroundings.
Of course not all developments offered all of these amenities. Especially in
Philadelphia the existing street and neighborhood network substantially
constrained the degree to which the new housing could reshape the
environment. At the very least, however, the new developments provided for a
new house and for the house-scale amenities that the house could provide. At
the other extreme, residents of Victoria Park lived in a sort of suburban fantasy,
where reality would only begin to intrude once they had driven outside their gate.
Although an examination of this issue was beyond the scope of the study, some
indication that the amenities provided by the new house was above all the most
important artifact was obtained through conversations with builders in Detroit.
New houses were also likely to be perceived as providing the owner with
additional status, although this would require further research to demonstrate
conclusively. Especially in the inner city, where the great majority of housing was
older and deteriorated, the possibility of living in a brand-new house, and one
that looked like one in the suburbs no less, was likely to be very appealing. The
existence of deteriorated existing housing was also likely to discourage residents
from desiring replicas of that historic housing. Residents of the Cecil B Moore
area clearly perceived the image of existing row housing as bad, despite the high
design quality of that housing. They consequently wanted the new housing to
"stand out" as much as possible from that existing context, which they doubtless
associated with many negative values.
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What could not be ascertained was the degree to which the fact that the
developments were new was more or less important than the fact that they
provided suburban amenities. The presence of alternative inner-city models,
however, indicates that replicating vernacular suburbia is likely to not be the only
form of housing that residents of inner-city housing might find palatable. HOPE VI
public housing projects, for example, are strongly inspired by New Urbanism,
which rejects many of the design features of vernacular suburbia. In Philadelphia,
other affordable housing projects, especially those built by and for Latinos,
provided a very different neighborhood image than those built primarily for
African-Americans. The possibility of cultural differences in housing image
preferences is an intriguing one and also merits further research. Finally, the
existence of the gentrification of existing historic neighborhoods, at least in
Philadelphia, indicates that many middle-class residents, a group which
undoubtedly includes some African-Americans, are interested in historic housing
models as long as the neighborhood offers a reasonable degree of stability.
Other players
If we accept that the strong desire by inner-city residents was the primary
motivator for the inner-city suburbanization observed in the case development,
the other players who participated in the development process can be seen as
merely facilitating this social desire.
Many of these players admitted this themselves. Developers in Detroit readily
admitted their perception of a market had led them to suggesting the idea for
suburban houses in Jefferson-Chalmers in the first place. The fact that not all of
the developments could be built did not dissuade them from believing that people
wanted the houses nonetheless. Policymakers in Philadelphia believed that
redevelopment efforts built along the density of existing row housing would fail in
part because people no longer wanted that kind of housing in lower North
Philadelphia. To emphasize the point they cited Yorktown as a development
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which had remained stable precisely because it provided the type of amenities
that people wanted.
For the most part, other players agreed with the primary development motivators
in both cities. Other government agencies in Philadelphia assisted in the
construction of the case developments there, making only minor comments on
their form. Both architects and planners cooperated in Philadelphia in designing
and providing the housing that was built there. City officials in Detroit played a
major role in facilitating Victoria Park, as they had in previous large downtown
developments. While this cooperation was in keeping with the 'growth machine'
hypothesis of Logan and Molotch (1987) that large development is required to
'keep the city going', officials involved in Victoria Park also seemed to genuinely
believe that suburban housing was the best solution for the problem. Finally,
while the architect of Victoria Park had serious reservations about the design of
the housing, he too acknowledged that the demand for the housing to some
degree justified its construction.
Although one might have expected the reaction of surrounding communities to be
suspicious if not hostile, this did not seem to be the case for most of the case
developments surveyed in either city. In fact, all three of the Philadelphia case
developments were designed with substantial amounts of community input. In
both the Poplar and the Moore homes resident input was obtained through
resident members of CDCs sitting on the design committees, while in Ludlow
resident input was filtered through the strong leadership of the community
organization there. This inclusive process seemed to alleviate any concerns that
neighboring residents might have had. The Detroit case developments, as we
saw, were more exclusive in both an economic and physical sense.
Nevertheless, neither Victoria Park nor Clairpointe's development history was
characterized by neighborhood dissatisfaction. This is not to say that there were
not some concerns, especially in Victoria Park, with issues of access to and
through the development, and with the clearly exclusive design of the
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development- but whether because of a relative lack of capacity or because
neighboring residents saw a benefit in any new development, the developments
were accepted by the community. Victoria Woods was a clear counterexample,
arousing vociferous community opposition that was enough to derail the project.
This was doubtless because of the development's somewhat unusual threat to
demap public space for high-priced private homes. Additional investigation of
community reactions to suburbanizing or suburban-like new home developments
would be desirable, especially in light of the likely continuation of residential
redevelopment at lower densities in both cities.
Reactions and consequences
Conflicts were relatively limited in the specific case developments, although it is
clear that Detroit is currently experiencing a conflict over the validity of enclave-
type developments like Victoria Park. Only time will tell whether the seeming
preferences of the market and the insatiable demands of the city 'growth
machine' will lead to further Victoria Park-type developments, despite the current
reservations of the planning department. The degree to which planners can
formulate policies that seem to provide for viable development alternatives is
likely to play a role in this debate. In Philadelphia, the goals of OHCD were
legitimized and organized by the publication of policy documents which
established both precedents and justifications for the type of housing
development that the department wished to promote. This strengthened the
ability of the department to promote more suburban housing, and little conflict
was consequently seen in Philadelphia. Detroit's ad hoc suburbanization process
was both aided and made more vulnerable by its dependence on favorable
political regimes in the Mayor's office. The complete lack of policy documents
gave neither developers nor planners any grounds on which to either support or
criticise their respective positions.
The study of the case developments made it clear that the palette of designs for
residential redevelopments in the inner cities of Detroit and Philadelphia
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encompassed more than simply continuing in a contextual vein, or completely
rejecting the historic context. In both cities, what was seen was a clear shifting of
development densities in inner city neighborhoods to levels not seen there
before. Many of Philadelphia's inner city neighborhoods appeared to be moving
more toward the density level of historic Detroit, with designs that sometimes
attempted contextuality (albeit within the framework of a different development
typology), and other times rejected context entirely. Many of Detroit's inner city
neighborhoods seemed to be moving toward the densities of vernacular
suburbia. Of course, all of the shifts seen were guided by the specific economic
constraints of the developments constructed, and shifts in these constraints could
well augur shifts in the development types seen. Philadelphia, for example, did
not experience any market-level construction in its inner-city neighborhoods. The
threat of total deurbanization was greater in Detroit because of the suburban-
level densities of new developments there, and the New Urbanist alternative,
which promised some maintenance of historic neighborhood-level design
features, was more powerful because of this threat.
in both cities the process of inner-city suburbanization seemed to have only
begun. Philadelphia was about to embark on an extensive clearance campaign in
its declining neighborhoods, while Detroit's renewed inner-city market continued
to be the source of conflict between the shifting ideologies of the city and the
financial pragmatism of suburban developers. The future would thus seem to
hold a spectrum of design choices for the revitalizing neighborhoods of Detroit
and Philadelphia: what one might think of as 'deep' suburbanization, where new
developments, like those seen in Detroit, emulated those of suburbia; 'lighter'
suburbanization, like those seen in Philadelphia, where the existing context was
equally rejected but where neighborhood design changes were not as extreme
and where densities of new developments did not drop to those of suburbia; or
contextuality, where developments emulated most if not all of the features of
historic housing in the neighborhood. The following chapter, the final one of the
dissertation, will discuss three issues: the significance of the phenomenon, both
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for the case cities and for other declining cities in the United States; the ethical
dilemmas raised by the prospect and reality of inner-city suburbanization, and the
prospects for intervention by architecture and planning professionals.
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Chapter Six
The Future of Inner-City Suburbanization
Introduction
The previous five chapters of this dissertation have been spent creating a
hypothesis for inner-city suburbanization, investigating its prevalence in the case
cities of Detroit and Philadelphia, and understanding its causality in those places.
This chapter, the final one of the dissertation, explores three questions related to
the future of inner-city suburbanization. The first is tied to its significance. Does
inner-city suburbanization even matter? In other words, is it a significant enough
trend that it should be addressed further, either by professionals or by
academics? The second question is related to how we evaluate inner-city
suburbanization. Is this phenomenon good, bad, or a little of both? Or are
multiple, conflicting evaluations possible? The third and final question is related
to action. If inner-city suburbanization is both a significant and problematic
phenomenon, what should the policy response be, and how does one go about
formulating such a response? This chapter discusses these questions not only to
provide closure to the study but to suggest future directions for research and
action in the professional and academic worlds that deal with inner-city
redevelopment.
As we saw in previous chapters, the world of practice has already begun to
address all three of these questions. The confrontation of inner-city
suburbanization in practice, however, has not been framed by a holistic
understanding of the phenomenon, nor has it always been directed by explicit
policies. The actions that have been taken have therefore been somewhat ad
hoc. For example, while Philadelphia's John Kromer decided upon an explicit
low-density policy, Detroit's redevelopment actions were driven by developers on
a case-by-case basis. Though they lacked a larger understanding of the
situation, the development officials and others involved were well aware of both
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the significance of their projects and of their evaluations of the projects. These
"reflections in practice" provided important hints to how these questions should
be addressed on a larger, more abstract level, and these practical reflections will
be often referred to in this chapter.
The fact that these three questions were addressed through practice does not
mean that reexamining them in the abstract is irrelevant. The most obvious
rationale for a study like that performed by this dissertation is to examine the
inner-city suburbanization phenomenon outside of the temporal and ideological
constraints that limit the various forms of professional practice. While the
professional world was ahead of the academic community in addressing inner-
city suburbanization (as it often is), it is rare that that professionals are given the
opportunity to produce the comprehensive, abstract, sometimes critical studies
that are necessary to provide additional insights on physical urban phenomena.
The goal of this chapter, as it was for this dissertation in general, is to close this
examination of inner-city suburbanization with a measured and informed
discussion of the meaning of the phenomenon. It is my hope that the findings
provided will be valuable both to professionals confronting the prospect of further
action in the face of decline and to those academics who wish to enhance the
profession's understanding of the prospects of the American inner city.
Any analysis of the future of inner-city suburbanization must begin with an
assessment of the phenomenon's significance. If the phenomenon is minor, then
further study is perhaps unnecessary and little practical action probably need be
taken. This chapter, however, argues that this is not the case. Urban decline is a
widespread phenomenon in the United States and any inner-city redevelopment
that occurs is therefore likely to be influenced by inner-city suburbanization.
Although this dissertation has studied the occurrence of suburbanization in only
two cities, it argues these cities are representative of others and that other
declining cities, both large and small, are also likely to experience inner-city
suburbanization as they redevelop these neighborhoods in the future.
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While it is always worthwhile to study a widespread urban phenomenon, such
studies gain additional significance when the phenomenon being examined is
shown to be somewhat problematic. We can find both types of studies in the
urban literature. Joel Garreau's Edge City (1991) was a noteworthy look at the
phenomenon of commercial urban sprawl which viewed it as a more or less
positive development. Jane Jacobs (1961), on the other hand, strongly
condemned the urban renewal phenomenon that she examined in The Death
and Life of Great American Cities. This study is widely viewed as among the
most significant in recent urban studies. This chapter argues that inner-city
suburbanization is not quite so easy to evaluate. It has both positive and negative
attributes, and therefore can neither be roundly condemned nor euphorically
welcomed. This chapter also argues that one's evaluation of inner-city
suburbanization is in large part dependent upon one's professional background.
In particular, this chapter argues that the professions of architecture and city
planning, both of which were closely involved in the creation of the inner-city
suburban developments studied, hold different viewpoints which are closely
linked to deep-seated values within those professions and which influence those
professions' perception of the phenomenon.
Policy actions are intimately linked to evaluations. Any action that is taken must
in part be based upon the decision that a situation either is or is not problematic.
The recent (mid-1990s) welfare reform efforts, for example, were enacted in part
because welfare as it currently existed was perceived to be a failure. Similarly,
the HOPE VI public housing redesign efforts were undertaken in part because
the existing design of public housing was perceived to be a disaster. Any policy
or design reaction to inner-city suburbanization will therefore also be likely based
in the evaluations that have been made of the phenomenon. The conflicting
evaluations of inner-city suburbanization, however, promise to make unitary
action difficult. In Detroit we have already seen how differences in opinion over
the goodness of low-density development have led to conflicting directives in that
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city. Although this chapter argues that the ambiguity of inner-city suburbanization
is likely to lead to continued debate, it also argues that the reality of continued
urban decline will force political support for suburbanization as the most plausible
physical redevelopment technique in severely distressed neighborhoods. This
chapter also emphasizes, however, that the negative evaluations of inner-city
suburbanization need to be taken into account to encourage a more unified base
of support for redevelopment policies that incorporate suburbanization.
The significance of inner-city suburbanization
The significance of inner-city suburbanization can be assessed both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Chapter Four provided several different
quantitative measures of the prevalence of inner-city suburbanization, while
Chapter Five provided qualitative impressions of the importance of inner-city
suburbanization in the development environment of the case cities. How do we
transform these measurements and impressions into a depiction of the
phenomenon's significance?
Quantitatively, the significance of inner-city suburbanization can be viewed at
several different scales. Using Detroit as an example, we will recall that 20
housing developments constructed in the city since 1990 were determined to be
qualitatively suburban. These 20 developments contained a total of 1,866
housing units.
Seen in their largest context, that of the Detroit metropolitan area, these 1,866
inner-city suburban housing units comprised only a tiny minority of the new
housing constructed. The Southeast Michigan Council of Governments
(SEMCOG) (2002) reports that a total of 239,010 new housing units were
constructed from 1990 through 2000 in the six-county region around Detroit.
Detroit's inner-city suburban housing was less than one percent of this
metropolitan area total. At this scale inner-city suburbanization could not be
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considered significant, since it comprises only a minute fraction of the new
housing constructed in the Detroit area.
If we examine only the city of Detroit, however, the qualitatively suburban
housing units become much more numerically dominant. According to SEMCOG,
Detroit gained a total of only 3,625 new housing units between January 1990 and
December 2000. The 1,866 qualitatively suburban units surveyed by the study
comprised approximately half of these units. The initial apparent insignificance of
Detroit's qualitatively suburban housing can thus be seen as a function of the
large quantity of new housing built in the overall Detroit metropolitan area, most
of which was suburban. When we examine this inner-city suburban housing in
the light of the small amount of new housing built in Detroit, inner-city
suburbanization quickly becomes a much more significant trend.
Quantitatively, the significance of inner-city suburbanization can only be
assessed at the scale of the city as a political entity. There are two reasons for
this. First, although cities are economically part of a much larger area, they are
politically isolated for the most part. Although city limits are somewhat artificial,
many social, economic, and physical trends both respond to and are influenced
by them. These trends are quite meaningful at the citywide level, even if they are
less noticeable at larger scales. No one would say, for example, that the terrific
housing decline experienced by Detroit was irrelevant simply because Southeast
Michigan as a whole gained housing units. Nor would one say that because
many rural parts of the Detroit metropolitan area experienced little growth that the
rapid growth in other parts was insignificant. Both cities and the changes
experienced within them are extremely localized occurrences, and as we saw in
Chapter Four, inner-city suburbanization is equally localized. Its quantitative
significance therefore needs to be assessed as such.
Secondly, inner-city suburbanization, as we saw, is a relative phenomenon as
much as it is an absolute one. It is therefore less meaningful to assess it in
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comparison with the housing of a metropolitan area as a whole than with urban
housing alone. As we saw, the differences between vernacular urban housing
and inner-city suburban housing are often striking, just as the differences
between a typical urban apartment building and a typical suburban single-family
house are. It is this difference, as well as the resemblance of inner-city housing
to suburban housing, that is significant, but this difference is only meaningful by
observing inner-city suburban housing within a relatively limited context.
Of course, there are even smaller scales in cities than that of the municipal limits
of a city. Downtowns, for example, are highly localized and hard-to-quantify
concentrations of intense activity that experience very different types of change
from other parts of the city. Similarly, as we saw in the case of Philadelphia, inner
cities can experience extremely localized changes in close adjacency to
gentrifying areas which are experiencing entirely different types of change. At the
scale of the inner city neighborhood, inner-city suburbanization becomes even
more quantitatively significant because forms of residential development that are
fairly common in other parts of the city are often quite rare. Within Detroit's inner
city neighborhoods, qualitatively suburban inner-city housing comprised an even
larger percentage of the total than it did in the city as a whole. It was therefore
even more significant at that limited scale.
The quantitative significance of inner-city suburbanization is relatively easy to
assess in Detroit because so much of that city's new inner-city housing appeared
suburban. The other case city of Philadelphia, however, presents some
difficulties in assessing its significance quantitatively, primarily because none of
its new housing was qualitatively similar to vernacular suburban housing. How do
we then assess the quantitative significance of the inner city suburbanization
trend there?
The lack of qualitatively suburban housing in Philadelphia's inner city
neighborhoods led to my decision to measure all housing in those
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neighborhoods, whereas in Detroit only qualitatively suburban housing was
measured. What did those measures tell us? Suburbanization scores in
Philadelphia ranged from a high of 4.52 out of 6 for the Poplar Nehemiah Homes
to a low of only 0.71 out of 6 for the Lillia Crippen Townhouses. The median
Philadelphia score was 2.47, or a little less than half of what would be a "perfect"
suburbanization score. While this score cannot be compared to that of Detroit as
only qualitatively suburban developments were measured there (undoubtedly
skewing its overall suburbanization score upwards), we may look at the relative
significance of the Philadelphia developments with respect to each other. It is
noteworthy that the two individually largest projects (the Poplar Nehemiah
Homes and the Cecil B. Moore Homes), were also among the highest scoring,
with rankings of first and fifth respectively out of 16 developments measured.
These two large projects together comprised 35% of the total number of housing
units built in the Philadelphia inner city since 1990, and as we saw in Chapter
Five, both displayed significant suburban attributes (though their unit densities
and neighborhood design were not suburb-like). On the basis of both the
presence of these two projects as the two largest assisted housing developments
built in the decade of the 1990s in north Philadelphia, and of their role as
precedents for further development (as seen in the policy studies published by
OHCD), we may say that inner-city suburbanization was significant in the
Philadelphia inner city. As we will see below the qualitative impressions of these
developments matched their quantitative significance.
Any qualitative assessment of the significance of inner-city suburbanization must
be based at least in part on the perceptions of those individuals who have
experienced it. Although this study did not undertake a comprehensive
assessment of people's reactions to inner-city suburbanization, the research
undertaken for the individual developments provided some guidance as to the
impact of inner-city suburbanization in each case city.
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This impact was, to say the least, substantial. The two major case developments
studied for this dissertation were both, at the time of their construction, perceived
as among the most, if not the most, important residential developments in the
city. This importance was due not only to their scale (as we saw, both Victoria
Park and the Poplar Homes were sizeable developments) but to their place in the
development histories of the city. The Poplar houses were perceived, quite
accurately, by the city's Office of Housing and Community Development as being
a flagship for the future of new housing design in North Philadelphia. Victoria
Park was even more important because of the depressed state of housing
construction in the entire city of Detroit at the time. In a city of over one million
where the construction of new single-family houses had been relegated by many
to the status of a historical event, the impact of a sizeable new, more or less
market-rate housing development was not to be underestimated. Some sign of
Victoria Park's importance could be seen in the twenty or so articles covering it in
the popular press during the years of its construction (see Bibliography). How
many suburban tract developments have received similar attention?
The institutional commitment to these flagship projects in both cities was
substantial. Philadelphia's OHCD felt that the Poplar Homes were important
enough to merit a substantial chunk of both present and future CDBG funding,
essentially mortgaging the future of assisted housing for the next several years in
order to support that development. Similarly, the director of OHCD felt that Poplar
was important enough to merit two studies (Home and Yorktown) to provide a
policy rationale and empirical evidence for the likely success of the project. In
Detroit, Victoria Park was believed to be important enough to merit individual
attention from the mayor, as well as the assignment of one of the mayor's
executive aides to oversee the project. The importance of Victoria Park was also
reflected in the city's large, and politically risky, financial commitment to the
project, a commitment which seems to have backfired when a new administration
came into office and criticized those same financial outlays.
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Similarly, private developers, at least in Detroit, saw Victoria Park as the leading
symbol of the turnaround of the residential real estate environment in the city.
Although one would probably never be able to prove that Victoria Park
contributed to the rise in housing values across the city, the perception of this
having been the case was widespread enough in Detroit that it is significant
nonetheless. In Philadelphia, however, the impact of the Poplar houses was
limited to the North Philadelphia neighborhood, as the city experienced entirely
different types of changes in other neighborhoods like Center City and gentrifying
rowhouse neighborhoods. With these other neighborhoods ripe for development,
private developers were unable or unwilling to afford North Philadelphia any
attention during the 1990s.
Finally, among the citizens of both city's declining neighborhoods, there was a
clear sense that the two flagship developments represented a bright future for
new housing in the inner city. Both the Poplar houses and the Cecil B Moore
houses were guided by citizen advisory boards who were equally as supportive,
or more so, of the provision of suburban amenities in the new housing as were
the government officials involved. In Detroit, the rapid sales of Victoria Park also
made the significance of this new type of development to middle-class African-
Americans very clear.
There can be little argument that these flagship developments, at least, were
extremely significant in their respective cities. The same case cannot be made;
obviously, for each of the developments found that exhibited characteristics of
inner-city suburbanization. Most of the CDC projects in both case cities, for
example, were constructed with little fanfare, though they may have had high
suburbanization scores. This, however, should not be taken as an indication that
the phenomenon as a whole was not significant. The flagship developments,
because of their high level of exposure, served as important symbols of the types
of changes that were occurring in the inner city housing markets of Detroit and
Philadelphia. Much like biologists like to emphasize the importance of "indicator
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species" (large, highly visible animals or plants) in showing the health of an
ecological habitat, the flagship projects symbolized the suburbanizing
transformation of Detroit and Philadelphia's inner cities. The generally high
institutional, private sector, and public level of attention paid to these projects
seems clear evidence that inner-city suburbanization, explicit or not, was
qualitatively significant in the case cities.
Despite the study's attempt to comprehensively investigate the phenomenon of
inner-city suburbanization in the two case cities, it had obvious limitations.
Perhaps most glaring was the fact that only two cities were examined. If only two
cities were examined, how can we then say that inner-city suburbanization is a
significant trend at a national level?
Although it was impossible within the limited scope of this study to examine the
prevalence of inner-city suburbanization at a national level, there are two
indications that such an examination would find the phenomenon to be prevalent
in a number of different American cities. The first is simply that while Detroit and
Philadelphia are only two cities, they are both among the ten largest cities in the
country. Many smaller cities in both the Northeast and Midwest share their
physical attributes, but in a lesser form. The smaller size of these cities creates
critical differences that are likely to make them more vulnerable to inner-city
suburbanization. In most cases the size of 'urban' neighborhoods in smaller,
older cities is much smaller than that of either Detroit or Philadelphia, whose
older neighborhoods extend for miles. Many of these smaller cities also suffer
from steeper decline than the case cities because of their limited size and
economic diversity. These cities are thus likely to have even less vernacular
urban residential context than the case cities do. This, combined with the often
weaker real estate markets of small declining cities, is likely to make inner-city
suburbanization an even more powerful force in these places.
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What cities would these be? Satellite industrial cities have been especially hard-
hit by urban decline. The decay of cities like Camden, NJ; Gary, IN; East
Cleveland, OH; and East St. Louis, IL has left them often unable even to maintain
amenities like public libraries and sanitation services. For these cities, housing
redevelopment in any form is likely to be seen as salvation. Other large declining
cities are also likely to face inner-city suburbanization pressures. Cleveland's
inner city, for example, has suburbanized somewhat with the construction of
large suburban-like houses in its Hough neighborhood, while the evidence from
other large cities like St. Louis and Baltimore is yet unclear and would require
further research.
For other types of cities, inner-city suburbanization is unlikely to become a major
force in the near future. Two types of cities seem especially resistant to inner-city
suburbanization; those older cities with strong economies, like San Francisco
and Boston; and those newer cities which generally have developed at very low
densities. These older, more successful cities may have experienced some
population decline but to have experienced only limited housing loss, which
demonstrates both an increased demand for housing and the limited number of
neighborhoods in which inner-city suburbanization would be possible (see
Chapter Four and Appendix B for more Boston data). Newer cities, of course, are
the classic Sunbelt cities, which have come to define an urban paradigm equal to
that established by the older industrial cities of the northern United States. These
cities were often built at relatively low housing densities of six to 12 housing units
per acre, have received substantial Hispanic immigration in the last twenty years,
and have relatively strong regional economies. All of these forces would
discourage the widespread abandonment of housing that has characterized older
declining cities. Los Angeles is a paradigmatic example of this newer type of city.
As we saw in Chapter Four, Los Angeles has increased both in population and
housing units, and consequently in density as well. In these cities inner-city
suburbanization is likely to remain a relatively unknown, and insignificant,
phenomenon.
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In closing, we have seen inner-city suburbanization to be a significant force in the
two case cities of Detroit and Philadelphia. These cities were selected to be
representative of the declining industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, and
as such the author believes that the inner-city suburbanization trend shown to be
operating in these two cities is symptomatic of a larger trend which would also be
seen operating in smaller declining cities. Further research would be required to
ascertain the prevalence of inner-city suburbanization in those places.
Within the case cities, inner-city suburbanization was shown to be both
quantitatively and qualitatively significant. A large percentage of new
developments in both cities scored high on the suburbanization index, and most
of the diverse actors involved in the creation of the developments perceived
these developments as symbolic of larger trends in the residential redevelopment
of the inner city. The next section will examine the question of the evaluation of
inner-city suburbanization. Although inner-city suburbanization may be
significant, this determination is not enough to establish a course of future action
toward the phenomenon. We must first address the question of whether inner-
city suburbanization should be interpreted as a positive or a negative event.
Evaluating inner-city suburbanization
How is one to evaluate the phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization? The
evidence from Chapter Five indicates that there is far from total agreement on
the subject of whether or not inner-city suburbanization is a good thing. On the
one hand, some politicians, in the case of Victoria Park for example, believed
that "there's nothing bad about" building enclaves of suburb-like homes in the
inner city. On the other hand, the very architect whose firm contributed to Victoria
Park believed that "it was the worst project (he'd) ever been associated with".
How could the same development inspire such differing, and conflicting,
evaluations? And what do these conflicting evaluations say about the prospects
of coming to overall evaluation of inner-city suburbanization?
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This section of the chapter will argue that these conflicting evaluations, of which
the above comments on Victoria Park were a glimpse, signify deep-seated
differences in the value systems of the individuals involved in the construction of
houses with suburban characteristics in the inner city. Despite the seeming
modesty of these houses, they held enormous symbolic power, representing
entirely different things to their diverse creators, some of whom viewed them as
wonderful, and others of whom viewed them as deeply problematic. These
different opinions, and the differences between value systems that these
opinions hint at, mean that a unified evaluation of inner-city suburbanization is
never likely to happen.
While many individuals, representing many different groups, contributed to the
construction of the housing developments studied in Chapter Five, this section
will concentrate on only two of those groups. As we have seen, the involved
groups ranged from community residents, to elected politicians, to municipal
staff, to private developers. This section will concentrate on the value differences
between the architects who designed the buildings, and the city planners who
provided the regulatory and institutional backing for the construction of the
housing.
Why architects and planners? There are two reasons why considering the
differing value systems of these groups with respect to inner-city suburbanization
is important. First, architects and planners were the individuals most directly
responsible for the design of most of the housing studied, though of course their
specific contributions varied from project to project. Architects directly produced
the designs for the houses, while planners maintained the regulatory
environment, such as zoning, within which the houses were constructed. Of
course, both groups were heavily influenced by outside sources. Although an
architecture firm was responsible for Victoria Park, according to one source those
architects were "told what to design", indicating that they were hardly solely
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responsible for its design features. Nevertheless architects were primary
participants in the inner-city suburbanization process, even if they were not
alone. Planners' roles also varied widely, ranging from strong to weak. Planners,
for instance, played only an advisory role in the design and development of the
Poplar Houses while housing officials coordinated and supervised the
development process. Though their role was not always dominant, planners were
nevertheless powerful, as we saw in the case of the problematic follow-up to
Victoria Park. Without the cooperation of planners, the housing developments
that were constructed would likely have been impossible.
The second reason is tied both to the historic relationship between the
professions of planning and architecture and to the hybrid nature of this thesis,
which is being written within an academic group containing members of both
professions. The relationship between architecture and urban planning has been
a constantly evolving one, with periods of closeness interspersed with periods of
greater distance. Whatever the exact nature of this relationship, the two fields
now generally operate separately both as academic disciplines and as
professions, though they are often associated. As planning has grown more
distant from architecture, incorporating aspects of public policy and social
science into its training curriculum and practice, the hybrid field of urban design
has developed, in part to make up for the focus on urban form that urban
planning has to some extent abandoned.
Because of its responsibilities to both professions, this study is especially
concerned with the way in which architects and city planners interpret the inner-
city suburbanization phenomenon, and also with the way in which urban
designers might interpret it. The discussion that follows will examine these
professional interpretations, review the interpretations that were found in the
case studies, and conclude with a theoretical evaluative viewpoint for the field of
urban design.
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Within the realm of architecture, suburbia is problematic. As we have seen,
architects are at best ambivalent about the design of suburban housing.
Dunham-Jones (2000) described how few architects concern themselves with the
suburbs, and many suburban houses are designed with only token input from
architects. Theoretical architecture has tended to concern itself more with
signature projects, most of which have borne very little resemblance to the
vernacular design of suburban houses. The result has been two design cultures,
the architectural and the popular, which rarely clash but more often simply refuse
to acknowledge each other, though occasional high-profile architects (most
recently Frank Gehry) break through this divide to impact both worlds.
Both sides have legitimate grounds for criticizing the other. Criticisms of high
architectural culture have focused on its aloofness, arrogance, and lack of
concern with clients' needs (see Wolfe 1981 for an amusing account of this
view), while architects, on their side, decry the simplistic and banal nature of
vernacular suburban design. Neither side, however, is monolithic: the
architectural community has historically had great disputes over the 'preferred'
form of design, while the general public rather more peacefully acknowledges
that there are many architectural ways to skin a cat.
In the light of the mutual lack of acknowledgement between architectural and
popular culture, the attempt of the New Urbanist movement to accommodate
both appears somewhat more noteworthy. New Urbanism acknowledges the
public's taste for somewhat historicist architecture, albeit with many of the latest
modern features, while imposing its own normative view of design at many
levels, ranging from a more careful historical interpretation of architectural style
to a significant redesign of the site planning and neighborhood form of vernacular
suburbia. While New Urbanism refuses to engage the avant-garde, thus
alienating many architectural theorists, it does attempt to engage the reality of
the vast landscape of vernacular suburbia, thus drawing together architectural
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and popular culture in a way that has not been attempted at such a scale since
before the Modern movement.
Urban planners, on the other hand, have developed a far less normative
approach to urban form and neighborhood design. The planning profession was
closely associated with the urban renewal movement of the 1950s and 1960s
that generally promoted Modernist design at the expense of vernacular
neighborhoods, and the perceived failure of this movement both relieved
planners of a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes of the public as well as
convinced the planning profession itself that public opinions were equally as
important as those of planners. The result has been a kinder, gentler profession,
but one that has also increasingly felt its sense of mission slipping away as its
core of professional knowledge has been increasingly delegated to other groups
(Rodwin and Sanyal 2000 provide an excellent discussion of changes in the
planning profession over the last few decades). Planning continues today with a
focus both on public empowerment, and a reduced normative agenda focusing
less on neighborhood design than on overall principles for urban development.
The "smart growth" movement, essentially advocating concentrated development
rather than continued urban sprawl, is a recent manifestation of planning's
reduced normative agenda (see Szold 2002 for a review of smart growth
practices in New England).
What did the case developments show us about the architectural and planning
professions' interpretation of inner-city suburbanization? The record was
somewhat mixed. In Detroit, architects disliked the suburb-like houses there,
while planners both supported and criticized the same phenomenon. The
Philadelphia developments were far less contentious, either because of their
inclusive design process or because the products of these processes were less
suburb-like than the Detroit developments. While the process may have been
uncontentious, the professional reaction to the Poplar houses has not been
unanimous. During a planning association's tour of the Poplar and Ludlow
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Houses in 2001, members expressed dismay at the degree to which
Philadelphia's new housing was imitating the suburbs.
If we look closer at the ethics of the two professions, we can see the potential for
ideological conflict, both internal and external, within the two professions. The
American Institute of Architects (AIA) Code of Ethics (2002) includes the
following professional obligations as part of the code:
- As a general obligation, architects should "maintain and advance their
knowledge of the art and science of architecture, respect the body of
architectural accomplishment, contribute to its growth, thoughtfully consider
the social and environmental impact of their professional activities, and
exercise learned and uncompromised professional judgment."
- With respect to the public, architects should "...promote and serve the public
interest in their personal and professional activities."
- With respect to clients, architects should "...exercise unprejudiced and
unbiased judgment when performing all professional services."
- With respect to the profession, architects should "uphold the integrity and
dignity of the profession."
While this rather vague series of directives offers substantial leeway, as it was no
doubt designed to do, it also offers some clear directives that provide architects
with substantial ethical ammunition with which to select designs. First among
these is the architects' obligation to "advance... the art and science of
architecture." Architects are thereby empowered, and even obliged, via their
professional education, to produce better architecture. The body which
determines what this better architecture is is not described in the code, but in
practice this determination has been left to the design and theory literature,
including professional magazines like Architecture which routinely publish and
give awards to what they consider to be the 'best' architectural projects. The
code also gives architects the right to make their own determinations as to what
good architectural design is by "exercising... uncompromised professional
judgment." Although the code also obliges architects to have a responsibility both
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to the public and to the client, this responsibility leaves the architect with
substantial empowerment. With respect to the public, the architect is rather
vaguely urged to "...serve the public interest...", while with the client the architect
is again encouraged to "exercise... unbiased judgment..."
Overall, the AIA Code of Ethics provides architects with a clear professional
mandate. Based upon their determination of what comprises good architectural
design, architects are obliged to remain aware of public obligations while
ensuring that the "integrity and dignity" of the profession remain intact. In
practice, these ethics can play out in several different ways. Architects who
believe that a client's request conflicts with their own idea of good design can
reject those ideas with a clear conscience, at the risk, of course, of losing the
commission. The integrity of the architect's judgment and of the profession's
standing remain paramount. Yet architects are also obliged to serve the public, or
at least not to produce designs that would in some way adversely affect that
public. What if the public's interest conflicts with the architect's design?
The ethical responsibilities of planners, in contrast, are much less related to a
notion of the profession's artistic integrity and much more to a notion of public
service. The American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) Code of Ethics
(2002) includes the following directives. Unlike the AIA Code, the AICP Code
includes no general directive, instead listing four sets of obligations to the public,
to the client, to the profession, and to the planner himself.
- With respect to the public, first and foremost, a planner must "serve the public
interest... which requires these [selected] special obligations [selected follow]:
3) A planner must strive to provide full, clear and accurate information on
planning issues to citizens and governmental decision-makers.
4) A planner must strive to give citizens the opportunity to have a
meaningful impact on the development of plans and programs.
Participation should be broad enough to include people who lack formal
organization or influence.
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5) A planner must strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons,
recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged
groups and persons, and must urge the alteration of policies, institutions
and decisions which oppose such needs.
7) A planner must strive for excellence of environmental design and
endeavor to conserve the heritage of the built environment."
- With respect to the client, the planner should provide "...diligent, creative,
independent and competent performance of work...consistent with the
planner's faithful service to the public interest."
- With respect to the profession, the planner should "contribute to the
development of the profession by improving knowledge and techniques,
making work relevant to solutions of community problems, and increasing
public understanding of planning activities."
Overall, the AICP code assigns planners a clear public mandate, while the notion
of responsibility to an internal sense of "integrity" is weak or absent. Predominant
is the idea that the planner must inform, empower, expand, and above all serve
the public. Only one mild directive, the last in the initial seven public
responsibilities listed by the code, urges planners to "strive for excellence" in
design. As with the AIA Code, the means by which design is determined to be
excellent is not given, but one may assume that it is provided through the
educational system or via the professional literature.
Both of these codes represent existing internal ethical conflicts within the
architectural and planning professions. Architects, commanded to further the art
of architectural design, are also commanded to serve their client and the public
interest. Planners are strongly commanded to serve the public interest while also
being encouraged to at least achieve "excellence" in design, even if it does not
necessarily further the art. Even the notion of serving the public interest holds the
potential for conflict. Who is to decide what the public interest is? What if the
public's stated preferences do not mirror the public interest as determined by the
architectural or planning professional? While architects are presumably
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empowered to interpret the public interest for themselves, planners are given
additional responsibilities that could conceivably be especially problematic for
them. These are to both "give citizens the opportunity to have a meaningful
impact", while at the same time providing "creative, independent... performance
of work".
Between the professions, the potential for ethical conflict is perhaps even
greater, with architects driven by an overall imperative to provide good design,
and planners motivated by an overall imperative to serve and empower the
public. Yet what happens if both professions are involved in the production of a
project which is broadly supported by the public, yet is roundly dismissed as poor
design?
The inner-city suburban development of Victoria Park provided exactly these
conflictual conditions. The recorded evaluations of the project from architects and
planners closely reflected those that might have been predicted from an
application of the above ethical codes to the development. Both professionals
acknowledged their predominant ethical affiliations while also acknowledging that
their secondary responsibilities conflicted with those predominant affiliations.
Victoria Park's architect described the project as "the worst I've ever been
associated", but admitted that "putting on my Detroit hat, the project (was) good
for the area." The architect quite accurately reflected that the project was "a real
dilemma." The planner who supervised the construction of Victoria Park, also
reflecting his ethical obligations, felt somewhat differently. Most important to him
was the fact that "people lined up to purchase" the homes, though he also
acknowledged that some planners "felt it was the wrong thing to put in the
neighborhood." Reflecting the importance of community opinion over design
ideology, the planner added that "design is not a religion- there is room for
different styles."
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If we acknowledge that the phenomenon of inner-city suburbanization leads to
ethical dilemmas for both planners and architects, and to potential ethical conflict
between them, the question of resolution arises. How are the professions to
resolve these ethical dilemmas, both the internal ones stemming from conflicting
professional directives, and the external ones stemming from the larger-scale
ethical differences between architects and planners? This question is an
extremely difficult one that goes far beyond the particular urban phenomenon
being studied, and a theoretical resolution is difficult. The case developments,
however, provided at least three different ways of resolving these dilemmas in
practice. The first was through repression. The second was through oscillation.
The third was through hybridization. These means of resolving ethical dilemmas
are similar to those found by Rein and Thacher (2002, unpublished) for resolution
of value conflicts in policy issues like policing and welfare reform.
In the case of repression, one ethical directive was simply subverted and ignored
by another, more dominant directive. This happened in the case of Victoria
Park's design, where the architect's design clashed with that proposed by the
developers. Although this architect believed that their design was problematic, he
was overruled, and the developer's design was implemented. The result was the
architect's dissatisfaction with the development, to the degree to which he
essentially disowned it, thus ethically dissociating himself from what he saw as its
illegitimate design.
This repression was not permanent, however. With the subsequent, and as yet
unbuilt, New Urbanist-inspired successors to Victoria Park we can see the
second principle of oscillation coming into play. In this case, a problematic ethical
occurrence (the suburban design of Victoria Park) was simply reversed the next
time around (the as-yet-unbuilt 'traditional' second phase), with the result that
both sides will have at least one realized project which more or less conforms to
their ethical values, with the hope that further projects might also do so. The
principle of oscillation can be very clearly seen in the current disputes over the
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larger-scale development future of the Jefferson-Chalmers neighborhood. This
dispute has extended to the point where there are actually two existing
proposals, one more or less promoting inner-city suburbanization, and the other
promoting a New Urbanist, historically contextual scheme, for the same
neighborhood. Again, both promoters hope for their scheme to be realized, and
even if it is not, with the principle of oscillation the potential exists for a different
resolution in the future. Rein and Thacher (2002, unpublished) called this
principle "cycling between different values over time".
It is perhaps not coincidental that the above two dilemma resolutions were seen
in Detroit, a city where both the political and policy regimes appeared to be both
somewhat dictatorial and somewhat capricious. Lacking a strong policy
framework that could resist changes in regimes and establish a consistent ethical
framework, Detroit was unusually sensitive to regime shifts. Thus the repression
of architectural ethics, which was in no small part the product of Coleman
Young's development-deal-oriented philosophy, was suddenly abandoned with
his retirement, opening the door for a sharp swing in political fortunes, in the
consequent ethical directives of the planning department, and in the design of
subsequent housing developments.
The hybridization resolution was manifested clearly in Philadelphia. It is perhaps
no coincidence that the visually hybridized development of the Poplar Nehemiah
houses was also the result of a hybridized design process involving architects,
planners, residents, politicians- in short, all of the players who were also
involved, to a greater or lesser degree, in the Detroit projects as well, but within a
process that provided for more empowerment of all of the parties concerned. As
we saw in Chapter Five, conflict was not unknown within this process; certain
issues, especially that of the door location, revealed the ethical differences that
were likely bubbling just under the surface, and provided the only clear view of
the true power relations extant in the process. The front door dispute was what
Rein and Thatcher would refer to as a "value floor": despite the various
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compromises made, this design feature represented the threshold of a key value
(the 'degree of urbanity' of the project) that the institutional players were not
willing to sacrifice under any circumstances, to the point to which they literally
threatened to not fund the development if forced to surrender. Despite these
differences, a product was produced that seemed to satisfy, or at least mollify,
the concerns of all involved. In its production of a "best available solution" the
Poplar process mirrored the process advocated for the resolution of complex
public policy disputes by authors like Susskind and Cruikshank (1987).
The hybridization process was not perfect. Real-estate developers, for one, were
absent from the Philadelphia design discussions, and it is likely that the desires
of these players would have substantially altered the mix of ethical directives, as
well as potentially confused the responsibilities of planners further by providing a
public element that desired suburban amenities even more than the low-income
residents present in the existing process, who appeared more or less satisfied
with the limited suburban amenities that were provided.
The above practical resolutions to the ethical dilemmas raised by inner-city
suburbanization will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter as I
consider future policy and design options. Below I will briefly consider the
somewhat difficult ethical position of the urban design field with respect to the
inner-city suburbanization phenomenon,
Urban design is not generally regarded as a profession in and of itself like
architecture or city planning, but as a hybrid field that draws from both. Lang
(1994) described urban design in the following way:
Whether (urban design) should be regarded as a discipline in its
own right is an open question... urban design has been most
closely allied with architecture and city planning by filling the
intellectual and professional gap between them... as architecture
reduces the domain of its concerns... and as city planning (deals)
mainly with transportation and land use planning, to the extent that
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it deals with other than social and economic issues, so urban
design has become increasingly an entity on its own.
As a hybrid between architecture and city planning, urban design is, in Lang's
words, "at best a collaborative art", with many responsibilities; above all, perhaps,
to the principle of good design; to the political process within which urban design
occurs; to the public whom urban design is intended to benefit; and to
developers, many of whom fund projects which contribute to urban design. This
challenging series of responsibilities is more difficult than that facing either the
architect or the planner, both of whom to a large degree have withdrawn into
relatively straightforward ethical realms: the architect to the realm of quality
design (if the client pays for it), and the planner to the realm of public
empowerment. Though Lang is not explicit about the complex ethical
responsibilities of the urban designer, it is not hard to see how the multiple
directives above could lead to substantial internal ethical conflict.
What, if anything, can be recommended for urban designers who are dealing with
the prospect of inner-city suburbanization in their city? Urban policymakers
(Rybczynski 1994, Cohen 2000, Rae 2000, Kromer 2001) have as yet failed to
address the design issues inherent in severe inner-city decline, while architects
like Andres Duany have promoted design ideals at the expense of reality.
Duany's transect of steadily declining densities fails to conform to a reality where
low-density developments are being inserted amidst formerly urban blocks.
Rather than a gradient, it appears that the new inner city is starting to resemble a
patchwork quilt of surviving historic blocks, new, low-density suburban
development, and the ever-growing areas of abandonment. The architectural
response should perhaps be expected. Ignoring reality may sound somewhat
shortsighted, but it is an effective way for coping with seemingly irreconcilable
differences, especially when the nonconforming reality remains part of one's
professional province.
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For those urban designers who choose not to ignore the prospect of inner-city
suburbanization, there are other options. One is to simply accept it as the only
feasible alternative, even if the thought of designing suburban housing for urban
neighborhoods fills one with horror. As the former city planning director of
Cleveland said, referring to the large suburban-style mansions being built in
Cleveland's Hough neighborhood, "It's better than nothing, after all." A third is to
both accept the prospect of inner-city suburbanization and the responsibility of
shaping its form, even if, in an ideal world, it would not be occurring. This third
form of confrontation will be discussed in the closing section of this chapter. If
one accepts both the significance of inner-city suburbanization and its somewhat
problematic nature, what should one do about it?
Confronting inner-city suburbanization
How should the hypothetical urban designer, architect, or urban planner best
confront the prospect of a housing development in the inner city with suburban
characteristics? The urban designer is here proposed as the professional best
equipped to confront this phenomenon because the other two professions, as we
have seen, work within ethical frameworks which allow them to confront only
certain aspects of the phenomenon without much ethical conflict. The architect
can simply refuse the commission, as many architects do when asked to perform
work that they are unwilling to; the planner can simply focus upon the public
benefits stemming from the project and work to ensure that the development
process is inclusive of all constituencies, equitable in its distribution of costs and
benefits, and reasonably acceptable to all of the public constituencies concerned.
The urban designer, on the other hand, cannot escape the fact that the
imposition of vernacular suburban neighborhood and architectural characteristics
into an existing urban neighborhood more or less directly contravenes many
urban design directives. What, then, should this hypothetical designer do?
First, the urban designer should examine the development directives in order to
evaluate the degree to which they conform or conflict with his or her own ethical
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values. Perhaps the development as proposed is not especially problematic: it is
limited in scale, for instance, or it does not differ significantly enough from either
its context or from the designer's own vision of what would be appropriate to
raise a flag. In these cases the urban designer can participate in the
development process without significantly compromising his or her own ethical
values.
In other cases, however, the development directives may appear to be
problematic. For example, the directive may be for a low-density development in
a row house neighborhood, such as the Poplar development, or for a
development with equivalent densities, but designed in such a way that
pedestrian access is difficult and automobile orientation is predominant. Many of
the multifamily Detroit developments were designed in such a fashion. It should
be noted that other situations development directives unrelated to inner-city
suburbanization could also be proposed, for example a high-rise apartment tower
in a neighborhood of small attached houses. These types of conflicts would be
dealt with in other ways, and will not be discussed here.
Once confronted with a development directive that proposes housing units which
are too low-density, too auto-oriented, too far from the street, or problematic in
any of the many other ways which an urban designer might determine, the
designer still has multiple options. He or she could simply withdraw from the
process and absolve themselves of responsibility for it. In some cases, however,
such as that where an urban designer works for a public agency, withdrawing
from the process may not be feasible. In this case the urban designer could
simply stick to his or her aesthetic guns, arguing resolutely for a different design
alternative, no matter what the opposition. This alternative, however, might also
be problematic because of the urban designer's responsibility to his or her
superiors, who might be responsible for addressing additional political or
economic directives. It might also lead to complete defeat if the urban designer
faces overwhelming opposition that favors another alternative. If he or she
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chooses to acknowledge these other directives as well the designer could simply
surrender, participating in a process that he or she disagrees with internally, but
does not acknowledge to others. Even in this situation the designer might take
solace in the hope that the policy directives might oscillate in the future, allowing
for the production of design alternatives that are more palatable.
The fourth option is for the urban designer to engage him- or herself in the
development process and work toward a compromise solution. In this case, the
designer would need to decide which minimum design features (equivalent to
Rein and Thatcher's policy "value floors") he or she would require in order to be
satisfied with the design. This determination could be made either before or after
the receipt of design directives; in other words, the urban designer could have an
explicit set of features which he or she would demand. More likely, however, is a
more fluid process, whereby the urban designer works in a back-and-forth
fashion with the developer or other actors to produce a hybrid design that
satisfies at least some needs of both parties.
The illustrations below provide a hypothetical example of such a process. The
initial design directive is based on Detroit's Alberta King Village development,
seen in Chapter Four. The series of drawings shows a process through which
two conflicting design directives, one supporting on a low-density, garden-
apartment-style, auto-oriented complex, and the other supporting on a high-
density, mixed-use, pedestrian-oriented complex, are accommodated by a single
design with elements of both.
The initial design directive from the developer was for a low-density (eight units
per acre), entirely residential complex of townhouse units organized as a
superblock, with an internal parking lot. Units opened inwards toward the parking
and back onto the street via relatively deep lawns. Vehicular access was only via
driveways opening onto the primary road and pedestrian access through the
complex was discouraged. This design is shown below.
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Figure 6.1. Initial low-density design directive
The urban designer's ideal vision, on the other hand, would be for a higher-
density (20 units per acre), complex of mixed apartment and two-family units,
with parking either on the street or through rear alleyways. Buildings would face
out to the street and would have relatively small yards. The neighborhoods street
grid would be continued through the development and pedestrian access would
be encouraged by sidewalks. The development also would contain retail along
the primary street. This design is shown below.
Figure 6.2. Urban designer's high-density ideal design
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Although the urban designer proposed this conceptual alternative, the directive
for lower densities and for a completely residential complex turned out to be
nonnegotiable because of political imperatives and funding considerations. The
urban designer therefore proposed a third design, which is shown below.
4M M I MilL
Figure 6.3. Hybrid design proposed by urban designer
The third design lowered densities to eight units per acre and removed the
commercial component of the project, but retained the existing street grid, kept
some parking behind the structures, and maintained a diversity of unit types.
Neither the urban designer nor the developer were completely satisfied with this
design. The developer felt that people would not want to park behind their units
for security reasons, and that per unit construction costs would be higher
because of there were more detached houses. The developer also felt that the
image of the development would be stronger if it were set off from surrounding
streets, many of which had dilapidated houses. Neither was the urban designer
completely satisfied. Unit densities, he believed, were far too low for this site,
especially given the density that it had once supported. The designer regretted
the loss of a commercial component to the development, which he felt would only
encourage automobile use by residents. Finally, the designer disagreed with the
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front-access parking to the units, which was not found in nearby neighborhoods
and which he believed would lead to an automobile-dominated streetscape.
However, both the designer and the developer were happy about those features
of the design which conformed to their ideals of a successful housing
development on the site. Both sides held some degree of power: because of his
or her position as a member of the city's planning department, the urban
designer's regulatory approval was needed for the site plan, and without the
developer's private capital the project could not go forward. Recognizing that
each was necessary for the other to make the project happen, the hybrid design
was approved and constructed.
Hybrid designs like those shown in the imaginary process above may not be the
most appropriate solution for every situation where urban designers and others
confront inner-city suburbanization, nor will they necessarily be feasible in all of
these cases. There will always be situations where design directives are non-
negotiable, and conversely, there will also be situations where many urban
designers will feel that their ethical imperatives do not permit them to
accommodate suburban qualities in urban housing developments. Nevertheless,
a hybrid process, if it is found to be acceptable to all of the parties involved,
seems to hold promise for both acknowledging the reality of a changing inner city
urban fabric and allowing the "integrity of the profession", whether it be
architecture, planning, or urban design, to remain at least somewhat intact.
Concluding thoughts
Within its limited scope this dissertation has demonstrated that the urban fabric of
steeply declining inner-city neighborhoods is changing through redevelopment.
The suburban ideal, based in the notion that low-density, automobile-oriented
development is a desirable way to build, is noticeably influencing the design of
much new housing being built in the inner city. This change is not occurring
because of a single Federal policy, or because a particular actor in the
development process is imposing it. If, indeed, inner-city suburbanization is a
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problem, there is no single actor to blame for it. The suburbanization of the inner
city is occurring because a variety of actors, for a variety of reasons, are
increasingly coming to the conclusion that housing with suburban amenities is, at
least in some cases, preferable to housing that mimics or exceeds the density of
the original neighborhood fabric.
Many of the forces leading to the suburbanization of the inner city do not seem
likely to be reversible. Urban decline, though it has been known to decelerate or
even reverse itself in cases, has not shown itself to be noticeably responsive to
policy directives in steeply declining cities like Detroit or Philadelphia. The
seemingly relentless loss of population and housing that these cities are
experiencing is gradually convincing policymakers there that a lower-density
future is the only realistic alternative for their inner city neighborhoods. The
housing developments that we have seen in this dissertation constitute some of
the first tentative, somewhat naive experiments in what promises to be a major
reshaping of the inner-city physical fabric. This new fabric will be one with far less
housing, far more automobile usage, far fewer corner stores, more open space,
and increased private amenities. This transition, however, is far from completed,
and there are a variety of forms it could take as the process unfolds. Detroit
could, for example, continue to redesign its declining neighborhoods as suburban
enclaves, a strategy that would no doubt appeal to the many city residents who
desire the suburban ideal. Philadelphia could take the same path in its
Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, consolidating blocks of cleared
rowhouses and redeveloping them as single-family detached enclaves. The
private development market there would no doubt be responsive to such a
strategy, and this interest would be a powerful incentive, as it was in Detroit, for
further inner-city suburbanization.
Another course of action, however, would be both more difficult and somewhat
more imaginative. The private market interest that we saw in the Detroit
examples is a powerful force that has barely been harnessed in inner-city
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development. The potentially unlimited capital of private developers could far
outstrip the Federal Government's rather token financial contributions to inner-
city redevelopment, contributions that, as we saw in Philadelphia, can pay for
only one or two large new housing developments per decade. It remains to be
seen whether the powerful force of private capital can be harnessed while still
preserving, or recreating, those aspects of historic urban neighborhoods that
architects and planners often find so pleasing. Is the delicate inner-city real
estate market strong enough to support something besides vernacular suburban
development? How affordable will these alternatives be? Would city residents
who desire the suburban ideal accept an even more modified version of this ideal
than the one produced by Victoria Park? Such a modified ideal, as we saw in the
example above, might include a reduced, but not eliminated street grid; housing
that was less dense, but not tremendously so; and perhaps most important, a site
design that acknowledges the reality of off-street parking while also
acknowledging the reality of the urban street. Cities like Cleveland are already
taking important steps toward this modified suburban ideal. Other cities,
however, are barely beginning to experiment with inner-city suburban
development, or have not yet even begun to do so.
Figure 6.4. Despite the suburban design of its homes (left), this inner-city suburban development
in the Hough neighborhood of Cleveland turned outward, as seen in the aerial photograph on the
right, rather than fencing itself off like Detroit's Victoria Park. Such conciliatory gestures, limited
as they may be, indicate some potential for the integration of suburban-style houses into inner-
city neighborhoods. Left photograph copyright Cleveland Neighborhood Link, right photograph
copyright Mapquest.com.
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The primary responsibility, as this dissertation has tried to emphasize, for
addressing the inner-city suburbanization phenomenon rests with the
architecture and urban planning professions. Only these professions have the
design skills and the understanding of the city to conceive of alternative visions of
inner-city redevelopment. Only these professions occupy the political roles
necessary to conceive and approve of a policy environment that can provide a
predictable course for this development. While other players in the inner-city
development process will probably continue to play their expected parts,
architecture and planning professionals should attempt to step outside of their
expected roles in order to influence the inner-city suburbanization process more
productively. In doing so they might perhaps both take a closer look at the
emerging ethical responsibilities of the urban design field, whose professionals
routinely attempt to accommodate their normative design ideals with the reality of
public service.
Only time will tell how the inner-city suburbanization process will play out in the
declining cities of the United States. Perhaps urban decline will suddenly come to
an end, or perhaps the New Urbanism will become so dominant so as to
overwhelm all opposition. Equally as likely, however, is the possibility that the
vernacular suburban ideal will continue to represent the preferred form of living
for many Americans, that the decline of many inner cities will continue, and that
the inner-city suburbanization process will continue to represent a challenge to
the design professions. If this is the case, it is my hope that the research of this
dissertation will be a contribution toward accommodating this phenomenon in the
most positive way possible.
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Afterword
A Note on Sources and Methods
This brief afterword describes in essay form the diverse sources and methods
used to compile the information used in this dissertation. For further information
please see the References section which follows the Appendices.
Performing the research for this dissertation presented substantial challenges,
primarily because of the wide scope of the work involved. The overall challenge
was to transform an anecdotal observation about city form, albeit one that I had
made often enough to be convinced it was a trend, into an empirical study, within
the constraints of an academic group where such studies, especially at the
doctoral level, were rarely performed, within a field where design research was
generally limited to promotional, or to equally anecdotal, and essentially
unsubstantiated, observations, and within a poorly-supported funding
environment for such studies.
The first problem was definitional, and Chapter Three describes the result of my
research in this direction. Both 'neighborhoods' and 'inner cities' were poorly
defined, but this issue was easily resolved by using the substitute of census
tracts and changing indicators over time, a methodology well-developed in
Jargowsky (1997). Suburbs, however, presented a different problem. Although
the term 'suburb' was used widely in both the popular and academic press, and
although studies of sprawl were high on the academic planning agenda, what
exactly a 'suburb' was was far from clear. At first glimpse the definition seemed
to be in the eye of the beholder; my assertions that new developments in inner
cities seemed 'suburban' was met by assertions that these neighborhoods
themselves were once suburbs, and that most urban neighborhoods could
actually be considered suburbs of one form or another. While there was
substantial truth to these assertions, they further convinced me that there was
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indeed a popular conception of what a 'suburb' was, and that this popular
conception was derived from the postwar suburb and no other. Although the
suburban history literature (Jackson 1985 and Fishman 1987) agreed, these
authors did not provide measurable characteristics that could be applied to other
neighborhoods to test their 'suburban-ness'.
In the text I emphasized the importance of the New Urbanist literature, especially
that authored by Andres Duany and his associates at DPZ. Duany, operating
under a conviction that "conventional suburban development" was problematic,
was in the process of developing his 'transect' concept during the course of my
research. This concept provided, for what seemed to be the first time, fairly
quantitative measures of different types of metropolitan-area neighborhoods,
from center-city to rural. This transect was described in the Lexicon of the New
Urbanism (2002). Duany's salesman-like promotion of the New Urbanism had
also produced a voluminous literature on descriptions of the neighborhood and
architectural design of this movement. These descriptions were easily reversed
and thereby transformed into a definition of what I called 'vernacular suburbia'.
My next challenge was to examine population and housing change in American
cities, and in neighborhoods within the case cities. At the city level, this data was
easily available in the Census Division's City and County Data Books. At the
neighborhood level obtaining and analyzing time-series information proved to be
more difficult. (2000 census information was not yet available at the time of
study, but this was not a problem given the scope of my research.) The digital
tool of geographic information systems (GIS) proved invaluable in this analysis.
Both 1990 tract-level data and 1990 tract maps were available for no charge over
the internet from the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) web site.
1970 data, however, was only available digitally in aggregated form, and would
have required consulting help to extract. Given my funding limitations it was more
practical, and more timely, to transfer this data manually from existing city-level
printed records (available at the Lamont Library Census Depository at Harvard
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University) to a digital database, and then to map it against the 1990 data. I have
previously described the complication of retracting, which necessitated some
limited aggregation, and potential inaccuracies, in the Detroit data.
Once I had selected my case neighborhoods the next challenge was to examine
the development activity which had occurred in those neighborhoods from 1990
to the time of research (approximately December 2001). This task proved to be
the most time-consuming and difficult of all. The only comprehensive inventories
of housing development available were those done by the city building
departments, and these were only partially accessible. Detroit's building
department summarized permit information and provided those summaries to a
variety of city agencies including the planning department, where John Lowe
kindly offered me full access to those records. Because of redundancies and
missing information in the Detroit building records, I augmented my Detroit
inventories with those assembled by the City of Detroit in their World Class City
ll publication, by the Michigan Capital Fund for Housing, and by a Crain's Detroit
Business inventory (April 3, 2000). With these sources I was reasonably
convinced that I was not missing any new residential projects in Detroit.
Philadelphia was a more difficult case. The city's Licenses and Inspection
department seemed neither to have computerized any historical data, nor to have
provided past permit information to other city agencies. According to L and I,
historic building permit data was available only by address in manual files,
making it logistically impossible to consult. I was therefore dependent on
information provided by other sources. Fortunately, the City's Office of Housing
and Community Development had provided extensive narratives of assisted
housing development activity in the city's annual Consolidated Plan, and the
Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations had also
provided excellent summaries of CDC development activity in their 2000 Annual
Report. Although these inventories did not compile private-sector development
activity, the extremely low levels of such activity documented in the popular press
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(see NYT 2/17/02) as well as the relatively limited number of Philadelphia
neighborhoods I was examining meant that I could also be confident of the
comprehensiveness of my development inventory there.
In order to perform the qualitative assessment of Detroit developments, I field-
visited most of the developments in that city. I also visited a substantial number
of Philadelphia developments. Measuring the past and present conditions of the
developments presented another challenge, one which was eased substantially
by the generous decision of Margaret Depopolo and the Rotch Library at MIT to
purchase complete sets of historic microfilms of Sanborn Map Company maps
for both of my case cities, as well as two more (Cleveland and Baltimore).
Sanborn maps were originally produced in order to provide information for fire
insurance purposes, and they provide without question the best record of
historical urban fabrics in the United States, including such features as
dimensions, building heights, materials, and uses for most buildings. I was
additionally aided in both cities by the presence of updated Sanborn maps in
their central public libraries. Detroit's built form had been updated through 1996,
and Philadelphia's through 2000. Both libraries kindly allowed me to take digital
photographs of these maps. For the measurement of developments constructed
after those dates, I was tremendously aided by the provision of detailed (one
meter resolution) color aerial photographs on the web site of Mapquest.com.
While urban form research was probably not on the mind of those who conceived
of this idea, the photographs, which were both more readable and more recent
than those provided by the United States Geological Survey, were extremely
helpful.
Technology again proved to be useful in the development measurement process.
Once I had scanned the historic Sanborn maps, I imported all of the files,
development by development, into AutoCAD Map software. This software
allowed me to digitally scale the maps to full size. I could then digitally trace each
development and calculate the areas and lot coverages of the vector polygons
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that resulted. While the land use and other information was available simply by
counting parcels, the area calculations would have been very tedious indeed, if
not impossible, without design software.
My final source challenge was to unpack the development histories of the six
developments that I had decided to examine in the case cities. While
Philadelphia's development inventory had been the more difficult, the publicly-
assisted nature of its case developments meant that I could look to the city's
Office of Housing and Communtiy Development for development information.
With the kind help of Carolyn Brown, an assistant director, and Hope Yusem, a
redevelopment officer, at the city's Redevelopment Authority, and subsequently
of Scott Wise, Director of Housing for OHCD, I was given access to a wide range
of historical materials for the three developments I was examining. These
included memoranda, committee notes, and past periodical articles. Most helpful
of all was the fact that OHCD had participated in the meeting of a design
committee for the Poplar Houses and had preserved minutes for each meeting.
These minutes allowed me to research in detail the individual design decisions
made for this development, and to understand the reasons for those decisions.
There was also substantial information of a similar nature available for the Moore
and Ludlow developments. While this documentation provided me with
substantial information on the motivations of community members, time
constraints prevented me from investigating community motives in more detail.
My case developments in Detroit had primarily been conceived and motivated by
the private sector. This was made clear to me in my preliminary readings of
periodical articles in the Detroit Free Press, the Detroit News, and Crain's Detroit
Business. The presence of the full text of these articles in the Dow Jones
Information Service website, to which the Rotch library subscribed, made the
search that much easier. Once I had a rough idea of the three development
stories I contacted the major players by telephone. Steve Vogel, the Dean of the
School of Architecture at the University of Detroit-Mercy, had both worked on the
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Victoria Park project and had done much thinking about the future form of
residential development in the city. He kindly spoke with me about the project
and suggested two additional names: Ron Flies, who had worked as Mayor
Coleman Young's executive assistant on Victoria Park, and Garry Carley, a
former Vice-President of Standard Federal Bank who had financed the
development. Both men exceeded my expectations in their generous donation of
time and assistance. Flies organized a very helpful meeting which also included
Robert Davenport, the project manager for Victoria Park from the Planning
Department, and Bill Phillips, who had coordinated the construction process for
Windham Realty. Carley took me on a driving tour of the Jefferson-Chalmers
neighborhood and included Anthony Adams, a real estate developer who had
worked with him on both Victoria Park and Victoria Woods, on the tour. I
subsequently had an additional, very instructive meeting with Phillips, who had
also coordinated the development of Clairpointe. Finally, I was fortunate in my
serendipidous meeting of Karen Gage, a planner who was the development
coordinator for the Jefferson-Chalmers area. Karen shared her perspective and
brought me up to date on the development struggles in that neighborhood.
Field visits
I made several field visits to both cities, visiting Detroit in October and November
2001 to photograph developments and assemble my development inventory, and
again in June 2002 to meet with the different players in the case developments. I
visited Philadelphia in November 2001 and again in January, March, and May
2002 to photograph developments, meet city officials, and examine development
files.
Software
The primary software used to produce this dissertation was the following:
Text Microsoft Word 97
Geographic Information Systems (census tract mapping): ESRI ArcView GIS
3.2a
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Computer-aided design (development measurement): Autodesk AutoCAD Map 3
Photographic manipulation: Adobe Photoshop 5.1 and 6.0
Graphic illustrations: Adobe Illustrator 8.0 and 9.0
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Appendix A
Details of Suburbanization Measurements
The following seven characteristics were used to measure the degree of
suburbanization of the case city developments:
1) Density, measured in dwelling units per acre (DU/ac);
2) Land Use Mix, measured as residential (r), commercial (c), or industrial (i);
3) Dwelling unit type, measured as percent of units in single-family detached
(SFD), single-family attached (SFA), 2-4 unit buildings, or 5+ unit buildings;
4) Ownership type, measured as the maximum potential units that are
homeownership (0) or rental (R);
5) Lot coverage, measured as a percent;
6) Street patterns, measured qualitatively and quantified as null (0.0), partial
(0.5), significant (0.75), or total (1.0) change.
7) Architectural shifts are qualitative and are not measured but are discussed
under individual developments.
The formulae for generating the scores for developments are given in Chapter 3.
Notes on measurement.
A) The area of a development used for the density calculation is taken either
from given figures, if available, or from polygons drawn to the centerlines of the
perimeter streets of the development and to the property line of adjoining
properties. If the development comprises less than several blocks, polygons are
drawn to the perimeter of the blocks on which the developments are located and
to the property lines of adjoining developments.
B) Owner type percentages are based on the following assumptions.
- Single-family houses are assumed to be owned.
- 2-4 unit buildings are assumed to have one ownership unit with the remainder
rental.
- 5+ unit buildings are assumed to be all rental units.
- Units above stores are assumed to be rental units.
- For the purposes of calculating ownership changes, the following percentages
are assumed for historic developments. For example, a site that was
historically 100% comprised of 3-unit buildings is estimated to have had 33%
ownership units and 67% rental units overall.
C) Lot coverage calculations use a representative sample of parcels from the old
development. The area selected is noted for each development. Lot coverage
calculations are based on individual lots and do not include street or alley areas.
D) The source of the aerial photographs used for Detroit measurements was
www.mapquest.com. Photographs were one meter in resolution, full color and
dated from approximately June 2000.
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Section A. Detroit Developments
For the measurements of Detroit developments, 'old' refers to information derived
from 1951 Sanborn maps of Detroit, while 'new' refers to information derived
either from 1996 Sanborn maps or 2000 color aerial photographs. In new
developments, measurements are taken from the entire development, and in old
developments from a sample block or portion of a block.
Virginia Park Estates
1) Old density: 27.75 DU/ac
New density: 2.8 DU/ac
Score: 0.9
2) Old LU: 94% R, 3% C, 3% I (12% mixed-use)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.12
3) Old Unit type: 72% 5+, 19% 2-4, 5% SFA, 4% SFD
New Unit type: 100% SFD
Score: 0.56
Old owner type: 14% HO, 86% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.28
4) Old lot coverage: 28.5%
New lot coverage: 12.6%
Score: 0.56
5) Old street pattern: urban grid
New street pattern: single-entry curvilinear loop road with pseudo-cul-de-
sacs. Western boundary street (Rosa Parks Boulevard) has been
substantially widened, removing about 30 feet from western boundary of site.
Date of street widening unknown.
Score: 1.0
Total score: 3.42
Victoria Park
1) Old density: 13.4 DU/ac
New density: 2.9 DU/ac
Score: 0.78
2) Old LU: 98% R, 2% C (4% mixed-use)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.04
3) Old Unit type: 4% 5+, 48% 2-4, 48% SFD
New Unit type: 100% SFD
Score: 0.96
4) Old owner type: 73% HO, 27% R
New owner type: 100% 0
Score: 0.56
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5) Old lot coverage: 28.5%
New lot coverage: 12.6%
Score: 0.56
6) Old street pattern: urban grid
New street pattern: urban grid transformed to single-entry loop road with one
through road and twelve cul-de-sacs
Score: 0.75
Total score: 3.65
Bradby Townhouses
1) Old density: 11.8 DU/ac
New density: 5.5 DU/ac
Score: 0.53
2) Old LU: 100% R
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0
3) Old Unit type: 54% 2-4, 46% SFD
New Unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.92
4) Old owner type: 74% HO, 26% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.52
5) Old lot coverage: 44.3%
New lot coverage: 26.7%
Score: 0.40
6) Old street pattern: urban grid
New street pattern: single-entry curvilinear road located off altered larger-
scale street grid
Score: 1.0
Total score: 3.37
Campau Farms
1) Old density: 11.2 DU/ac
New density: 16.0 DU/ac
Score: -0.43
2) Old LU: 94% R, 6% C (12% mixed-use)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.12
3) Old Unit type: 46% 2-4, 54% in SFD
New Unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.92
4) Old owner type: 77% HO
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.46
5) Old lot coverage: 45.34%
New lot coverage: 26.3%
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Score: 0.42
The sample historic block for Campau Farms and Circle Drive Commons was the
same as these developments are contiguous.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid
New street pattern: single-entry curvilinear loop road located off altered larger
street grid, block has been consolidated, resubdivided and streets and alleys
demapped
Score: 1.0
Total score: 2.49
Circle Drive Commons
1) Old density: 11.4 DU/ac
New density: 13.2 DU/ac
Score: -0.16
2) Old LU: 99% R, 1% C (2% mixed-use)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.02
3) Old Unit type: approx. 50% 2-4, 50% SFD
New Unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.5
4) Old owner type: 73% 0
New owner type: 100% 0
Score: 0.56
5) Old lot coverage: 45.35%
New lot coverage: 25.2%
Score: 0.44
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: single-entry curvilinear loop road located off altered larger
street grid, block has been consolidated, resubdivided and streets and alleys
demapped
Score: 1.0
Total score: 2.36
Marketplace Court
1) Old density: 11.5 DU/ac
New density: 12.6 DU/ac
Score: -0.09
2) Old LU: 81% R, 19% C (38% mixed-use)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.38
3) Old Unit type: 35% SFD% 65% 2-4
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.70
4) Old owner type: 68% HO
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.36
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5) Old lot coverage: 57.4%
New lot coverage: 26.0%
Score: 0.55
Sample block was northeast third of block bounded by Livingstone (N),
Russell (E), Brady (S), and Rivard (W)
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: double-entry perimeter loop road with end-in parking, one
entrance apparently usually closed, intervening grid has been demapped.
Southern boundary street (Mack Ave) has been substantially widened to 150
feet, removing approximately 80 feet from southern portion of site. Date of
street widening unknown.
Score: 1.0
Total score: 2.9
Friendship Meadows II
1) Old density: 10.7 DU/ac
New density: 10.0 DU/ac
Score: 0.07
2) Old LU: 10% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.10
3) Old Unit type: 35 DU SFD (61%), 22 DU 2-4 (39%)
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.78
4) Old owner type: 38% R, 62% HO
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.76
5) Old lot coverage: 58.6%
New lot coverage: 26.4%
Score: 0.55
Sample block was eastern half of the northern quadrant of the block bounded
by Superior (N), Rivard (E), Alexandria (S), and Hastings (W). The same
sample block was used for both Friendship Meadows developments as the
developments are continguous.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: single-entry drive with interior drive and end-in parking
court. Join access with Friendship Meadows Ill development.
Score: 1.0
Total score: 3.26
Friendship Meadows III
1) Old density: 11.5 DU/ac
New density: 9.4 DU/ac
Score: 0.18
2) Old LU: 26% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
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Score: 0.26
3) Old Unit type: 8 DU in 5+ (12%), 36 DU in 2-4 (55%), 21 DU in SFD (32%)
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.90
4) Old owner type: 68% R, 32% HO
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.64
5) Old lot coverage: 58.6%
New lot coverage: 33.0%
Score: 0.44
Sample block was eastern half of the northern quadrant of the block bounded
by Superior (N), Rivard (E), Alexandria (S), and Hastings (W). The same
sample block was used for both Friendship Meadows developments as the
developments are continguous.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: single-entry drive with interior drive and end-in parking
court. Join access with Friendship Meadows III development. Separate loop
drive for small central building.
Score: 1.0
Overall score: 3.42
Alberta King Village
1) Old density: 9.29 DU/ac
New density: 8.1 DU/ac
Score: 0.13
2) Old LU: 28% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.28
3) Old Unit type: 6 DU in 5+ (4%), 66 DU in 2-4 (48%), 65 DU in SFD (48%)
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.96
4) Old owner type: 53% max R, 47% HO
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.94
5) Old lot coverage: 42.3%
New lot coverage: 11.8%
Score: 0.72
Sample block was eastern two-third of the block bounded by Magnolia (N),
Vermont (E), Brainard (S), and Wabash (W)
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: double-entry drive into central interior perimeter drive with
end-in parking. Street grid has been closed and demapped except at
perimeter. Southern boundary street (formerly Myrtle, now Martin Luther King)
has been widened, removing approximately 50 feet from parcels at southern
boundary of site. Date of street widening unknown.
Score: 1.0
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Total score: 4.03
D.J. Healy Apartments (Pablo Davis Elder Living Center)
This development was demapped from a public park and therefore did not
replace any prior developments. It was not measured.
Grayhaven and Shore Pointe Village at Grayhaven
These two developments were built on a formerly unoccupied piece of land and
therefore did not replace any prior developments. They were not measured.
Mildred Smith Manor /
1) Old density: 15.0 DU/ac
New density: 12.0 DU/ac
Score: 0.20
2) Old LU: 0% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0
3) Old Unit type: 40% in 5+, 46% in 2-4, 14% in SFD
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.92
4) Old owner type: 77% max R, 23% HO
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.46
5) Old lot coverage: 47.7%
New lot coverage: 24.3%
Score: 0.49
Sample block was the entire site of the development, a block bounded by
Lysander (N), Lincoln (E), Canfield (S), and Trumbull (W).
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: The block was been closed on its east and north sides
and attached to a larger superblock bounded by West Forest Avenue on the
north. Interior alleys have been demapped and access has been shifted to a
driveway that connects to an interior parking lot between the two apartment
buildings.
Score: 0.5
Total score: 2.57
Clairpointe of Victoria Park
1) Old density: 10.15 DU/ac
New density: 3.1 DU/ac
Score: 0.70
2) Old LU: 0% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0
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3) Old Unit type: 8 DU in 2-4 (10%), 70 DU in SFD (90%)
New Unit type: 100% SFD
Score: 0.20
4) Old owner type: 5% max R, 95% HO
New owner type: 100% 0
Score: 0.10
5) Old lot coverage: 42.3%
New lot coverage: 11.8%
Score: 0.72
Sample block was the northern end of the development, the block bounded
by an alley behind Tennessee (E), Freud (S), and Clairpointe (E).
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: The street pattern has been radically altered with the
removal and reconstruction of Clairpointe Street on the former western side of
the block and the construction of two new 'double cul-de-sacs' which provide
access to the houses as well as a buffer between the houses and Clairpointe
Street. Houses and garages face onto these interior streets.
Score: 1.0
Total score: 2.72
Helen Odean Butler Apartments
1) Old density: 17.1 DU/ac
New density: 14.7 DU/ac
Score: 0.14
2) Old LU: 7% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.07
3) Old Unit type: 24 DU in 2-4(57%), 18 DU in SFD (43%)
New Unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.86
4) Old owner type: 57% max R
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.43
5) Old lot coverage: 61.4%
New lot coverage: 27.4%
Score: 0.55
Sample block was the northern quadrant of the development block, bounded
by E. Vernor Highway (N), Access Road (E), Waterloo (S), and McDougall
(W)
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys
New street pattern: The block has been consolidated and the alleys removed.
In addition, the street running along the southern boundary of the site has
been demapped and the parcel now backs against Elmwood Cemetery.
Access to the development is via a driveway off Vernor Highway which leads
to surface parking lots between the buildings.
Score: 0.5
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Total score: 2.55
Woodward Place at Brush Park
Woodward Park was measured for three different periods: 1896, 1951, and the
present (2001). The additional sample of 1896 was taken to show the change
that occurred between that date and 1951. Brush Park was sampled earlier than
the other development because the neighborhood had already experienced
substantial decline by 1951, the date of the other samples.
1) 1896 density: 1.61 DU/ac
1951 density: 7.62 DU/ac
2001 density: 8.1 DU/ac (assuming final occupancy of currently abandoned
42-unit apartment building)
(Score 1896-2001: -4.28)
Score 1951-2001: -0.12
2) 1896 LU: 4 non-R parcels, 17 R parcels, 38% MU
1951 LU: 11 non-R parcels, 9 R parcels, 100% MU
New LU: 100% R
(Score 1896-2001: 0.38)
Score 1951-2001: 1.0
3) 1896 Unit type: 4 DU in 2-4, 17 DU in SFD
1951 Unit type: 66 DU in 5+, 29 in 2-4 ("rooming", assume 1 unit per floor), 4
in SFD
New LU: 104 DU in 5+, 5 DU in 2-4, 1 DU in SFD
(Score 1896-2001:1.0)
Score 1951-2001: 0.54
4) 1896 owner type: 100% 0
1951 owner type: 3% 0, 97% R
New owner type: 100% 0
(Score 1896-2001: 0.0)
Score 1951-2001: 0.06
5) 1896 lot coverage: 22.7%
1951 lot coverage: 41.0%
New lot coverage: 39.0%
(Score 1896-2001: -0.72)
Score 1951-2001: 0.05
Sample block was the northern half of the block bounded by Adelaide (N),
John R (E), Winder (S), and Woodward (W).
6) 1896 street pattern: urban grid with alleys
1951 street pattern: Growth between 1896 and 1951 occurred at the parcel
level and no alterations were made to the street grid.
2001 street pattern: Although the entire block except for two parcels has
under single ownership, the block and alley system is being preserved for
automobile access to garages for midblock units. Additional driveways have
been added behind the Woodward Avenue units (and presumably the John R
units when they are completed) which provide for automobile access to those
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units. The block changes made by the Woodward Place development are the
smallest of the developments sampled.
(Score: 0.0)
Score: 0.0
Total score: 1.53
Section B. Philadelphia Developments.
In this Section, 'old' refers to development information derived from 1952
Sanborn maps of Philadelphia, while 'new' refers to information derived from
2000 Sanborn maps.
The formula for measuring the unit type and tenure type of Philadelphia
developments was changed slightly to measure homogenization instead of
measuring change. This had already been done in the land use measurement by
measuring the degree of 'mixed-use' as twice the number of commercial-use
parcels. In other words, a development that had changed from 100% 2-4 unit
buildings to 100% single-family attached dwellings was given a 1.0 value for
change, but a 0.0 value for homogenization, whereas a development that had
changed from 50% 2-4 unit buildings and 50% single-family attached to 100%
single-family houses had experienced only 50% change, but 100%
homogenization. Detroit developments were remeasured to reflect this change in
criteria.
The formula for the unit type and owner type scores was therefore altered to [
2*((lesser percentage old) -- (lesser percentage new)) ] / 100
For example: old unit type 30% SFA., 70% 5+; new unit type: 40% SFA, 60% 2-4;
Score = 2(30-40)/100 = - 0.2. The new development is LESS homogenous than
the old development.
West Diamond Street Townhouses
1) Old density: 64.0 DU/ac
New density: 22.7 DU/ac
Score: 0.65
2) Old LU: 25% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.25
3) Old unit type: 100% in 2-4 unit dwellings (2-4)
New unit type: 100% in single-family attached (SFA)
Score: 0.0
Old ownership: 33% homeownership (HO), 67% rental (R)
New ownership: 100% HO
Score: 0.66 (2x lesser of percentages)
4) Old lot coverage: 69.4%
New lot coverage: 33.4%
Score: 0.52
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Sample block was the entire development block at the southwest corner of
Diamond and 16th Streets.
5) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. The street pattern was unaltered
by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 2.08
Eleanor Mills Houses
1) Old density: 50.3 DU/acre
New density: 43.7 DU/acre
Score: 0.13
2) Old LU: 9% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.09
3) Old unit type: 32% 2-4, 68% SFA
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.64
4) Old owner type: 21.4% R, 78.6% HO
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.42
5) Old lot coverage: 76.0%
New lot coverage: 53.9%
Score: 0.29
Sample block was the entire development area on Page Street between 17 th
and 1 8 th Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. The street pattern was unaltered
by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 1.57
Francisville V (Vineyard Place)
1) Old density: 38.7 DU/acre
New density: 18.0 DU/acre
Score: 0.53
2) Old LU: 100% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 1.0
3) Old unit type: 40% 2-4, 60% SFA
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.8
4) Old owner type: 73% HO, 27% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.54
5) Old lot coverage: 79.0%
New lot coverage: 34.6%
Score: 0.56
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Sample block was the entire development, bounded by Ridge, 17 th, and
Cambridge Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid. The street pattern was unaltered by the
development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 3.43
Jardines del Borinquen
1) Old unit density: 58.6 DU/acre
New unit density: 48.2 DU/acre
Score: 0.18
2) Old LU: 31% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.31
3) Old unit type: 55% 2-4, 45% SFA
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.9
4) Old owner type: 63% HO, 37% R
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.74
5) Old lot coverage: 64.0%
New lot coverage: 47.5%
Score: 0.26
Sample block was a representative residential portion of the south end of the
block bounded by 7th, Diamond, Marshall, and Norris.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid. The street pattern was unaltered by the
development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 2.39
Johnnie Tillman Townhouses
1) Old unit density: 52.6 DU/acre (contextual)
New unit density: 21.7 DU/acre
Score: 0.59
Since the historic site of the development was mostly occupied by industrial
uses, the old unit type figure is derived from a measurement of historic
residential developments in the immediate area. It is therefore labeled
contextual.
2) Old LU: 100% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 1.0
3) Old unit type: 79% 2-4, 21% SFA
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.42
4) Old owner type: 21 % HO, 79% R
New owner type: 100% R
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Score: 0.42
5) Old lot coverage: 74.5%
New lot coverage: 26.3%
Score: 0.65
The sample block was the entire development block, bounded by Master,
Germantown, Thompson, and Orianna Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys.
New street pattern: urban grid. All alleys were eliminated in the new
development and replaced by parking lots for the new dwellings.
Score: 0.5
Overall score: 3.58
Lillia Crippen Townhouses
1) Old unit density: 44.7 DU/acre
New unit density: 26.2 DU/acre
Score: 0.41
2) Old LU: 100% 1
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0 (it has changed, but is not more homogenous)
3) Old unit type: 100% SFA (contextual)
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.0
4) Old owner type: 100% HO (contextual)
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.0 (it has changed, but is not more homogenous)
5) Old lot coverage: 68.5%
New lot coverage: 47.9%
Score: 0.30
Sample block is a representative sample of the southern end of the block
bounded by Berks, 6th Wilt, and Marshall Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid. The street pattern was not altered by the new
development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 0.71
Los Balcones
1) Old unit density: 57.5 DU/acre
New unit density: 37.9 DU/acre
Score: 0.34
2) Old LU: 50% mixed-use (in parcels, 90% industrial in area)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.5
3) Old unit type: 100% SFA
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.0
4) Old owner type: 100% HO
365
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.0
5) Old lot coverage: 65.1% (residential only)
New lot coverage: 35.1%
Score: 0.46
Sample block is the entire development, located on the block bounded by
West Norris, Howard, Berks, Waterloo, Hewson, and Mascher.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. Street pattern was not altered by
development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 1.3
Ludlow Village Ill
1) Old unit density: 43.0 DU/acre
New unit density: 14.0 DU/acre
Score: 0.67
2) Old LU: 56% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.44
3) Old unit type: 27% SFA, 73% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA (twin)
Score: 0.54
4) Old owner type: 42% HO, 58% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.84
5) Old lot coverage: 62.0%
New lot coverage: 25.8%
Score: 0.58
Sample block is the entire development, bounded by Cecil B. Moore, Franklin,
Oxford, and Perth Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. Franklin Street was substantially
widened and given a central mall as part of this and the Ludlow IV
development.
Score: 0.5
Overall score: 3.57
Ludlow Village IV
1) Old unit density: 54.7 DU/acre
New unit density: 18.8 DU/acre
Score: 0.66
2) Old LU: 73% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.73
3) Old unit type: 47% SFA, 53% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA (twin)
Score: 0.94
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4) Old owner type: 42% HO, 58% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.84
5) Old lot coverage: 75.8%
New lot coverage: 33.9%
Score: 0.55
Sample lot is the entire development, bounded by Cecil B Moore, 7th, Oxford,
and Franklin Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. Franklin Street was substantially
widened and given a central mall as part of this and the Ludlow Ill
development.
Score: 0.5
Overall score: 4.22
Poplar Nehemiah
Poplar Nehemiah was located relatively close to the Philadelphia CBD and, much
like Brush Park in Detroit, experienced at least two substantial transformations in
its built form subsequent to its initial development with row houses. In 1920 this
neighborhood was a dense, primarily residential area; by 1951 it had become a
semi-industrial, partially vacant area, and by 2000 it had been completely
redeveloped with housing. Measurements are therefore given for 1920, 1951,
and 'new' (2000) states, but scores reflect changes from 1951 to 2000, as with all
other measured developments. As no new developments were constructed
between 1920 and 1951, 1951 unit density and lot coverage figures were the
same as 1920 for residential parcels.
1) 1920 unit density: 50.4 DU/acre
1951 unit density: 50.4 DU/acre
New unit density: 14.9 DU/acre
Score: 0.70
2) 1920 LU: 56.7% mixed-use
1951 LU: 100% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 1.0
3) 1920 unit type: 100% SFA
1951 unit type: 26.2% SFA, 73.8% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA (twin)
Score: 0.52
4) 1920 owner type: 35% R, 65% HO
1951 owner type: 46% R, 54% HO
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.92
5) 1920 lot coverage: 67.2%
1951 lot coverage: 67.2%
New lot coverage: 22.1%
Score: 0.67
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th tSample block is bounded by Harper, 12 , Poplar, and 13th Streets and was
formerly divided by Cambridge Street.
6) 1951 street pattern: urban grid with alleys.
New street pattern: substantially altered. Alleys have been eliminated and two
grid streets have been eliminated and transformed into cul-de-sacs.
Score: 0.75
Overall score: 4.56
Taino Gardens
1) Old density: 44.0 DU/acre
New density: 20 DU/acre
Score: 0.54
2) Old LU: 19% Mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.19
3) Old unit type: 94.9% SFA, 5.1% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA (twin)
Score: 0.1
4) Old owner type: 91.7% HO, 8.3% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.17
5) Old lot coverage: 60.0%
New lot coverage: 32.7%
Score: 0.46
Sample block is bounded by Dauphin, Fairhill, Susquehanna, and 6th Streets.
6) 1951 street pattern: urban grid without alleys. The street pattern was not
altered by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 1.46
Universal Court /
1) Old unit density: 42.3 DU/ac
New unit density: 42.3 DU/ac
Score: 0.0
2) Old LU: 100% R
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0
3) Old unit type: 45.5% SFA, 54.5% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 0.91
4) Old owner type: 36.4% R, 63,6% HO
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.73
5) Old lot coverage: 64.7%
New lot coverage: 64.4%
Score: 0.0
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Sample block is entire development, block bounded by Christian, Broad,
Carpenter, and 15th Streets.
6) 1951 street pattern: urban grid without alleys. The street pattern was not
altered by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 1.64
Villas de HACE
1) Old unit density: 57.4 DU/ac
New unit density: 44.1 DU/ac
Score: 0.23
2) Old LU: 40% mixed-use (by parcel, 90% 1 by area)
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.40
3) Old unit type: 42% SFA, 58% 2-4 (contextual)
New unit type: 100% 5+
Score: 0.84
4) Old owner type: 42.3% R, 57.7% HO (contextual)
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.85
5) Old lot coverage: 73.1%
New lot coverage: 38.1%
Score: 0.48
Sample block is entire development, block bounded by Jefferson, 6th Master,
and Marshall Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid without alleys. The street pattern was not
altered by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 2.8
Gratz Commons
1) Old unit density: 30.4 DU/ac
New unit density: 28.3 Du/ac
Score: 0.07
2) Old LU: 100% R
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.0
3) Old unit type: 40% 2-4, 60% SFA
New unit type: 42.8% SFA, 57.2% 5+
Score: -0.06 (new development is less homogenous)
4) Old owner type: 40% HO, 60% R
New owner type: 100% R
Score: 0.8
5) Old lot coverage: 52.5%
New lot coverage: 46.2%
Score: 0.12
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Sample block is bounded by Susquehanna, Gratz, Diamond, and 191h Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys. The street pattern was not altered
by the development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 0.93
Universal Court II
1) Old unit density: 61.8 DU/acre
New unit density: 39.3 DU/acre
Score: 0.37
2) Old LU: 28.6% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.29
3) Old unit type: 50% SFA, 50% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA
Score: 1.0
4) Old owner type: 60% HO, 40% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.8
5) Old lot coverage: 73.9%
New lot coverage: 67.3%
Score: 0.09
Sample block is entire development, block bounded by Catharine, 15th,
Christian, and 16 th Streets.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys. The street pattern was not altered
by the new development.
Score: 0.0
Overall score: 2.55
Cecil B Moore Homeownership Zone Housing
1) Old unit density: 65.2 DU/acre
New unit density: 14.7 DU/acre
Score: 0.77
2) Old LU: 22% mixed-use
New LU: 100% R
Score: 0.22
3) Old unit type: 41% SFA, 59% 2-4
New unit type: 100% SFA (twin)
Score: 0.82
4) Old owner type: 60% HO, 40% R
New owner type: 100% HO
Score: 0.8
5) Old lot coverage: 70.9%
New lot coverage: 21.7%
Score: 0.69
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Sample block is block bounded by Jefferson, 18th, Harlan, and 19 th Streets
and formerly divided by Sharswood Street, and now divided by the
reconfigured Gratz Street.
6) Old street pattern: urban grid with alleys. Limited street reconfigurations
occurred in the new development.
Score: 0.25
Overall score: 3.55
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Appendix B
Suburbanization Measurements for Boston, Massachusetts
As part of the preparation work for this dissertation I studied neighborhood-level
population and housing change in the city of Boston, Massachusetts. While
Boston was only ranked as a 'possible' city for inner-city suburbanization, the
variety of types of neighborhood change that occurred there were instructive and
illustrate the changes that might be seen in more prosperous cities than those
examined in this dissertation.
Below is sample data from Boston, a city which has lost population but has
gained housing units since 1950. I examine change from 1970 to 1990 due to
substantial changes in census tract geography before that date. I have corrected
the data shown for the limited retracting that occurred (primarily splits in census
tracts rather than redefinition of boundaries.) During this period Boston's
population dropped from 641,071 to 574,283, but its number of housing units
rose from 217,623 to 250,863 (U.S. Department of Commerce).
Figure B. I shows population change by tract while Figure B.2 shows housing unit
change by tract.
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Figure B.1. Population change in the city of Boston, 1970-1990. Data from United States
Decennial Census, 1970 and 1990. Dark gray indicates >20% loss in population; white no
change; dark red >20% gain in population.
Consistent with Boston's overall population loss, many tracts lost significant
population over the period 1970-90. 59 census tracts, or about 31 % of all Boston
tracts, lost over 20% of their population, while 21, or only about 10%, gained
more than 20% population. Most population gain was restricted to the Central
Business District during this period. Transitioning industrial areas like the Boston
and Charlestown waterfront also gained significant population, in part because
their original populations were small. Parts of the South End, Mission Hill, and
Allston-Brighton also gained significant population. Population loss was
especially concentrated in areas outside of the urban core. Large swaths of East
and South Boston, Roxbury and Dorchester tracts lost over 20% of their
population, as did areas of Roslindale further from the city center. A few close-in
neighborhoods also lost significant population, including the North End, North
Charlestown, and the Back Bay.
Figure B.2 shows housing unit change in Boston from 1970 to 1990. As might be
expected from the overall city figures (a slight net gain in number of housing
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units), more census tracts gained than lost housing. 41 tracts, or about 20%,
gained more than 20% over their 1970 number of housing units, whereas only 17
tracts lost more than 20% of their housing units. Severe housing unit loss was
concentrated in lower Roxbury, the oldest part of Boston's African-American
ghetto. Other parts of Roxbury and Western Dorchester also lost population,
though not as severely as lower Roxbury.
Figure B.2. Housing unit change in the city of Boston, 1970-1990. Data from United States
Decennial Census, 1970 and 1990. Dark gray indicates >20% loss of housing; dark red >20%
gain of housing.
Severe housing loss was closely correlated with severe population loss in
Boston, but not the reverse. When housing and population loss by tract are
compared, we find that 16 Boston tracts lost over 20% of both their population
and housing. This constitutes all but one of the tracts which lost housing. Only
one-third of the tracts which lost over 20% of their population also lost significant
amounts of housing. The first finding is perhaps to be expected, as a large loss of
housing units necessitates a loss in population as well, barring increased
375
LE
densities in remaining units. The second finding indicates that population loss
may have multiple causes. In neighborhoods like north Roxbury, where both
population and housing are severely declining, it is likely that the neighborhood is
experiencing severe distress. In the remaining cases, population loss
unaccompanied by housing unit loss may indicate an uncrowding of existing units
through children leaving the home or through an influx of smaller households.
This was likely the case in neighborhoods like the Back Bay and the North End,
both of which have maintained their value and stability during this time.
If we take a closer look at those tracts which lost population and housing, we see
again that different changes can produce statistically similar results using these
two indicators. One of the two small declining south Boston tracts is comprised of
severely distressed public housing which was being redeveloped in 1990. The
losses in this tract may therefore be attributable to the timing of this event. The
two declining tracts closest to the Charles River are the home of the Longwood
medical complex and the Northeastern University campus rather than low-
income residents. The losses in these tracts may therefore be due to
development of housing for institutional uses. The remaining twelve tracts are all
low-income residential areas in Roxbury or West Dorchester, where substantial
housing loss and consequent land vacancy has indeed occurred (Medoff and
Sklar 1994). Note that these tracts directly adjoin rapidly growing tracts. It
appears that severe decline and rapid growth can occur in close proximity.
Boston shows that a city experiencing net population loss and housing gains can
nonetheless experience localized changes in population and in housing stock. In
the case cities, both of which have experienced net declines in population and
housing stock, one can imagine severe localized losses of population and
housing.
Below I describe the selection and measurement of a sample case development
in Boston, MA, and comparison of that development with development previously
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existing on the site. Although this development does not ultimately meet all the
criteria of suburbanization, the aim of this example is to demonstrate the
methodology rather than to verify my research hypothesis for this particular case
development.
The sample development is found in the Lower Roxbury neighborhood of Boston
in a severely distressed census tract (see Figure B.3). This development was
selected because it is a well-known example of successful neighborhood
revitalization under the auspices of a nonprofit neighborhood planning agency.
The development actually consists of two separate phases called the Dennis
Street Housing and Winthrop Estates. For the purposes of this study we will
consider it to be one development. The land was not cleared for redevelopment
but was reclaimed from vacant lots under the auspices of the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) during the 1990's. Figures B.4 and B.5 show
figure- ground images of the development area neighborhood in 1931 and 2000.
Figure B.3. The sample development, Winthrop Estates,is located
in a severely distressed census tract in Boston.
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density; homogenization of housing type to single-family homes; homogenization
of ownership status to homeownership; homogenization of land uses to
residential only; changes to curvilinear street patterns; changes in site planning;
occurrence of suburban-style architecture. A previously constructed CAD model
was used for the measurement of lots and buildings, and buildings were
constructed from survey data and from 1931 Sanborn Map Company fire
insurance maps.
1) Severely distressed neighborhood context. This criteria was used to select this
development and it therefore satisfied it automatically.
2) Large reductions in housing unit density. The rebuilt neighborhood in 2000
contained fewer buildings occupying less ground than did the neighborhood of
1931. This figure-ground reduction was mirrored in the development's housing
unit density reduction. In 1931 the neighborhood was fully built out. In 2000, it is
fully built out again, but at a new standard of development. In 1931, the six
blocks contained a total of 480 housing units, or 36.7 housing units per acre (this
figure includes interior street space). In 2000, the same six blocks contained a
total of 158 housing units, or 12.1 housing units per acre. The development of
2000 was only 33% of the housing unit density of the area in 1931. This figure
was skewed upward by the presence of surviving buildings which were built out
more densely than the new buildings. When only new buildings are considered,
the replacement rate was only 21%: 85 new housing units replaced the 407 units
that were lost to arson and disinvestment.
3) Homogenization of housing type to single-family houses. In 1931 the Winthrop
Estates blocks were mainly built up with triple-deckers (a common Boston
apartment house type), and with apartments over stores. Only a small
percentage of housing units were single-family homes. Of the 407 units that were
lost between 1931 and 2000, 25 of them, or 6.1%, were single-family houses.
Single-family homes occupied a somewhat larger percentage of the buildings in
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the six sample blocks. Of 189 residential buildings in 1931, 25, or 13%, were
single-family homes. In 2000 the neighborhood had fewer single-family homes
than in 1931. 9 of 25 single-family homes survived, while all 85 new buildings
were either rowhouses or attached "twin" two-family homes. The lack of
construction of new standalone single-family home dropped the percentage of
single-family houses to 5.6% of total housing units. The level of homogeneity of
house type, however, significantly increased. The mix of single-family houses,
triple-deckers, and mixed-use residential commercial buildings that was lost was
replaced almost completely by two-family houses. Only nine of the new units
were in rowhouses.
4) Homogenization of ownership type to owner-occupied status. While it was
difficult to determine how many of the units in 1931 were owner-occupied, it is
likely that the majority of them were not. Of the 407 housing units that were lost
between 1931 and 2000, only 25 of them were categorized as 'dwellings', or
single-family houses. The remaining 382 units were found in buildings labeled as
'flats' or 'stores'. I estimated that approximately one unit in three was owner-
occupied, giving 127 additional housing units. The homeownership percentage of
the 1931 blocks was therefore at most only 37%. The new housing units were far
more homogenous: 100% of the new housing units (85 in total) were owner-
occupied.
5) Homogenization of land use mix to residential only. In 1931 commercial and
industrial uses were almost all located on the two peripheral streets of the six
blocks, Dudley Street and Blue Hill Avenue. This was not a result of zoning, as
the land uses in this area were determined prior to the imposition of zoning
districts. Rather, the location of commercial uses was likely a result of market
imperatives to locate where one could be most easily found by customers. A few
single-family homes and many apartments were also to be found along these
major streets. Industrial uses were rare: there were only four industrial buildings,
all apparently related to automobile repair. Commercial uses were more
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common: there were 36 buildings labeled 'store'. Only two of these stores were
located on interior streets, both in three-story mixed-use buildings rather than in
standalone commercial structures. By 2000 the majority of commercial structures
were gone. 27 stores had vanished, while one of the four industrial buildings had
been demolished and replaced by a vacant lot. One of the vanished stores had
been replaced by another store by 1967, and the remainder had fallen victim to
arson and disinvestment. They were replaced by housing and open space. Many
of the remaining commercial structures were vacant or underutilized.
6) Changes in street patterns to curvilinear streets. None of the redevelopment in
the six sample blocks changed existing street patterns. The street pattern of
1931 remained.
7) Suburban site planning. The percentage of lot coverage of new houses and of
the buildings that previously occupied their sites was calculated for a sample
block within the Winthrop Estates blocks. (This is the second block from the top
within the red line.) In 1931, the buildings that would later be redeveloped had an
average lot coverage of 39%. The average number of housing units per lot was
4.2. In 2000, the new buildings had a somewhat lower lot coverage of 31%. The
average number of housing units per lot was 1, as each two-family house was
built on two old lots. Although without photographic evidence it was difficult to
determine how the space around the 1931 buildings was used, observation of
surviving triple-deckers indicated minimal space between buildings, sometimes a
distance of only a few feet, with back yards used for outdoor storage for the units
above or sometimes a small yard. Front yards were minimal, and there was
generally no space on the lot for storage of automobiles. The situation in 2000
was quite different. Each unit has its own private backyard space, and although
front yards were often small, there was often space for an ample side yard and
for off-street parking 'pads' (see Figures B.6 and B. 7).
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8) Suburban architecture. Determination of what was and was not 'suburban'
architecture was a subjective exercise, and the architecture of Winthrop Estates
could not be said to be definitely urban or suburban (see Figures B.6 and B.7).
Certainly there was some overtly 'domestic' imagery, including front porches and
gables, in the new houses. This may have reflect an attempt to render a bit of the
pastoral ideal in these urban houses.
Figures B.6 (above) and B. 7 (below). Images of typical two-family houses from Winthrop
Estates. The architectural imagery of these homes, while incorporating typical suburban features
ike off-street parking, was not iconically suburban.
Table B. 1 (following page) summarizes the eight points of analysis from the case
development.
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Indicators Winthrop Estates Formula/Comments
Severely distressed Y (1990 hsg, pop / 1970 hsg, pop)*100
neighborhood must > 20%
Unit density reduction 66% 100-[(New HU/ac)/(Old HU/ac)*100]
Homogenization of house type -6.1% (%New HT-%Old HT)
Homogenization of owner type 63% (%New OT-%Old OT)
Homogenization of land use 100% 100-[(New mixed-use/Old MU)*100]
Changes in street patterns NA Street patterns not altered
Suburban site planning 21% 100-[(New lot coverage/Old LC)*100]
Suburban style architecture inconclusive Qualitative assessment
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